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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the political economy of the Sudan to reveal the nature and causes of 
the 1973-85 particular crisis in that country. The 1973-85 crisis is placed within the 
historical context of recurrent crises which have characterised the independent Sudan. It 
is argued that political and economic crises have occurred over the period 1956-1985 and 
several common features of these crises can be identified to constitute general political 
and economic trends. In their turn, they have characterized the general crisis since 
independence in 1956. 
The general crisis facing the Sudan is an organic crisis of transformation. Twenty nine 
years have elapsed between the Sudan becoming independent and 1985, the end of the 
period under study. The problems of transforming the inherited co lonial economy and 
structures have remained on the national agenda since then, without resolution. 
The study of the colonial political and economic legacy provided an important component 
of the thesis as it reflected on the process of the articulation of the capitalist mode of 
production and the pre-capitalist modes of production which had prevailed in the country 
before the re-conquest of the Sudan in 1898. Political, institutional and market inter- 
relationship affected the nature of the Sudanese economy, class structure and class 
struggle. The nature of the colonial state as an authoritarian and relativelý autonomous 
state left its features in the politica! economy of the country. 
In trying to understand the crisis both in. its particular and general manifestations the 
thesis examines the nature of the post-colonial state and its historical development. The 
colonial heritage of the country and the concrete class struggle gave the post-colonial 
state its nature and'constituted its crisis. In revealing the nature of the post- colonial state 
a ruling power bloc is identified. That power bloc was composed of the religious and 
tribal aristocracy, the bourgeoisie and the military and civilian bureaucracy. 
The thesis argues that the crisis of the post-colonial state is a crisis of hegemony. The 
failure of the dominant power bloc, a fraction or a class of it to establish its hegemony is 
the main cause of the crisis of the state and the particular form of that crisis: the military- 
civilian governments alterance in power. 
The post-cýlonial state's ability to use coercion was legitimately limited and its tendency 
towards authoritarianism was challenged by the urban democratic movement and the 
effective regional forces, especially the Southern Sudanese. The politics of ethnic conflicts 
were closely related to the composition of the ruling power bloc as Northern, and of Arab 
Islamic culture. It was in the politics of ethnic conflicts that coercion was widely used 
against the Southern people. The civil war which struck the country twice contributed to 
the crisis of the post-colonial state. 
The essence of crisis of the economy is found in the crisis of agricultural production both 
in its irrigated and rain-fed sub-sectors. Though the nature of the crisis in both sectors is 
found in the process of articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes, the result of the 
articulation process is different in both sub-sectors. 
ii 
Within this context the particular 1973-85 crisis is studied. The particular crisis is a 
continuation of the general post-colonial - crisis, yet distinguishable. The military- 
bureaucratic fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie which dominated the state during the 
1973-'"85 period failed to establish its hegemony and ruled the country through an 
authoritarian state. The failure to build an alliance with the urban democratic movement in 
the North between 1969 and the July 1971 coup d'6tat was a tuming point in the history 
of the Nimeiri regime. The National Reconciliation of 1977 did not reach its logical 
conclusion by widening the base of the regime. The promulgation of Islamic Sharia Law 
in 1983 did not promote the regime! s quest for legitimacy and remained to be an 
additional tool of repression. 
The study of the economic crisis of 1973-85 revealed that it was a continuation. of the 
general crisis, as well as a particular crisis of simple and extended reproduction that 
resulted from specific policies of the regime. The regime failed to transform the structure 
of the economy. Despite the expansion, the economy remained unevenly developed, 
export-oriented, with weak inter-sector and inter-regional linkages; liable to be severely 
affected by intemational crises and moderately benefiting from intemational booms. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
"... there are some things in sensation which do not stimulate the intelligence to inquiry 
because the judgement of sensation is satisfactory, and others which positively insist upon the 
intelligence inquiring into them because the sensation gives no satisfactory rcsult. "(Socrates in 
The Republic, Plato: 1984,216). 
1.1. An Overview 
Sudan became an independent republic on I st January 1956. For the following next years 
a democratic parfiamentary system was established under the First Republic. The Second 
Republic was established in November 17th 1958 when the military took power and it 
lasted for six years. The military and Second Republic where overthrown by a popular 
uprising on October 21st 1964., known among the Sudanese andin the literature as the 
October Revolution . After the Revolution, a transitional government led the country in 
the Third Republic in which a democratic system was re-installed. Four years were to pass 
before on May 25th 1969, Colonel. Gaff-ar Mohamed Nimeiri led a coup detat establishing 
the Fourth Republic, known as the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. The Nimeiri's 
Republic remained in place for 16 years. It was overthrown through a joint action of a 
popular uprising, beginning on March the 26th 1985, and a coup d'etat concluding the 
uprising on 6th April on the same year. - 
The alternate rriilitary-civilian regimes were not the only political feature of the Sudan, 
before and after Nimeiri. Civil war was a second striking feature. On the eve of the 
independence a short and limited mutiny took place among the forces of the Southern 
Corps stationed in Toriet, Southern Sudan on August 16th 1955. Since then civil war has 
twice struck the Sudan. 
A third important feature of the post-colonial Sudan has been economic crises. It has been 
observed that each civilian. military alterance in the country was preceded by economic 
crises (KabaHo: 1988,21-30). The longest and deepest crisis was that of 1973-85 which 
was the inspiration for the research that has led to the writing of this thesis. The choice of 
the 1973-1985 as the period of the study is justified by the fact that by 1973 the specific 
features of the p articular crisis of the Nimeiri regime began to gather momentum slowly 
and disguised at first, and fast, deeply and apparent in the second half of the seventies and 
the early eighties. The choice of the period 1973-85 is also justified by the length, extent, 
and intensity of the 1973-85 Crisis which was one of the longest compared to the 
previous crises of 1957-58,1963-64 and 1967-69. 
Chapter 6 discusses this assertion in detail. the manifestations of the 1973-85 crisis are 
reviewed in Chapter 4, while Chapters 5 attempts an analysis of the historical process of 
the 1973-85 crisis: how it occurred and gathered momentum, the forces that contributed 
1 
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to the process and the policies that led to it and deepened it. Chapter 5 further attempts to 
disclose the specific nature of the crisis of the state and the economy during that period. 
1.2. The Research Problem 
The fafl of Nimeiri brought the hope to most of the Sudanese people that their problems 
miabt come to an end. Hence wide democratic discussions began just after his fall on the 
issues of the crisis facing the country and their resolution. More emphasis and greater 
effort was given and put on the discussions on the econornic crisis suffered during the 
Nimeiri regime. It was in response and as continuation of those efforts that the problem of 
this research has been formulated. As I carried out research on the economic crisis and 
was involved in public discussions on the nature and causes of the economic crisis 1973- 
1985 (KabaRo: 1985), I became increasingly aware that to further the understanding of 
that crisis one has to set a different research problematic and scope. 
Not withstanding the important insights one can acquire by trying to understand that 
particular crisis by limiting its analysis to the scope of economics and to the period in 
which it had been manifest, I have become convinced that the restricted level of inquiry is 
unsatisfactory in revealing the causes of the crisis and its continuation for a long period. 
Two key issues are of relevance in studying the crisis, if a better understanding is to be 
achieved. * 
The first is the interrelation between the economic and the political in the crisis. It can be 
seen that there was simultaneous and sequential occurrence of economic and political 
crises since the independence of the Sudan. This observation is subjected to thorough 
analysis in chapter 3. It has also been observed that the post-colonial state in the Sudan 
continued to be centra I to the economic system of the. country on the different levels of 
production, distribution and accumulation through the direct ownership of means of 
production and the acquisition of surplus, through the economic and financial policies in 
affecting distribution and allocation of resources and through the administrative measures 
in controlling the economic activities of different classes in the Sudan. In general the post- 
colonial state is observed to be central in the process of capital accumulation and the 
reproduction of the economic system. Chapter 3 highlights that important role of the 
post-colonial state in the economy. 
This has brought the study of the state to the very centre of the research problem and has 
broadened the scope of the research from that of pure economics, where the main 
problematic is the study of economic phenomena, to one of political economy, where the 
problematic is the study social relations including economic and political relations in a 
concrete socio-economic structure, that is in a social formation. 
The second issue is that of the historical dimension of the study. The need for a historical 
analysis has arisen, not simply as a matter of time series analysis and statistical verification 
of the existence or non-existence of a trend or a set of trends that discloses the 
interrelation of variables and/or events, but by trying to understand the phenomena in 
3 
their development, the phenomenon as its history. It is not only the question of the 
phenomena in isolation from each other, but also as expressions of objective elements in 
their interrelations: as systems that are assumed to be better understood in their historical 
development. This led the research to go deep into the colonial legacy, not in search for 
an apology or for escape goat to justify the crisis of the state and the economy; but rather 
to identify the elements of continuity and discontinuity in the process of formation of the 
Sudanese socio-economic structure. Chapter 2 provides such an attempt by analytically 
reviewing the colonial legacy. The analysis is further continued in Chapter 3 to focus on 
these elements of continuity and discontinuity after the independence and up to the 
coming of Nimeiri to power. 
Such a historical approach makes the analysis of continuity and discontinuity, as well as 
the distinction between the general and particular, possible. It is also possible through 
historical analysis to distinct the particular as being a moment of condensation or eruption 
of the general. This led to re-formulate the problem of the research to be the study of the 
1973-85 crisis in its-historical context. 
The re-formulated problem, suggests a different approach. This different approach is not 
to simply assimilate several different disciplines, ( the bringing together politics, 
economics, history and sociology), but it is attempting a different level of enquiry that of 
political economy. 
1.3. Some Conceptual Problems 
The use of several categories in this thesis is not governed by a pre-determined rigid 
theoretical model of explanation, (except in the sense that the methodology used in the 
research is based on a theory of knowledge, a model of enquiry). Though the concepts 
and categories of political economy are used, they are used as the starting point whenever 
the abstraction from reality has made it necessary. The continuation of their use has been 
determined by their ability to express an element or a" relation of a... whole, which 
already existed historically" (Marx: 1976,34). In other words categories have been 
defined in relation to objective reality and not the contrary. 
1.3.1. On the concept of Crisis - 
Crisis is defined in language as "turning-point in illness, life history, time of difficulty 
danger of anxiely about thefuture,.. " (Oxford Advanced Dictionary, 1985,204. ) Stem 
returns the word to its Greek origin Wrisis'where it means "to separate or divide", 11to 
sift, to decide' and that crises in ancient Greece were "moments of truth when significance 
of and events were brought to fight" (Stem, 1970,9). Crisis is introduced by Hypocrite to 
characterise "the turning point in a disease when death or recovery hangs" (Rader, 1979, 
187). According to Habermas the linking of crisis to fllness made the concept familiar 
within medicine before its use in social science (Habermas, 1976, ). O'Connor noticed 
that " 'economic crisis' as weU as 'moral crisis' and 'spiritual crisis' were common as early 
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as the seventeenth century, but their meanings were vague and their status in social and 
political thought was weak" (1987,108). By the eighteenth century the concept was 
re lated to the problems of nation building (Ibid., 108). Stem showed that historians used 
the term to describe "critical moments when national character and institutions were 
thought to have been decisively tested" (1971,9). Andre Gunder Frank summed the 
definition using the medical analogy: 
crisis is a period in which a diseased social, economic, and political body cannot live on 
as before and is obliged, on pain of death, to undergo transformation that will give it a new 
lease on life" (198 Ij 11) 
The basic problem that faces one in searching for a relevant theoretical definition and 
explanation for the crisis, is the state of fragmentation of the social sciences. The crisis is 
either dealt with as economic crisis, political crisis or social crisis (as the area of the 
research of sociology). Such a state of fragmentation and specialisation makes it difficult 
to grasp social reality in its complexity as a whole. The state of fragmentation and 
specialisation in social sciences has arisen to satisfy the needs of a dominant mode of 
production in a relatively stable social formation (the capitalist mode of production and 
the bourgeois society). The role of social sciences under such society is the justification 
and promotion through reform and maintenance of the estabushed order of things. A 
theory of crisis in this context attempts partial explanation of 'what went wrong' rather 
than a comprehensive questioning of the social foundation of the whole system. The latter 
was achieved by bourgeois science before and during the bourgeois revolutions (the role 
of the thinkers and scientists of the Renaissance and the classical political economists, 
including the Physiocrats, Adam Smith and Ricardo) when they challenged the foundation 
of the feudal and pre-capitalist systems. The new trends in social science began by what 
Marx described as 'vulgar economists%, but within the context provided here, any social 
formation has or should have its 'vulgar' social science. The role of that 'vulgar science' is 
not only to justify, as asserted by some radical. critics, but also to maintain, remedy and 
develop the socio-economic system (and that why it could be described as science and not 
pure ideology). In that context the different. theories 'of crisis in the fragmented social 
sciences, have a limited role in studying social formations which are facing an organic or 
structural crisis, - a crisis of transformation. Castells define the structural crisis as a 
situation when: 
"it becomes impossible to expand or reproduce the system vvithout transforming or 
reorganisation of the basic characteristics of production distribution and management and 
their expression in terms of social organisation. " (1980,80). 
This is similar to the definition of organic crisis provided by Gramsci and his disciples, 
"An organic crisis is a crisis of the whole system" (Forgacs, 1998,427). The question 
remains on how the crisis of the whole develops. Since the whole is not just the arithmetic 
sum of its elements, but rather the interrelation of these elements, a partial crisis, (a crisis 
of one element), might trigger the crisis of the whole (of the system or structure). An 
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organic crisis m its development might also results in a chain of particular crises whether 
particularity is concerning its time limit or its partiality (economic, political, ... etc). 
The distinction that Gramsci made between organic movements, which are relatively 
permanent and conjectural which "appear as occasional, immediate, almost accidental" 
(Gramsci, 1971,477), is very important in distinguishing organic crisis which "sometimes 
lasting for decades" and gives "rise to socio-historic criticism" (Ibid., 178) from 
conjectural crisis that might be political of "minor, day-to-day character" (Ibid., 177). 
Despite this important distinction, Gramsci noticed the relation between conjectural 
phenomena and organic movements by specifying the dependency of the former on the 
latter (Ibid., 177). This distinction is similar to the one suggested by Elmat Altvater 
between small and great crises. Altvater defines small crises as those "which only require 
adaptive processes within the given form of social production "and great crises as those " 
.. 
breaks of more or less important parts of the formal structure of social reproduction" 
(1984,9-10). The latter definition is similar to that provided by Connell for transitional 
crisis of the whole which results from "the coming together of crisis of tendencies in a 
number of substructures" (1979,253). Castells defines the structural crisis: 
"What defines a situation of structural crisis is that it becomes impossible to expand or 
reproduce the system Yvithout a transformation or reorganisation of the basic characteristics of 
production, -distribution and management, and their expression in terms of social 
organisation" (1980,80) - 
The fragmented social sciences could only recognise this or that crisis tendency 'of 
substructure!, small crises in Altvater words, conjectural phenomena in Gramsci's, as 
economic, political or social in dimension and periodical and short in time., 
It is in the traditions of classical political economy (had tackled the question of 
transformation of pre-capitalist to capitalist modes of production) and Marxism (which 
assigned itself the task of refuting the eternity of the capitalist mode of production and 
provoking its revolutionary change), that a possibility of a theory of organic or structural 
crisis could be found. Both orthodox traditions could only provide the methodology of 
investigating the problems of transformation, rather than providing satisfactory 
explanation of these problems and their probable solutions. 
These formulations help in this thesis to distinguish between particular crises and a 
general crisis. The particular crisis (which is particular in time and dimension) is one that 
is resolvable within the existing socio-economic system (or at least having its effects 
moderated). The general crisis, on the other hand, is an organic or structural crisis that 
requires restructuring the socio-econon-ýc formation, a task uncompleted in the modem 
Sudan. This view is similar to that expressed by Basil Davidson on the African crisis: 
11 have benefited from a personal discussion , vith Peter Lawrence of Keele University about the 
problem of time in the definition and concept of crisis. The discussion took place during a ROAPE 
conference in Coventry University in 1990. 
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"Africa's real problems are those of a period of major transition from systems of development 
viable in the pre-colonial past to other systems, similarly viable, which can face the challenges 
of the future... 
"The crisis which thus arises is , therefore, one of 
institutions. Those of the past have lost their 
continuing power. Those of the present offer little save confiision- Those of the future have yet 
to appear. " (1974,6) 
A sinfflar identification of the crisis is presented by Onimode: 
"... this is a crisis of system and structure, and the profound instituional failure is beyond the 
remedial power of any more modification or reform, since the system or systems as they stand 
simply do not work and cannot be made to work" (1988,2) 
In situations where a general crisis prevails the particular crisis tends to manifest a 
moment of condensation of the general crisis, and hence attempts to resolve it might only 
result in moderating the effects of the general crisis. 
1.3.2. The State 
The category of 'colonial state, used in Chapter 2 in this thesisý, expresses the colonial 
state that was found in the Sudan from 1898-1954 . 
It was a construction of a concrete 
realit7y and not a colonial state as such, an abstraction expressing a general phenomenon. 
This approach enables us to qualifý some theoretical statements like that of Alavi's, one of 
which states that the basis of the colonial state lies "in the metropolitan structure", (1972, 
61). By arguing'in Chapter 2 that the specific colonial state in the Sudan had been a 
product of the Condominium Agreement between Britain and Egypt in 1898 and that the 
Agreement had created a situation in which the colonial state enjoyed a relative 
autonomy, it is shown that the relation is not as simple and direct as has been suggested 
by Alavi. The colonial state in the Sudan stands as historical evidence to confirm that, 
"the colonial state cannot be reduced simply to that of a loyal minister of capital" as 
Lonsdale and Berman have stated (Lonsdale and Berman: 1973,484). Chapter'2 argues 
that the members of the "political service" in the condominium era were able to achieve a 
relative autonomy from both of the condominium powers and the Sudanese society. The 
tendency to preserve the relative autonomy of the colonial state had motivated most of 
the policies that contributed to the formation of the colonial and post-colonial Sudanese 
Soc io-economic structure. 
This led to take the colonial state as the starting point, which contradicts the approach 
suggested by Colin Leys: "In order to understatid the significance of any state for class 
struggle we must start outfirom the class struggle, not the state. " (Leys: 1976,43). 
In ex-colonies like the Sudan, one needs to go back to the colonial state and its policies of 
economic and political articulation to understand the'classes and their struggle and hence 
the post-colonial state. The inquiry, in this research, takes the sequence State-Classes and 
Class Struggle -State. The understanding of the post-colonial state requires both the 
21n a footnote to that Chapter, it is explained Nvhy Sudan is treated in the thesis as a colony despite 
the fact that it Nvas never part of the British Colonial Office and legally spcaldng it ,,, -as under a 
condominium rule of Britain and Egypt. 
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studies of the colonial state and the class struggle before and after independence. That line 
of inquiry leads to a similar position from that of Lonsdale and Berman that "the 
articulation of modes of production must form the basis for any theoretical analysis for 
the colonial state" (op. cite.., 489). In order to avoid a reduction of the colonial state to 
one of the causes of its estabfishment or to one of the results of its policies, it is important 
to differentiate between the international and local levels of articulation of the modes of 
production and their interrelationship. It is hence becomes clear that the articulation of the 
modes of production on the local level is central in understanding the colonial legacy, (the 
socio-economic structure that resulted from the colonial period, and in that context the 
post-colonial state). The study and analysis of the articulation of modes of production at 
both the local and international level become therefore, essential for the study of the post- 
colonial state, as well as being the basis for a theoretical analysis of the colonial state 
itself. The point is that the colonial state was not a result of the articulation of the modes 
of production in the colony, but was its initiator. It had continued holding the rein of its 
progress until independence. The articulation of modes of production in the previous 
colonies was a creation of colonial power and was not an internal historical development 
of the societies of these colonies. The articulation was possible because of the relative 
autonomy of the colonial state from the colonised societies and its authoritarian nature. 
The particular situation of the colonial state in the Sudan created the base for the relative 
autonomy from both the colonised society and the colonial powers and that was reflected 
in the articulation policies that had shaped the economy and the class structure of the 
Sudan. 
The articulation process, as argued below, is not an internal process only. It involved an 
important international dimension: the articulation of the economy of the colony as a 
whole (and on regional and sector levels) with the international capitalist eco ' nomy 
in 
general and the metropolitan capitalist economy in particular. This justifies the continued 
influence of the metropolitan country and the international capital on the* post-colonial 
state. That influence does not qualify the argument that the post-colonial state by 
definition is a puppet or even has its economic base abroad. The question becomes the 
common interests of the ruling classes in t' he post-colonial state and those of foreign 
capital and the interrelation developed between the particular national economy and the 
world capitalist system. It is within this frame of the articulation of the international and 
local economies that the policies and foreign relations of the post-colonial state in the 
Sudan were discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. Saying that does not exclude that there were 
interests for some countries in the Sudan regarding its strategic geopolitical position in 
the region. Chapter 3 provides an example of such interests of the United States which 
brought the Sudan in the focus of the US foreign policy before 1969. The question is also 
discussed in Chapter 5 when the argument for new economic interests in the Sudan is 
stated. 
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1.3.3. The Relative Autonomy If the State 
The concept of 'relative autonomy' of the state is used in this thesis to mean that a state is 
performing "its functions in a relatively independent. manner vis-A-vis the dominant classes 
and also vis-A-vis the other dominated classes, that' is vis-A-vis 'the civil society' in Marx 
terms" (Thomas: 1984,67). It is differentiated here between the relative autonomy of the 
colonial state from the colonised society and that of the colonial power, and a relative 
autonomy of a 'national' state from its own society. The former depends on the structure 
of the colonised societies, their response to the process of colonisation; and the colonial 
power-(s) and the sort of administration they estabfished to administer the colonies, the 
policies they had used in articulating or incorporating forces, systems and modes of 
production in order to achieve their colonial goals. The specific case of the colonial state 
in the Sudan, its relative autonomy and the policies it had adopted to achieve its goals are 
discussed in Chapter 2 below. 
National states autonomy, on the other hand, is either a product of authoritarianism or 
hegemony. The former could, by analogy, be compared with the Bonapartist model. 
1ýffiband had rightly stated that Bonapartism 
" is not the religion of the bourgeoisie at all- it is a last resort in conditions of political 
instabilio, so great as to present a threat to the maintenance of the cýdsting social order, 
including of course the system of domination which is the central part of that order". 
(Miliband: 1973,9 1). 
On the same line, one can argue that authoritarianism'in general is not the religion of the 
Sudanese power bloc, though the authoritarian model was used as "a last resort". The 
Abboud's coup d'etat which was organised mainly by the elected prime minister in 
November 1958, and discussed in Chapter 3, is an attempt to construct such a model. In 
that sense 'relative autonomy' arises as a reflection to the absence of a hegemonic clas s or 
a fraction of a class, as a manifestation of a crisis and as an attempt to resolve the crisis. 
The form it takes depend on the historical conditions that make it an option. National 
state relative autonomy may take the form of a military dictatorship or a civilian one 
(which is a result of a constitutional coup d'etat) which either concentrates power in a 
president or a single party. 
1.3.4. The Concept of Hýgemony 
By contrast the other kind of relative autonomy rises as a result of the hegemony of a 
ruling class which because of its established hegemony does not need to control the state 
directly. In such a situation a state not only appears as the state of all the civil society, but 
performs like one, though on the basis of the rules of the game set in the process of 
establishing the hegemony of the dominant class. Gramsci pointed out that, 
".. thefact of hegemony presupposes account be taken of the interests and the tendencies 
of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise 
equilibrium should beformed" (Gramsci: 1971,16 1) 
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The results of this process are not determined solely by the dominant class. Hegemony is 
established in the course of class struggle. In that context the relatively autonomous state 
" seeks to implement and guarantee the collective interests of all members of a class 
society dominated by capital" (Offe: 1984,120). The base of the relative autonomy, in this 
sense, is the acceptance by ordinary people, from the dominant and dominated classes, of 
a set of 'rules of the game'; i. e. their recognition of the legitimacy of the political system. 
In other words relative autonomy is based on hegemony and not just domination, 
consensus and not mere coercion. The role of ideology in establishing this process is 
great, not only as 'false consciousness' for the dominated classes, but as an ideological 
discourse which incorporate some aspects of the ideology of the dominated classes. 
Compromises are made both on the ideological as well as the economical level. Laclau 
writes: 
"A class is hegemonic not so much to the extent that it is able to impose a uniform 
conception of the world on the rest of society, but to the extent that it can articulate different 
vision of the world in such a way that their potential antagonism is neutralised. " (Laclau: 
1977,161). 
When relative autonomy of the state is based on the hegemony of the ruling class/, it 
becomes a symptom of political stability. The relative autonomous state is the best in 
performing the rule of the bourgeois state'as "a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" to u. se Marx and Engels' expression, Miliband qualifies 
the concept, however, in this way: 
".. the notion of common affairs assumes the e. -dstence of particular ones, and the notion of the 
whole bourgeoisie implies the c., dstence of separate elements which make up that whole. This 
being the case, there is an ob-, ious need for an institution of the kind they refer to, namely the 
state; and the state cannot meet this need without enjoying a certain degree of autonomy.. In 
other words, the notion of autonomy is embedded in definition itself, is an intrinsic part of 
it. "(Mliband: 1973,85, fn 4). 
The need of the ruling class for such a relatively autonomous state is not only to mediate 
and articulate the interests of the fractions of the dominant class among themselves, but to 
assist in the establishment of their hegemony over the dominated classes and civil society 
as a whole. The concept of hegemony' becomes important in the analysis of political 
stability and/or instability and of the crisis of the state. 
It is necessary, however, to differentiate here between the economic and political 
domination of a social class, a fraction of a social class or a social bloc of several classes. 
Economic domination is determined in the field of production, exchange and distribution, 
but the reproduction of this economic domination, in a class society does not depend on 
the reproduction of goods and services alone, it requires the reproduction of a system of 
social relations, including the relations of production themselves, that is the reproduction 
of the social formation as a whole. In class societies, classes struggle among themselves 
and against each other in their attempt to destroy, alter, change, or reproduce the system 
of social relations whether the economic, political, legal, cultural... etc., in order to 
achieve new or more material and non-material benefits or to preserve and enhance 
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existing ones. Political dorrdnation enables a class or fraction or a bloc of classes to 
influence the direction of the reproduction of the social formation, including, of course, 
the production system and its dominant mode of production or articulated modes of 
production, whether towards radical change, reform or preservation. The economically 
dominant class becomes a ruling power, a politically dominant class; but political 
domination could only be achieved at a moment in history when a class or a fraction of 
class, 
*Fcan arouse, in itself and in the masses, a moment of enthusiasm in which it associates and 
mingles with society in general identify itself -VNith it, and felt and recognised as a general 
representative <emphasis in the origin>, of this society .... It is only in the name of general interests that a particular class can claim supremacy. " (Marx: 1956,179). 
To extend that moment, a politically dominant class needs to establish its hegemony, its 
"ideological predominance over subordinated classes", (Miliband: 1969,162), to practice 
its intellectual and moral leadership (Gramsci: 1971,48). This is a process, Miliband 
shows, which involves "a permanent and pervasive effort" and to which a multitude of 
agencies and individuals contribute. Nun noticed that, 
"classical Marxist proposition to which representative democracy is the form of government 
which most closely corresponds to the interests of the bourgeoisie depends on ... the 
consolidation .. of its hegemonic supremacy, its development of a metaphysical justification of its leading rule, and its efficacy as a ruling class. " (Nun, 1970,334). 
Chapter 3 argues that the Sudanese bourgeoisie was not the dominant class at the eve of 
independence, both economically and politically and that its intellectuals lost 
' 
the initiative 
in organising the masses and establishing their intellectual and ideological leadership. 
After the rejection of their first demands which they had presented to the colonial state in 
1942; their response instead of adopting a strategy of mass mobilisation and organisation, 
was to retreat seeking the support of the religious and tribal aristocrats and making use of 
the contradictions between the two condominium states, Egypt and Britain. They lost the 
historical opportunity of establishing their political, intellectual and ideological leadership. 
It is also argued in Chapter 2 and 3 that the Sudanese bourgeoisie intellectuals, the 
product of the colonial education policy, failed to formulate an ideological discourse that 
would enable them to mobilise the masses, especially after achieving independence. 
Political stability under authoritarian states is not thus a product of the hegemony of the 
ruling class/. Political stability under such states depends on the acceptance of the 
economically dominant class/ of the rule of the authoritarian state either as direct 
representative of their interests or as guardian, a 'master', or an arbitrator; that is 
accepting its relative autonomy for the sake of the reproduction of socio-economic 
system. That does not necessarily guarantee the acceptance of the dominated classes, 
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which are to be repressed through the destruction of their independent organisations, the 
use of coercion and the spread of an ideology of fear. 3 
The process of establishing a hegemony of an economically dominant class becomes more 
difficult and complex where and when the dominated classes are independently organised 
and their intellectuals produce a counter ideological discourse. Class struggle intensifies in 
such cases and the possibility of authoritarian state increases (Thomas: 1984,82). That 
was the case in the Sudan in 1956-69 as Chapter 3 argues. The tendency towards 
authoritarianism within the different factions of the ruling power bloc is attributed to their 
intention go establish their domination by destroying independent mass organisation, Le 
trade union, students unions, .. etc., and to 
impose the unity of the power bloc; that is to 
achieve by coercion what they had failed to achieve through consensus. The problem 
remains that the success of the authoritarian state itself depends on its ability to stand up 
to the challenges set by the dominated classes; that is its ability to suppress or incorporate 
the independent organisations of the dominated classes or co-opt their leaders and to 
unify the power bloc. This might maintain some political stability for a while . Political 
stability in such condition does not deny the existence a crisis of hegemony , 
but it 
disguises it. 
1.3-5. Hegemony and Legitimacy Crises 
A crisis of hegemony is defined by Gramsci as a situation where the ruling class loses its 
authority on the masses because it 
" has failed in some major political undertaking for wl-dch it has requested or forcibly 
extracted, the consent of the broad masses.., or because huge rna ses... have passed suddenly 
from a state'of politico passivity to a certain activity, and put fonvard together demands 
which taken together, albeit not organically formulated, add up to a revolution" (1971,210). 
A crisis of hegemony is, hence, a challenge from below to the authority of the ruling class 
and in that sense, it is an organic or structural crisis which involves the whole socio- 
economic system. The hegemony crisis involves by definition a state crisis because it 
includes a legitimacy crisis which is defined as: 
"a crisis in which the allegiance needed if the dominant institutions are to function effectively 
is well below the level they actually receive. " (Connolly, 1984,12). 
While the hegemony crisis expresses the crisis of the ruling class or a power bloc, the 
legitimacy crisis is the crisis facing the state. Hence a legitimacy crisis may rise without a 
ruling class'or power bloc faces a hegemony crisis. The development of a legitimacy crisis 
into a hegemony crisis depends on the response of the ruling class to the legitimacy crisis 
and its ability to reform the political system and the state apparatus, change the leading 
personnel or to adopt new policies in order to regain the legitimacy of the actions and 
decisions taken by or through them. Legitimacy crisis and its resolution is the product of 
3:. By ideology of fear it is meant the state of mind created by a wide use of coercior4(detention, 
torture, extra-judicial execution ... etc), which prevails among the masses under some authoritarian 
state, ie Chile after 1973, the Sudan after 1989.. etc 
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social and class struggle. The transition from colonial to post-colonial states may lead to 
serious legitimacy crises because of the expectations of the people from their new rulers. 
People do not only expect a rise in their standards of living, but also expect a change in 
the way they are governed. 
The rise and fall of civilian and /or military regimes could be understood in the context of 
the crises of hegemony and legitimacy. The crises of the state under both military and 
civilian regimes could be sought in the crisis of hegemony of the ruling class/ or fraction/s 
of them- It might take the specific form of a legitimacy crisis as was the case during 
Abboud's regime in 1964. The question remains as to why a crisis of hegemony or 
legitimacy rises and why it takes the form of civilian military alterance. The answer to 
such questions have to be sought in the concrete social and class structure and social and 
class struggle; i. e. in the historical process of political ec-onomic and social struggle. This 
is a basic theme through out this thesis. 
1.3.6. Articulation and Class Structure 
Class structure in post-colonial societies is the result of the policies of articulation that 
reshaped the socio-economic structure in the former colonies. That makes the study of 
class formations in such societies, if not equivalent to the study'of articulation of the 
modes of production, at least derived from it. That is why a great part of Chapter 2 in this 
thesis is concerned with the policies and process of economic and political articulation. 
The concept of the articulation of modes of production is used in. this research to mean 
the interrelation of the capitalist mode of production with pre-capitalist modes of 
production mainly to serve the interests of capital owners. That is whether the interests of 
capital owners are achieved by the direct production and realisation of economic surplus, 
whatever form it takes, or the indirect production and realisation of that surplus through 
the insurance of a sustained supply of cheap labour power and/or raw materials, and 
ensured markets for commodities produced by that capitalist mode of production, ( 
whether on a world scale or a national one). Chapter 2 discuss this process as it was 
carried in irrigated and rain-fed agriculture in the Sudan. 
Articulation as. a process of interrelation between capitalist and non-capitalist modes of 
production, (Rey in Foster-Carter, 1978), has a multi-dimensional effect that gives 
capitalism its particular characteristics in the post-colonial societies. For exampýe while 
capitalism in the developed countries developed the productive forces, in post-colonial 
societies this is not always the case where capitalist relations of production, (mainly 
capital-wage-labour relation), are found without any developed means of production, 
especially the tools of production. This has its effects on both the capitalist and working 
class and their level of discipline, organisation, consciousness ... etc. 
The articulation process suggests that the penetration of capitalist production in pre- 
capitalist modes does not necessarily follow the pattern described by Marx which was 
assumed to take two stages, in the first, 
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"Capitalist production makes the sale of products the main interest, at first apparently-yiIhout 
affecting the mode ofproduction itseýy, (italics not in the origin). " (Marx: 1977, a, 36) 
While in the second stage, 
"whenever it takes root capitalist production destroys all forms of commodity production 
which are based on self-employment or merely on the sale of excess products as commodities. " 
(lbid- , 36). 
In the second stage capital completes the generalisation of commodity production and 
transforms it all into capitalist production. Rey, has made this last statement a different 
third stage, with the qualification that no Third World country has reached it, (Foster- 
Carter, op. cite. 56). 4 Rey's concept of stages is mechanistic and assumes sequence of 
even development which might or might not take place. Instead different pattern of 
articulation are suggested as not exclusive. We identify four of these: 
a) political articulation which subordinate the pre-capitalist modes of production through 
the incorporation of its politically and economically dominant social groups, stratum and 
class, the articulation of tribal and religious aristocracy in the Sudan is an example of that 
(Chapter 2 ), 
b) institutional articulation which involves reorganisation, legislation and introducing 
managerial or administrative organs to capture, control and achieve the goals of the 
articulated system, the Gezira Scheme in Sudan is a good example, (see Chapter 2 below), 
c) the articulatio n through exchange, which is not only a relation between merchant and 
commercial capital and the pre-capitalist producers (peasants, nomads craftsmen and 
women, the latter is very important where most of the domestic crafts industry was 
dominated by women), but it is a process in which the state plays a great role (taxation, 
organisation of markets, construction of infra-structure .. etc. ), 
d) articulation on the cultural and ideological level, in which despite the supremacy of the 
capitalist ideology and culture, the coexistence of social elements of the two kind of 
modes, leads to both modes adopting some aspects of the other's culture and ideology. In 
chapters 2,3 and 5 the role of religious sectarianism and Islamic fundamentalism as pre- 
capitalist ideologies used to justify capitalist exploitation and capital accumulation is 
discussed. 
The articulation process in one pattern is by analogy compared with the relation between 
merchant capital and the English cottage weaving industry in the Seventeen century when, 
as described by Marx, weavers as independent producers were controlled by merchant 
capital through the selling of the wool to them and buying their produce of cloth. (Marx, 
1977 b, 334). "Such a pattern of exchange relation cannot by itself contribute to the 
overthrow of the old mode of production", wrote Marx (ibid., 334). In contrast to Kay's 
4The three stages of articulation which have been suggested by Rey are: 
" I. an initial link in the sphere of exchange, where interaction -with capitalism reinforces the pre- 
capitalist mode-, 2. capitalism lakes roots', subordinating the pre-capitalist mode but still making 
the use of it, 3. (not yet reached in the Third World), the total disappearance of the pre-capitalist 
mode, even in agriculture" (Foster- Car-ter: 1978,56) 
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assertion when evaluating the role of merchant capital in the production of 
underdevelopment that, "capital created underdevelopment because it did not exploit it 
enough" (Kay: 1975, X), Marx argued that such a pattern would have worsened the 
conditions of direct producers more than if they would have been under the immediate 
control of capital (op. cite.. 335). David Booth was accurate when included in his 
definition of articulation the tendency of capital to sustain pre-capitalist "forms of labour 
process which e? wire a supply of labour power .. at less thmi its value, that is less than its 
fill cost ofproduction. " (Booth: 1985,76). Bernstein showed, incidentally in a critique of 
Kay, that articulation permitted capital, in colonial societies, to make a partial payment 
for the costs of reproduction of labour, usually that of the individual worker, while the" 
costs of maintaining the workers family and the generation reproduction of labour power 
are borne by the worker's family, which still engaged in agricultural production in the 
home village. " (Bernstein, 1976,59). Cliffe emphasised the purpose of the process as of 
keeping those societies as a "source of primitive accumulation" for the wider international 
capitalist system (1976,125). Meillassoux brought to attention its direct effect on the " 
agricultural communities" as "being both undermined and perpetuated at the same time, 
undergoing a prolonged crisis" (1980,199). This relation between the articulation of 
modes of production-and the crisis in agriculture is of great importance in this thesis. 
In the Sudan, the colonial state played great role in the articulation process, (see Chapter 
2 below ), Witlý intensive and extensive use of coercion. 5 Since the main characteristic of 
the pre-capitalist modes which were subjected to the articulation process were 
agricultural, the peasants and rural population in general were the main subject to state 
coercion. Pre-capitalist superstructure institutions themselves articulated in this process, 
played an important political, ideological and economic tole in the process of coercive 
articulation of the peasants and rural population. Hence was the political articulation of 
the tribal and religious, (sectarian, in the Sudanese case), leadership a nd their maintenance 
as an arislocracy, (Chapter 2 below). 
The articulation process which had the commoditization as its main mean to appropriate 
economic surplus. necessitated the spread of traders and merchants in the different parts of 
the pre-capitalist formations, constituting the primary cell of a bourgeois class. The 
process involved the establishment of commercial and financial (banks) firms, plantation 
and mmmg companies and hence the foreign capital in these societies, (in the Sudanese 
case there was a limitation to this part of the process, see Chapter 2). Settlers followed in 
some countries from the metropolitan, which was not the case in the Sudan. 
Chapter 2 argues that the spread of commoditization had required the relative 
development of transportation, communication and other economic and social services 
5According to Foster-Carter. Rey asserts a use of violence, " violence is a necessary component of 
all articulation" (Foster-Carteropt. cit., 60). Coercion might be a better description because it 
includes the use of violence. 
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which consequently required the employment of wage labour, ( in Southern Sudan, 
compulsory labour was used to construct road and build government stations). A need for 
processing industries, (gins in the Sudanese case, see Chapter 2 below), had also arisen as 
part of export production which led to the formation of a small working class. The 
monopoly of these activities by the colonial state and/or foreign capital contributed to the 
working class acquisition of national consciousness early in the class struggle. 
The great role played by the state in the articulation process, led to the emergence of a 
local bureaucratic social stratum. The use of coercion in the process including the use of 
violence to suppress the resistance of local population, led to the formation of local 
armies in the former colonies. Nfinimising the cost of administration and repression was a 
main reason in including natives in the bureaucracy and the army, but the idea of using 
educated natives as a link with the population was among the reasons of creating such a 
group. The analysis of the role of bureaucracy and armies in post-colonial states has 
arisen in a debate in the fiterature6. Taking into account the conceptual problems which 
arise in that debate and in relevance to this research, some cMfication on the position of 
the bureaucrats and the military in the class structure has to be established. 
The stand in this thesis on the question of bureaucrats, the military and the professionals 
is based on two propositions. The first is that classes are defined as: 
"large groups of people distinguished from one another by their position in some historically 
defined system of production, by their relations to the means of production (for the most part 
registered in lavvs), by their roles in the social organisation of labour, and consequently ky the 
methods of acquisition and the magnitudes of those share of social wealth which they obtain. " 
(Lenin, 1971 , 23 1) 
The second proposition is that: 
" Society gives rise to certain common functions which it cannot dispense with- The persons 
appointed for this purpose form a new branch of the division of tabour within S'ociety (italics 
in the origin). This gives them particular interest of those who empowered them, they make 
themselves independent of the latter and the state in being. " (Encgls, 1977,635-6). 
Applying the first proposition, the definition of the bureaucrats, the military *and all the 
professionals as petty bourgeoisie is rejected. The petty bourgeoisie as a class is defined in 
this thesis as commodity producers who own their means of production and provide most 
of the labour power in the production process. ' They are petty producers, but as petty 
producers were and are found in all pre-capitalist modes of production, they become petty 
bourgeoisie under the capitalist mode of production because of the generalisation of the 
commodity production, i. e. labour power became a commodity itself The basic 
characteristic in the definition we adopt is that the petty bourgeoisie own their means of 
production, which make them recognise and defend the right to private property, the right 
to the private ownership of the means of production. Though others who dont own 
6 Example of the contributions to the debate on the question in the African context are: Meillasoux 
(1970), Lcys (1973,1976,1978), Saul (1974,1979), Shivii (1976) Freylond (1977), Zienmarm 
and Lanzend6rfer (1977), Brett (1978) Beckman (1980), Kitching (1980), Bernstein (1981), 
Balyies (1985), Charney (1987), Forrest (1987) 
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private means of production are not petty bourgeoisie in this sense, they may adopt a 
petty bourgeoisie stand from the private ownership. But they may adopt other ideological 
stands on the question of the private ownership of the means of production. In such an 
ideological stand they are not united according to the ir class nature. The other important 
characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie is that they are not alienated from the produce of 
their labour in the production process itself though they may be in the exchange procesS7. 
Though they share with the proletariat that they both work, they differ in this important 
aspect of the alienation. The petty bourgeoisie is neither alienated from their means of 
production nor from the produce of their labour. This definition is adopted because of its 
epistemological usefulness. It keeps the category of petty bourgeoisie in line with the 
general definition of other classes, the bourgeoisie and the working class. Accordingly 
some of the professionals who do not sell their labour power to the state or private sector 
and work independently might be defined as petty bourgeoisie, not because they are 
professional or technocrats, but because they produce commodities and/ or services by 
their own means and own their products or the returns to their service. Some of these 
professionals do employ others to work for them with wages and salaries and produce the 
commodities or services and could only be identified as bourgeoisie. In both cases there is 
a risk that basing the analysis on the economic definition might keep it on the abstract 
level, while the concrete analysis which brings in the political and ideological elements 
and the class stru2gle as a process may identify these -groups according to the specific 
position they take politically and ideologically in the class struggle. Stating that raises 
many questions than providing answers to the main question as to why these groups can 
have contradicting positions in the class struggle. 
Applying the second proposition those groups are identified as social groups different 
from the defined classes of the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the worldng class. 
They are the product of the modem bourgeoisie state, education and social services and 
their development becomes a function of the development of science and technology 
necessary for the development of capitalist production. Their role in the division of labour 
is determined by their education and training that give them a high social prestige 
compared to the working class, the traditional petty bourgeoisie and some fractions of the 
bourgeoisie itself This is especially true in the developing countries where there are still 
high percentages of illiteracy and the bourgeoisie failed to establish its hegemony. The 
role in the division of labour cited to these groups is defined as the mental work, an 
ideological definition which does not always describe the work done by these groups or 
some of them. Poulantzas wrote: 
71n articulated modes of production, as discussed in Chapter 2, the situation become more 
complicated and peasants and agricultural producers may be alienated from their products. 
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"The division between manual and mental work is not a physiological or biological division 
between those who work with their hands and those who work with their brains. It has to do 
with the social conditions under which the division between mental and manual labour exists, 
which as Gramsci pointed out, concern the whole series of rituals, 'know how`, and symbols. " 
(1977,122) 
Thus it is not enough to describe them as urban petty bourgeoisie. as Munck did when he 
identified them as urban petty bourgeoisie in contrast to the traditional rural petty 
bourgeoisie composed mainly of the peasants8. He described them, 
"The urban petty bourgeoisie for its part is a broad catch-all category covering teachers and 
traders, clerks and civil servants prostitutes and policemen, etc. There is a tendency towards 
proletarianisation in this group too, although new layers constantly re-form, maldng it more a 
process of simultaneous conservation/ dissolution. in the much the same way as the small- 
scale production of - the peasants, these sectors cannot withstand the advance of 
capital"(Munck, 1984,93) 
Similarity is not identity and to establish that some similar behavioural attitudes between 
the petty bourgeoisie and other groups like teachers, professionals, bureaucrats and 
policemen (not speaking of prostitutes !) will make all these groups identical is-not useful 
from epistemological and cognitive point ofýview. 
Munck argued that there is a tendency towards proletafianisation, which by all means will 
not include all the groups. Some of the urban petty bourgeoisie, especially craftsmen are 
subject to this tendency; also poor peasants in 'rural areas, but not the bureaucrats, 
professionals and the military. It is true, as it is Shown in Chapter 4 in this thesis, that the 
real incomes of some professionals and civil servants may decline in the process of income 
redistribution through inflationary measures such as the structural adjustment 
programmes. This similarity does not make those groups alienated producers of surplus 
value. 
The solution presented to the problem by Nicos Poulantzas might be of some relevance 
here, though he had tackled the question within the perspectives of developed capitalist 
societies. Poulantzas argued: "To define the working class as the whole of the 'wage- 
earning class'., has the effect of reducing the class divisions in society to the divisions 
between rich and poor. " (Poulantzas, 1977,114). He then went to define the wage-eamers 
whom he did not include in the working'class as Salaried non productive workers arguing 
that they "have a specific class membership" and could not be designated as an 
"intermediate strata" as the French Communist Party" does (Ibid, 111-2). His position 
which is shown in Classes in Contemporary Capitalism is based on three propositions. 
The first that these groups are members of a specific class which he called the new Petty 
bourgeoisie' 
. 
The second proposition is that there are transformations in modem 
capitalism that "have to do with the extensions lirnits of the working class"(Ibid, 117) but 
those transformations "do not change the specific class situation of the new petty 
SIn the debate on this subject some Nwiters tend to define the Kulaks as petty bourgeoisie, which is 
not accurate because the kulak as a rich flarmer might be a capitalist Nvho employ NN-age labour. 
Peasants, hereby are identified as pett. y bourgeoisie only when they are petty producers Avho 
cultivate their land or the land they rent. 
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bourgeoisie. " The third proposition is that although as a result of the transformations of 
capitalism the new petty bourgeoisie is "objectively polarised towards the working class", 
"that happens for the new petty bourgeoisie as 'a specific class '; ie as a class which has its 
own interests (Ibid, 118). Poulantzas propositions led him to an important conclusion 
which is of great relevance to our discussion of the Nimeiri regime, that is: 
"... they [the new pctty bourgeoisie] must be -, A-on to an alliance with the working class, 
and ... even when they are won, they can be lost as allies and they can turn to the other side. This is what happened in Allende's Chile and also in Portugal. 1ý these saMed non- 
productive workers can shift from an alliance with the working class to an alliance with the 
bourgeoisie it is precisely because they are not automatically polarised towards the working 
class. This is not because they do not have specific class interests, but because they have a very 
dubious class specificity. "(1bid, 116) 
In Chapters 3,4, and 5 it will be argued that the change in the policies of the Nimeiri 
regime after 1971 was a reflection of a change in the alliance with the working class and 
the democratic urban movement in a concrete political situation in which different 
political . actors assuming representation of 
different classes or national interests, 
consciously or unconsciously dismantled the possibility of the continuation of such an 
alliance. 
It is important to notice the structure of this new class and its composition of different 
divisions and fractions. One can identify two broad divisions of great importance: the 
military and the civilian. In Third World countries this division acquires great importance 
because of the role played by the miEtary in politics. Its relevance to the Sudan is 
examined in Chapter 3 and 5. The fraction composition of the new class include the 
bureaucrats, the professionals and the technocrats. While the role of the latter is limited in 
the Sudan because of the b ackward situation of the forces of production especially 
industry and agriculture which led to the disintegration of this small fraction between the 
former two9. The bureaucrats and the professionals on the other hand played great role in 
the Sudanese society. 
Bureaucracy according to Max Weber is "a technically efficie nt instrument of 
administration" (Beetharn, 1974,64), which is characterised by an "inherent tendency to 
exceed its instrumental function and to become a separate force in the society", (Ibid, 65); 
at the same time of being characterised as "unable to free itself from the outlook of the 
social classes from which it was recruited and to which it was allied" (Ibid, 66). Alfred 
Weber went further than his brother to state: 
" it is a fundamental error to imagine that the bureaucracy has the characteristic of being 
independent of any social basis. It finds its social basis in those power groups which control 
the organisation of the society. " (quoted in Beetham, Ibid, 66) 
Gramsci pointed out that bureaucracy at "a certain point... becomes a cast" (1971,246), 
that looks at the representative system as a "nuisance" because it "hinders and delays the 
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technical action of the governinent", that is of the bureaucracy (Ibid, 254). It is within this 
theoretical frame that bureaucracy is defined in this thesis as a fraction'of the new petty 
bourgeoisie and its development and role are examined through out the thesis in a 
concrete historical analysis. 
The professionals on the other side are the most complex fraction of the new petty 
bourgeoisie in the Sudan. The fraction as such is a modem one despite that some groups 
within it went through the same development conditions as the bureaucrats and the 
military, (the teachers), but the majority is the product of the development of higher 
education after the second World War. Though they supplied the ruling bloc with its most 
dynamic part, the bourgeoisie intellectuals who formed the Graduates Conference (See 
Chapter 2 and 3), they became predominantly attached to the left and the democratic 
movement until the Nimeiri" regime. Their role in Sudanese politics will be discussed 
through out the thesis. 
In contrast to the Eterature dealing with these groups in developed capitalism, the 
literature on the Affican experience concentrates not on their polarisation towards the 
worldng class, but rather towards the bourgeoisie. Frantz Fanon was pioneer in bringing 
the "university and merchant classes" and the "business, agricultutal and liberal 
professions" (Fanon, 1976,120) together as 'the national middle class' and 'the national 
bourgeoisie' using the two categories alternatively. Though Fanon's analysis which was 
based on these definitions is interesting and p rovide many valid arguments about the 
adoption of the one party system and the rise of the 'leader' in the post-colonial state, his 
concept of classes was rather a simplification of a more complex issue. Roxborough -once 
wrote: 
"the class structures of the Third World differ from those of the advanced nations in two 
principal ways: they more coniplex (emphasis added), and classes themselves are usually 
much ireaker (emphasis added)" (1979,72) 
-The fact that classes in Africa are weak does not mean that they do not exist, nor does 
mean that Merent classes can form one class. That is why the concept of power bloc is 
used in this thesis to express how and why the post-colonial state in the Sudan is 
dominated by a group of classes and class fractions. Fanods failure to distinguish between 
different classes among the power bloc undermined his interesting analysis. He, for 
example, equated the bourgeoisie, an d what Poulantzas called the new petty bourgeoisie. 
This led him to generalise that, "The single party is the modem form of the dictatorship of 
the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted unscrupulous and cynical" (Fanon, opt cited, 132) 
and that the "bourgeoisie dictatorship of underdeveloped countries draws its strength 
from the existence of a leader. " ( Ibid, 135). For sure, one can argue that both statements 
are true if the 'bourgeoisie' is replaced by the new petty-bourgeoisie; which, in my 
opinion, was the experience of many African countries such as Egypt under Nasser, 
Algeria under Boumedienne, Guinea under Sekou Tore and Tanzania under Nyerere. It 
will be difficult if Fanon's argument is accepted to understand the role of the bourgeoisie, 
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or fractions of it, in the struggle for democracy in countries like Sudan (1958-64 and 
1969-1985). Nor is it possible to understand, for example the difference between the 
post-colonial state in Kenya and Tanzania. The distinction between the bourgeoisie, the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie and the new petty bourgeoisie is important in this thesis for 
the analysis of the nature and different stages of the Nimeiri regime, in particular and the 
post-colonial state in general. 
This thesis argues that the behaviour of the new petty bourgeoisie in the Sudan is 
determined by the concrete historical condition of the development of its different 
generations. These conditions include the level and nature of the social and political 
struggle of the different classes in the Sudan and its effect on them, the sort of education 
and training they have been through and the economic conditions they work in. Until the 
rise of the Nimeiri regime in 1969, it is differentiated in this thesis between the pre-World 
War and the post-World War generations among the bureaucrats, the professionals and 
the military. Generally speaking the pre-War generation had identified themselves with the 
power bloc since the division in the Graduates Congress (see Chapter 2 and 3 ); while the 
post-War generation was critical of the power bloc and 'until 1969 had identified 
themselves with movements on the left or the Muslim Brotherhood. Few of the latter 
maintained relations with political parties which represented the power bloc, but even 
those were either provoking some political change or new patterns of capital 
accumulation. This was apparent after the October revolution of 1964 and was reflected 
in the divisions in the Umma Party and the struggle within the Democratic Unionist Party' 
(DUP ). It is also argued that this fraction. had acquired its national political awareness in 
the struggle against colonialism and the rise of the working class movement in the Sudan. 
It was influenced by the international conditions: the rise of a socialist bloc and the 
revolutions in China, Cuba and Vietnam, and the'rise of the liberation movements and 
more directly the regional conditions (especially the rise of. Nasser itý Egypt and the Pan- 
Arab movements, the Pan-Affican movements, the Islamic Brotherhood and the African 
socialism). The latte ,r 
have deeply affected the ideological orientation of the post-War and 
the post-independence generations. 
The discussion on the Affican petty bourgeoisie is brought to the stage in the attempt to 
understand the nature of the post-colonial state, especially in countries where the new 
petty bourgeoisie, (according to the definition argued above), had prevailed after the 
independence. Terms Eke bureaucratic bourgeoisie and state bourgeoisie were used to 
describe the ruling class in some African countries (Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, Zambia, .. 
etc. )10. In the Sudan the question did not rise until the May 1969 coup, despite the fact it 
was not the first coup. The military of the 1958 coup were considered as part of the ruling 
bloc (see Chapter 3), but this did not disguise their class nature as a fraction of the new 
new petty bourgeoisie. Their concrete conditions of development as a pre-war generation 
'() See footnote 6. 
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determined their polarization towards the power bloc rather than the working class and 
the traditional petty bourgeoisie (See Chapter 2 and 3). The opposite was the case of the 
military of the May 1969 coup , who belonged to the post-War generation 
The question of why this is so is rather a question of concrete analysis, because 
theoretically the two possibflities of polarization are found in the"interests and nature of 
the new petty bourgeoisie as such, as an abstract concept. In the concrete analysis two 
main factors may influence the ideological orientation of the petty bourgeoisie, their 
education (particularly the education system) and the class struggle in the definite 
historical period of their arise or formation. Their actual political stand depends on the 
concrete political struggle of the different classes and their poUtical organisations and the 
different tactics adopted by them. Looking into these aspects, it is attempted in Chapters 
3,4,5, and 6 to discuss the different policies and alliances made by the mifitary in 1958- 
64 and 1969-85. A pause is taken in Chapter 3 to reflect on the historical development of 
the Sudanese mifitary and the attempts to establ-ish secret political organisations in the 
army. The question of alliances is of particular importance to the prolonged crisis of the 
Nimeiri regime is discussed in Chapter 3 and 5. It distinguishes between two crisis' 
plýases the 1969-1971 and the 1973-85. While the first phase is discussed briefly in 
Chapter 3, the second phase is discussed in Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
1.4. A Statement of the Theme of the Thesis 
This thesis examines and seeks to explain the crisis of 1973-85 by using the methodology 
of political economy. By studying -the political economy of the Sudan the crisis is 
understood in its concrete historical context. This study has revealed that the 1973-85 
crisis was one of a chain of other crises that took place in the Sudan between 1956-1985. 
All these crises despite their particularities are found to have an element of continuity that 
linked them together. This element is the organic crisis of transformation that has 
prevailed in the country since independence in 1956. 
The Sudan has inherited a socio-economic structure that is based on a specific articulation 
of a capitalist and pre-capitaEst modes of production and their respective social forces. 
This structure had been developed and sustained by the colonial state and because of the 
specific articulation of the modes of production could not continue to develop or be 
sustained without that colonial state (the state being defined as a condensation of social 
relation and not the state apparatus or personnel). It was through coercion that the 
colonial state was able to keep the structure and to secure the development and growth of 
the colonial economy. The post-colonial state was not able to provide that level of 
coercion, not because physically it was not able", but because the post-colonial state as 
an expression of a new condensation of social forces has no justification to use such a 
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level of coercion. The new condensation of power required a quest for legitimacy that 
was based on hegemony. The colonial process did not result in a hegemonic class or a 
fraction of classes, nor did the post-colonial era led to a class being able to establish its 
hegemony. This resulted in a crisis of hegemony. The crisis of hegemony (as being 
defined above in sub-sections 1.3.4 and 1.3.5) is central to the general crisis that has faced 
the country since 1956. The crisis of hegemony is found to be the result of both of 
colonial and post-colonial processes of social, economic and political development and 
change. 
The use of coercion by the post-colonial state, in the absence of a hegemonic class and 
the failure to establish the hegemony of the power bloc, found different kinds of 
resistance and both were main causes behind the unstable state in the Sudan from 1956- 
85. On the other hand the inability to use absolute and unchecked coercion left the 
structure unsustainable and could not be developed without a basic transformation; at the 
time its different elements changed in quantity and quality which aggravated the situation 
more bringing it to. a level of serious organic crisis. The change in political regimes 
through 1956-85 is discussed as attempts to resolve the crisis. The failure to address the 
essence of the crisis, the transformation of the scio-economic structure, accelerated the 
levels of political instability and economic decline and brought the existence of the post- 
colonial state and a unified Sudan into question. The basic transformation of the structure 
of the socio-pofitical and economic system became a necessary condition as a resolution 
to the organic crisis and establishment of ihe hegemony of a ruling power that provides 
political and social stability and economic development. 
Within this context the crisis of 1973-85 is understood and analysed. The 1973-85 crisis 
was both a continuation of the general crisis that had prevailed in the country since 
independence and a particular condensation of that crisis that resulted from the nature and 
policies of the Nimei. ri regime. The elements of continuity were those that characterise 
the socio-econornic structure as a special articulation of modes of production, It was a 
particular crisis of the only regime that came to power aiming at resolving the 
transformation problem while ending in keeping a decayed version of the structure it set 
itself the task to transform. 
On the political level, the modernisers who dominated the state after 1971 thought that 
they could bring political stability and provide for Peoples' participation by establishing a 
new state based on four main institutions: the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), the 
Presidency of the Republic, the National Peoples' Assembly, and the Peoples' Local 
Councils. The relation between the institutions was thought to be determined by the 
Permanent Constitution, which was drafted and promulgated in 1973. This thesis argues 
that these new institutions failed to bring political 'stability, to allow the democratic 
representation and participation of the Sudanese people in the decision-making and to 
provide the rational management of the economy. Political stability is argued through out 
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this thesis is a function of the hegemony of the ruling class and the legitimacy of the state. 
This thesis argues that the nature of the state in the 1973-85 period was governed by 
being fairly dominated by the new petty bourgeoisie. the new petty bourgeoisie not only 
failed to establish an alliance with other classes, it was unable to maintain its unity. This 
thesis shows the resistance. of some of the fractions and groups of the new petty 
bourgeoisie and their contribution to political instability. It argues further that a split was 
persistent among the ruling group itself. This split has allowed for an increasing power of 
the President and his use of the tactics of playing the different fractions against each 
other. The authoritarian nature of the state and the weakness of the institutions 
established by the Permanent Constitution enhanced the powers and the role of the 
President. The character of the President himself contributed to both the weakness of the 
institutions and hence to the instability of the system. The ruling group failed to establish 
its hegemony and its resort to coercion and repression intensified as the resistance of 
other classes and their political and trade union organisations increased. The legitimacy of 
the state declined as its policies failed to deliver the goods which were both expected by 
the population and promised by the regime. Within this context the National 
Reconciliation is discussed and evaluated as an attempt to regain legitimacy. Its failure to 
obtain that target rested on the authoritarian nature of the state and the particular role and 
powers of the President. The promulgation of the Islamic laws in September 1983, the 
declaration of the State of Emergency and the Prompt Justice Courts in April 1984 were a 
dual attempt for a quest for legitimacy and a resort to intensified repression at a time 
when the economic crisis, famine and popular resistance dominated the Sudanese agenda. 
Neither legitimacy was gained, nor repression was able to prevent the overthrew of the 
regime in March-April 1985 through a popular uprising. 
Of particular importance to the political crisis was the renewals of the unrest in the South 
which is described in the thesis. It is argued in chapters 3,4, and 5 that the Addis Ababa 
Agreement of 1972 which brought an. end to. the civil war in the South was the greatest 
achievement of the Nimeiri era. VAiile Chapter 4 describes the process through which the 
Agreement turned to be obsolete, Chapter 5 argues that the Agreement. failed in bringing 
any change to the domination of the North-Arab groups on the Sudanese state. As a 
result the policies that preserved uneven development in the country continued. Chapter 5 
also argues that the Agreement and the Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government 
Act, 1972, which was promulgated as a result of the Agreement, provided for a sort of 
parliamentary democratic system within the authoritarian presidential republic. The 
contradiction between the two systems contributed to the failure of the Agreement. The 
particular policies of the President towards the South and the promulgation of the Islamic 
Laws in 1983 vrovided for the concrete process through which the Civil War was 
renewed in the South. 
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The modernisation policy has added new production capacities to the economy in both 
industry and agriculture, buHt a new net of modern' roads and highways, modernised the 
telecommunication net work and increased the number of those enroled in the general and 
higher education. Despite aH these achievement in the economy, the economic crisis of 
1973-85 was the longest and deepest in the history of the Sudan. The thesis argues that 
the particular economic crisis of 1973-85 was in essence part of the organic crisis of 
transformation. This was reflected in both levels of simple and extended reproduction. On 
the simple reproduction level the economy failed to maintain itself resulting in the under- 
utilisation of the already instaHed capacities and the low and declining levels of 
productivity and yields, the increasing debt of the state and the country, and the high rate 
of inflation (all -of them are documented and verified in the thesis). On the extended 
reproduction level, the new projects failed to compensate for the decline and decay of the 
old ones wHe they, the new ones themselves, suffered from inadequate planning, and 
from mis-mangement of their construction and execution. They suffered after their 
completion from financial and managerial problems that led to the same problems of 
under-utilisation of capacities and low productivity and yields. 
Of particular importance both for the political and the economical crises of the Nimeiri 
regime were the policies adopted in 1978-85 under the auspices of the DOE It is argued 
in this thesis that these policies contributed to the deepening of the crisis of the regime. 
The policies that were suggested by the IMF did not provide the immediate solution to 
the particular economic crisis. Instead they contributed to the loss of the already eroding 
legitimacy"of the regime. It was no Wonder the March-April combined popular uprising 
and coup detat were instigated by the last measures of austerity the regime had 
announced. dramatically the measures were taken despite the fact that the ROF had 
already suspended the last Stand-By Arrangement (1984/5 SB Arrangement), agreed on 
with the Sudan on June 1984. 
1.5. The Sources of the Research: 
This research has benefited ftorn primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are 
mainly of three types: direct political experience, informal interviews and data and 
information collection from government files, official documents and memorandums, 
political statements by officials and publications of political parties, newspapers and 
magazines (both Sudanese and foreign ) and memoirs of prominent political figures. The 
secondary sources are both theoretical works on the questions of the crisis, political 
economy, the state, classes, ideology.. etc, and empirical studies mainly on the history, 
politics, economics of the Sudan as well as studies on the third world, especially on 
Afiica, the Middle east some Asian and Latin American countries. 
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discussed are of contemporary nature. The concentration on information gathering 
through this method was for the periods following the October revolution of 1964 and 
which directlyatected the May Coup of 1969 and the Nimeiri regime period (1969-198 5) 
. 
Among those interviewed were mifitary men, ex-ministers, leaders of political parties ( 
especial. ly the Umma, DUP, Communist parties and the National Islamic Front) and trade 
unionists. Some of those interviewed were faced by information gathered from other 
persons or sources in order to check the information or to find some justification for 
actions taken by the interviewed, their parties, trade unions or governments, in which they 
were ministers. Some of the interviewed were very critical towards events, decisions or 
actions they participated in. The result of the interviews assisted the author in his analysis. 
1.5,3 Governmental Information: 
Two sources of primary governmental information are used. The first is unpublished 
government information and data from internal files of some departments (especially 
those of the Ministry of Finance, National Economy and Planning and the Ministry of 
Trade and Supply, the Company's Registrar of the Public Attorney Chamber, .. ete)13. 
Of 
these information are the documents concerning the minutes of the Paris Club14, the files 
on Sudan Debts, letters by ministers to the IMF and internal departmental memoranda 
concerning development expenditure and negotiations with the IMF. 
The second source is official publications by the different government departments. Of 
these there are annual publications such as: the Economic Review published by the 
Research Section of the Department of Economics'5, the Annual Report of the Bank of 
the Sudan which is published by the Bank of the Sudan, the National Accounts and 
Supporting Tables, published by the National Accounts Division of the Department of 
Statistics'6 the Internal Trade Statistics and Price Indices which published by the Intern4l 
Trade division of the department of Statistics, and the Year Book of Agricultural 
Statistics which is published by the Statistics Division of the Depart-ment of Agricultural 
Economics of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources, the Gezira Board 
Report published by the Gezira Board* and thý Mechanized Farming Corporation 
agricultural Statistics Bulletin published since 1982 by the Mechanized Farming 
Corporation 
. 
There are also other official non-periodical documents such as: the Five 
Years Plan 1970/71-1974/75, the Six Years Plan of Economic and Social Development 
1977/78-1982/83, both published by the Ministry of Planning and the Sudan Foreign 
Trade Analysis 1970-81, published by the Foreign Trade Section of the Department of 
13The author used his connection as ex-employee of this Ministry (1976-77) 
14 Paris Club is a meeting of creditor countries held in Paris, convened by the World Bank, 
chaired by a senior Official in the French Treasury. The RvIF is invited to report (testify) on the 
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Statistics. Several other government publications provided primary data are quoted and 
cited in the thesis. In 1985 the Department of Statistics prepared 'The Economic Indices' 
which was a collection of statistical data for the Nimeiri period and was published by the 
National Economic Conference. This publication is used in this thesis as a main source for 
national economic indices. 
The National Economic Conference of 1985/86, provided a rich primary data. It included 
reports and papers from different government departments, public corporations and a 
special statistical data information prepared by the Conference Secretariat 
1.54. Other Primary Sources 
Political literature produced or published by the political parties, political leaders and 
govemment officials was one of the primary sources of this research. 
1.6. The Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised in six chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 2 deals with the 
question of the legacy-of colonialism in an attempt to establish an understanding of the 
colonial state and economy. The crisis of the posi-colonial state between 1954-73 is 
discussed in Chapter 3. While Chapter 4 provides and extensive - survey of the 
manifestation of the. 1973-85 crisis, Chapter 5 and 6 attempt to explain the crisis by 
studying its genesis in Chapter 5 and its place within the general crisis in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 provides a conclusion. 
CHAPTER 2. 
THE LEGACY OF COLONIALISM 
2.1 Antroduction 
This Chapter provides a brief historical account of the formation of contemporary 
Sudanese socio-economic and political structure. That process began with the re conquest 
of the Sudan by the, Anglo-Egyptian armies under the leadership of Lord Kitchner and 
resulted in the defeat and destruction of the Mahdist State (1885-1898) in the battle of 
Omdurman on I st September 1898. 
The re conquest of the Sudan was an unusual international element because it was carried 
by both Egypt and Britain. ' Both the Egyptian flag and claim were used during the 
Fashoda incident to keep the French out of the Sudan (Beshir, 1977,20, Holt and Daly, 
1979,117). Lord Cromer rejected the idea of annexing the Sudan by Britain because of 
its international complications amongst the European forces scrambling for Affica; and at 
the same time he rejected the country's re-incorporation with Egypt in defence of the 
interests of Britain based on the right of conquest. This conflict of interests was to be 
resolved by the settlement between the two countries in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement 
of January 1899, known widely as the "Condominium Agreement" 
The Anglo-Egyptian military victory of 1898 was to be followed by establishment of a 
new state to replace the defeated and the destroyed the Mahdist State [1885-1898]. 
imposing a military administration with the Sirdar [the commander-in chief], of the 
Egyptian Army assuming the post of the 
, 
Governor General of the Sudan. 
This chapter reveals the nature of the Sudanese socio-economic and political structure 
established after the re conquest and which is the outcome of a prolonged and complex 
process of destruction, transformation and articulation. It identifies the social, economic 
and political forces that had resulted from that process. The identification of these forces 
and how they interrelated with each other and with the colonial state is of great analytical 
importance in understanding the character of the post-colonial state, and the presence of 
political and economic crises in the Sudan. 
The chapter is organised in four sections. Section 2.1 is an introduction, while section 2.2 
deals with the colonial state, its origin and its main characteristics. It discusses three of 
these characteristics; its relative autonomy, its militarism and its economic statism. 
Section 2.3 discusses the formation of the colonial economy and its effects on the 
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transformation of the socio-economic, structure of the country. Section 2.4 analyses the 
effect of some of the policies of the colonial state on the socio-economic structure of the 
country. Section 2.5 discusses the controversial aspect of the colonial policy towards 
Southern Sudan. Section 2.6 provides a conclusion which- summarises the main findings 
of the chapter. 
2.2. The Colonial State 
The colonial state established by the Condominium Agreement had three main 
characteristics which affected the future development of the socio-econon-iic structure in 
general and the post-colonial state in the Sudan in particular. These three characteristics 
were relative autonomy, militarism and economic statism. 
The relative autonomy of the Colonial State in the Sudan was of two dimensions: the 
first in relation to -the two condominium states, and the second towards the Sudanese 
population. The relative autonomy of the Colonial state vis-A-vis the Condominium was 
strengthened by two main factors which had affected the implementation of the 
Agreement. The first was the British occupation of Egypt which turned Egypt into a 
weak partner as was demonstrated in the aftermath of the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, 
(the third Governor- General, 1916-1924), in 1924 when the Egyptian army was 
compelled to withdraw from the Sudan. Egypt was, in rea 
, 
lity, excluded from the 
administration of the Sudan even after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 which allowed 
the return of Egyptian personnel and troops. After the 1936 Treaty th e Egyptian role in 
the administration of the Sudan was insignificant, though Egypt always played an indirect 
role through its influence on the Sudanese intelljýgentsia and the Khatimyya religious sect. 
Egypt was supposed to play a greater role in running the affairs of the country because it 
was financing the administration and the army in the Sudan. Until 1913, when the Sudan's 
budget was balanced for the first time, Egyptian financial subsidy was crucial and it 
amounted to LE 5.35 million. Egypt paid the entire cost of its army in the Sudan until it 
was withdrawn in 1924. Furthermore, Egypt also provided some LE. 5.4 million in loans 
to finance the capital needed for the infra-structure until the First World War. (Daly, 1991, 
3) 
The financial regulations adopted by the Condominium states in 1899 and amended in 
1910 empowered the Egyptian Council of NIinisters to approve, supervise and audit the 
budget of the Sudan (MacNfichael, 1934,111-113). The British occupation of Egypt 
reduced these powers to nominal ones, yet the danger of Egyptian control and 
interference was, at least theoretically, present. * Hence the Colonial State in the Sudan 
recognised the importance of generating revenues from domestic sources; but this was 
constrained both by the scarcity of such resources and political considerations 
necessitating low taxation rates. Thus the Colonial State sought to increase its revenue by 
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developing cotton production in Sudan which resulted in the second factor, the creation 
of a strong relation with the British textile industry. The latter was interested in "securing 
an increased supply of cotton drawn from within the Empire" and since the Sudan was 
"found to be suitable for the growing of long staple cotton", (Niblock: 1987,12), the 
British Cotton Growing Association, (BCGA), the representative of the British textile 
industry, backed the Colonial State plans to develop the Gezira. Hence a "collaboration 
betweeii a colonial goveniment desperate for revemie mid in need of British support, 
and Lancashire textile indust7y which couldprovide both" was established. (Daly, 1991, 
p3). " 
However, the direct influence of Britain was limited, mainly because "the Sudanese affairs 
were handled by the Foreign Office rather than the Colonial Office", which resulted in 
"the local British officials " having "more administrative" autonomy "than was the case in 
much of the rest of the British Empire. "(Voll and Voll, 1987,5 1). Sir John Schuster; the 
Financial Secretary in the Sudan 1922-1927, described this situation as "a very fortunate 
arrangement for me because the Foreign Office had no machinery for controlling overseas 
territories and therefore left me completely fi-ee to do Mjob. (emphasis added)" ýb 
(Schuster, 1979,40). 
The relative autonomy of the colonial state vis-A-vis the Sudanese population was natural 
since it was a foreign body imposed on the country by force. Its implications were 
reflected in the economic, religious, administrative and educational policies adopted by 
the colonial state. Those policies, which are the focus of discussion below, affected the 
structure of the Sudanese economy and society. 
The second characteristic of the colonial state in the Sudan was its militarism which was 
due to the fact that the colonial state was a product of a military conquest. Despite the 
continuous denial by Lord Cromer that "it, is not a military government .. " 
( Annual 
Report, 1902,75), the colonial state was a military establishment, not the least because it 
was run by the British officers of the Egyptian anny whose Sirdar, the Commander-in- 
Chief, was the Governor General and "Conimander-in-Chief of the civil government" in 
the Sudan (MacMichael, 1934,121-122). It was, in fact, "a benevolent autocracy", 
(ibid. ). The Times described it in 1900: 
21t is interesting to note that the re-conquest of the Sudan was not initiated in anyway by its 
economic potentialities and it was considered a' white elephant' depending in General Gordon's 
statement that, "The Soudan is a useless possession, everwas so, and ever will be so", to which 
Colonel Stewart remarked I quite agree wi , 
th General Gordon that Sudan is an expensive and 
useless possession. " (Quoted in Lord Cromers Report of 1900, p 991 
3-fbe Agreement established an autonomous administration to be headed by a Governor General, 
nominated by the British Government and appointed by the Khedive of Egypt. The Governor 
General would assume the supreme military and civil command 
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"Everything derives from the vAll of the Governor General. He unites in himself, and 
delegates from himself, all legislative, executive and judicial powers. He 'notifies' his 
ordinances to the joint Sovereigns, [Great Britain and Egý, ptl, but he is under no obligation to 
attend to their advice. " ( The Times, 8 April 1900, italics added). 
Policies adopted were conveyed to governors through confidential memoranda; 
governors had to convey them to subordinates, and reports were expected to reflect both 
the implementation and the evaluation. Until 1945, when the Advisory Council for 
Northern Sudan was established, no direct official consultation with Sudanese was carried 
and they were not involved in the decision -making process. As from 1910, ordinances 
and policies were decided by the Governor-general in Council, though the Council 
remained an advisory body. Annual meetings of the governors of the provinces were held 
to review and discuss issues referred to by the Governor-General or his secretaries, yet 
only reconunendations were issued by such meetings. Despite this centralisation of the 
decision making process the governors, in their provinces and the district commissioners, 
in their districts, had exercised great powers in dealing with the day-to-day affairs. They 
combined legislative, judiciary, financial, and administrative powers. The Sudanese people 
used to call the system 'Hukaniat al-Muffishin', the goverment of the district 
commissioners. The district commissioner remained the sole authority in the district until 
after the independence. The governors of the provinces and the districts commissioners, 
their deputies and assistants constituted the Sudan Political Service, which was headed by 
the Civil Secretary and attached directly to the Governor General. Other technical 
departments developed through time to constitute the Sudan Civil Service. 
The post of Governor General was held by a military. officer until 19244. In addition all 
posts of the provincial governors and their assistants were held by British officers until 
the begirming of the World War 1. Moreover, "Railway, Posts, Telegraphs, Works and 
Surveys were in the hands of Sappers, the Steamers and Boats Department, as it was then 
known, was run by two naval engineers, two ex-marine sergeants and about thirty m arine 
engineers from Britain, Italy and Greece with Bimbashi Azrni and some junior officers 
from the Egyptian Army. "(Scott Hill, Some Sudan Memoirs, SAD, 20-1). The jobs of 
clerks, storekeepers, and junior technicians in some departments were held by British 
NCOs. 
Ruth First noticed that the colonial administration in the Sudan not only "resembled 
armies, in theirformations and ethos, " but it was "the instrziment of military men. 
Military conquest ivasfollowed by military administration.. " and "77ze militag cast of 
goveniment and administration was one of the dominant characteristics of colonial 
policy in the Sudan "(First, 1970,127). 
4Tbrce military men assumed the post from 1898 to 1924, they Nvere: Lord Kitchner, 1898-1899, 
Sir F. R. Wingate, 1900-1916, and Sir Lee Stack, 1916-1924. 
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This 'dominant characteristic' was reflected in the form of routine that governed the 
relation between the Governor-General, his assistants and subordinates which was 
determined by a "chain of authority from the top downwards" (Ibid., 27), and complete 
submission of subordinates to their seniors, in short a military discipline. 
This characteristic remained although after 1901, civilians were taken in the service of the 
colonial state. The appointment of civilians was not meant to change the military system 
of government, which was advocated by Lord Cromer as "the form of government ... 
suitable to the present very backward condition for the country. " (RAF S., 1902,75). It 
was rather because the military officers were liable "to be removed at the time when their 
services are of the greatest value" (Ibid. ), as happened during the Boer War in 1899. 
The military personnel continued to be influential through the first three decades of the 
Condominium 
. 
(Collins, 1972,298). MacMichael provided a Est of 33 military who held 
the posts of governors of the provinces, Mudirs, until 1933 (MacNfichael: 1934,299). 
Collins found that few of the miEtary personnel remained till the independence of the 
Sudan in 1956, some resigned from the army and took jobs with the colonial state. Most 
of the military who remained in the service were stationed in remote areas to administer 
regions and tribes known for their resistanc(ý to the colonial administration (Collins, op. 
cit., 289). 
Militarism of the system continued through the process of the selection of civilians to the 
Political Service. The process was carried by boards dominated by British officers of the 
Egyptian Army. They tended to choose candidates in "their own image. " (Ibid., 296), 
Physical fitness of the candidates was given great importance in selection to the extent it 
was said that Sudan was "the country of blacks. ruled by Blues"5 . Military. training was an 
important item of their training 01 
The militarism of the colonial state was justified by the priorities it had determined, the 
first of which "was the elimination of popular resistance" (Holt, 1961,119). To that task 
Lord Kitchner explicitly directed his subordinates in his first policy memorandum, "All 
insubor'dination' must be-promptly and severely repressed [my emphasis] ." 
(GGAR., 
1899,55). Resistance continued for the first three decades of the colonial state and Sir 
Harold MacMichael, the Civil Secretary, was to write in 1934, "Hardly a year had passed 
since the re-occupation without the need for punitive expedition. "(MacMichael, 1934, ). 
Though the Battle of Omdurman and the killing of Khalifa Abdullahi and his senior 
associates in November 1899 had brought an official end to the Mahdist State, the 
Mahdist Chapter was never closed. About twenty Mahdist or religious revolts took place 
over the first three decades of the Condominium. But religion and Mahdism were not the 
5By 'Blue' is meant the traditional Oxford and Cambridge recognition of a person Nvho has 
represented his university at a major sport in the annual varsity contest between the mo 
universities (Collins and Deng, 1994, p 249. ) 
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sole motivates of resistance, the tribes of the Southern Sudan and Nuba Mountains 
rejected the alien rule leading to more than seventeen revolts in the South and twenty one 
in the Nuba Mountains . 
(For details see: Beshir, 1977,50- 55, MacMichael, op. cite..; 96- 
107 and 174-187). So the colonial state constantly kept its guard firm for the first three 
decades which promoted militarism of the state. 
The third characteristic of the colonial state was economic statism. This was a product of 
the colonial state to finance itself without provoking the population by imposing high 
taxation or losing its autonomy by depending on Egyptian finance conditioned by 
Egyptian control. It was also promoted by the personal interest members of the Sudan 
Political Service developed in the development of the government revenue on which their 
career depended. Economic statism had many implications on the socio-economic 
structure of the country, its class structure and its post-colonial state. The next section 
discusses the policies that developed economic statism. 
2.3. The Economy 
2.3.1. The Colonial Vision 
Lord Cromer, the designer of the Condominium, had set a general outline for the 
establishment of a colonial economy in the Sudan. In 1907, during a visit to the Sudan he 
expressed his wishes to link the Sudan with the international market through a railway 
extended to Suakin on the Red Sea, and another one extended to Kassala and -the 
Abyssinian borders. He also wanted to extend the railway line to El Obied to collect the 
gum from Kordofan. He wanted to clear the Sudd on the White Nile , to erect one or two 
dams on the Blue Nile and to invest in the Gezira. (Cromer's Speech reported in Shuqair, 
1967,1342. ). The same year, Wingate Pasha, the Governor General , repeated the same 
programme in his annual report, 
"The task- which the Sudan Government has set itself to perform is primarily to confer the 
benefits of civilisation on the inhabitants by rendering secure , as far as is possible, their 
persons and their property; by improving communications across those -Aide stretches of desert 
or wilderness which intervene between the main centres of population and yields; by ýdding to 
the fertility of the naturally rich soil by. means of artificial irrigation suitable to the varying 
conditions over so large and extent ofa country-, and finally by providing- in addition to the 
great Nile vmteni-ay and railway which bind Sudan to Egypt- a good port and harbour on the 
Red Sea -within easy access of the interior, whereby the inhabitants may be more furnished 
ivith their requirements from abroad, and may find outside markets for their natural 
products. " (RAFS, 1907 p34) 
The implementation of this programme was constrained by the availability of capital. The 
British government was unwilling to spend the British tax-payer money or to guarantee 
the borrowing of capital on London money market until 1913. It was then convinced, [or 
persuaded], by the British Cotton Growing Association, [BCGA] to provide the required 
guarantee. The colonial state was hesitant to attempt raising such capital through taxation 
from witlýn the Sudan for political reasons. From the start a policy of low taxation to 
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avoid political unrest was decided. Another possible source of capital was private foreign 
investment. Despite the attempts of many investors to come to the Sudan just after the re- 
conquest, "The Sudan soldier-administrators were in any event not wildly enthusiastic 
about an influx of foreign entrepreneurs. "(Daly, 1986,219). It was thought that foreign 
investors might interfere in government policy, bring influence of other European states 
and/ or upset the goverm-nent's relation with Sudanese. (Ibid., 219). Egypt was, hence, left 
to bear the financial burden of balancing the annual current budget and provide the 
necessary capital for roost of the infra-structure investment in the Sudan. The details of 
Egyptian financial contributions are discussed in section 2.1 above. Following Marx's 
remarks on the British in India (Marx, 1978 a, 659), 6 one can easily argue that Sudan was 
held under the British by the Egyptian Army (until 1924), at the Egyptian cost (mainly 
until 1913 and slightly after that) and by the Sudan Defence Force at the Sudanese people 
cost after 1924 and until independence. 
There were other social and political constraints to the implementation of the 
programme. These constraints contributed in shaping and specifying the structure of the 
colonial economy. Among these was the policy of the colonial state to avoid any 
measures which initiate revolutions or uprisings and its continuous attempt to articulate 
the "best class natives" (see below ).. Both considerations constrained the range of 
government policy towards taxation, land tenure, foreign investment, economic statism 
and articulation of pre-capitalist production relations in cotton production. 
The result was low taxation rates as we have pointed before which meant that 
government had to depend on the revenues which would be generated by running public 
utilities, i. e. Sudan Railways, the River transpqrt, posts .. etc. and 
involvement in 
production ie the Gezira Scheme, Toker, Nuba Mountains etc.; hence the rise of statism 
in the colonial economy. Seeking revenues was not the only promoter of statism; the fear 
to involve foreign capital and enterprises was another reason. Though the latter was also 
related in some aspects to the attempts of avoiding revolutionary agitation; other reasons 
might be found in the fact that the colonial state, "was... iptensely jealous of its monopoly 
of power,... deeply concerned that this monopoly be instantly and unambiguously visible. "; 
for "Successful capitalist development would have created new centres of non- 
government influence and even power, and new administration problems which the heavy 
emphasis on rural administration had not equipped the Political Service to solve. " 
(Sanderson, 1985,104). In addition to a these reasons statism was the best formula to 
maintain the relative autonomy of the colonial state vis-A-vis Egypt, Britain , foreign 
6 India, according to Marx, "was held in the English thraldorn by an Indian army maintained at the 
cost of India" (Mar. -., 1978 a, p 659). 
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capital and the internal local social forces through providing its independent sources of 
finance. 
The policy to avoid revolution which led to political articulation was one of the reasons 
behind the colonial land policy. One aspect of this policy was the recognition of the 
established rights of ownership (the Title to Lands Ordinance of 1899), either by 
providing ownership documents, (issued by previous regimes), or by proving the 
successive cultivation of the land for the previous five years, the latter was considered as 
having, "an absolute title as against all persons" (Cromer, 1900,1047). Another aspect 
was the recognition of the communal rights of land utilisation, in spite of the fact that 
such lands were considered the ownership of the government, according to the Land 
Settlement Ordinance of 1905. A third aspect of the land policy was the prevention of 
land speculation and its transfer to the foreigners, hence as early as 1900 the government 
issued a Proclamation; 
"Whereas it has to the notice of his Excellency the Governor-General that certain persons 
taldng advantage§ of the want of money in the Sudan are acquiring lands from the inhabitants 
at prices below the actual value, notice is hereby given that until such times as it may be found 
possible to establish a land register, as contemplated by the Title to Land Ordinance 1899, all 
contracts for the purchase of land should be submitted to the Mudir for approval and that 
power, M11 be given to land Commissions which may be appointed to revise the terms of any 
sales ... of which notice shall not have been given to the Mudir. "(Sudan Government Gazette, I April 1914, quoted in Gaitskel, 1959,43). 
In 1905 ,a stiffer control was 
decreed. Any sale, mortgage or disposal of the land by 
another means by any native without the prior consent of the Mudir was declared. void 
and money thereby paid might not be recoverable ( Gaitskell, op. cit., p44). A special 
Proclamation was issued in 1912 to prevent any sale of the Gezira land except for local 
Gezira natives. (Ibid. ) The logic behind this aspect of the land policy was stated clearly by 
a land officer, 
"If unsophisticated people are given the chance to sell their land, they will do so, and a large 
discontented land-kss class, easy prev for agitator, is formed " (Msldn, 1950,283. ) 
A fourth aspect of the. land policy was the declaration that, "all waste, forest and 
unoccupied land shall be deemed to be the propeM of the government, until the contrajy 
be proved. "(Simpson, 1955,12) The consequences and implications of the land policy 
were very important in shaping the colonial economy in the Sudan. The first important 17 
consequence was the prevention of land ownership by foreigners which ruled out the 
colonial settlers' model of Kenya and Rhodesia (See Collins: 1975,29-62, Sender and 
Smith: 1986,24-28, Ake: 1981,80-81, and Amin: 1976,327-328). Foreigners granted 
concessions for agricultural investment were to be allotted government lands which were 
far from the banks of the Nile which required costly capital investment in pumps and 
canalisation, the profitability of which was possible only in large areas which were 
impossible to grant under another constraint , water to be discussed below. Hence, no 
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foreign company was able to keep its concession except the Sudan Plantation Syndicate 
(SPS) which was granted a 10000feddwis concession in 1905, after a relaxation in the 
water constraint following the construction of Aswan Dam (see below) and kept in 
business by the colonial state when in 1911 was "entrusted with the management of 
Tayiba", the Gezira experimental farm and promised to be given an area of 10000feddails 
of the area to be irrigated in the Gezira. (Gaitskell, op. cit., 63. ) 
The second important implication of the land policy was that by preserving both the 
ownership and cultivation rights, and preventing the sale of lands which might have 
resulted in a landless class, primitive accumulation of capital, the historical process of 
divorcing the producer from the means of production., (Marx: 1967,737), did not take 
place in its classical way. That was -responsible for the absence of people ready to sell 
their labour power for several decades during the colonial period, a problem mentioned in 
many colonial reports yet attributed to the laziness of'the Sudanese people. To quote only 
one of these reports, Lord Cromer wrote in 1900, regarding 
"... the further question of whether the Soudanese are willing to work. The local officials are 
well-nigh unanimous in their opinion that, as a general rule (sic), the Soudanese are not 
industrious race. In this respect they are the very reverse of Egyptian, who are a singularly 
industrious race. "(Cromer, 1900, p80) 
The shortage of labour could have been solved by the liberation of the slave population 
in the Sudan which was estimated to be 20-30% of the population of Northern Sudan. 
Yet the colonial state did not attempt this solution for political and economic reasons. 
The colonial state argued that the intervention of the Slavery Department of the Egyptian 
Government, wl-&h was established in 1880, to abolish slavery in the Sudan, might lead 
to political unrest. Wingate wrote in 1908, 
"it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that there is a strong feeling of discontent among 
the Arabs at the loss of their Sudanese servants(sic! )"(quoted in Kbalafalla, op. cite.. 30) 
He went on to threaten that any attempt to interfere in "Domestic Slavery (sic)" would 
produce hundreds of Abdel Kader"; referring to Abdel Kader Wad Habuba who led a 
revolt in 1908, though the latter had nothing to do with slavery. (Daly, 1986,235). The 
economic reason for not interfering with slavery was, as clearly put by Wallis the Director 
of Intelligence in 1918, "keeping labour on the land", (Ibid., 234); but that would not 
solve the problem of the demand for labour by foreign investors and the colonial state 
itself. Many other suggestions were brought forward. One of these was the import of 
foreign labour 
, "either Indian or Chinese", because the "Egyptian labour market is far 
from being over-stocked" (Cromer, 1901,64). Leigh Hunt, the founder of Sudan 
Plantation Syndicate, attempted solving the problem by "bringing in American Negroes", 
but those brought in "soon asked to go back home" (Beshir, 1977,33). The only foreign 
labour possible to attract was that of the West Africans, specially the Fallata from 
Nigeria. Tokar, Gash, Gezira, Nuba Mountains as well as Port Sudan, were the areas 
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were the greater settlement of Fallata encouraged by the colonial state had taken place. In 
the Gezira area alone their number increased from 5000 in 1929 to 60000 in 1956. 
(Khalafafla, 1982,16). 
The most important implication of the land policy and its corollary, the labour policy was 
the sort of arrangements carried by the colonial state in the Gezira scheme. To solve both 
the problem of land and labour the colonial state adopted the policy of articulating the 
pre-capitalist mode of production existing in the Gezira with a capitalist mode of 
production introduced by the state and its foreign agent the Sudan Plantation Company, 
later renamed as the Sudan Plantation Syndicate, (SPS). This articulation took the shape 
of what is widely known as the tripartite crop-sharing arrangement between the state, the 
SPS and the Gezira tenants. The Gezira model was to haunt most of irrigated agriculture 
in the Sudan. The dynamics and complications of this articulation will be discussed in 
Chapter 6 below. - One of the most important constraints on the colonial economic policy 
was that of the Nile Waters which was imposed by Britain in order to protect Egyptian 
interests. Lord Cromer wrote in 1904, 
"I know of but one issue where any conflict of interest between Egypt and the Soudan is 
possible. Tlat is of the question of water supply.. 
"it is essential that in all matters connected with utilisation of the waters of the Nile on any 
large scale, the control exercised from Cairo should be absolute.. "(Cromer, 1904, pp 80-81). 
This control was eventually practised by the British advisers of the Egyptian Department 
of Irrigation. Until the construction of the Aswan Dam in 1902 , only 2500feddans were 
licensed for perennial irrigation in the Sudan. After the completion of the Dam , the 
irrigation -of further 1 0000feddw7s was permitted, and was increased by another 10000 in 
1912 when the Dam was raised. Open permission for pump irrigation during the flood 
period, July to February, was given in 1905 (Gaitskell, 1959,109). 
The plans to cultivate the Gezira with cotton brought the whole question of the Nile 
Waters to the fore. A contradiction appeared between extending the Scheme area to the 
optimal size which would make the project profitable according to projected 
yields/feddan and cotton price/lb on one hand and the water available, taking the Egyptian 
needs into consideration. This contradiction provoked different proposals and estimates 
which necessitated the formation the Nile Projects Comrnission in 1920. The 
Commission, which was composed of three members, failed to reach a unified report. Of 
the three members, two suggested that Sudan should use the Nile during the flood season 
only, and the third suggested the acknowledgement of Egypt's existing rights and that in 
the future any saved water through the construction of new projects should be equally 
divided (Fabnumi, 1960,116-25). 
The reports of the commission were shelved following the assassination of Sir Lee Stack 
the Governor General in Cairo in November 1924 which led to the ultimatum presented 
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by Lord Allenby, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Egyptian government. 
In the ultimatum Allenby notified the Egyptian government that the Sudan Government 
would "increase the area to be irrigated at the Gezira from 300000 feddans to an 
unlimited figure as'need may arise. "(Henderson, 1965,65). The crisis in the Anglo- 
Egyptian relations that followed the ultimatum overshadowed the Nile Waters question 
which then became a card to be played by the British. The colonial state in the Sudan lost 
no time in suggesting the appointment of a new commission to study the question. The 
Nile Commission was formed in 1925 to study "the basis on which irrigation can be 
carried out with full consideration of the interests of Egypt and without the detriment to 
her natural historical right" (Fabunmi, op. cit., 117). For Chamberlain, then British 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the commission "was one side of a bargain", the other side 
of it was that Egypt should contribute to the costs of the administration in the Sudan and 
especially to the maintenance of the newly formed Sudan Defence Force if - the 
Condominium was to be kept and Egyptian interests in the Nile were to be maintained. 
(Daly, 1986,319). The report of the Commission was the basis for the 1929 Nile Waters 
Agreement. 
According to the Nile Waters Agreement the Sudan share in the Nile waters was 
determined to be 1/22 of that of Egypt (that is 922,1,000,000 cubic meters compared 
with 22,000,000 cubic meters to Egypt) . 
(Treaty Series No. 17,1929). The Agreement 
provided for technical arrangements and discharge khedules which clearly defined the 
dates and quantities of water discharge in the Gezira and pump schemes. Areas to be 
irrigated by pumps between January and July were specified. Though the. Agreement 
relaxed the constraint on the government irrigation plans by providing water for the 
Gezira and limited area for pump irrigation, the constraint continued to constitute part of 
the colonial heritage of the independent Sudan. 
2.3.2. From Subsistence to Commoditv Production 
The history of the colonial economy is the history of the process of transformation' of the 
Sudanese pre-colonial economy from subsistence to commodity production. In 1899 an 
official report described the Sudan: 
"... was essentially a subsistence economy, [ivit] the people self-sufficicrit. in essential 
foodstuffs. There was little production to be offered to the external market- Within the country 
trade did not extend much beyond local barter, except in those commodities destined for 
export. Industry was limited to the handicraft manufacture of articles in wood, metal and 
earth. There was a small domestic production of rough woven cotton articles. "(GGAR-, 1899, 
53. ) 
The process of transforming that subsistence economy began as we have shown above by 
settling the land question, land being the most important means and object of any 
agric ultural economy. But this, in itself, was not enough to enhance the development of 
commodity production. In addition to Private property, simple commodity production 
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requires a division of labour which involve the specialisation of independent producers in 
the production of different items. The generalisation of commodity production requires, 
in addition, the transformation of labour power into a commodity. (Marx, 1967,668 
Of all-these conditions only one existed in the Sudan, private ownership of land in the 
riparian and Gezira areas and the right of land utilisation within community lands in other 
parts in the country. The latter only partially served the function of private ownership of 
land, because it remained short of changing land into commodity which had its 
repercussions on land utilisation on the sub-sector of rain-fed agriculture which is 
discussed in Chapter 6. The division of labour was carried within the family or the 
household on gender and age lines. (Khalfalla: 1984,14). Exchange and trade existed, but 
items were surplus goods produced basically as use-values. 
Instead of promoting the internal division of labour towards more specialisation, the 
colonial process of commoditization took a different historical path. The Sudan economy 
was to be integrated into the international division of labour as a producer of raw 
materials and importer of manufactured goods. Wingate outlined that the policy of the 
colonial state was to link the Sudan through a port on the Red Sea with the international 
market so that "the inhabitants may be more economically furnished with the 
requirements firom abroad and may find outside markets for their _pLodycts" 
(emphasis 
added). To achieve that the Sudanese producers had to develop a need for 
"requirements", which they did not produce and/ or to shift from locally producing some 
goods to importing them. They should also either have surpluses to sell or especially 
produce exchange-values. The need for new requirements was developed through a 
'demonstration effect', where the role of traders, especially the Jallaba, was great. In 
1904, Colonel Sparkes, the Governor of Bahar el Gazal wrote in his annual report, 
"There is an increasing demand for civilised commodities.. ". (GGAR, 1904,98). Major 
Fieldman reported from Bahar el Gazal in 1913 that after, 
"the introduction last year of general stores at Maridi, Yambio and Tcrnbura, inspectors of the 
three districts write enthusiastically as to the keenness of the population to obtain money to 
enable them to'purchase articles at the store which have taken their fancy. " (GGAR, 1913, 
68). 
Locally cottage-based cotton industry which used to exist in the Gezira area and the 
Northem province disappeared due to the sl-ffl of demand to the more competitive 
imported textiles of higher quality and cheaper price (Ibrahim. 1989,74). 
The need for money to pay taxation also led to the development of the market relations. 
During the first decade of the colonial rule a range of different taxes on land, crops, 
saggias (water-wheel), palm trees, cattle, sheep and camels were introduced. In addition 
a poll-tax was imposed in some areas like the Nuba Mountains, Southem Sudan and the 
Ingassana area in the Blue Nile. 
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The development of market relations and commodity production was enhanced by the 
extension of the railways to Khartoum in 1899, between Berber on the river Nile and 
Suakin on the Red sea in 1906, to Meddani in 1909 and through the Gezira via KOsti to 
El-Obied in Kordofan in 1911, and to Port Sudan, the new port, in 1909. -The British 
Cotton Growing Association reported in 1913 that, "no single other colony in tropical 
Africa can boast of such excellent transport facilities". Cromer's desire to extend the 
railway to El Obeid to bring Kordofan's gum to the Market (Shuqair, 1967,1342, ) was 
fulfilled in 1911. Following that organised markets spread in Kordofan; El-Nahud, Um- 
Ruaba, El-Rahad and El-Obeid itself, gum-arabic became the greatest source of export 
revenues until 1920 when cotton took its place. 
In the Sudan the relation of the so-called tradition sub-sector with the international 
market was established before the establishment of the modem sector. The list of exports 
fi7om the former contained millet, cattle, sheep and goats, honey, hides and skins, sesame, 
dates, ostrich feather and dura. In 19088 they represented about 92% of Sudan exports 
earnings and decreased to 88% in 1913. 
This relationship has continued despite the development of the Gezira scheme and the 
independence of the country. It came to constitute the most important single simulator of 
commodity production in this traditional sub-sector and was, in reality, responsible for the 
change in the crop structure and the bias towards the production of oil-seeds, ie sesame 
and groundnuts, following the Second World War. Through this relation indigenous, 
expatriates merchants and commercial companies were able to accumulate large sums of 
capital fi7om the economic surplus appropriated from the peasants as conunercial profits 
through the exports and imports from and to the traditional sub-sector. Most of the 
surplus appropriated from operations in this sub-sector were transferred to urban areas 
and the modem sector, accumulated as capital and re-invested in trade, contracts, pump 
irrigation, and later in mechanised agriculture and/or industry (after independence). The 
part of the surplus which remained in the sub-sector itself usually invested in expanding 
trade'and transport, (private lorries), or as financial capital, especially through the -Shail 
s ystem which is a financial system introduced by merchants to provide credit to peasants 
during the rainy season and compel them to sell part or all of their crops in advance, 
before the harvest, at low prices . 
Mahmoud in her study of the Sudanese Bourgeoisie (1984) revealed the importance of 
the Western Sudan, one of the areas as the source of capital accumulation and showed 
that, "During the later 1930s and in the 1940s, the majority of the now leading edible oil 
capitalist in Khartoum originally accumulated their capital in western Sudan. " (Mahmoud, 
1984,122). My own observation in other spheres of investment confirm these results. 
Almost most of the cattle, sheep and camel merchants had accumulated capital fi7om 
trading in western Sudan and. transferred it to Khartoum. Some of them who were 
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resident s in Khartoum had their agents from the Jallaba resident in the west. Agents of 
foreign companies exporting crops like groundmits, sesame and gum-arabic transferred 
their accumulated capital to Khartoum and Port Sudan and themselves became involved 
in export import trade. 
The momentum of this process was not uneven between different parts of the country. It 
depended to great extent to accessibility to foreign markets which was made possible by 
railway extension and improvement of other sorts of transport and communication 
facilities. This condition excluded the Southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains, and parts of 
Darfur and"the Blue Nile provinces. The Passport and Permit Ordinance of 1922 and the 
Closed District Ordinance of 1929 prevented the free movement of traders, and especially 
the Jallaba, (who were the catalysts for commodity production), in these areas. Even in 
such areas Mahmoud found evidence that suggested that merchants had also accumulated 
capital, ie the South, and had transferred it to the North (mainly to Khartoum and Port 
Sudan), (Ibid., 123). It is important to notice that the commoditization process did not 
introduce a new internal division of labour in the traditional sub-sector that resulted in the 
specialisation in corm-nodity production, instead the production of commodities was 
annexed to the subsistence economy, increasing the burden on labour and la nd. It is also 
important to notice that despite the increase of the burden, a general commoditization of 
land and labour did not take place. This was mainly the result of the colonial state 
articulation policy which kept the land tenure system; ie land as communal property, 
though tribal aristocracy became more involved in land allocation including land for 
cultivation, pasture and gum-arabic gardens. One important result of these constraints 
was the stagnation of the level of the development of the productive forces and its 
corollary the low-level of productivity in the sub-sector. The implications of this process 
on the rain-fed agricultural production will be discussed in chapter'6. 
The process of commoditization was given a great 'push- by the establishment of the 
Gezira Scheme. Here commodity production was imposed by direct state coercion. The 
1921 and 1923 Gezira Land Ordinances and their amendments in the 1927 Ordinance had 
provided for the legal control of the Gezira land through its compulsory lease to the 
government for forty years. But instead of changing the landowners into free labourers 
and hence laying the base for the generalisation'Of commodity production by converting 
labour power itself into a commodity, the colonial state as we have shown above opted 
for the articulation of the pre-capitalist relations of share-cropping, the implications of 
which will be discussed in Chapter 6. The base for regional uneven development was 
established governed by the needs of international market rather than the internal 
development and integration of the economy. Sudan link with the international market 
was confirmed. 
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2.3.3. The Link with the International Market 
The confirmation of the Sudan link with the international market was established through 
three types of relations: the relation with the international money market, the relation 
through foreign enterprises having branches or subsidiaries in the Sudan, and through the 
'export/ import relation. 
The relation of the Sudan with the international money market began by the British 
Treasury Bill in 1919 which guaranteed the interests on a loan of ; E3 million to be raised 
by the Sudan Government in the London Money Market at a rate of interest of 5.5% for 
the construction of Sennar Dam and the canalisation works of the Gezira Scheme. World 
War I interrupted the construction and raised the costs. The loan had to be increased to 
16.5 million, issued in two instalments in 1919 and 1921 at 5.5% rate of interest and 
payable in 30 years starting in 1929. Another loan was guaranteed by the British Treasury 
in 1923 to complete the construction and to provide for the increase of the proposed area 
from 300,000feddans to 450,000feddans, to be repaid at 4% rate of interest in 25 years 
starting in 1950. The Sudan Government through issuing Debenture Stock guaranteed a 
loan of ; EI. 3 million to Kassala Railways Company, which was owned by the 
Government, at a rate of interest of 4.5%, repayable in 20 years starting in 1934. Two 
other similar loans were issued to the. Sudan Construction Company and the Gedaref 
Railway and Development Company both owned by the Sudan Government and 
guaranteed by her in London Money Market. The Sudan Government also guaranteed the 
privately owned Sudan Light and Power Company (Limited) to raise 10.4 million and 
offered it the monopoly of generating and distributing the electricity in major Sudanese 
towns and the running of the tram service in Khartoum. Two of these loans apart, all of 
them were repaid before the country's independence . 
The second type of relationship was through the foreign private enterprises working in 
the Sudan. The most important of them was the Sudan Plantation Syndicate which was 
first established as the Sudan Experimental Plantation Company by Leigh Hunt, an 
American, in 1904. The Company was registered in London with a capital of 180,000 
distributed in il shares. In 1907 the Company changed its name to the Sudan Plantation 
Syndicate. For the first six years the Syndicate was involved in the production of cotton 
in Zeidab, north of Khartoum on the east bank of the Mile. In 1910 it increased its 
authorised capital to 1250,000 of ; E1 shares. In 1911, the British Cotton Growers 
Association took 5,000 shares in the Syndicate and the BCGA chairman joined its boards 
of directors. That was not by chance because the same year it was entrusted with the 
management of the Gezira experimental farm at Tayiba (Gaitskell: 1959,75-76) and after 
long negotiations it was co-opted as a partner in the Gezira Scheme entrusted with the 
management and entitled to 20% of the gross profits of the cotton sales. The Syndicate 
concession was to last for 25 years (Ibid., 126-128). The Syndicate achieved a gross 
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share in the profits of the Scheme during the period it managed it 1926-1950 of 122.7 
million and a profit, (before tax deduction ), of S. 6 million of which 18.7 million were 
divided to shareholders mounting to 15% of the nominal value of the share per year 
(Ibid., Table 6,273). The Syndicate profit is a classical case of economic surplus 
generated within one country and exported to another. The Syndicate concession was 
withdrawn in 1950. 
In addition to the Syndicate, private foreign companies dominated foreign trade in the 
Sudan. Most of these companies were British. They included the Mitchell Cotts Group, 
GeHately Hankey and Co., Sudan Mercantile and a number of cotton specialised trade 
companies. My estimate of their total capital is that it ranged between 18 to 110 million, 
wHe they were dealing in exports and imports of the value of 1100 to 1250 million until 
their nationalisation in 1970. They were dependent on the credit facilities provided by the 
commercial banks in the range of E 11-22 million per year. (Estimates based on data of 
foreign trade statistics publish ed by Sudan Government and the Annual Reports of the 
Governor General on Administration, Finance and Accounts of the Sudan, presented 
annually to the Condominium Powers, a copy of which was submitted by the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs to the House of Commons in London and published by it, 
among its States and Accounts Papers; copies of the original reports are kept in the 
Central Documents House, in Khartoum. ) 
The commercial banks themselves were foreign enterprises. The first of these banks, the 
Egyptian Ahli Bank, was established in 1901, it was followed by the Barclays DCO in 
1913 which soon dominated the market providing credit facilities until 1946 when the 
British Ottoman Bank established its first branch in 1946. It was followed by Bank Misr 
(Egyptian) and the Credit Lyonnais (French) in 1953 , the Ethiopian Commercial Bank 
and the Arab Bank in 1956. The commercial banks restricted their activity to the finance 
of foreign trade providing credit facilities for both exporters and importers. In 1956,67% 
of the credit facilities provided by these banks were allocated to the finance of exports, 
50%, and imports 17%. (Salih: 1975,39). 
The most important linkage with the international market was found in the nature of the 
colonial economy as a mono-export-crop economy. By the establishment of the Gezira 
Scheme., the Sudanese economy became structurally dependent on the export of cotton. It 
was not only the source for the income of 100,000 tenants and their families, but it was 
also the source of foreign currency to finance the country's imports' bifl. It was also the 
main source of the government's revenue whether through its direct share from the cotton 
profits or through the indirect taxation and excise duties imposed on the cotton exports, 
(which by 1956 constituted 72% of the. total earning of exports). Government revenue 
also befitted from the tariff duties on imports financed by cottorfs export earnings. A 
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failure in the cotton crop and/or a collapse in the international cotton market lead to 
economic crisis. The Great Depress ion of 1929-33 was a classical example of the latter. 
2.3.4. The Great Depression and the Colonial Economy 
The Great Depression of 1929-33 was disastrous to the newly established mono-crop 
export economy. The average price of cotton in International Markets decreased from 
18.4 in 1928/29 to 7.9 penceALB in 1929/30 and to 6.4 pence/LB in 
193 0/3 L(Gaitskell: 1959,152). The direct result was the collapse of export earnings from 
113.5 rrffllion to less than Y. 6 million in 1932. The Government revenue decreased from 
16.8 million in 1928 to 13.8 million in 1932 the Sudan Government was forced to ask for 
Egyptian financial aid. 'Austerity measures were introduced including cutting the salaries 
of government employees and the reduction of their number and the reduction of 
government expenditure on public utilities. Salaries of all government employees were cut 
by 5 to 10%, and the starting salary of the newly appointed graduate of Gordon College 
was reduced from 18 to L5.5 per month, leading to the Gordon College Student's strike 
of 1931. The total number of government employees decreased from 5888 in 1930 to 
4773 in 1932 and 4753 in 1933. Those who lost their jobs included 20% of the 1000 
British. Some 800 Sudanese and Egyptians had their employment terminated. Some 
departments suffered more than others. For example, in the Department of Sudan 
Railways, 31% of British, 33 of the Egyptian and almost all the Greeks personnel lost 
theirjobs. 
Education suffered greatly from the effects of the Great Depression, especially because 
the Depression occurred at times unfavourable for education. The Gordon College's 
student -adrnýission fees were raised to E15 from L12 charged before and student's 
boarding fees to 128 instead of Y. 25. Elementary school fees were raised from 18 to f. 10. 
Grants for education were generally curbed. 
This classical example of the effect of an-intemational depression illustrates the possible 
effects of an international crisis on the economy of the Sudan which had become linked 
with the international market through the export of pnmary commodities, dominated by 
one, cotton. 
2.3.5. ThePost War Boom and the Colonial Economv. 
The international link could bring the crisis right into the Sudan, but on the other hand it 
could also bring in a boom. The post-World War Boom was a classical example for the 
Sudanese economy. The mechanism through which the positive effects of the boom were 
transferred was, (as in the crisis ), the price of cotton and the earnings from cotton 
exports. The price of cotton began an increasing trend after World War. It increased from 
10 penceýLB in 1945/46 to 19 penceALB in 196/47. It jumped to 38.5 pence/LB in 
1947/48, an increase of more than 100%, and remained at that high price during 1948/49, 
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to increase further to 41.3 penceALB in 1949/50. (Gaitskell, op. cit.., 263). The good 
prices were reflected in the exports revenues which increased from E10 million in 1946 to 
E15.3 million in 1947, to; E1 in 1948. 
The increase of revenues of cotton exports were reflected in an increase in the revenue of 
the government and the incomes of the Gezira tenants. The government revenue 
increased LE8.2 miflion in 1946 to LE10.1 million in 1947 to LE12.7 in 1948 to LE19.2 
in 1949 to LE41.9 in 1950/51 (when the fiscal year was changed from a calendar year one 
running from July to June one) (Kaballo: 1984,34-35). 
The income per tenancy in Gezira increased from LE29 in 1946 to LE96, LEI 89, LE221 
and LE281 during the years 1947,1948,1949 and 1950 respectively. The total cotton 
revenue for all Gezira tenants increased from LEO. 5 million in 1946 to LE5.8 million in 
1950. 
It is impossible to equate the effects of an international economic crisis and a boom on a 
mono-export crop economy like the one established by the colonial state in the Sudan. 
One important difference is the long period effect of any international recession compared 
with the short-run effect of a boom. A recovery from an international recession (as the 
Sudanese experience bad shown) did not mean a return to a pre-recession level of prices. 
In 1930 the price of cotton declined to 7.9 pence/LB from a level 18.4 pence/LB in 1929 
and did not return to the 1929 level for seventeen years, during which the average price 
was less than half that of 1929. 
VvUle the period of declining prices continued for seventeen years that of increasing 
prices above the average price from the first season of the Scheme in 1925/26 to 1929, 
continued for only four seasons. If the accumulated loss is compared with the 
accumulated gain, the former, which amounted to LE34 million, was greater than the 
latter, which amounted to LE23.1 millions. ( Calculated from data provided by 
Gaitskell: 1959,267, Table 1). 
2.3.6. The Manazement of the Colonial Economv 
Although one can apparently distinguish between direct and indirect management of the 
colonial economy ( the Gezira Scheme as compared to the rain-fed agriculture sub-sector, 
the so-called traditional), the difference was not that substantial. That was because of the 
degree of the potential coercion, in the nature of the authoritarian colonial state, which 
could be used to enforce the decisions on both levels. It is true that a distinction might be 
made between direct administrative control and the use of economic and financial policies 
to affect the behaviour of economic variables through the responses of economic agents 
(producers, buyers and/or sellers, etc. ), but this itself involves a degree of coercion. 
'"Ule direct management in agriculture was based mainly on what we defined in Chapter 
I as the institutional pattern of articulation, in other sectors it was based on the capital- 
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labour relationship despite the presence of a militarist pattern of routine and discipline 
which, as it has been argued above, was a general characteristic of the colonial state. An 
example of the former was the Gezira Scheme, which was run by the Syndicate as part of 
this institutional pattern of articulation to the extent that for the tenants the Syndicate and 
the State were identical. Examples of the latter were the Sudan Railways and the. 
Steamers department which were run to maintain a satisfactory rate of profit to contribute 
to the government revenue which owned the capital. Production and services were 
carried in both cases according to detailed plans to the extent that the schedule of 
agricultural activities in Gezira was compared to a Ford Factory discipline (Founu- 
Tchuigoua: 1978,29), and a retired railwayman described the trains during the colonial 
period "as punctual as Big Ben"(Discussio n with Sudan Railway workers and employees, 
Railway Club, Khartoum 1987, on the 'Causes of decline of Sudan Railways'). The 
authoritarian colonial state did not face a real challenge to its management of the 
economy until after World War, when both the Gezira tenants and the railway workers 
went on strike, the former demanding the distribution of the reserve fund and the latter 
demanding the right to form their trade union organisation. It was for the post-colonial 
state to face the outcomes of these challenges ten years -later. 
The indirect management involved the patterns of political articulation, the articulation 
through exchange and co-existence where a greater autonomy of the pre-capitalist modes 
of production existed. The political articulation, as *we have already discussed, 
contributed to strengthening the tribal and religious aristocracy by allotting, pump 
schemes on. the banks of the Blue and White Nile. The tribal. aristocrac y also used the 
recognition of their traditional powers by the colonial state in the management of 
communal land, Hashab (acacia Senegal) gardens, and through local tax collection to 
accumulate capital. They all became part of the economic management and as 
beneficiaries of the system, active elements in its reproduction. The district and provincial 
commissioners reserved for themselves the powers of interference to issue licences, to 
estimate the business profit tax, to determine the maximum prices and rents as well as the 
minimum wages to government's temporary workers. In the closed areas they had the 
powers to permit or deny the entry of merchants to their districts or provinces. Hence 
bringing the pattern of articulation through the exchange mechanism -under their last 
resort control and continuous influence. 
The members of the political and civil service themselves, who as it has been argued 
before were not employees of the colonial office in London and their careers development 
and pensions depended on the 'Sudan Government', developed interests in the 
reproduction of the articulated system of modes of production as it maintained the 
financial independence of the colonial state and ensured their careers. They made 
47 
themselves an economic base and an external and internal allies, all benefited from the 
restoration of the status quo and the reproduction of the articulated system. 
To maintain th&. - reproduction of the economic system, the state had to insure the 
reproduction of the producers, their means of production and their articulated production 
relations. The articulation of modes of production ensured that the minimum 
requirements for the reproduction of the producers' labour power were produced by them 
in the articulated system, ie tenants produce their grain (dura) in the Gezira, and the 
peasants, the nomads or the trans-nomads, became partially a subsistence and partially a 
commodity producer. This is the essence of what we argue as incomplete generalisation 
of commodity production. It is incomplete because the producer had not been completely 
divorced from his/her means of production, ie labour power in general did not become a 
commodity. 
The commoditý product of the articulated system had to be exchanged if capital was to 
realise economic surplus and if the production process was to be repeated whether as a 
simple or extended reproduction. The fact that the commodity product was export- 
oriented, ( it was not just produced for exchange, but for exchange abroad), made the 
reproduction of the system depend on the international market. The system for its 
reprod uction, relieý on the international market for the supply of some of the means of 
production, some of the consumer goods, especially for those living in the urban areas 
and -which attract through a demonstration effect more and more of the rural population 
who came in contact with the market. Part of the value of the exported commodity was 
appropriated as economic surplus by the owners of the capital: the state, the Syndicate 
and commercial companies a. nd local merchants, while the tenants and peasants return 
some of the value of their labour power. Part of the economic surplus was exported (see 
above), by the Syndicate to be paid as dividends to its shareholders, part by the state to. 
pay back the loans used in the construction of the Scheme and a part by other foreign 
commercial companies and banks, even if their profits were not directly related to the 
export activities. The state used part. of its share to finance its personnel and activities as a 
state. Simple reproduction requires a value of exports which should cover' all these 
requirements. Extended reproduction require a value of exports which should not only 
cover all these requirements but should achieve a surplus to be accumulated and 
reinvested. The colonial state, except during the great depression maintained the 
conditions for an extended reproduction, though extended in a limited scale and mainly 
aimed at expanding the export production, by ensuring two conditions: a) an annual 
increase in exports of about 8.6% between 1910 and 1942 and 15.5% between 1942 and 
1956. b) curtailing public and private consumption, government ex enditure increased by Ip 
3.7% between 1910 and 1942 and by 12.8% between 1942 and 1956, which were, in 
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both cases, less than the growth rate of exports. The surplus accumulated during the 
1935-42 period allowed the higher expenditure during the 1942-56 period. 
The first condition, the growth of export, was maintained by the factory-like system of 
production and the horizontal expansion of the cultivated land. The second condition'. the 
curtailing of consumption, was maintained through a set of measures: a) insisting on 
maintaining not only a balanced budget, but also a surplus to be deposited in a reserve 
fund, through the restriction of government expenditure; b) a rigid exchange control and 
foreign trade permit and approval system which required the registration of exporters and 
importers and the obtain of a valid licence for the export and import of any commodity; 
c)the curtail on consumption through price fixing policies, wage and salaries 
determination, taxation, especially indirect taxation with its high income distribution 
incidence against the poor; in addition to direct subjection of some commodities during 
World War H to strict rationing system. 
2.4. Religion, Native Administration and Uneven Development 
In its attempt io bridge the gap between itself and the population, the colonial state used 
a number of policies such as a religion policy, an indirect rule policy and an education 
policy. These policies had their implications on the socio-econornic structure of the 
country. The follo , wing sections 
will. discuss these policies. An additional section will 
discuss the so-called Southern Policy for its importance in the discussion of the uneven 
development and civil war in the post: -colonial Sudan. 
2.4.1. The Religious Policy 
The religious policy of the colonial state in the Sudan which was "determined largely by 
considerations of politics and security" (Holt and Daly, 1979,124), attempted by several 
measures to avoid any feeling among the Muslims of Northern Sudan that the colonial 
state was undermining Islam or trying to convert Muslims to Christianity. Lord Kitchner 
wrote. to the Mudirs ".. Be careful to see that religious feelings are not in anyway 
interfered with and that the Mohammedan religion is respected. "(170. /78/5022). 
In 1901 the colonial government issued a proclamation to encourage 'true Islamic 
religion' and hence a 'Board of Ulema' [ Religious Scholars], was established formed of 
an orthodox-Islamic-cult which included the Muffi, [an Islarnic scholar whose 
responsibifity is the distinction between al-Halal, that is what is perinitted, and al- 
Harram, what is prohibited, according to Islamic beliefs, and to provide spiritual 
guidance for Muslims in controversial matters], the GrandKadi, [Chief Justice of Islamic 
Courts], and some other Islamic notables. The aim of the Board was to counteract the 
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influence of Islamic sufism which was thought to be the fertile soil for MahdiSM 7 and 
religious uprising. Further a system of Islamic Sharia Courts was established under the 
Mohammedan Law Courts Ordinance of 1902 to deal with: 
"(a) any questions regarding marriage, divorce, guardianship of minors or family relationship, 
provided that the marriage to which the question related was concluded in accordance with 
Mohammedan law, provided the parties are all Moharnmedans. 
"(b)Any question relating to NVaqf, gift, succession, wills , interdiction or guardianship of an 
interdicted or lost person, provided that the endower, donor, or the deceased or the interdicted 
or lost person is a Mohammedan. 
"(c) Any question other than those mentioned, provided that all the parties, whether being 
Mohammedans or not, make a formal demand signed by them, asking the Court to entertain 
the question and state that they agree to be bound by the ruling of Mohammedan law. " (El 
Nur: 1960,79) 
Moreover, the government encouraged the rebuilding of mosques and khalwas and 
subsidised them, facilitated the pilgrimage to Mecca and observed great sensitivity when 
dealing with Islamic matters (Daly 1991,3-4). Christian missions were pre . vented from 
work in the Muslim dominated Northern Sudan and when a concession was made to the 
missions to operate in education and the health services, it was on the condition that they 
did not preach Christianity to Muslims. However, full consent of Muslim children's 
parents was required before any religious instructions could be given. 
Despite the colonial state's suspicion towards Sufist Islam, Ali al-Mirghani, the leader of 
the Khatimyya religious sect was allowed to move freely to reorganise his -sect and 
though sufists were prevented from building their mosques and zawyas, [small 
mosques], Ali al-Mirghani was allowed to rebuild the Khatimyya mosque in Kassala. In 
1900 he was awarded, on the recommendation of the colonial authorities, the C. M. G. in 
recognition of his collaboration and as an act to promote his personal image and social 
prestige among Sudanese relative to the defeated Mahdist notables. al-Mirghani made use 
of these opportunities to increase his wealth through possession of estates and 
agricultural lands and collecting Zakaht (Islamic tax) and gifts from his followers. 
The colonial stat&s attitudes towards Ali al-Mirghani suggests that their policy with 
regard to Sufist Islam w. as pragmatic and depended on the dual role that it might play in 
enlisting collaborators or eliminating enmity. This was illustrated during the World War 1, 
when the government, afraid of the possible religious agitation that might rise iri support 
of Turkey and the Ottoman Sultan as the leader of the Muslim countries, sought the. 
service of the Sudanese religious notables, including Abdul Rahman, the son of A] Mahdi. 
As a result of the of Wingate's efforts, Abd al-Rahman and "five hundred other religious 
and tribal leaders signed the Sudan Book of Loyalty, pledging their full support for Great 
Britain and her allies during the War (Warburg, 1971,107). The Book was followed after 
7Mohamed Ahmed Nvho declared himself al Mahdi and led the Mahdist Revolution of 1881 Nvas 
originally a member of the Sammaniyya Sufist Sect. 
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the War by a delegation of religious and tribal leaders to Britain in 1919 to congratulate 
King George on victory. This began a new era in the collaboration of traditional religious 
leaders and the colonial state. Sheriff YOsuf al-I-Endie, the leader of the I-Endyya religious 
sect "who in 1909 publicly charged by the Board of Ulema for interfering in tribal afflairs 
became persona granta. and was recommended for a C. M. G. "(1bid., 107). Al-Hindie's 
political rehabilitation enabled his ascent to being one of the wealthiest Sudanese, 
possessing lands in Gezira and Khartoum and also like al-Mrghani received gifts from his 
followers. 
In addition to traditional leaders, Abd al-Rahman appeared as a valuable collaborator.,, 
Abd al-Rahman proved to be useful to the colonial state both in internal and international 
affairs. Internally Abd al-Rahman condemned the 1924 Revolution, was a go-between in 
ending Gordon College Student' strike, stood against the radical wing in the Graduate 
Congress and backed the moderates who preferred co-operation with the colonial state, 
and with his followers participated in all the institutions created by the colonial state in its 
policy of gradual constitutional development which was rejected by the militants. 
Internationally, Abd al-Rahman expressed the rejection of the unity with Egypt and 
travelled twice to Britain to rally the support of British officials against any possible' 
British concessions to Egypt. in the Sudan, ie the Sidqi-B evin Protocol of 1946. 
Abd al-Rahman benefited from his services to the colonial state. Though Abd al-Rahman 
agricultural activities began as early as 1908, the outstanding growth in his wealth, 
commercial and agricultural activities were due to the direct and indirect assistance of the 
colonial state, as a reward to his services during the War and the 1924 events. Due to the 
shortage of fuel supplies during the War, Abd al-Rahman was granted a contract to 
supply the government with wood from the forests of Gezira Aba9 and to cultivate the 
land cleared by cotton. In 1919 he was offered contracts to supply the construction of the 
Sennar Dam by local building materials. In . 1926 he was granted a loan of 4500 Egyptian 
pounds which was written off later. He was also given a lease, with two of his relatives, a 
lease to cultivate Gondal Scheme on the Blue Nile which was originally deieloped by the 
goveniment. 
On the other hand, Abd al-Rahman making use of the opportunity given to him by the 
government to tour the Gezira areas during the war, laid the foundation for organising his 
followers "into a religious tariqa" (Ibrahim, 1989, ppl73-174). I-Es organisation was build 
81n. a private letter to Clayton, Wingate claimed that the government was able to deal with a 
Mahdist uprising in Jebel Qadir in 1915 because Abd al-Rahman "informed about him.. " 
ffingate to Clayton, 24 April 1915, SAD/469/9). 
ý"Gezira Aba is a small island on the White Nile, north of Kosti. Mohamed Ahmed al-Mahdi 
began his revolution from Us Island in 1881, where he maintained his first victory against the 
Turko-Egyptian forces. 
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on a system of mmidub, (representative/delegate), and wakeel, (agent), that spread to 
cover most of the provinces where the Mahdyya was popular, especially the western 
provinces of Kordofan and Darfiir. He also organised reading groups of his father's book 
of blessings and prayers which the Grand Kadi declared legal after a long hesitation by the 
authorities. 
Abd al-Rahman used the organisation of his Ansar'O to enhance both his political and 
economic career. His success to keep his followers calm during the War proved to the 
authorities that he was influential. He used his followers to demonstrate his power by 
rallying them in Aba Island during religious and political occasions. The two Muslim Eids 
[festivals] where occasions used by Abd al-Rahman to perform a show of power by 
gathering his followers for Eid pray. He used also to gather them whenever an official 
was visiting the area. 
Abd al-Rahman used his religious influence to enhance his wealth and agricultural 
activities. His mandubs and ivakeels collected Zakaht (Islamic tax) from his followers. He 
accepted gifts from them in exchange of barkah (blessing) . In addition the muhajifin 
worked in his agriculture schemes for "pittance.. bellila [boiled dura meal], porridge and a 
blessing" (Rober-tson, 1974 , 33). 
Ali al-Mirghani never accepted the promotion of Abd al-Rahman, and since 1919 when 
the latter presented his father's sword to King George, al-Mirghani accused the British of 
planning to install Abd al-Rahma'n king on the Sudan. This established a sort of rivalry 
between the two notables which aggravated the historical conflict between their two 
religious sects. This led al-Mirghani to seek alliance with Britain's rival in the Sudan, 
Egypt. 
Hence rel igious policy in the Northern Sudan which was started by the desire to counter 
Sufist Islam as the origin of Mahdism, concluded, through pragmatism, by promoting 
religious sectarianism and alliance with Neo-Mahdism leaving the Northern Sudan divided 
between two competing religious sects led by wealthy religious aristocracy. 
2.4.2. Education Politics and Politics of the Educated 
From the start the colonial state thought of education as an important tool to establish 
their hegemony. Salisbury wrote to Kitchner in 1898 that, "The only method" to "count 
securely upon... their, [Sudanese] co-operation either in the duties of government or the 
promotion of industrial progress "was" to give the races whom you have conquered 
access to the literature and knowledge of Europe" (Quoted in Beshir, 1977,39). Lord 
Cromer, on the other hand, thought of the creation of' a class of Soudanese who before 
IOThe Ansar are the followers of Sayed Mohamed Ahmed al Mahdi(1844-1885) who led the 
1881-1885 Revolution in the Sudan aenin t the Turko-Egyptian rule(1821-1885), and created an 
independent state (1885-1898). 
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long be capable of filling some subordinate posts under the Government. " (Cromer 
Speech at Khartoum, 28th January. 1903, FO/635/25). Sir James Currie, the first Director 
of Education, defined the objectives of the education policy in his first annual report in 
1902 as the creation of indigenous class of administrators and artisans and the difflusion of 
elementary education among the masses to enable them to cope with the machinery of 
government and administration ofjustice. (GGAR. 1902,. 114). 
Moreover , education of the 
Sudanese was thought important to replace the Egyptians 
working in the Sudan. Egyptians were thought to endanger the hegemony of the colonial 
state, (dorninated by the British), either through corruption which would created mistrust 
and discontent among the Sudanese or by spreading hostile feelings towards the British in 
line with the growing nationalist feeling in Egypt itself The Court of Inquiry into the 
mutiny of Sudanese Battalions in 1900, accused the Egyptian Officers of inciting the 
mutiny. Colonel Jackson who headed the Court went further and suggested the removal 
of the Sudanese cadets from the Egyptian Military School in Cairo and the establishment 
of a similar school in Khartoum to avoid the influence of Egyptian Nationalism on the 
cadets The recommendation was implemented in 1905. 
The policy led to the creation of a new class of effendia, the predecessor of the Sudanese 
bureaucracy. By 1920 out of 4178 classified jobs within the colonial state apparatus, 15 44 
junior post were held by Sudanese as compared to 535, British, 1824 Egyptian, 167 
Syrians, and 109 other nationalities (Beshir, 1969, p55). The expenditure on education 
increased from 0.3% of total expenditure of the government in 1901 to 2.4%in 1920 and 
number of attendiner elementary schools from 1280 in 1907 to 7649 in 1920. (ibid., pp44- 
55). 
Though the outcome of the first twenty years was significant in elementary education, 
the achievement of education as a tool of hegemony was unsatisfactory as far as the 
colonial state was concerned. Instead of creating an educated strata which would, as 
expected by Salisbury and Currie, facilitate the acceptance of the colonial rule, it was 
clear by the end of the war that the educated were carriers of the 'germs', to use Maffey's 
famous expression, of nationalism "from which" the Sudanese rural population should be 
protected. The rise of nationalist feelings was reflected in the organisation of the League 
of the Sudanese Union in 1920 and the White Flag League in 1923 and the '1924 
Revolution which were all initiated by the educated elite. The response of the colonial 
state was aggressive repression and education suffered a major set-back between 1924 
and 1938. Expenditure on education was stagnant between 1924 and 1926 and suffered 
from major cuttings from 1930 to 1937. It was to bear most of the burden of the Great 
Depression of 1929-1933 ; expenditure declined substantially from 179,609 to 112,393 
Egyptian pounds, the number of children at elementary schools decreased by 0.3%, at 
primary schools by 32% and students in Gordon College, the only secondary school by 
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39.1% and those in technical schools by 45%. The salaries of the College's graduates 
were cut by % which led to the Student's strike of 193 1. At the same time th e number of 
classified jobs was decreased by more than 1000 between 1930-1933. Though those 
measures might be reviewed as a necessary response to the Great Depression, a general 
attitude against the development of education in the Sudan was widespread amongst the 
British Officials. A British arrival in the Sudan in 1929 wrote that he found "strong 
disapproval of education, especially of Gordon College, amongst most of the British 
officials .. "(Griffith, 1953,6). 
The dissatisfaction with the Sudanese educated strata was reflected in addition to the cut 
in education expenditure and opportunities, by the adoption of the policy of indirect rule 
after 1922 (see sub-section 2.4.3 below) 
The suspicion of the educated and the anti-education policy in the Sudan at that time 
could be attributed to an overall colonial policy. This policy contributed to the hostility to 
education. It was based on the principle of indirect rule which had spread through the 
British Empire following the publication of Lugard's 'Dual Mandate' in 1922 and the 
practical experience of indirect rule in Nigeria. It could also be explained by the Milner 
Report of 1920 11 wlých advised the Government of the Sudan to take in the "matter of 
education, not to repeat the mistake (sic) which has been made in Egypt of introducing a 
system which fits pupils - for little else' than in employment in clerical and minor 
administrative posts, and creates an overgrown body of aspirants to government 
employment" (quoted in Madbvfichael, op. cit.., 262). Hence the Commission advised the 
expansion of education that would give" the Sudanese a capacity and taste for 
employment in other directions . 
"(Ibid., 262). Thisdid not imply an anti-education policy, 
but rather sugoest a shift in emphasis from educating for government employment to 
education for "employment in other directions". Even for government employment, the 
colonial state should have extended education because supply was far behind demand. In 
1928 there were 270 vacancies than available graduates (Sanderson, 1989, p78). 
Although the need for more junior and technical personnel was great due to the expulsion 
and compulsory retirement of Egyptian personnel after the 1924, the education system 
was not able to provide enough Sudanese to replace them. paradoxically, though the t) I 
intermediate and secondary schools- students had increased between 1920 and 1930 
before it began to decline, the intake and number of elementary schools declined sharply 
during this period and a shift towards replacing them by khalwas was hastened . 
Meanwhile the need for junior and middle-rank posts was satisfied by employing more 
I IT'he Nfilner Commission Nvas appointed in 1919 to investigate the events and causes of the 1919 
Revolution in Egypt; Sudan was not part of its terms of reference, yet two of its members visited 
the Sudan and the Commission in reality submitted a separate report on the Sudan. (see 
MacMichael, opt. cit. Chapter XII for elaborate review of the Commission Report. ) 
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British junior personnel whose number was estimated to be 464 in 1930 and decreased 
during the Great Depression to reach 358 in 1934 and remained at that size till 1939. 
The anti-education policy might be explained by the fact that the members of the Political 
Service had developed a vested interest in both preserving the colonial state and slowing 
and delaying any Sudanization of its personnel because, unlike the officials of other 
British colonies who might not loose their jobs if replaced by the nationals of the colony 
or even if that colony got its independence, the personnel of the colonial state in the 
Sudan were the employees of that state and their future and careers were linked to it. 
Education of Sudanese, hence, would have resulted in two things that might endanger 
that vested interest; nationalism and Sudanization . The 
irony was that those colonial 
officials who restricted education in the Sudan were the same officials supposed by the 
paternal colonial ideology to be the guardians of the people to preparing them for self- 
government. But in the 1920s that was not seen contradictory by the colonial ideologists 
because self-government, according to them, was supposed to be achieved through the 
institutions of indirect rule. So education ceased to be a tool of establishing and 
exercising hegemony during the 1920-1935 period. Sir Stewart Symes who replaced 
Maffey as Governor-General (1934-1940), was more liberal and thought of winning the 
educated Sudanese rather than leaving them to be recruited by the Egyptian nationalists, 
especially as the negotiations between Egypt and Britain had been continuing since 1930 
threatening that a compromise on the Sudan question might lead to the return of the 
Egyptians personnel to the Sudan; an issue which was actually agreed to in the 1936 
Treaty. In addition, Symes recognised the need for a central bureaucracy of efficient 
employees and not of 'native tribal chiefs' if the colonial state was to carry its objectives. 
(Bakheit, 1987,172). This central bureaucracy, according to Symes was to build on the 
shoulders of the British administrators and, in order-to keep the costs of administration as 
low as possible, he argued for collaboration not with tribal authorities, but with Sudanese 
intelligentsia. (Daly and Holt, 19, pl45) When Symes. took over the govemor-generalship, 
the educated Sudanese were emerging as a pressure. group for the change of education. 
That was expressed in the articles published in at-FaJar, the Sudanese magazine edited by 
Arfat Mohamed Abdalla, demanding more education. MA Mahjoub who would later 
become prime minister, wrote in 1934, "Give Us Education" demanding the enhancing of 
the development of education and the establishment of a "school of law, an agricultural 
school, and a higher school of engineering" (quoted in Beshir, 1977,126). Many other 
articles played the same tune. In addition the educated strata came out openly to attack 
the native administration policy of the government vis-A-vis the development of education 
and the promotion of the Sudanese to seniorjobs. 
By 1935 the government itself recognised the need for the development of higher 
education and in 1936 a decision was made to establish higher schools for engineering, 
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agriculture and veterinary in addition to the schools of medicine (1924) and law (193 1) 
which were established earlier. 
The promotion of. educated Sudanese in the administration was hastened. The Sudanese 
officials replaced British and Egyptian personnel in Divisions 2 and 3. Accordingly the 
number of Sudanese in these posts increased from 2736 in 1930 to 4162 in 1939, while 
the corresponding number of British personnel decreased from 464 to 356 and that of 
Egyptians from 1003 to 574 in the same period. 
The new attitude of the colonial state towards education and the educated Sudanese 
since'1934, which was a result of many factors as we have seen, and the general 
atmosphere created by the negotiation and conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1936, brought to the agenda of the Sudanese Intelligentsia the question of their role in the 
determination of the future of the Sudan. Without going in the details, the educated 
Sudanese strata was able to establish its first officially recognised organisation in 1938 by 
forming the Graduates Congress. The Congress conceived itself as a body concerned with 
matters of public interest, a wide definition which understood by Congress members to 
include issues ranging from encouraging and promoting education to demanding self- 
determination. The colonial state on the other hand, understood'the Congress on a 
different level as a "serni-public organisation interested in philanthropic and public affairs 
and competent to hold and express opinions on such matters as comes within its purview" 
(Hunderson, 19533,540/1) and as far as it should not seek recognition as a political 
organisation or clahn the representation of wiy but its members. Hence from the start 
there were a conflict in defining the role and nature of the Congress. This conflict 
manifested itself when the congýess submitted a memorandum in 1942 demanding, among 
other things, the British and Egyptian governments to "issue, on the first possible 
opportunity joint declaration granting the Sudan, in its geographical boundaries, the right 
of self-determination, directly after the War. " (Ibid., 540/1). 
The colonial state did not only reject the memorandum, but also declared that by 
submitting it the Congress had forfeited her recognition and co-operation. It expected the 
Congress to "co-operate with [her]... in furthering what is sincerely [sic] imagined to be 
the best interest of the Sudan as a whole. "(Civil Secretary to Governor s/March, 
28th, 1938 Bag, I/l/1, NRO, Khartoum). The Civil Secretary bluntly told the Congress "to 
renounce any claim, real or implied to be the mouth-piece of the whole country . "(ibid. 
) 
Hence after four decades of colonial education policy the colonial state found itself in 
conflict with the same class of its o-vvn creation. 
Yet the educated strata was fi-ustrated by the rejection of their memorandum and were 
faced by the challenge of their own claim that they represent the people. They were not I 
able to rally the people in any form of popular organisation or mass activity that could 
have proved their claim and gained them the recognition of the colonial state as 
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representative of the people. Instead they turned to the traditional religious sectarian 
leaders to get access to the masses. This resulted in the split of the Congress and hence 
the national movement and affected the formation of the political parties in the Sudan 
where the biggest two were to be dominated by the two big religious sects, the Mahdyya 
and Khatimyya. The frustration of the educated strata led them to seek alliance with the 
two Condominium States, Egypt and Britain. A trend allied with Britain accepted the 
colonial state policy of gradual constitutional development that prepare the Sudan for 
self-government. This trend was linked with the Mabdyya sect which formed the Umma 
party in 1945. The other trend thought alliance with Egypt to demand the withdrawal of 
the British and the unity of the Nile Valley, Egypt and the Sudan, under the Egyptian 
Monarch and these formed the AsMqqa party. 
A new and different generation of the educated strata appeared in the aflermath of the 
Second World War. It was a result of internal and regional as well as international 
circumstances. 
On the internal level, the upgrading of the Gordon College to a post- secondary college 
in 1944/45, the transfer of the secondary branch to Wadi Seidna in 1944, and the 
establishment of new secondary schools in. Hantoub in1946, Rumbeck in 19.49 and Khor 
Tagat in 1950 diversified and widened the education opportunities. Since 1939, the 
Graduate Conaress had encouraged the establishment of non-govemmental schools 
[Ahlia Schools which means native schools], and organised an annual Education Day to 
raise funds for building them. By 1956 32 intermediate and 4 secondary schools were 
built through such initiative. The Congress also encouraged Sudanese students to seek 
higher and university education in Egypt and in 1946 the delegation. of the Sudanese 
parties which visited Egypt "urged the Egyptian Government to open more opportunities 
for- Sudanese education in Egyptian universities and schools" (Beshir, 1969, p166). By 
1949 there were about 789 Sudanese students in the Egyptian universities and high 
education institutes (Ibid., 166). Some of those students were influenced by the Marxist 
literature' and introduced to the communist ideology through the Egyptian Communist 
Party, known the as the Democratic Movement for National Liberation, [HADATW, the 
Arabic abbreviation]. A group of those students joined HADATW and by 1944 they 
formed a cell of the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation, [HASATW] which 
later to be renamed as the Sudanese Communist Party. At the same time Marxist 
literature was known to some Sudanese intellectuals during the Second World War when 
introduced by British soldiers influences by the British Communist Party. 
The international situation during and after the War and the role played by the Soviet 
Red Army and the establishment of the communist rule in Eastern Europe, all created an 
atmosphere which promoted the spread of communist slogans and Marxist ideology. 
Sudan was no exception. In 1946 a communist organisation was established in the Sudan 
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and its first cell was among the students of the Gordon College . 
This affected the student 
movement which had begun in 1938/39 as a cultural society in the secondary and high 
schools of the college and developed into a student union in 1941. Under the pressure of 
the newly organised communists, the College Union launched the first public 
demonstration since that organised by the League of the White Flag in 1924. That was a 
different development in the struggle against the colonial rule because it introduced direct 
agitation of the masses instead of raising memorandums and behind closed-doors 
discussions and negotiations which were the tactics adopted by the Congress. In 1947 the 
Student Union leadership was won by the communists and their allies. The political 
activities spread among the students of the newly established secondary schools and in 
1949 a Student Congress was formed to co-ordinate the activities of the national students 
movement. 
At the same time the new trend among the educated strata extended their activities to 
contribute to the organisation of the workers trade unions in 1946/47 and of the Gezira 
Tenants in 1952. Instead of seeking alliance with religious sectarian leaders or co- 
operating with one of the Condonfinium states, the new trend sought the organisation of 
the masses and raised the slogans of the right to self-determination and the joint struggle 
with the Egyptian people against the British colonialism . This new attitude was reflected 
in the strikes of the railway workers and the College Students in'1947 demanding the 
official recognition of their unions. It was also reflected in the wide demonstrations of the 
students, workers, and other urban dwellers against the establishment of the Legislative 
Assembly in 1948 These activities represented different tactics from those adopted by the 
Congress. In 1944, for example, when the colonial state decided to establish the Advisory 
Council for Northern Sudan, the Congress decided to boycott it, but no popular activity 
was involved. In 1948, the demonstrations against the Legislative Assembly took place in 
most of the Sudanese towns and resulted in the death of two workers and many 
casualties. The Ashiqqa, being mostly an urban party, was drawn to this new 'struggle 
tactics, while the Umma party accepted the participation in the gradual constitutional 
development institutions. ' 
In 1949 a group of students formed the Nan& Liberation Movement, as a response and 
rejection to the communists influence among the'students. This movement developed 
through the influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren Movement into a Sudanese 
Muslim Brotherhood Movement which would play influential rule in Sudanese politics 
later. 
Another group emerged in 1951 named itself ' independents ' and although remained a 
student group, its leaders in the fifties were, as individuals, to serve as ministers during 
one of the important periods of rule (1971-1976). 
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The instability and lack of continuity of the colonial education policy resulted in fewer 
educated Sudanese compared -with what could have been achieved if the restriction on 
education between 1920 and 1935 Were not imposed. A corollary to that result was the 
delay in Sudanisation of senior and rniddle-level personnel jobs until the period of self- 
government in 1954-56. By 1949, for example, the Sudanese held only 14.3% of the 
administrative jobs (Niblock: 1987,59). Their number in the Political Service was only 
119 in 1952. In 1954 when the Sudanisation Committee began its work according to the 
Self-Government Agreement of 1953, there were 1069 British employees, compared with 
a number of 550 in 1920. Table I shows the classification, according to nationality, of the 
Civil Service (including the Political Service ) in the Sudan for selected years from 1920 
to 1956. 
In 1956, when the Sudan became independent, 71.1% of the employees of the Sudan 
Government and its public corporations had completed intermediate or elementary 
schools only. Those who completed secondary schools represented 23.21/o and those who 
attended higher education, including university, constituted 5.7% of the government and 
public corporations employees. (Calculated from Al An-tin, n. d., 3 1) 
Table 1. Nationalijy of Civil Servants 1920-1956 (Including the Political Servicý) 
nationality 1920 1930 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Sudanese 1520 2760 7860 9774 9007 11621 
British 550 1030 1168 lill 732 259 
Egyptian 1630 1320 145 108 124 120 
Others 260 320 45 56 52 227 
Total 3960 5430 9218 10049 9915 12127 
Source: Beshir, 1977, Education Policy and Emplopnent in the Sudan, Khartoum, 
DSRC, University of Khartoum 
2.4.3. Native Administration 
Though the policy of indirect rule in the Sudan is associated in most of the literature with 
the developments in the aftermath of World War 1, (ie Beshir, 1977; Al Terraffi, 1982, 
MacNfichael, 1934), the policy of incorporating the tribal leaders in the colonial 
administration had been practised since Wingate's govemor-generalship (1900-1916). A 
handbook issued to assist the sub-mamurs advised them that the Sheikhs "perform work 
of the greatest important and responsibility.. " and that it "is the aim of the Government to 
associate [them] as a class with the work of the administration. "(Quoted in Warburg, 
1971,142143). Though the Sub-inainur's Handbook notified the sub-nialnurs that sheikhs 
were not 'public servants', the colonial state regarded them as "its tribal agents, who could 
be appointed, overruled, and dismissed just as any government official"(Ibid., 143). The 
Governor-General reported in 1906 that the "policy adopted has been to raise the status 
of the sheikh as far as possible in the eyes of his people by trying to impress on them (and 
59 
on him) that he is the representative in his own village of the goverrunent"(GGAR-, 1906, 
The implementation of this policy was left to the governors of the provinces without 
further directives or ordinances being issued. The invasion of Darfur and its annexation to 
the to the Sudan brought up the issue of indirect rule for the first time. MacNfichael 
suggested a "conservative policy which leave the power of the existing sheikhs, 'sharatis', 
'niefiks' and `sultan' over their people unimpaired.. "(Daly, 1986,198). Wingate who 
accepted the suggested policy insisted on the subordination of the native administration to 
the colonial state and rejected a proposal of using Abd al-Hamid, a rival of Ali Dinar and 
a son of a former Sultan of Darfur, as an independent Sultan or as ".. a. the hereditary and 
legitimate Sultan of Darfur", but he did not mind using him in the "capacity of 
Government delegate or official intermediary" (Ibid., 189). 
The question of native administration was brought to the agenda once again when S. 
Wallis the Director of Intelligence suggested granting judiciary powers to some notables 
in urban and rural areas in 1917. The same year, Bonham Carter, the Legal Secretary, 
made a similar proposal suggesting that such judiciary powers granted to native notables 
should be supervised bythe British inspectors and not the Egyptian mamurs so as to limit 
the powers of the latter. He also suggested the formation of advisory local councils 
composed of native notables and tribal leaders to assist the inspectors and bring them in 
direct contact with the people. instead of depending on the Egyptian inalnurs as 
mediators. When these proposals were put to the annual meeting of the governors of the 
provinces in 1918,1919, and 1920, a dual* policy of appointing more Sudanese to minor 
jobs and the promotion of native administration was adopted. At the same time a 
tendency towards the Anglicisation of the Sudan Government appeared. This was 
reflected in the increasing powers of the inspectors, whose title was changed to district 
commissioners, (DC), to reflect their direct responsibility of the administration of the 
districts which led to the marginalisation of the Egyptian Mannirs until they were expelled 
in 1924. Districts were re-arranged and became smaller which resulted in the increase of 
the British administrators. 
The Milner Comnýttee intervened in the discussion already undergoing within the Sudan 
Goverment to suggest in 1921, 
"Having regard to its [the Sudan] vast extent and the varied character of its inhabitants, the 
administration of its different parts should be left as far as Vossible, in the hands of Native 
authorities, wherever they exist, under British supervision. A centrallsed bureaucracy is 
wholly unsuitable for the Sudan. Decentralisation and the employment, wherever possible, of 
native agencies for the simple administrative needs of the country, in its present economv and 
efficie KK. " (quoted in MacMchael 1934,144-45) 
The report of the Milner Comn-fittee concluded the long discussion among the officials of 
the colonial state and 1922 witnessed the issue of the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs 
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Ordinance. It regularised, "the customary" powers of the sheikhs of nomads of 
"punishment upon their tribesmen and of deciding disputes among them", which had been 
exercised by them "from time immemorial". The Ordinance authorised the Governors of 
the Provinces with the consent of the Governor-General to grant such powers of 
punishment and settlement of disputes to the nomad sheikhs on condition that these 
powers are exercised on their tribesmen only. Punishment was limited to a fine of 25 
Egyptian pounds or equivalent in kind if the sheikh exercised his powers in a council of 
elders or up to 10 Egyptian pounds if he was sitting alone (El Nur, 1960,78). The right 
to appeal to the district commissioner against sentences passed by sheikhs was clearly 
stated in the ordinance. By 1923, about 300 Sheikhs were exercising judiciary powers 
according to the Ordinance. The 1922 Ordinance was substantial in upgrading the 
prestige as well as the performance of the Sheikhs who were by the time carrying 
administrative duties of maintaining order, preventing crimes, arresting wrongdoers and 
collecting tax (MacMichael, op. cit.., 245). 
The 1924 revolution and the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General who 
advocated the dual policy, marked the retreat from that policy and the adoption of the 
policy of 'indirect rule'. Sir Geoffrey Archer, who replaced, Lee Stack as Governor- 
General, attempted a continuation of the policy; but was compelled to resign in 1926, 
leaving the platf6rin to Sir John Maffey (1926-1933) who provoked the policy of indirect 
rule as "protective glands against septic germs" of the nationalism thought to be spread 
from Khartoum in the future (Sanderson, 1989,81; Daly, 1988,366). Maffey from the 
start, declared his policy as of favouring tribal leaders to appointment of "executive 
officials selected.. from the ranks of native population". I-Es choice of the fon-ner, he 
argued, was because it was a proper instrument of devolution, a less costly one, and 
would allow an "opportunity... to lay a foundation upon which a lasting structure may be 
built from the best material to be found in the count! yL(Quoted-in MacNlichael, op. cit.. 
pp 250-1). A logical corollary to that policy was "gradually to reduce the number of sub- 
mamurs, clerks, accountants, and similar bureaucratic adjuncts in out districts" (Ibid., 
251). 
No time was wasted, the 1922 Ordinance was revealed to be replaced by the Powers of 
Sheikhs Ordinance of 1927 which was not to be applied to nomads' alone. ' The new 
ordinance enabled the Governor-General to establish by warrants Sheikhs Courts in any 
area in the country. The Governors of the Provinces were empowered to issue regulations 
to organise courts procedures. In 1928 the same ordinance was amended to allow smaller 
tribes to be attached to bigger ones. By 193 1, the 1928 Ordinance was replaced by the 
Native Courts Ordinance which was more "simple in structure, broad and elastic in 
sanctions", as described by the Civil secretary (Ibid., 254). It was to be applied to all 
Sudan except the Southern Provinces where the Chiefs Courts Ordinance of 1931 was in 
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power (Al Terraffiý 1982,12). It established five classes of courts: a village court, a court 
of Sheikh sitting alone, a court of Sheikh sitting with elders, a court of Sheikh presiding a 
council of Sheikhs, and a special court to be convened to look at genuine inter-tribal 
fights and/or disputes. All courts, except the village and: the special courts, were to be 
established by warrants issued by the Governor-General_ The Village court was to be 
appointed by a written order of the Governor of the Province, while the special court was 
formed with the approval of the Legal Secretary (El Nur, 1960,85). 
The judicial powers granted to the tribal leaders enhanced their social status and allowed 
the devolution of more administrative powers and responsibilities. This included the 
control of grazing rights, water resources, gum-arabic gardens, distribution of land for 
rain-fed cultivation, control of markets, and collection of tax. This provided tribal leaders 
with new powers which enabled them to increase their wealth and accumulate capital. 
Hence a social strata wl-&h was during the Mahdyya on the decline, had been 
rehabilitated and promoted by the colonial state. This led to the conservation and 
encouragement of the tribal system, especially in Western and Southern Sudan where no 
economic development took place during the Condominium. 
The Passports and Pennits Ordinance of 1922 and the Closed Districts Ordinance of 
1929 backed the tribal policy of the colonial state by allowing the declaration of vast 
regions of western Sudan, the Funj area of the southern. Blue Nile, and all the Southern 
Sudan as closed districts preventing the free movement of citizens; especially the riverine 
merchants, (the Jallaba ), who were required to obtain a priory permit to enter and 
practise trade in these areas from the Governors of the concerned provinces. Both the 
tribal and closed districts policies contributed to the prevention of the possýble integration 
of the Sudanese tribes and ethnic groups. 
The restriction of education which constituted part of the policy of indirect rule kept the 
areas dominated by native administration at the bottom of the educational development in 
the Sudan. Until 1944 only one graduate from Gordon College was from Darfur and in 
1952 only 14% of the pupils of elementary schools in the province could find places in 
intermediate schools, compared with 42% in Khartoum province. In 1953 only one 
intermediate school was operating in Darfur, compared to two in each Kordofan and 
Kassala, three in the southern provinces and an average of five schools in each Khartoum, 
Blue Nile and Northern provinces (Daly, 1991,334 ). 
2.4.4. The Southern Poliev 
The term "the Southern Policy" is generally used in the literature on the Sudan to refer to 
the set of directives detailed in the Civil Secretary's Circular of January 25th 1930. 
However, the term is used here to define the set of policies and measures practised or 
attempted through the Condominium era (1898_1956). This is because the 1930 Circular 
62 
was only one element in the Southern Policy, and in perspective, was not even a new one. 
It was in reality a formal statement of a number of measures which had been practised and 
executed for a long time before its issue. 
The 1930 memo constituted of four main directives: the replacing of Arabic-speaking 
staff by a non- Arabic speakers; the control immigrant traders from Northern Sudan, the 
need for the British staff to farnifiarise themselves with the beliefs, customs, and 
languages of the people of the South, and the use of English language wherever 
communication in the local vernacular was impossible. All these elements of the policy 
had been practised before 1930. For example in 1910, following the establishment of the 
Equatorial Corps that took over from the Egyptian Army Battalions that had been 
stationed in the South since the re conquest Wingate agreed to introduce English as a 
semi-official language. (Wingate to Heiden, private, 27 December 1910, SAD, 103/7/2). =1 
This was followed by the expulsion of the Arabic-speaking Battalions of the Egyptian 
Army. Another example was the Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922, which was 
soon Followed by the Closed District Order the same year, both had restricted the 
movement of the Northern traders, Jallaba It is, hence, absurd to assume that the 1930 
memorandum determined the Southern Policy, unless we mean by the use the term to 
ignore other important elements of the practised policy of the colonial state in the South; 
elements such as the repressive policy of the punitive expeditions, the religious, 
S. 12 The first objective 0 educational and investment poliCip of the British in the South was 
international, to reach the remote frontiers preventing other European forces, the French 
and the Belgium, from claiming any rights in the area. Hence the reason behind the early 
military presence which provoked the resistance of the tribes in the South. The Southern 
resistance generated the most important element of the Southern Policy which was the 
punitive expeditions and patrols marched through'the Southern Region for three decades 
in order to pacify the country. The core of the Southern Policy was the suppression of the 
resistance of the Southern people. MacMchael reported more than twenty four 
expedition sent against the Southern tribes, especially the Nuer, between 1904-1934 
(MacNEcheal, 'op. cit.., Chapter 8 and 15). Even the Royal Air Force, "recently stationed 
12Tbe concentration on the relation between the North and the South, or on the policies towards 
the northern traders in the south, the policy towards Islam and Arabic language, is the North- 
biased and in reality ignores the most important elements of the Southern Policy, the term defined 
as all the measures taken or attempted by the colonial state in Southern Sudan and implicitly 
assumes that if the Northern traders, the Arabic language and Islam are allowed to spread, the 
post-colonial Sudan would not have suffered from a Southern Problem. That understanding 
suggests a -policy of arabization and Islamization may solve the problem. A suggestion Nve find 
ridiculous because it is not democratic, it ignores the right of the Southern people to develop their 
culture and it undermines the role of ethnicity, uneven development and the unequal distribution of 
wealth in the countrv. 
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in the Sudan was called in to fly several missions against the Nuer" (Daly, 1986,401), 
who had the "distinction of being a perennial thorn in the flesh of the 
government" (MacMichael, op. cit.., 179). 
These expeditions gave the adininistration in the South its main characteristic. 
"Administration in the South", wrote Sanderson, "became synonymous with military 
operations" (1991,46). The result was disastrous; people were killed, villages burnt and 
cattle raided and looted. Some of these punitive measures could be identified as genocide 
missions as in the expedition against Dinka Aliab in 1919 (Ibid., 46). 13 By the early 
1920s, the coercive policy of punitive was heavily criticised. Sir Wasey Sterry, (1866- 
1955), the Legal Secretary (1917 1926 ), who was acting Governor-General in 1920, 
described the policy as a failure ( Sterry to Woodland, 23 September 1920, SGA, CIVEC 
1/9/3 ). Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General (1917-1924). himself a leader of a punitive 
expedition in 1902, was reported by Willis, then Director of Intelligence, to have been 
convinced "to set his face against any more petrols ( Quoted in Daly , 1986,399). 
Although alternative measures were taken to establish a stable adrninistration in the area 
the punitive expeditions continued until 1932, despite these criticism. 
These measures represented new elements of the Southern Policy and were in line with 
similar , measures 
t*en in the Northern Sudan; the expulsion of Egyptian mainurs and the 
articulation of indigenous political systems by the introduction of native administration. 
The district commissioner among the Azande was nothing else than a Paramount Chief, 
while the Nuer, after the 1929 expedition, recognised the -government authority and the 
district commissioner as their chief (Sanderson and Sanderson, 1981,180). The DCs- 
CNefs administration continueq to rule the South until independence in 1956. 
In addition to the punitive expeditions and the establishment of the colonial authority in 
the South, the Southern Policy included other important elements which were, also, in 
practise before the 1930 memo , 
randum such as the religious and educational policies. 
The religious policy in the South was a result of a compromise made by Lord Cromer and 
the Colonial State in Khartoum to the different Christian missions which were prevented 
from work in the North as part of the religious policy in that area which was designed to 
avoid any religious agitation. The missionaries attacked the administration in Khartoum as 
one preventing the spread of Christianity and the promotion of Islam. Leaning to the 
pressure the government in Khartoum allowed the work of the missions in the South. 
131n a recent article A. Dickie, -, NTiting about "Systems of Agriculture production in the Southern 
Sudan", mentioned 'sparse population' as a constraint to agricultural development in the area. 
Investigating the causes of 'sparse population', he cited"years of exposition to" raiding and 
destruction by slavers, Turko-Egyptian and Dervishes"as Nvell as civil Nvars after independence 
(Dikie: 1991,280); but he failed to mention the 'contribution' of colonial state through the policy of 
punitive expeditions! 
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Three Christian missionary societies were active in the South: the Italian Roman Catholic 
(known as the Verona Fathers), the Anglican Mis§ionary Society and the Arýerican 
Presbyterian Nfission. The South was divided into spheres among the three societies. 
Education in the South was left totafly to missionary societies, the result was a'poor 
quality of education and the product an educated Southerner who was different than that 
educated in Gordon College and government schools in the North. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This Chapter has analysed of the colonial state and economy which had developed in 58 
years in the Sudan. They represented the colonial legacy which the social and economic 
forces in the independent Sudan, although they were its product, had to examine, 
evaluate, continue or/and change. It was the challenge, the historical conditions in which 
the Sudanese people had inherited, that they have to overcome if they were to shape their 
history. These conditions were of an uneven developed, export-oriented economy with 
weak inter-sector and inter-regional linkages; liable to be severely affected by 
international crises and moderately benefiting from international booms, The social 
structure was composed of an influential religious and tribal aristocracy, based on a 
system of articulated modes of production where the capitalist mode of production 
through its international linkage was the dominant, a weak national bourgeoisie, a small., 
though organised and militant, working class, and a wide rural population composed of 
tenants, peasants and nomads. The social classes also included a divided bureaucracy, 
military and intelligentsia, - formed pf the old effendia fraction who were the product of 
Gordon College and a new fraction affected by the growth of the national movement after 
World War 111. 
After almost half the length of time of the colonial rule, the country faced a crisis which is 
described in Chapter 4. Could that crisis be related to the colonial legacy? The questions 
remain how and why? 
CHAPTER 3 
THE CRISIS OF THE POST-COLONIAL STATE 1954-1973 
3.1. Introduction 
A pioneer work that has attempted the analysis of crisis in the Sudan was that of 
Mohamed Hashim Awad, (1966)1. Awad based his analysis for the ten years 1956-1966 
on the study of the ruling group which he held responsible for the corruption and bad 
government. According to Awad this group was mainly composed of businessmen who 
had great influence in the political parties thr6ugh financing the activities of these 
parties(1966,78-81). He found the origin of the power of the businessmen. in their 
collaboration with the colonial rule, their domination of the local councils because the 
intellectuals refused to participate in them when they were first established by the colonial 
government, and their ascendancy to the central government through the domination of 
the par-ties and the parliament. Awad argued that the Sudanese businessmen group had 
allied itself to the foreign businessmen group. Through that alliance the foreign group 
found safeguards against the growing nationalism and the local group gained finance by 
the foreign banks and profits in joint operations with 'foreign commercial 
companies. (pp5 8-60) He also argued that a fraction of the Sudanese businessmen group 
were mostly money lenders to agriculture in both modem and traditional. He went on to 
argue that the main problem of agriculture was exploitation by money lenders to which 
even the owners of large irrigated schemes on the White and Blue Nile banks as well as 
those on the Northern Province2 were subjected. (Ibid, 22) 
By studying the origin of the members of the Advisory Council (1945-47), the Legislative 
Assembly (1948-5 ) and the first Parliament (1954-58), he noticed that they were either 
businessmen, tribal leaders or ex-govemment employees. By comparing the origin of 
members in the three institutions found that there was increasing -weight of the 
businessmen compared to that of the aristocracy of the tribal leaders. He also noticed that 
increasing numbers of the tribal leaders were becoming part of the businessmen and that 
there was a change in the ex-employees category which tended to be composed of mainly 
of junior employees who resigned their jobs to be full-time politicians, compared to the 
retired senior employees who were members of the two first councils (Ibid, 115) Those 
new politicians became more dependent on political parties on their living, and hence 
I "Exploitation and the Corruption of Government in the Sudan" which Nvas published in Arabic 
J-ýJ-rvi ý-ý LDL"W, . 2According to the provinces in 1966, the Northern Province is equivelent to the Northern region in 
1993. 
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dependent on the businessmen who financed the parties. They were also tended to 
establish their own business enterprises to safeguard their future (Ibid, 115-116). 
Awad held the businessmen group responsible for all the problems of the country 
including the problem of the South (Ibid, 51-52). ' He identified the other problems as the 
exploitation of agricultural producers which undermined the development of agriculture 
in the country (Ibid, 22-27), corruption which wasted resources and increased inequality 
and increased the uneven development of the country which endangered its unity (Ibid, 4, 
136-7 ). Awad rightly criticised those who reduce the crisis in the country to a crisis of an 
unstable government which could be resolved by some constitutional amendment or a 
draft of a permanent constitution (Ibid, 4). 
Another pioneer work in the analysis of the long run crisis was the report of the Central 
Committee of the Sudan Communist Party to the Fourth Conference of the party held in 
November 1967 presented by its late secretary general Abdel Khaliq Mahgoub (1927- 
1971). In addition to its Marxist approach, the report beriefifed from two factors that 
made it a comprehensive attempt to study the crisis since 1956. The first it was tackling a 
period between the two party conferences which was concurrent to the crisis period at 
the time (1956 -1967)3. The second factor whkh contributed to making the report 
comprehensive was the structural organisation of the party which in addition to its 
branches that spread on the basis of work and living places had also adopted the method 
of establishing specialised committees on aspects of economic, education, foreign affairs 
... etc. This structure provided the writer of the report with a wider comprehensive view 
of the Sudanese society. 
The concept of backwardness is central to the analysis of the Sudanese economy in I the 
report (1968,70). Despite this centrality of the concept of backwardness, backwardness 
was described in the report rather than analysed. This led to the adoption of the modem- 
traditional dichotomy in its static descriptive form: a traditional sector where 50% of the 
national income was produced and 75% of the population were living and a modem 
sector that produces "agricultural commodities for export" of which cotton represented 
60% (Ibid, 79). The presence of a traditional sector was sighted as the evidence of 
backwardness of the Sudan and that it "did not enter the stage of economic revolution" 
(Ibid, 94) and that the failure "to shake the tradition sector and the bringing in of centres 
of progress within it is the greatest evidence to the failure of the pattern adopted by our 
country after independence" (Ibid, 94). This pattern defined as the capitalist path of 
development. The report described the crisis in the Sudan as a crisis of the capitalist path 
of development which according to the report is historically closed and is unable in 
breaking the chains of backwardness. Though the report presented a thorough analysis of 
the development of the Sudanese capitalist class, its origins and the sources, sectors and 
areas of capital accumulation, it did not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of 
3ne third party conference was held in February 1956. 
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the failure of the development of production forces in the economy. This question is of 
great importance especially when the report states the development of a capitalist class in 
industry and agriculture. Did that lead to a development of capitaliýt relations and if so 
why it did not lead to a development of the forces of Production ? The report answer was 
based on the analysis of the role of foreign capital in foreign trade and industry and the 
dependency of a single primary agricultural product. It rightly suggested that the presence 
of foreign capital perntitted the exportation of surpluses abroad yet it did not try to 
estimate the volume of exported surplus and its relative value to the national income(lbid, 
85-86,93). It also pointed out the tendency of the international prices of primary 
agricultural products to fall and of the manufactured goods to rise (Ibid, 81,86); yet it did 
not explicitly discuss the question of Sudan terms of trade4 while unequal exchange was 
mentioned twice without qualification or clarification. It concerned itself in the aspect of 
foreign trade with the trade partners of the Sudan and it held as evidence of the presence 
of neo-colonialism the development of Sudan foreign trade with Western countries 
compared with Socialist countries. The effect of the cold war was clear in this part of the 
report (Ibid, 74-78). 
When dealing the economic crisis the report did not discuss explicitly the question of 
uneven development and the mechanism that Wed to deepen it. The report, by adopting 
the static modem traditional dichotomy ignored the development of capitalism in the so- 
called traditional sector. In discussing the industrial development the report concentrated 
on the role of foreign capital avoiding the discussion of the industrial strategy itself which 
was based on the import-substitution strategy. 
The report went on to discuss the political crisis since the independence in 1956 dividing 
it in three periods: the first parliamentary period 1956-58, the military rule 1958-64 and 
the October revolution 1964. The report adopted a class struggle approach in its attempt 
to analyse the three periods. The first pe riod was characterised by the struggle and split 
among the political leadership of the naticinal bourgeoisie about political power which 
was reflected in a split among the masses that weakened its ability to confront and resolve 
the problems of social change. The report did not give a satisfactory explanation for that 
split. and whether the struggle for political power had different economic interests' and 
did not explain the role of foreign powers (ie Egypt) in that struggle. The report rightly 
analysed the role of trade unions and the tenants movement and the other urban 
democratic forces in the struggle for social change and democracy in this period. The 
report summarised the crisis which led to the 1958 coup: 
413y the time the report NN-as NN-riten, the question of terms of trade was thoroughly discussed in 
development literature in general. 
5A]i (1989) tried to give an explanation based on the diferent interests on the question of the Nile 
'k, %-aters negotiations between EMpt and Sudan. In Chapter 3 of this thesis an attempt is made to 
provide more concrete analysis. 
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"The failure of the political system in resolAng the post-independece problems and the split 
among the national masses led to an acute crisis in the country. Meanwhile there was a 
,y elements, especially 
the communist party, among the mass continuous growth of revolutionar 
movement. The initiative was at the hands of the forces of the extreme right which transferred 
the class struggle from the peaceful arena to a military dictatorship targeting the democratic 
forces basically. " (p 108). 
According to the report the success of the 1958 coup proved the weakness of the social 
foundations of the "Western Parliamentarianism" in the Sudan due to the presence of "a 
heavy weight for the forces of traditional sector in the social and economic life" (Ibid, 
108). 
In analysing the crisis of the military rule of 1958 the report provided an evaluation of the 
role of high rank bureaucrats as part of the ruling bloc. In contrast the lower rank 
bureaucrats were identified as part of the popular masses, yet for that situation to 
continue "the revolutionary movement has to develop its relations with these cadres ... and 
to work consciously in the different education institutes to enlarge the circle of those 
cadres by supplying it with n-dlitant elements.. "(1bid, I 11). 
One of the important parts of the report was the analysis of the military and their role in 
politics. The report in its analysis of the military and the composition of the Sudanese 
army reached the coalition that "it has become clear that it is wrong to speak about the 
armed forces as unified body or a class; it represents in reality the class and national 
struggle that takes place in our society. " (Ibid, 115). Reaching this conclusion was not 
synonymous -to developing a strategy based on organising a CoUp6, for the report 
criticized what it called "the left opportunist trends which propagate that there is no place 
for the mass strug le" and that "what is remaining for the revolutionary movement is to =9 
retreat and organise a military action for that will prepare the political army of the 
masses. " (Ibid, 142). The alternative strategy was, according to the. report, to maintain 
and strengthen the daily struggle of the masses (Ibid, 152). 
In analysing the period that followed the October revolution of 1964, the report 
maintained the theme of the weak bases 'of the Western Parliamentarianism and' the 
weakness of the Sudanese capitalist class that pushed it to ally itself with "the old tribal 
and semi-feudal forces". The nature of the parliamentary system. under ýhat alliance was 
reactionary and destructive to the an important foundation of the system: the bourgeoisie 
democratic rights and because such a system became a daily instrument to stop 
development and economic growth, the active masses had search for a different way of 
development. Hence the impossibility of political stability because it meant to surrender 
and stop the struggle. (Ibid, 152). By this conclusion the report did not only present an 
analysis of the reasons of instability, but become one of the reasons to it by going on to 
suggest how the masses should strengthen their struggle. This led the report to focus on 
the importance of the democratic rights to the masses and to disclose an important 
contradiction in the position of the ruling power bloc from liberal democracy when they 
6NVhat Avas called in the SCP literature after 1969 "a coup mentality" 
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us. ed it to achieve political power and used that power to deny the masses their 
democratic rights (Ibid, 132-4). 
One important shortcoming of the report was its failure to discuss a comprehensive 
analysis of the question of Southern Sudan or the other regions which suffered from the 
uneven development. This was strange in a report written after the October Revolution in 
the Sudan which brought forward to the agenda of Sudanese politics the questions of 
even economic development and the representation of the different regions in the central 
government and state apparatuS7. The report mentioned the situation in the South as a 
'real' obstacle to the possibility to "induce a revolutionary development depending on the 
forces of the modem sector", because of the existence of a political movement in the 
South which was anti-national, pro-imperial and antagonistic to the democratic 
revolution. No evidence or analysis was provided to justify this strong judgement. 
An interesting Sudanese writer who has written a number of books on the crisis in the 
Sudan is Mansour Khalid8. Khalid main theme is built on the concept of the elite. For him 
the crisis in the Sudan is the crisis of the elite(1993,15-17). This theme has been 
elaborated in Khalid's last two woks: "The Goveniment 7hey Deserve: the role of the 
elite ih. Sudan political evolutioij"9 and "7he Sudanese Elite atidAddiction ofFaihire"10. 
Khalid critically examined the behaviour and attitudes of the Sudanese elites whom he 
defined as "the educated" (1993,15-16). He emphasised the intellectual failure of the elite 
which reflected in 
"< an> unrealistic conception of how power structure inside the Sudan should Nvork, complete 
failure to learn, or care to learn from the experience of others, and sheer inability by the 
politicians to put their national roles above their sectarian adherence and fraternal 
sympathies" (1990,142) 
He accused them of the "Lack of vision, " and "the complete absence of a spirit of co- 
operation " among them to establish "credible policies for the nation as a whole" (Ibid, 
120). The elite was predominantly from the riparian northern Sudanese who failed to 
"reach out, at the grass-roots level, for recruitment of Southerner or other non-Muslim 
(lbid, 12P-I). When they formed their parties, they allied with sectarian leaders and the 
two Co-domini. The latter amounted to "a mortgaging of will" (Ibid, 89). The elite , 
according to Khalid had failed in solving the two main problem that faced the country: 
70ne year after the report, Mahgoub, the Secretary general of the party presented a document 
entitled "Problems of the Aftennath of the Conference" jz-ýJ Zq U ýLýý in which he 
discussed the role of the regional forces and their relation Avith the communists. 
8Mansour Khalid (1931- ), born in Omdurman and educated in the sudan, USA and France, 
, worked as lawyer before joining the UN Legal Administration and the UNESCO. After the May 
1969 Coup in the Sudan he held several ministerial portfolios such as the Youth and Sports, 
Foreign Aff-airs and Education as Nvell as acting as Assistant to the President of the Republic. In 
1978 he defected the Nimeiri regime and took some acadmic jobs in USA before joining the UN 
again, albeit this time to Nvork in enviromental issues. He published several books and articles in 
English and Arabic on the problems of the Sudan 
9Published in 1990 by Kegan Paul, London. 
101n published in 1993 in Arabic J-uD J-Jj ; ký 
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national unity and development. In his listing of the failure of the Sudanese elite, Khalid 
used to make a comparison with the Indian elite and the different way it had tackled the 
problems of India which were of great similarity to those of the Sudan. 
The crisis of the elite was reflected most in its failure to produce a "pre-eminent national 
who could transcend the divides of religion, region, and ethnic affiliations" (Ibid, 120), 
again in comparison with India, "the Sudan, was deprived of a Nehru" (Ibid, 140). 
Though Khalid's analysis provided a valuable historical account of the failure of the 
Sudanese elites, it was not able to answer the question why was the failure? Why the 
Sudanese elite did not behave like that of India? Was it as Khalid advised politicians and 
thinkers inside the Sudan to recognize as "form of intellectual infertility if not a moral 
escapism stemming from a desire to delay the moment of truth" (Ibid, 142)? Why there 
was "a desire to delay the moment of truth"? An alternative way to look at the failure of 
the elite is to relate their vision, programmes (or the lack of it ) and their actions and 
policies to the interests of the-classes they represent or assume they represent. This thesis 
is an attempt to provide such an alternative. Yet it remains that Khalid's contribution to 
the analysis of the intellectual bankruptcy of the ruling power bloc is invaluable. His 
critique of the alternative policies, programmes and stands of the democratic forces which 
represent the oppressed people of the Sudan worth to be taken seriously by those forces. 
Though Tim Niblock (1985) did not explicitly use the concept of crisis, he provided an 
important contribution to the study of. the political economy of the Sudan. Niblock 
historical approach enabled him to see the continuity of "two kinds of imbalance or 
inequality which had become prominent under the condominium", those were 
"differentiating both regions of the country And social groupings within it" (Niblock, 
085,204). He revealed that the interests of he called 'the incipient bourgeoisie' had 
found their expression in the conservation of the socio-economic structure which was 
inherited from the condominium in alliance with the "senior establishment figures whose 
social influence (whether based on tribal, ' religious or economic pre-emmence)" (Ibid, 
204). He was able to see the other face of the coin "Political movements based on those 
who were regionally or socially disadvantaged". (p 205). The struggle between two 
forces was the main element. in the dynamics of the 1956-69 period. There are many 
similarities between Niblock analysis and the analysis in this thesis. The main difference is 
the emphasis on the thesis on the analysis of the economic structure applying the concept 
of articulation of the modes of production and the treatment of the whole period as one 
of an organic crisis of transformation. 
Peter Woodward contributed to the Study of the crisis in the Sudan. A common theme in 
his several works on the Sudan" is the study of political stability which led him to build 
110f particular interest to the crisis question are rd Woodward, P., (1979), Condominium and 
Sudanese Nationalism, Rex and Collings, London 1979, (1983), 'Islam, Radicalism and 
Nationalism in Sudanese Politics Before Independence' in Islam. Nationalism and Radicalism in 
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his analysis of the Sudanese crisis around the phenomenon of the unstable state12 - For 
Woodward the state is 
"the institutions of a government that both endeavours to maintain political order and 
implement policies within its own frontiers and that dealswith other states" (1990,1). 
Three elements in Woodward's approach to the Sudan crisis worth mentioning. The first 
is his historical approach to the question which he insisted on emphasising in the several 
works he has written (1985, p 3; 1986, p 65; 1990, pI and 1992, p 1). Using this 
approach, he attempted to search for the origin of the crisis, the elements of continuity 
(and discontinuity ) as well as the development (accumulation or condensation) of the 
crisis elements. In his preface to Sudan After Nitneiri, he wrote about the famine, floods,, 
locusts, political instability and civil ivar in the 1980s: 
"None of these were new to Sudan, but the close conjunction was unusual and all ivere far 
more intense (emphasis added) than at any time since independence in 1956" (1986 p 1) - 
It was not the appearances that attracted Woodward to hold the threads of continuity, but 
also the search for the essence of the crisis. For example he noticed the importance of the 
dominance of the centre as an element in the continuity. He wrote about the change 
brought by Nimeiri and his fellow officers in 1969: 
"<they> sought to sweep away the personnel, the institutions and the interests, but they did so 
still as people from the centre taking over the centralty dominated state <emphasis added>" 
(1985,5) 
This historical approach allowed him to point out one of the contradictions in the political 
life in the Sudan: 
"<While> political debate and acti-6ty of a national character remained predominantly an 
urban actiNity, the bases of support necessary for electoral success remained the rural areas, 
where sectarian support was overwhelmingly the largest single factor in clections. "(1990,98). 
It was strange that Woodward did not go far enough to point out the repercussions of 
this contradiction on the stability and instability of the system. He only saw that "the 
major parties "could reach out and command a majority of the rural areas of the north, 
which was vital in the parliamentary system" (Ibid, 133), and that "when converted into 
gover-nments it worked out unstable coalition cabinets" (Ibid, 133). He overlooked the 
role of the urban areas in the instability. While the major traditional party could control 
the parliament, they could not control the masses and their democratic organisations in 
the urban areas. This was reflected in a contradiction in the practise of liberal democracy 
which was responsible for the tendency to confiscate democratic rights of the masses and 
the establishment of an authoritarian state whether on the basis of military dictatorship 
Egypt and the Sudan, edited by Warburg and Kupferschmidt, '1983, (1985), Sudan: Threats to 
Stabilijýv, the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Conflict Studies Number 173, (1986), Military 
Civilian Relations' in Abd Rahim, etal, editors, (1986), Sudan Since Independence, Go%, %-cr 
Publishing Company, England, 1986, pp 65-73., (1990), Sudan, 1898-1989, The Unstable State, 
Boulder and Lester Crook Academic Publishing, London., and (1991), Sudan After Nimeiri, 
Centre for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, Scool of Oriental and African Studies, (SOAS), and 
Routledge, London and New York, 199 1. 
12This became the sub-title of his book "Sudan 1898-189: The Unstable State" published 1990. 
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(1958-64) or civilian dictatorship (Khalil's attempt to rule the country under a state of 
emergency in 1958, the ban of the communist in 1965 and the attempt to build an Islamic 
state by the draft of the permanent constitution of 1968). 
The second element was the attempt to analyse and link the class, religion and ethnical 
elements in the Sudanese politics. Though Woodward analysed ably the development of 
the commercial bourgeoisie class, his"Inalysis was one sided for he ignored the ruled 
classes except for a paragraph on the peasants (1990,127). The rule played by the small 
working class and the tenants of the irrigated agricultural schemes was of great 
importance in the instability of the state in the Sudan. In this thesis more attention will be 
given to these classes in Chapters 3,4 and 5. Woodward pointed out the complications of 
the ethnic origin of the commercial bourgeoisie and its reflection on the stability in the 
Su dan, especially the South. he also pointed to the role of religion both in maintaining the 
domýination of the class and dividing it. He wrote: 
"The wealthy class was less than homogeneous, for though leading members of both main 
parties have a common stake in the system, they lacked the vision or capacity to operate. The 
failure in tam , weakened the system. As a class in itself it was riven not only by sectarian and faction rivalries in politics, but also by highly clannish nature of much of its capitalist 
activity. " (1990,133) 
He rightly pointed out that the clientelism through which class, religion and ethnicity were 
employed had left the South out of the benefits of the system. 
The third element was his attempt to build connection between the international and the 
local elements that contributed to the crisis of the Sudanese state. This was obvious when 
dealing with the condominium, but it became more complicated after independence. The 
relation with Egypt and the united States contAuted to -instability in the period 1956-58 
(1986,65 and 1990,13 1). While adopting revolutionary politics towards Eriteria and the 
then Congo Kinshasa after the October revolution in 1964 and concentrating on the 
relation with the Arab countries after the June 1967 Middle East war made it easier for 
the Anya-nya movement to win the Affican countries. 
Charles Gordon (1989) also contributed to the study of the unstable state in the Sudan. 
Gordon surveyed the Iýstory of state in the Sudan to show that "<when > Sudan became 
independent it had only b een a single unitary state for forty years" (Ibid, 61). Though a 
state has been created, "no goverrunent succeeded in crating a Sudanese nation" (Ibid, 
61). He then 'went on discussing the factors that contributed to instability of the state 
which he classified under "five groups of factors- the geographical, demographic, 
historical, economic and political" (Ibid, 66). 
Three geographical factors were listed by Gordon. The large size of the country, its 
climatic diversity and harshness. He added to these three factors an additional which is 
related to the econon-dc geography of the country and that was "the paucity of Sudan's 
infrastructure" which " make <s> transport and communication very difficult" (Ibid, 67). 
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When discussing the demographic factors, he pointed that the 22 million population of the 
country are of "597 tribe who speak. 1 15 languages" (Ibid, 67) of whom 15-20 "is also 
very mobile" (p 68). While Islam is predominant in the North, only 15% of the Southern 
population are Christian (4% of the total population of the country. 
In listing historically the political factors, he put together the South-North relation, the 
unstable coalition goverm-nents which were characterised by "inter-party rivalry and 
instability"(Ibid, 69) and a list of political events without trying to give reasons why tMhgs 
happened that way and another. Dealing with the economic factors he concentrated on 
the issue of uneven development which was, and will remain, a vital issue when 
attempting any solutions for the questions of national unity, development and democracy 
in the Sudan. Saying that it is important to look at the dynamics that created uneven 
development and continued to. re-generate and deepen it. It is hoped that this thesis 
contributes positively in that direction. 
Despite the effort Gordon made in pages 74-77 to demonstrate the unique problems 
facing nation-building in the Sudan compared to other Arab and African countries, he did 
not tackle whether the question itself was on the agenda of the different political and 
social forces. Though implicitly Gordonrelated stability and the lack of it to the success 
and failure of nation building, he did not try to analyse the reasons why the question of 
nation-building had not been tackled, not saying resolved, by the different Sudanese 
governments or political leaders. Putting together factors, though very important, he 
failed to provide a concrete analysis of the reasons of the crisis of the instability of the 
state. However, Gordon was able to point out the sort of problems which should be faced 
if stability would ever be. maintained in the Sudan. 
Salih (1975) argued that the Sudanese economy inherited from the colonial rule a 
"productive structure" that 
"... despite the elapse of nearly two decades of political independence during which national 
(in contrast to colonial) economic policies were pursued remained substantially unchanged 
".. the productive structure thus inherited and perpetuated, colonial and malformed, does not. 
only failed to provide the basis and support for a process of dynan-ac development but, much 
worse, it actually constitutes an obstacle both to the initiation- and sustenance of such process. ' 
(1978,94) 
After providing a historical account of the process of the malformation of the -economy 
under the colonial rule, Salih went on analysing the structure concluding that by 1956 it 
was a structure of a dual economy with underdeveloped sectoral structure which was 
characterised. by being disproportionately developed, weak sectoral interdependence and 
a rudimentary manufacturing sector (109-112). He further noticed the high degree of 
openness and sensitivity to a distorted foreign trade which led to financial as well as 
physical dependence on foreign trade (Ibid 1124). For Salih these characteristics were 
connected and interrelated and together they formed a malformed structure which was 
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"archaic, non-integerated and outward oriented". Hence the question for Salih become 
one of the transformation of the economy from its colonial malformed structure to 
"a modem, integrated, and in which the production and invcstmcnt activities in various 
sectors are, to the maximurn possible degree, self-reliant, inwardly directed and internally 
linked"(Ibid, 137) 
Though most of the analysis provided by Salih is found to be sound and constructive in 
the study of the long run crisis, some critical remarks to clarify the difference between 
that analysis and the one adopted in this thesis. 
The first remark is related to the role of political force (administrative measures ). Salih 
mentioned that the coloniýl state "applied purely administrative measures (ie political 
force)" in the initial stages, but as the "process gathered momentum, this political force 
was supplemented with economic forces", and he argued that "the weight of the latter 
increased steadily through time" (Ibid, 101). Though he did not say that the use of 
political force f4ded away, the emphasis in this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) is that political 
force was crucial to maintain and run the colonial economic structure and that the failure, 
which was a result of inability (see Chapter 3), to continue the use of political force to the 
same extent used by the colonial state, while perpetuating the colonial economic 
structure, was one main reason for the crisis of the economy and the state. 
The second remark is about Salih use and definition of the modem-traditional dichotomy. 
The use of this dichotomy prevented Salih from looking to the unity of the economic 
structure and the interrelation between the so-called modem and traditional parts of the 
economy to the extent he declared "Each part was almost an economy by itself' (Ibid, 
103). The relation between the traditional part and the international market was 
underestimated by Salih. The dynamics of capital accumulation, labour migration, 
resource allocation and environmental imbalances were not revealed. These dynamics 
could have been revealed if the formation of the economic structure was dealt with as an 
articulation of modes of production. This is a task attempted in this thesis. 
This chapter and the next three argue that the Sudan has faced a general, political and 
economic crisis since its independence in 1956 and that the 1973-1985 crisis was only one 
of a series of individual crises that the country had passed through while undergoing a 
general crisis. Though any of these particular individual crises represented a 
moment/point of intensification of the manifestations of the general crisis in all or some of 
its general trends, it had its own logic which could be found in the particular historical 
events of the period of its occurrence. The existe nce of its own logic might suggest that it 
could have been avoided. Saying that does not mean that the overall trends of the general 
crisis could have been suppressed altogether without tackling the structural reasons 
responsible for the general crisis (which have nothing deterministic about them). The 
dealing with these structural reasons, does not eliminate the possibility of a particular 
short-run crisis; though may alter their logic, length and depth. 
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The general crisis has been manifest in general political and economic trends. The 
particular political and economic crises are discussed in this chapter as elements in the 
dynamics of the social process and contributing to the trends of the general political and 
economic crisis. 
On the political level two of these trends have dominated the contemporary period. Both 
trends could be classified as symptoms of political instability and expressions of a crisis of 
the post-colonial state. The first trend is of a civilian-military alternation of governments 
through a dialectic of military coup d'6tat and popular uprisings; the coups brought 
military to power and the uprisings overthrew them and re-instated civilian democratic 
rule. Neither the military nor the civilian democratic governments were able to install 
political stability or solve the crisis of the post-colonial state . 
The other trend is of a continuous conflict between the North, which dominates the 
central government, and the South which demands a fair share in power and wealth. This 
trend has been reflected in two civil wars, the first lasted for seventeen years, (1 955- 
1972), while the second has continued since 1983. The renewal of the civil war despite 
eleven years of peace following the Addis Ababa Agreement of March 1972, suggests 
that either the reasons for the conflict were not dealt with or that new reasons have 
arisen. We argue in chapter 5 that despite the specific events that led to the beginning of 
the second civil war, the main reason behind it is that the causes of the conflict had not 
been resolved whether by the peace agreement or by the policies that followed it. The 
origins of the conflict are part of the reasons for the general political and economic crisis. 
The central component of this general crisis is the crisis of the post colonial state. This 
reflected in what seems to be a continuous political instability which takes difTerent forms. 
It has been reflected in a civilian-military alternation in governments a civil war in the 
south, or mismanagement of the economy, a civil service crisis and the maladministration 
of the para-statal- corporations.. etc, are all but appearances of the crisis of the post- 
colonial state; despite the relative independence of these phenomena and the reasons for 
their own particular crises. 
3.2. The Nature of the Post-Colonial State 
The crisis of the post-colonial state in the Sudan could be sought in its structure and its 
performance in relation to the economy, the different social classes, ethnic, religious and 
regional groups; all in a historical context, that is in the social and political conflicts and 
struggles of the different social classes and groups. Both the structure and performance 
were haunted by the colonial heritage. Yet one cannot argue as Ali (1989) has done that 
the state in the Sudan, "remained after independence, in essence unchanged"( 60); or as 
Mahmoud claimed, "After independence in 1956, the nature of the state did not change. " 
(1984,15). Arguing the static nature of the state, reduces the post-colonial state to the 
colonial heritage. The post-colonial state is certainly the product of the colonial state, but 
it is, also, its potential negation. It is impossible to equate the colonial and post-colonial 
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states, they cannot be assumed to be identical , not 
least because of the formal 
contradiction in terms, and also because of the definition of the state which was adopted 
by Ali himself. The state is 
"a condensation of social relation, constituted through a long process of struggle and 
negotiation by socio-econornic forces aspiring to achieve domination. "(Ibid, pp58-59 
Looking to this "condensation of social relations", one can find the absence of the 
colonial power as an element in the internal social relations represented by the colonial 
state and its personnel and as an element of an external political-legal relation to which 
the post-colonial state is subordinated. This does not mean to exclude the effects of the 
international forces, whether they are the ex-colonial or neo-colonial, generally what 
Alavi calls "foreign imperial bourgeoisie" or "metropolitan bourgeoisie" (Alavi, 1972, 
61). Alavi argued, "At independence, however the direct command of the latter over the 
colonial state ended. " (Ibid, 61). The fact that the Sudan has become an independent 
sovereign country could not be reduced, as Thomas rightly argues, to "certain 
formalities.. flag and national anthem, new constitution, membership in the United 
Nations, and so on. " (Thomas: 1984,50). Such a reduction: 
"ignore [s] the significant expansion , 
of the state functions and the modification of methods of 
rule that of necessity followed independence, and leads to a serious misunderstanding of the 
qualitative leap involved in the transition from colonial to post-colonial state structure"(ibid, 
50). 
Political independence is not a formal change, even if some social forces in a newly 
independent country tried to reduce it to one, because the absence of the colonial power 
is not equal to subtracting a quantity from an arithmetic sum. It is an absence of an 
element which changes the relations among the remaining elements, forming a new 
identity, ie 'whole'. It is ýn expression of the development of the indigenous social forces, 
to the extent of obtaining political independence. It is a qualitative change. Similarity in 
some aspects between the two states does not mean identity, and could be explained by 
recognizing the elements of continuity expressed in the colonial heritage in the structures 
of both the state and the society in general. Carolyn Baylies rightly argues that, 
"For while independence of itself does not alter the economic or class structure, it does effect a 
change in the political process and the mechanism through which class forces are brought to 
bear on the state"(Baylies: 1985,15). 
Hence there is a justification for the use of a different category, 'the post-colonial state. 
It is, thus, the concrete analysis of this newwhole', though composed mostly of inherited 
elements, that reveals the nature of the 'social relations' and its 'condensation', a thing 
which Ali attempted with regard to the state's agricultural policies and arrived at results 
which revealed the class nature of those policies; yet that has not proved that "the state 
remained, after independence, in essence unchanged. ". Mahmoud had attempted in her 
study of the Sudanese bourgeoisie such a concrete analysis which contrary to her 
assertion of the unchanged nature of the state in the post-colonial era, showed the 
influence of the Sudanese bourgeoisie in shaping the policies of the post-colonial state 
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and in influencing the process of capital accumulation, (Ibid, 6 ), in which the state 
policies are determinant. Unless there is an implicit argument the Sudanese bourgeoisie 
were practising the same influence during the colonial rule, then the argument of the 
unchanging nature of the post-colonial state is false. Such an implicit argument could 
easily be proved wrong. If the 'essence' and 'nature' of the state are terms used by Ali and 
Mahmoud to mean the function of the state "to secure the reproduction of the society", 
which "on a very general level every state has" (Ziemann, and Lazendorfer, 1977,149); 
or "the enlarged reproduction of commodity production and exchange" (Charney, 1987, 
59), then the class structure of the post-colonial state gains great importance in the 
analysis. It is also necessary to find out whether a "conflict.. between local dominant 
classes and foreign capital over the distribution of surplus and possibilities of 
accumulation" does rise and whether it has been resolved and how. It is equally important 
in determining the nature of the post-colonial state, to identify the dominated classes and 
whether post-colonial state has been able to destroy "the organizations of the masses" 
(Thomas: 1984,92), or co-opt them. The latter issue is important if the state is 
understood to express the 'condensation! of the class struggle which will intensify 
foHoWing the absence of a foreign enemy that used to necessitate the unity of the different 
classes of the ex-colonies. 
However, this must not prevent the observation and analysis of the increasing influence of 
international forces of the world capitalist system on the Sudanese State, (and of course 
the economy). The relation here is not just a direct economic relation with the 'world 
market' which plays a decisive role in the reproduction of any export-oriented economy 
based on the production of primary products, but also a political one which might not 
directly involve a particular economic relation. An example isý the relation between the 
Sudan and the USA which for the latter was governed, for a long time ( until the 
discovery of oil in the Sudan by the American Chevron Oil Company13), by its world 
strategic considerations, the economic interests involved in them were existing outside the 
Sudan. We shall notice that this was part of the process through which the political and 
economic crises were generated and deepened. 
Ali identified the power bloc which dominated the post-colonial state in the Sudan, "the 
religious aristocracy, indigenous capitalists engaged in agriculture and commerce together 
with elements of the educated Sudanese"( 61). To that identification of the power bloc it 
is necessary to add the tribal , 
aristocracy and to specify the elements of the educated 
Sudanese and identify them as the high hierarchy of the civil service and the army, the top 
ranks bureaucrats and the military, the new petty bourgeoisie. 
The policies of the post-colonial state were to serve the interests. of some or all elements 
of the power bloc and that was the 'essence ' of the post-colonial state. Whether those 
interests were similar or identical to or part of those of the ex-colonial power does not 
13a subsidary of Standard Oil of California (SOCAL). 
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reduce the post-colonial state to a colonial one. The interests of the former, or at least 
what it conceived as its interests, became the goal to be achieved, maintained and 
reproduced, and whether the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie were met was a by- 
product. 
The post-cOlonial state was unable to perform like a colonial state in the management of 
the economy and society. That was despite the fact that it had kept the structure and 
institutions of the colonial economy and most of the state apparatus unchanged. This was 
not only because it was in "essence" and "nature" different from a colonial state, but also 
because it could not perform fike one14. The colonial state was authoritarian and was 
relatively autonomous vis-a-vis the Sudanese population; it was imposed on them, though 
it sought alEances and political articulation through its religious, tribal education and 
economic policies. The post-colonial state, on the other hand, was not autonomous and 
was not able to become authoritarian. This was one of the basic "contradictions of the 
post-colonial state. It was unable to run the economy and society in. a colonial way, yet it 
had preserved the structures and institutions of the colonial state and economy. This 
contradiction had arisen mainly because the basic change in the social power structure, 
which was due to the eRmination of the colonial state, had not only changed the balance, 
but had created new expectations among the different classes. The elin-dnation of the 
colonial power was not followed with a change in the structure and final objective of the 
economy which was unevenly developed, weakly interlinked on sectoral and regional 
bases, oriented towards the export of agricultural raw materials (basically cotton which 
by 1956 constituted 72% of the country's export earnings) and dependent on its supply of 
capital goods and manufactured consumer goods on imports. It was an economy which 
did not aim to satisfy the increasing and changing needs of the Sudanese population. 
Those who had formed the ruling power bloc were the beneficiaries of the economic 
structure as owners of cotton schemes, agents of export and import companies, lawyers 
of commercial enterprises, employees Of the- state, the revenue of which was directly and 
indirectly linked to the production of cotton and foreign trade. They were all anxious to 
capture the mechanism of capital accumulation and to enhance their wealth, while the 
dominated classes had expected improvement in their incomes and living conditions. 
Mohmed Ahmed Mahjoub, an ex-prime minister in. the Sudan and a prominent Umma 
leader, wrote in 1974 recalling the immediate period after independence, 
14The question is a conu-adiction between a "developed state 
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"Trouble started soon after ipdependence. It stemmed from one basic cause; having either 
worked for or opposed independence, the parties found themselves without any particular aim 
once it was achieved. Much was enwed f the parties and they all fill short of e. LCpgctation. 
They had no defined progLammes to deal with economic or social development. " (emphasis 
added), (Mahjoub, 1974: 175) 
This was partly true, because. keeping the old structures and attempting to expand them 
was a programme in itself, while these structures did not satisfy the' expectations' of the 
population. Niblock noted that, 
"Those who ruled the Sudan over these years [1956-69] sought to develop the country within 
the socio-economic structure which they had inherited from the Condominium era, with minor 
changes. "(Niblock, 1987: 204) 
What was lacking was a programme for changing the colonial economy and structures. It 
was unavailable because the dominant classes did not want one because they were the 
beneficiaries of the status quo. The ruling power bloc tried to reproduce, sometimes with 
horizontal expansion, the structures, institutions and methods of the col onial economy. 
Two problems had arisen from this attempt. The first was the failure to manage the 
economy in the colonial authoritarian way, specially where the articulation of pre- 
capitalist modes of production involved compulsion by the state directly; ie the Gezira 
Scheme, or indirectly, ie the private pump schemes, and the rain-fed sub-sectors. The 
history of the post-colonial state was one where attempts to exercise authoritarian *power 
were challenged by the masses, as it will argued below. The second has been identified as 
"a basic... contradiction " between the expectations of the people and an economy 
basically not designed to satisfy their rising and changing needs (Bush and Kaballo, 
1991: 11). This failure to "deliver the goods" had been one of the important interrelations 
between the political and economic crises which had characterized the post-colonial state 
in the Sudan. Economic crises had providýd a ".. possible condition for the loss of 
hegemony" (Charney: 1987,63) of the ruling power bloc and had provoked the 'masses' to 
pass "frorn a state of political passivity to a certain activity" (Gramsci: 1971,210) which 
was both political and economic in nature. At the same time it was used as justification by 
different political groups competing for power not to abide by'the rules of the game' and 
attempt reaching power by military coups. All leaders of military coups used the presence 
of economic crises and the failure to meet the expectations and to satisfy the basic needs 
of the people in their political discourse which is usually broadcast in their first statement. 
In the Sudan economic crises had contributed to the several political crises faced the 
country since independence. 
3.3. The Non-autonomous State 
Chapter 2 identified the colonial state was relatively autonomous from the Condominium 
powers and the Su8anese socio-econon-k formation. That allowed the colonial state to 
articulate forces and structures both on the economic and political level. The post- 
colonial state history is one of its quest and attempt to establish this relative autonomy, 
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with little success during the military regimes, in vain most of the other times, as we will 
see in this Chapter. Niblock noticed that, 
"... the pre-1969 Sudanese state enjoyed only limited autonomy. It was controlled fairly directly 
by the 'incipient bourgeoisie!, through the influence which the Sudanese establishment could 
exert on the main political parties and on the military leadership" (Niblock: 1987,233) 
The main reason behind this lack of relative autonomy was the competition among the 
different fractions of the ruling power bloc to inherit, not only the political power of the 
state but its economic power. This in turn was a direct result of economic statism 
developed during the colonial era and the articulation of pre-capitalist and capitalist 
modes of production. 
By 1955 the government's current revenue was 16.5% and its expenditure was 14.9% of 
the Sudan GDP. Its share in the gross national capital formation reached 5.1% of the. 
GDP, compared with 3.4% the share of the private sector. Moreover, the importance of 
the state as a tool of capital accumulation and a device. for financial transfers from the 
public sector to the private sector in the Sudan was apparent from the decisive role it 
played in issuing export and import licences, allotting new mechanized rain-fed 
agricultural schemes and irrigated pumps schemes, approving the establishment of new 
industries and granting them concessions, as well as sorting government's bids, appointing 
government's contractors and determining its purchases. The prolonged discussions in the 
first Sudanese parliament on these issues and the exchanged accusations of corruption 
and utilization of official positions to give licences or allot schemes to relatives or 
political followers or partners were clear evidence on the importance the different 
fractions in the ruling club was giving to the domination of the state apparatus. It was, as 
Morris Szeftel, (1983), described the situation in Zambia , the politics derived by the aim 
of distributing the spoils. The discussions in the parliament also showed the backing that 
some fractions of the Sudanese bourgeoisie was expecting from the state in its 
competition with foreign enterprise (Awad: 1966,37,56); which is shown in chapter 4 
was dommating Sudan foreign trade and its banking system. 
The competition'itself could have taken place among rival fractions of the ruling power 
bloc when the hegemony of the bloc as a whole was established, and rules were set for 
the competition game that ensure the reproduction of the social relations. 
The relative autonomy of the state in such a case, as it is argued in Chapter 1, would have 
been an expression of that hegemony. It would also have been a manifestation of the role 
of the state as a mediator and/or arbitrator of a last resort in the competition game 
without losing sight of its obligation safeguard the conditions for reproduction and 
expansion of the dominant mode of production or the articulated system of modes of 
production. 
In the Sudanese case the ruling power bloc was unable to establish its hegemony as a 
bloc, nor was any fraction of it was able to establish its own hegemony. Ali noticed that, 
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".. neither the bourgeoisie in the state nor any other class or fraction succeeded in retaining 
ascendancy over the entire power block indefinitely. In fact, frequent change in the structure 
and distribution of power within the ruling bloc, and unabated and unceasing quest for 
hegemony therein, characterized the post-colonial state and prevented the dominant social 
forces from achieving any enduring or stable equilibrium of class alliances. " (Ali, 1989 : 74) 
This situation was partially an element of the colonial heritage. Sudan, like other Third 
Word countries, "was left with a heterogeneous s* et of class forces where no single or 
bloc of classes could ensure the sustainablity or reproduction of their political 
dornination. "(Bush and Kaballo, 1991: 4). 
The adoption of the colonial state of political and economic policies of articulation did 
not lead to a classical transformation of the pre-capitalist modes of production and social 
forces in the Sudan into a capitalist mode of production. Instead an articulated system of 
modes of production was established. As a result the Sudan was left with a weak 
capitalist class. The colonial economy in which this class emerged and developed was 
dominated, (in modem irrigated agriculture, ) by the colonial state and (in foreign trade 
and finance) by foreign capital. The rain-fed agriculture was mainly a peasant econoniy 
dominated by pre-capitalist relations politically articulated under the auspices of tribal 
leaders and internationally linked through exchange relations by commercial capital. The 
local merchants in these rural areas were petty traders who were mainly commercial 
agents of foreign capital. Some of them began investing in groundnut production as th e 
boom in oil-seeds prices began after independence (For data on oil-seeds prices see 
Kabal-lo, 1984, Appendix) 
The presence of local capital in agriculture was in the private pump schemes on the White 
and Blue Niles as well as the Northern province. Although by 1954 (the first year of self 
government) their investment reached 57,000feddans of cotton, it only constituted 9% 
of the 628 thousandsfeddans, the total area cultivated by cotton that year. 
The presence of the local capital in mechanized rain-fed -agriculture was also weak and 
did not gather any momentum before the beginning of the implementation of the 
recommendation of the working party formed by the first national government to study 
the development of the mechanized rain-fed agriculture and which . favoured' the 
encouragement of private investment (Kaballo, 1984,4). 
The industrial fraction of the Sudanese bourgeoisie was also weak due to the recent 
history of manufacturing industry in the country, its primary processing type as well as its 
small share (1%) in the GDP in 1956 (Harvey and Klive, 1959, ). 
The commercial fraction of the Sudanese capitalist class, except for a few individuals, was 
mainly a fraction of petty-traders distributing commodities imported by foreign companies 
and/or collecting agricultural products for export by the same foreign enterprises. In 
addition to the weakness of its economic base, the Sudanese capitalist class was, due to 
the uneven development of the economy, a class composed of Northern Sudanese of 
Islamic and Arab origin. This had great complication in Sudanese politics, especially if it 
is noticed that the other fractions of the power bloc, the religious aristocrats and the 
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educated petty bourgeoisie were mainly from the same region and origin. This was one of 
the basic reasons behind the politics of the ethnic conflicts faced the Sudan since 1955. 
The capitaBst class was also weak because it was divided on sectarian and tribal lines. It 
has already been shown in Chapter 2, how the colonial state, seeking its own allies, 
promoted sectarian and tribal leaders and ýirengthened their political and economic 
powers which conserved and enhanced their cultural and ideological influences, especially 
in the rural areas. That chapter also indicated how the leaders of the Graduate Congress 
in their first confrontation with the colonial state sought the support of the sectarian 
leaders instead of seeking the support of the masses. By that action that fraction of the 
Sudanese new petty bourgeoisie lost its independence and was not able, as in other 
African countries, to dominate the post-colonial state. (ie Ghana, Tanzania... etc, see 
SauL 1974; Murray, 1967; Fitch and Oppenheimer, 1966); 
All these weaknesses of the bourgeoisie were reflected in their political organizations. 
When the Sudan became independent in 1956, two political parties were dominating the 
political scene: the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the Umma Party (UP). Both parties 
were a result of a split in the Graduates Congress which had assumed the role of the 
Sudanese national movement(1938- 1945)(see Chapter 2 above) . 
The split was on two main issues. The first was ideological concerning the religious sect 
that the movement should seek alliance with. The two predominant sects in the Sudan 
were the Khatimyya and Ansar. The Khatimyya sect had followers among the tribes of 
northern and eastern Sudan and in urban areas. The Mahdist Ansar sect influenced the 
tribes of western Sudan, the Gezira, the White Nile areas and the Danagla tribe in the 
north. 
The second issue was the relation with Britain and Egypt, the Condominium powers. 
Though there were common economic interests between the two countries and their 
respective allies, the relation could not be explained by those economic interests alone. It 
had roots in the conflict between Egypt and Britain on the Egyptian claim of sovereignty 
on the Sudan and the trend among some Sudanese to use that conflict in their fight for 
independence. The group allied with the Khatimyya and Egypt formed a party called al- 
Ashiqqa which, through a process of internal splits and unity, changed its name to the 
National Unionist Party (NUP). The other group allied with the Mahdist sect and the 
British formed the Umma Party. 
Both parties represented an alliance of fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie educated 
strata, the commercial and agricultural fractions of the capitalist class and the aristocratic 
strata of the tribal and religious leaders; with different weights of these social groups in 
the two parties. The weight of the educated and merchants was greater in the NUP. The 
Umma Party was dominated by the religious aristocrats of the Mahdi family, agricultural 
capitalists and tribal leaders. 
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These social forces were distributed in the two parties according to different tribal and 
religious sectarian affiliations. They reflected two important non-class cleavages in the 
Sudanese society, which they had their roots in the pre-capitalist social formations. Both 
parties were dominated by Northern social classes which were Arab Islamic in orientation 
and inspiration. That formed an important element in the political split between the North 
and the South. 
The division of the Sudanese capitalist class on tribal and sectarian lines in the two parties 
and its economic weakness compared to foreign capital and the religious and tribal 
aristocracy hindered their ability to lead the masses. Both sections of the class, whether in 
the NUP or in the Umma, were dependent in their ideological appeal to the masses on 
religious sectariani sm: Khatimyya and Mahdism respectively. This in itself was a sign of 
ideological bankruptcy. Historically the bourgeois class in Europe is a secular class and 
for social and economic modernization. The Sudanese bourgeoisie chose, voluntarily or 
compelled, a schizoid ideological stance. Among its intellectuals, they were discussing 
Balzac, and Voltaire, reading Taha Hussein and Raffie, fond of Montesquieu and 
Rousseau, learning by heart the poems of Milton and Elliot, but in public they were either 
Khatimyya or Ansar (the follower of the Mahdist sect)15. They isolated themselves from 
the people as an 'educated strata', the 'graduates of Gordon College' and the 'effendia '. 
When the time had come for the quest of the 'masses' support, they opted for rallying that 
support through the religious sectarianism and traditional tribalism. 
In 1955, when the petty bourgeoisie of the educated'strata in the NUP thought that by 
leading the independence struggle they had established their hegemony and that they did 
not need the influence of the Khatimyya sect any more, they tried to isolate the 
Khatimyya from the process of decision making in the party and the government. They 
lost power for a coalition instigated by the two religious leaders. The religious aristocracy 
felt the need for their coalition in order to face the danger of loosing their potential 
hegemony as the traditional leadership of the people, and hence losing their domination of 
the state. The Khatimyya formed their own party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in 
1955. This resulted in a number of events which'Ied to expulsion of the NUP from the 
goyernment and the formation of a coalition of the Umma party and PDP. 
Although the conflict appeared to be ideological as a conflict between "politics and 
holiness", as it was quoted in the contemporary Sudanese newspapers, it was more down 
to earth than that. The conflict was about the domination of the state : who should inherit 
the colonial power? 
The Unima and PDP coalition united the traditional religious and tribal aristocracy, 
agricultural bourgeoisie and parts of the commercial bourgeoisie. This unity involved 
many internal contradictions. The traditional tribal and religious leaders were anxious to 
"To be fair, it is necessary to mention the small group of the Sudanese intellectuals knox-, -n as 
Abit RaufGroup which rejected to be part of any religious sectarianism. 
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expand their agricultural interests most of which they gained during and with the 
assistance of colonial rule. On the other hand, the commercial bourgeoisie and a fraction 
of the new petty bourgeoisie, composed mainly of retired government employees and 
professionals, formed the leadership of the NUP, thought they should be allotted the new 
agricultural schemes, export and import ficences, presenting themselves as the countrys 
new entrepreneurs who could challenge the foreign enterprises and make deals with them 
at the same time as the parfiamentary discussion in 1954-56 revealed. (Awad: 1966,55- 
57). 
There was also a contradiction between the Khatimyya and the Ansar merchants 
concerning trade and economic relations with Egypt. Egypt was a traditional market for 
Sudanese cattle, camels and oil-seeds. It was also a traditional source of cheap popular 
textile imports. While the Khatimyya merchants had a wide interest in developing the 
relations with Egypt, the Mahdists persisted in their traditional conflict with her which 
was aggravated by the failure to reach a new agreement on the distribution of the Nile 
waters. Both the religious aristocracy of the Mahdi and Mirghani families had great 
interest in pump irrigation on the banks of White and Blue Niles. In addition the Mirghani 
family had interests in agricultural production in the Nor-them province, both as investor 
and receiver of tributes. 
The movement of Abdalla Khalil, then the Prime NIinister of the Sudan to accept 
American Aid (which was at that time condemned by most of the political parties as part 
of the Eisenhower Doctrine which governed the American foreign policy in the fifties and 
aimed at establishing defence pacts in the NEddle East linked to the American defence 
policies), resulted in more deterioration of the relations with Egypt as well as a wide 
internal opposition. 
3.4. The State Crisis 1954-58 
Divided and weak, the different fractions of the power bloc were not able to agree on a 
set of rules for the contest of power. During the first two years of independence it 
appeared as if the parliamentary democracy would set the rules of the game, but the 
handing of the power over to the military in 1958 showed that was not the situation. One 
level of the political instability was caused by constantly changing governments between 
1954-1958. Five governments handed power to each other during this short period. Three 
of them were headed by Azahari of the NUP, in January 1954, November 1955, and 
February 1955. The other two were headed by Khalil of the Umma in July 1956 and 
March 1958. Taking into account that only two elections took place during this period, 
then the split in the NUP and 'crossing of the floor' by parliament members were 
responsible for this instability. When Azahari was first elected on January 1954, he had a 
majority of 19 votes in the Parliament, he lost a vote of confidence on November 10th 
1954 by two and regained it after four days by four votes to lose the confidence vote in 
Parliament again on June 1956. Khalil was elected in July with 28 votes majority. 
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'Crossing Parliament floorwas another manifestation of the weakness and the divisions. of 
bourgeoisie in the Sudan at the time. 
By 1958, when the 'project' of the ruling power bloc to establish its hegemony was not 
achieved through a democratic form of government, the ruling power bloc sought the 
authoritarian option. This was partially as a result of the colonial heritage which by 
adopting the articulation on the political and economic levels, not only kept a strong 
aristocracy but also prevented the emergence of a bourgeoisie capable of establishing its 
hegemony which in its turn would have made it possible for the state to gain a relative 
autonomy vis-a vis the civil society. It was also due to the inability of the petty 
bourgeoisie intellectuals to establish an independent mass movement in their struggle 
against colonialism and depended instead on the religious and tribal aristocracy in their 
appeal to the masses which kept the latter imprisoned within the sectarian and tribal 
ideological discourse. The mass movement which had developed after World War 11, 
acquired radical dimensions. 
3.4.1. Class Conflicts and the Authoritarian Tendenev 
Authoritarianism was one of the characteristics of the colonial state in the Sudan'and was 
very important in the functioning of the political and economic institutions and the 
suppression of the national movement under colonial rule. The post-colonial state in the 
Sudan had begun as a constitutional democratic state where there was a provision for the 
separation of powers: the executive, the parliament and the judiciary which allowed for 
accountability of the government to the parliament and for sovereignty of the rule of law 
constitution guarded and by an independent judiciary, on one level, on the other level the 
basic democratic rights which allowed independent organisation of the social groups and 
classes not affiliated to the ruling power bloc. Such a system required that the ruling 
power bloc should recognize the contradiction between a democratic state and the 
colonial heritage of authoritarian institutions and structures and the need for changing 
them. It also required making compromises to establish the hegemony of the ruling power 
bloc or a fraction of it on consensus and not by simple/ crude coercion. It further required 
the change of the management of economic institutions by providing for economic 
incentives and market forces to allocate and re-allocate resources. 
There are always limits to the use of coercion in different societies depending, not only on 
the readiness and ability of the ruling class, but also on the consciousness and 
organization of the ruled classes and their ability to challenge the use of coercion. The 
concrete analysis of the Sudanese case reveals that the ruling power bloc was not able to 
make the needed compromises and changes and failed when it opted for the use of 
coercion under the first civilians to establish and sustain an authoritarian state. The use of 
coercion against the tenants of the private pump schemes on the white Nile in 1956 
provoked a wide condemnation. The declaration of state of emergency in 1958 was met 
with resistance and was actually ignored by most of the people, ie the workers strike in 
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1958 took place despite the state of emergency. The failure of the civilian authoritarian 
option was due to the existence of a mass movement in the urban areas. This urban mass 
movement had three forms. 
The first was a political form. It was constituted, at that time, by two political parties: the 
NUP and the Sudan Communist Party. The NUP was the most single influential political 
force in the Urban areas, in terms of membership and supporters. The NUP membership 
had greater weight of merchants and intellectuAls compared to the Umma party. Its 
influence among the tribes of the Northern province was greater than the Umma and it 
was only competing with the PDP, the Khatimyya backed party . The Urban areas of the 
Sudan were greatly inhabited by people migrated from the Northern province who 
compose d the largest sections of the merchants, educated strata, and the working class. 
Since July 1956, the NUP was compelled to stand in the opposition. Before the 1958 
elections, the Unima - PDP government, being conscious of the fact that the NUP was 
influential in the Urban areas redistributed the electoral constituencies to give the rural 
areas more weight and representation in the new parliament. (Niblock: 1987,211 and Haj 
Musa: 1970 , 254/256). The results of the 1958 elections confirmed the position of the 
NUP in the opposition. The NUP got 44 seats in the new Parliament of 173 members, 
where the Umma had 63, the PDP 26 and the Southern Liberals 40 seats. The leadership 
of the party adopted a"populist" stand to the extent of making alliance with the trade 
unions movement, in contrast to the stand of the government of the. NUP (1954-1956) 
which was the first to deny the trade unions the right to participate in politics. 
The Sudan Communist Party (SCP) was established in 1946. Its membership was 
composed mainly of that part of the petty bourgeoisie educated strata which after the war 
had chosen to form independent mass organizations, some workers and students. Its 
influence was mainly among the educated, the students and the workers in the urban 
areas. The party was illegal and was performing through the Anti-Imperialist Front 
formed in 1953. The SCP contributed to the organization of workers, farmers, tenants 
and students trade unions. 
The second dimension of the mass movement was a trade -unions. The trade union 
movement constituted of two parts: the workers trade unions and the farmers and tenants 
unions. The workers were organized since 1947 (for details see Fwazi, 1957, Beshir, 
1977, Sayeed, 1990), and in 1949 a Workers Congress unifying these unions was formed, 
reorganized in 1950 as the Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation (SWTUF)(Beshir, 
1977, pl96). The SWTUF was closely associated with the SCP. According to Beshir the 
SCP, "not only provided the militant leadership which the movement needed, but it also 
provided the ideological and political orientation which characterized the Sudan labour 
movement over the years"(Ibid, 198). This might be one of the reasons for participation 
of Sudan trade unionist movement in national politics. Yet, a fundamental reason, it could 
be argued, was the role of the state in the economy in the Sudan, and especially as the 
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largest individual employer of wage-labour in the country. The first trade union was 
formed by the workers of Sudan Railways, which was a government department. The 
battle to obtain recognition for the railway's first trade union, the Workers Affairs 
Association, was seen as a fight against British Colonialism. This developed a conceptual 
link, through the histoýy of Sudanese trade unionism, between economic and social 
demands and political struggle. The different political parties accepted this linkage during 
the struggle for independence and the SVTrUF initiated the formation of the United Front 
for the Liberation of the Sudan in 1950. Soon after the NUP formed the first national 
government in 1954, it began denying the poEtical role of the trade union movement; but 
when the NUP was compelled to move to opposition, the political role of the trade unions 
was again recognized. 
Table 2. Number of Unions and Union Membershiv 1949-1968 
Year Niunber of Unions Total . Membership 
1949 5 NA. 
1950 62 NA. 
1951 86 37793 
1952 99 NA. 
1953 NA. NA. 
1954 134 NA 
1956 NA. NA. 
1957 NA. NA. 
1958 135 86355 
Source: Ahmed A. G. M. 1984 28. 
The importance of the trade union movement in the Sudan did not result from the size of 
the urban working class. By 1955/56 the urban working class was less than 0.4% of the 
population of the country and about 0.8% of the labour force; however it constituted 
45% of the Urban population. The real importance was due to its role in the national 
economy. The economy was dependent on the railways as the most important means of 
transport, especially as far as the exports and imports were concerned. In 1953 there were 
25,000 railway workers and their trade union was the largest of all the Sudanese workers 
trade unions. By 1958 (as table 2 shows) there were 135 trade unions organizing about 
86,355 workers, the bulk of them was united in the Sudan Workers Trade unions 
Federation (SWTUF). 
By 1958 the SW7FUF was in wage disputes with the government and when the 
government accepted American Aid, the SWTUF declared a successful one day strike 
which generated a campaign of opposition resulting into a formation of an opposition 
front composed of the NUP, the ACF, the SWTUF and the student unions of the 
Khartoum University and Polytechnic. 
The third dimension was the students movement. The origins of the movement were 
shown in Chapter 2. Like the workers' trade unions, the student movement developed a 
political tradition and participation in public affairs. The student' movement, being under a 
radical leadership, joined the opposition groups. Following the strike of the SWTUF, the 
Khartoum University Students Union (KUSU), initiated the formation of the opposition 
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front in 1958. The agenda of the front was the stand against the authoritarian project of 
the prime minister Abdalla Khalil. 
The 1956-58 period revealed that the religious and tribal aristocracies could control the 
parliament through their influence in the rural areas but were not able to control either the 
urban areas or the modem forces of the petty bourgeoisie and working class. The latter 
were well organized to perform as pressure groups and cause economic and political 
instability. 
3.4.2. The Regional Question on the Agenda 
Chapter 2 indicated how the policies of the colonial state resulted in an unevenly 
developed Sudan. It is also discussed in this chapter how the ruling power bloc was 
composed of the bourgeoisie, religious and tribal aristocrats and the educated petty 
bourgeoisie strata of Northern Sudan who were of Arab-islarnic origins. From the start 
this brought to the post-colonial state's agenda the question of other ethnic and religious 
groups. 
The failure of the ruling power bloc to include' representatives of other groups, especially 
the Southerners was evident during the Sudanization process when only eight 
Southerners were promoted to senior posts replacing the 800 British officials, while the 
remainder posts were allocated to Northerners. An apologist from the North described 
that as"FoHowing the best traditions of the British Civil Service", for the Sudanizat ion 
Commission "allocated jobs and made promotion in accordance with seniority, experience 
and qualifications"(Beshir, 1968: 72). Actually what happened was a failure "to take into 
account that the South would eventually need 
, 
some compensating mechanism whereby to 
gain greater representation as the years went by" (KhAlid, 1990: 158). The promises made 
by Northern representatives in the Juba conference and during the 1953 elections were 
forgotten. The Northern power bloc needed the alliance with the. Southern Sudanese in 
the struggle against British Colonialism, when the latter was giving way, that alliance 
became outdate d and the representation of Southerners in constitutional institutions 
would then become merely a decoration. 
The events which took place immediately before the mutiny of the Equatorial Corps in 
August 1955, were evidence of the attempt of the Northern power bloc to monopolize 
the. state power and exclude Southerners from real power. Though two Southern 
ministers were appointed to the cabinet, (raised to three in some government), the South 
itself was put under the administration of the Northern Sudanese who also assumed the 
leading role in forces of the Equatorial Corps (composed of Southerners) after the 
Sudanization of the Administration and the Armed Forces in October 1954. 
The dissatisfaction of Southern Ws with the Sudanization process lead them to cross the 
floor to join the opposition. The Southern Liberal Party called for a conference in 
October 1954, some days after the announcement of the Sudanisation Committee's final 
report. The conference which took place in Juba adopted the demand for a federal union 
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between the South and the North (Sayeed: 1990,255). The message was clear: because 
the Northerners did not give the Southern petty bourgeoisie its share in the post-colonial 
state, the Southerners would demand a federal system to get their 'fair share', and in that 
they would rally the masses and make use of ethnic and religious differences between the 
South and the North. A minor contradiction between the Northern ruling power bloc and 
the Southern petty bourgeoisie would develop into a major conflict and into an 
antagonistic contradiction between the North and the South. 
On May 1955, the two Southern ministers resigned from the NUP parliamentary group 
and the Cabinet and joined the Liberal Southern Party (LSP) which was demanding a 
federal status with the North (R of S: 1956,21). Azhari's government responded by 
issuing accusations and threatening Southerners with using force against any attempt to 
cause troubles within the South. The third conference of the LSP, the only Southern 
political party, to be held in Juba in July 1955 was faced with obstacles. The NUP 
government and the administration in the South were accused of trying to intimidate the 
LSP (Ibid, 91). In the same month, the new Northern administration of Anzara agro- 
industrial project, the only one in the South, dismissed some 300 hundred workers. On 
the 25th of that same month a Southern member of the Parliament, Mr. Elias Kuze, was 
sentenced to 20 years in prison following a rally in which he attacked the government 
policy and its attitude to make an alliance with the Southern tribal leadership. Though the 
accused was a member of the Parliament, his parliamentary immunity did not prevent his. 
arrest and trial in a Chiefs Court without permission from the Parliamentary authorities 
concerned. The second day of the trial, demonstrations broke out in Anzara, the army 
was called in to shoot the demonstrators and six Zande were Bled and many others 
wounded. Though the situation became critical, the NUP government in Khartoum was 
not concerned with the South since it declared as. early as 1954 that it would use force 
against any Southerner who would endanger the security and unity of the country. 16 This 
official threat made an apparently false telegram, which Was assumed to have been signed 
by the Prime Minister Ismail al-Azahari, easy to circulate and likely to be believed. The 
false telegram ordered the Northern administrators to oppress and ill-treated the 
S outhemers. (O'B all ance: 1977,. 40, Sayeed: 1990,257/258). On August 7th, 1955 two 
civilian were arrested in Juba accused of contributing to a plot to cause a mutiny in the 
Southern forces of the army. Demonstrations demanding their release were dispersed by 
the use of tear gas for the first time in the South. On August the 18th the Southern units 
of the army in Torit in the Equatoria province, refused the orders issued to them to move 
to the North. The mutiny resulted in the death of 275 Northerners and 70 Southerners. 
16T'he flu-eat N-Nas issued on August the 18th, 1954 folloNNing a visit of a joint parliamentary 
delegation of the Unima and the Liberal parties headed by Buth Diu, the Secretary of the latter, 
which attacked the government policy. 
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The pol. itics of ethnic conflicts claimed a new era throwing dark shadows on the real 
issues behind them. 
Despite these shadows, the pol-itical movement in the South continued to believe in a 
possible peaceful solution to the contradiction between them and the Northern power 
bloc. In December 1955, the Southern members of the Parliament agreed to vote for the 
immediate independence of the Sudan, following a promise given as a decision passed in 
the Parfiament to consider their 'claim! for a federal system of government when the 
permanent constitution was written. But when the Constitutional Committee was formed 
only three Southerners out of 46 members were appointed to it. When the Committee 
'considered' the Southern 'claim' for a federation, it rejected them and the Southern 
members walked out. One of the Southern leaders, Father Saturino Lohure, a Catholic 
priest and a founder of the Federal Bloc, summarized the position of many educated 
Southerners when he said in the Parliament on June 1958, 
"The South claims to federate with the North.. a right that the South possesses as a 
consequence of the principle of free self-determination which reason and democracy grant to a 
free people. The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the Alorth so 
decides, direct1v or indirect1v throuph political, social and economic subjeciion ofthe South. " 
In less than eleven years, since the Juba Conference decided the unity of the Sudan, the 
Southern demands developed from mere constitutional safe-guards to a federal state to a 
threat to separate. It is absurd to explain that change in position merely by reference to 
the colonial heritage, because the colonial heritage did not prevent the Southern 
representatives in the Juba Conference ftom chosing the unity of the Sudan. The 
explanation, though should take into account the colonial heritage of the Sudan as a 
whole (in the sense how the North and South developed and were structured), should be 
sought in the way different actors on'the stage performed. Because the play no longer had 
an author, the actors were the authors and they should be held responsible about their 
performance. 
Most of the Northern politicians and scholars do not go beyond the circumstances 
directly encountered and inherited from the past. They try to explain what they call the 
Southern problem by recalling the colonial past as if the history of the Sudan had*stopped 
on independence day. Prime Minister Azahari told a press conference in September 5th 
that, "What has happened in the South now is a predetermined result of the heritage of the 
past and the plots which had been prepared over, years. " (at-Ayarn Daily, 6/9/1955). Ali 
Abd al-Rahman, a founder and president of PDP and ex-minister who held important 
ministerial portfolios including those of education and interior as well as of foreign affairs, 
wrote explaining the 1955 events, 
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"Colonialism and Mssionarics had cooperated in creating the feelings of hatred and erunity in 
the hearts of Southerners preparing by that a time-bomb which was just triggered off by the 
withdrawal of the British in 1955 and after the establishment of the self-government and its 
success in the Sudnni7ntion.. "(Al Amin: 1970,5 1). 
Generally this was an apologetic approach by the leading members of the ruling bloc, not 
only to justify their failure but also to treat the Southerners who did not surrender to their 
authority and accept their hegemony as 'the half-educated elements', 'the mission boys', 
'the British agents '(Garang: 1971,22). 
On the other side some of the Southerners had the idea that the difference in the 
development between the South and North could only be overcome under the trusteeship 
of the British Administration ignoring the fact that the colonial state was responsible for 
the state of uneven development. According to Joseph Garang that was a rightist group 
which was incited by- and allied themselves with the British and later with the Umma 
party. They base their stand on Nofth-South conflict, taking the whole North as Arabs 
and Moslems who wanted to exploit and suppress the Southerners. Like the Northern 
ruling power bloc, they retreat to history, but this time the history of slave trade in the 
Sudan, to search for the causes of the conflict. The rightist group was building its 
ideological discourse, again like the power bloc, on ethnic and religious grounds with 
Africans on the ethnic level and Christianity on the religious as elements opposing 
Northern Arabs and Islam. (Ibid, 14-15). 
This wing of the Southern political movement of tried to bloc the process of the self- 
determination before the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953 (Ibid, 21). Their failure was 
due to the rise of a national group in the Southern politics, led by Bullen Alier on the 
same year. The latter allied itself with the national movement in the North. The problems 
of 1955, were a direct result of the betrayal of the power bloc in the North of its Southern 
allies by forgetting "the promises they had made during the election campaign". and their 
failure to "meet the urgent needs of the South-e. g economic construction, the principle of 
equal pay to equalworký abolition of the poll tax, raising the standard of living of the 
masses, adequate share in the state apparatus, etc. " (Ibid, 22) As a result, the rightist 
group in the Southern political movement flounshed. 
The mistrust and worries about the policies of the power bloc spread to other less 
develo ped regions in the Sudan and a Federal Bloc was formed after the 1958 elections. 
Though mostly constituted of Southern members, the Federal bloc inspired the rise of 
important regional awareness. 
The Beja Congress held in October 1958 demanded an autonomous rule for Eastern 
Sudan, (where *more than 500,000 Beja people were living at the time), and more 
representation for the Beja in the Central government. The November coup brought the 
Beja movement to a temporary halt. 
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3.4.6. The Economic Crisis of 1957/58 
Failing to change, or even being conscious of the necessity of change, the post- colonial 
state maintained the Sudanese economy within the international division of labour where 
it was subject to the conditions in the international market, especially the fluctuations in 
the prices of primary commodities. This was more clear as far as the prices of cotton, 
which by independence constituted 72% of the earnings of Sudanese exports were 
concerned. The cotton prices which rose sharply in 1951 during the Korean war to reach 
134.7 cents per lb, declined sharply to 70 cents in 1952, and 67.4 cents in 1953. In 1954 
it began a smooth rise to 72.8 cents and continued rising during 1955 and 1956 to reach 
77.1 and 80.7 cents respectively. It dropped sharply to 51.7 cents per lb in 1957 and to 
35.7 cents in 1958, 
The decline in cotton prices, linked with a poor output of cotton in 1957/58 and the 
failure to sell the production of 1956/57 and 1957/58 were enough to create a crisis for 
Sudan mono-commodity export economy. The cotton output of 1957/58 was 1061,000 
kantars, less than half the output of 1956/57 and about 60% of the average cotton 
output for the years 1951/52-1955/56. In addition by the beginning of 1958 there were 
494,000 bales of cotton unsold and only 231,000 bales of that had been sold by 
November 1958 (Haj Musa: 1970,191). 
The crisis in cotton production, prices and trade was combined with a bad season for two 
other export crops, sesame and groundnuts. The output of sesame declined from 153, 
000 metric tons in 1956/57 to 141,000 metric tons in 1957/58, a decline of 7.9%. The 
total output ofaroundnuts decreased by 11% from 146 to 129,000 metric tons in the 
same period. (MoF: 1968, 
The decline of the output-of the main exports, the fall of cotton prices and sale combined 
together lead to a deficit in the trade account in 1957 of LS 16.2 millions compared with 
a surplus of LS 21.6 millions in 1956. Sudan terms of trade declined from 125 in 1956 to 
112 in 1957 and further to 103 in 1958 ( taking 1953 as base year: 100)(MOR 1964,36). ' 
The government budget which showed a surplus of LS 13.2 million in 1956/57, realized a 
surplus of only LS 6.1 million in 1957/58, a decline of more than 50%. In the 1957 
budget the government decided to increase customs on some commodities to remedy the 
decline in its revenues. (The price of sugar increased. by 20% as a result). Generally, the 
effect of the crisis was a sharp rise in the prices of consumer goods, the price indices 
showed a rise of 21.9% in 1957 compared with 1956 and of 109.8% compared with 
1953. In general the Gross National product declined by 1.5% with a general decline in 
agricultural production of 25.4% over 1957/58 compared to those of 1956/57 (Ibid, 64, 
Table 1). 
Facing these economic difficulties, the government of Khalil decided to seek foreign aid. 
This brought the controversial issue of American aid (see below) and the crisis brought 
the trade unions in confrontation with the government. 
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3.4.6. The Foreign Dimension 
The post-colonial state in the Sudan was not only subject to the contradictions of internal 
social forces and political groupings, it was also subject to regional and international 
contradictions and struggles. The two Condominium states Egypt and Britain did not 
cease to have interests and seek influence in the Sudan, and were joined after W orld War 
H by the United States of America. The USA decided its policy in the light of colonial 
withdrawal on the Truman Doctrine of'filling the gapguided by the Cold War. The post- 
war importance the American policy anticipated to Egypt on the geo-political map of the 
Nfiddle East could be interpreted accordingly. Ethiopia, whose emperor developed strong 
personal relations with many Sudanese notables during his exile in the Sudan at the time 
of Italian invasion, became more concerned after the changes in Egypt in 1952, and also 
contributed to foreign intervention in Sudanese politics (see below). 
The Egyptian claim of sovereignty over the Sudan which remained the basic demand of 
all Egyptian governments and constituted an obstacle to all the Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations on the Sudan, was, at least tactically, replaced in 1952 after the coup in 
Egypt by the recognition of Sudanese right to self-determination. In October 1952 the 
new Egyptian government invited the major Sudanese political parties to negotiations in 
Cairo; at the end of which an agreement on a united Sudanese-Egyptian amendment to 
the Self-Government Statute proposed by Sir Robert Howe, the Governor-General, was 
signed. The new Egyptian position was declared in a "Note from the Egyptian 
Government to the British Government concerning Self-Govemment and Self- 
Determination for the Sudan" which reads, 
"The Egyptian Goveniment firmly believes in the right of the Sudanese to self-determination 
and the effective exercise thereof in the proper time and ivith necessary regards. '. ' 
This was followed by great efforts by Egypt to unite the unionist parties in the Sudan into 
one party the NUP (Mahjoub, 1974: 53). The basic aim was that the Sudan (under NUP 
government) would opt for unity with Egypt. Hence Egypt backed NUP in 1953 elections 
which followed the agreement between Britain and Egypt signed on February the same 
year. The relation between the NUP elected government and the Egyptian government 
w ent through a period of tension after the March 1954 events in Khartoum when the 
Umma party and the Ansar Mahdist sect organized violent demonstrations during General 
Neguib's visit to attend the official opening of the Parliament. The events made the NUP 
leaders aware about the extent of the opposition possible to be launched against any 
attempts for the unity with Egypt. The events in Egypt during the same period 
contributed to the NUP adoption of a cautious attitude. The struggle among the Free 
Officers in Egypt, the dismissal of Neguib, and the crushing of the Wafdists, Communists 
and Muslim Brethren, all well reported and covered in the free Sudanese press and 
discussed among the educated and the urban masses as signs of a dictatorial regime. 
Hence was the legitimate question, "With whom should we unite? " was the cry of 
Sudanese press (Beshir: 1988,17). Another question which contributed to the tension was 
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the Nile Waters. The NUP government came under increasing pressure from the fraction 
of agricultural capitalists in and out the government to denounce the 1929 Nile Waters' 
Agreement and negotiate a new agreement which would "allow the expansion of pump 
schemes and the production of cotton. " (Bush and Kaballo, op. cit., 11). Negotiations on 
this question with Egypt were held in vain and lead to conflicts within the government 
which resulted in Prime Minster Azahari's expulsion of three senior ministers who 
accused the government of being "swept by the Egyptian tide" and of being "weak wined 
about the Nile Waters"(quoted in Ali: 1989,106). 
However, since November 1954 the NUP government was becoming more pro- 
independence17 (Sayeed: 1990,226-228, Beshir: 188,17), the response of the Egyptian 
government was harsh: in-unediately began putting pressure on Prime Minister's Azahari 
and encouraged other unionist leaders to denounce his leadership. This contributed to the 
splits in the party which resulted in 1956 in the formation of the PDP and the replacement 
of Azahari by Abdalla Khalil of the Umma as prime minister in July 1956. . 
An Umma dominated government was the last thing Egypt wanted in the Sudan, but it 
came partially a result of Egyptian manoeuvres against the NUP and partially a result of 
Egyptian stand on the Nile Waters issue which pushed the unity of the agricultural 
capitalist fractions despite the religious and tribal cleavages. It was just natural that the 
relations between Egypt and the Sudan would deteriorate more after 1957. The failure of 
the negotiations between the two governments on the Nile Waters issue and the Egyptian 
plans to build the High Dam in Aswan with its consequences for Sudan district of Wadi 
Halfa was the first obstacle. 
In 1958 a boundary dispute emerged between the two countries when Egypt claimed that 
its frontier with the Sudan according to the 1899 Agreement, which was adopted as 
reference for the frontiers in the 1953 Agreement granted the Sudan the right of self- 
determination, was Latitude 22 degrees -north. Though the Egyptian claims were 
, vithdrawn, the damage in the relations between the two countries was to remain until the 
coup in November 1958. 
The relation between the two countries deteriorated further by the negotiations between 
the Sudan, government and the United States of America concerning the US aid to the 
Sudan. For Egypt the American presence in the Sudan was thought dangerous at the time 
the Egyptian-American relations were deteriorating concerning the question of security in 
the Middle East (The Baghdad Alliance), and the problem with the World Bank 
concerning the finance of the IEgh Dam at Aswan. These worries were reflected in the 
stand taken by PDP in the coalition government during the discussion of the US aid 
agreement. 
17Selwyn Lloyd (1956) quoted Prime Minster Azahri as telling William Luce, the political 
secretary to the Governor General, that the Sudan should be friendly with Egypt but independent. 
Azahri said to Luce "You must not suppose anyone in his senses, having thrown off one, would 
put himself under a new master. " (Lloyd, 1978,16). 
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Rumours and al-legations also contributed to the tension in the relation between the two 
countries. A rumour about the interference of Egypt in bringing the PDP -and NUP 
leaders together in Cairo was circulated by the press and found its way to the prime 
minister in an official memorandum fird m the Sudan Ambassador in Cairo(Mukhtar: 1987, 
145). The leaders of both parties denied the rumour. (see Al An-tin, and Sayeed: 1991, 
343). There was also an allegation that there was an Egyptian plot to use young officers 
to initiate a coup (A] Tom: 1987,156/7). 
While the relations between Egypt and the Sudan were febrile, the relations between 
Britain and the Sudan were passing a calm and sometimes disguised transformation. 
Despite the fact that the British had left behind strong political Aes in the form of the 
Umma party, and substantial econorfflc influence because of the colonial heritage of a 
mono-crop agricultural economy and a presence of British commercial and banking 
enterprises, the British influence in the Sudan was declining. This was mainly due to the 
international changes after World War 11 and the relative decline of the British influence 
in international politics and economics. The crisis of the British textile industry due to 
international competition, left the Sudanese cotton without its traditional market. The 
Sudanese exports to Britain (in which cotton was dominant), declined from the high level 
of LS 32 midlions in 1956 to LS 11.8 and 11.9 millions in 1957 and 1958. While exports 
were declining, imports from Britain were increasing from LS 12.5 millions in 1956 to LS 
17.9 and 19.1 in 1957 and 1958 respectively. In response to this. trade crisis, Sudan began 
searching for other markets. This was the period when economic relations with the 
United States of America, West Germany, Italy, East Germany, Soviet Union and other 
European countries began to gather momentum, albeit at different speeds. Britain was 
"dismayed" by those attempts(Khalid: 1990,153). This was reflected in the way meetings 
and negotiations between Sudanese ministers and representatives of those countries were 
reported in the British Embassy reports to the Foreign Office(Ibid, 153 and fn 62,160). 
The stances of the Sudanese Foreign Mimster(1956-58), Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub, 
were of particular concern to the British Foreign Office, especially during the Suez Crisis 
and his speech in the UN General Assembly in 1957. Mahjoub was described in British 
Foreign Office papers as"unreliable, vain and colour-conscious". (Ibid, 
Despite all these tensions, the British government and its Ambassador kept close relations 
with Sudan. During the Azhafi's premiership (1954-56), Azahari, his government and his 
opponents asked for British assistance (Ibid, 140-142). The Umma faced by its defeat in 
the 1953 elections urged the British government to "denounce the agreement [of 
February 1953 that had estabfished the transitional self-government] dissolve the 
parliament, set up a caretaker government and arrange elections, under international 
supervision, for an independent Sudan" (Ibid, 147). The British ruled out the proposal as 
underestimating the role of nationalism in the Sudan. According to recently released 
British Documents, Azahari was reported seeking funds from the British government for 
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his 'National Unionist' party to preserve a working majority in the parliament in exchange 
for some economic concessions for British business in the Sudan QE 1081/6 1956). His 
minister of Social Affairs and National guidance was reported seeking assistance, both 
financial and advisory for counteracting the communist influence in the trade union 
movement. Britain did provide the advisory assistance through its Labour Attache in 
Beirut, but declined, (at least that what the official documents claimed), to provide the 
financial assistance for both the minister and his prime minister (JE 1081/6 1956 ) 
When Khalil became prime minister (1956-58), the British Ambassador's meetings and 
consultations were frequent and reported in the despatches to the Foreign Office, along 
with surveillance of the political events in the Sudan and analysis of the attitudes of 
different political parties and leaders. The Ambassador, for example, raised with Prime 
Minister Khalil the dissatisfaction of the British government with the anti-British attitudes 
of Mahjoub, the Foreign Minister, especially his speech in the UN General Assembly. He 
reported to London that Khalil told him that many people had advised the prime minister 
to dismiss Mahjoub, but he was compelled to keep him until the. general elections to 
preserve the unity of his government (FO/371/125959 From Khartoum No. 
162/13/2/1957). 
In his first dispatch after the November coup, the British Ambassador revealed that he 
had advised Khalil against organizing the coup (FO/371/ 131713, From Khartoum to FO. 
No. 1470, November 21 1958). Instead of. the coup the Ambassador suggested to Khalil 
to negotiate with the NUP in order to form a wider coalition (Ibid, No. 99 November the 
25,1958). The coup of November 1958, though according to the Ambassador did not 
change the situation as far as the relation between the Sudan and Britain was concerned, 
took place despite the British advice which had reflected that Britain was no longer the 
single decisive power in the country. 
Since the end of World War 11, the USA had become more interested in the Sudan for 
geo-political and strategical reasons. ' Following the Truman Doctrine of filling the gap 
created by the withdrew of the British from some of their colonies, the USA considered 
the Sudan was geo-politically of strategic importance vis-a-vis Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt 
was of great strategic importance for the USA in the security of the Middle East. In 
Ethiopia the USA had a communication station in Eritrea since 1942 which they upgraded 
in 1953 when they replaced the British military mission which was withdrawn in 1952. 
The communication installation in Asmara were by then "ideally situated for the US 
global radio communication network" (Halliday: 1977,10-11). Before July 1952, the USA 
policy towards the Sudan was simply to put pressure on Britain to hand Sudan over to 
Egypt. This was thought to contribute to settling the Egyptian position within the 
Western alliance. This position continued during the negotiations with the new Egyptian 
government after the coup of July 1952 and the American Ambassador in Cairo was 
quoted by a Sudan Government senior official as had been unable to understand why 
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"anybody should be bothered about the destiny of a few million Sudanese niggers" 
(Mavrogadato: 1986, 
- 
106). But that position was clearly changed when the radical 
attitudes of the new Egyptian regime began to appear and the influence of the Sudan 
Communist Party became apparent after Sudads independence. A presence of a 
potentially growing communist party was an important element in determining the USA 
policy towards the Sudan, the first sub-Saharan Affican country to gain its independence 
with its geo-political importance in the Middle East and Afiica. The USA, also, might 
have thought to use the Sudan as an element of pressure on Egypt, especially on the issue 
of the Nile waters and the building of Aswan Mgh Dam. . 
When Nixon, then Vice-President, visited Khartoum in 1957 the Eisenhower Doctrine 
was the issue of the day. Though the Sudanese government rejected any participation in 
military pacts and the provision of military bases, it accepted USA! s offer of economic 
aid. On November 1957, a technical mission from the US International Cooperation 
Association visited Khartoum to discuss the details of the offer. The question of the US 
aid generated a tense political atmosphere. On one hand the opposition parties and 
organizations. launched a campaign against it, while the other hand. the fragile Umna - 
PDP witnessed its most serious test. Sudan had become one of the fields of the already 
started Cold War. According to Philip Agee, an ex-CIA employee, the CIA was behind 
the 1958 coup (Agee: 1975,82), though it is questionable whether they were, like prime 
minister Khalil who invited in the army, able to control the regime that resulted from the 
coup. 
3.4.7. The Culmination of the Political Crises 
On the eve of the second session of the. second parliament, the political crisis was 
gathering momentum On five levels. The first was the weakness, divisions and ideological 
bankruptcy of the ruling power bloc. The second was the ris ing opposition to the 
government within the dominated classes which were becom ing more politically active. 
The third was the beginning of the regional demands. The fourth was the 1957/58 
economic crisis and the fifth level was the active intervention of the foreign forces in 
Sudanese politics. All these levels were interrelated and composed the crisis of the post- 
colonial state in 1956/58. 
For the ruling power bloc the key to the resolution of the crisis was to overcome the 
divisions within itself There were, at least four ways of achieving that target as an 
important condition to the resolution to the political crisis of 1958. Three of them were 
within the civilian democratic system. The first was to form a coalition government of the 
NUP and PDP. Negotiations were said to have been held in Cairo to achieve that goal 
(Suliman, 1969: 351). The leaders of the two parties denied that such negotiations had 
taken place. (AL Amin, 1§69,91, Sayeed, 1990,343-344). 
The second solution was a broad coalition government of all parties represented in the 
parliament. This was suggested by a number of distinguished Sudanese including the 
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speaker of the Parliament and the chain-nan of the Journalists Union, who tried to mediate 
in bringing that solution. Negotiation with different political par-ties were carried and the 
only obstacle was Mr Khalil the Prime Nfinister (Sayeed, 1990,342). 
The third solution which faced the same obstacle was suggested by Siddik al-Mahdi the 
President of the Umma party, the formation of a coalition between the NUP -and the 
Umma. While the negotiation for the formation were carried in the Prime Minister's 
house, but he had already invited the army to take power. One of his ministers who 
worked also as his assistant Secretary General of the Umma Part y wrote, 
".. Then he, [Khalil], accepted the formation of a new government. An agreement Nvas reached 
after many meetings between the leaders of the Umma, the NUP and the Southerners, on the 
formation of the government, the number of ministers and the general targets to be achieved 
by that government_ While that was the situation and we thanked God that we had overcome 
all the difficulties and obstacles that faced us , we, the n-dnisters, were awaken by armed 
officers and soldiers who delivered to us letters, seemed to have been hurriedly written, 
conveying our dismissals as ministers which was signed by General Abboud, the Army's 
Commander in Chief. " (my translation from El Tom, 1987: 157) 
The fourth solution was a military coup d'etat following the experiences of Egypt, 1952, 
Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan (1958). Khalil decided to chose the option of a military coup 
d'etat. Gramsci noted that "... a particular political act may have been an error of 
calculation on the part of the leaders of the, dominant classes" (Gramsci: 1988,19 1). The 
decision of Prime Minister Khalil to hand over the power to the Military was one ofthese 
errors. I-Es intentions were to use the military to govern on behalf of his party and under 
his auspices'. (see El Tom, 1987: 158, and The Report of the Judicial Inquiry Committee on 
the Causes of the 17 November 1958 Coup; 1965: 23-27). He was not able to control the 
military whom he had invited. General Abboud, being handed the power, decided to play 
the role of the master and not the puppet. He established an authoritarian military regime. 
The coup d'etat of 1958 could not just be explained by the "proceeding historical 
developments" because that would be more than "a historical apologia" as Marx criticized 
Proudon's explanation of the coup that brought Louis Bonparate to power in France in 
1852 (Marx: 1978 b, 4). The coup could not also be explained by the historical error of 
Khalil or'the authoritarian tendencies of Abboud, unless these two were looked at within 
the concrete class struggle in the Sudan and the conflict of interests of the regional and 
international forces in the period 1954-58. The coup in itself was evidence of the failure 
of the ruling power bloc in resolving the issue of the leadership and of setting and Z 
accepting rules for the game for power contest among its different fractions. It was also 
evidence that these fractions were unable to compromise among themselves on one hand, 
and with the dominated classes on the other. It was an expression of the intellectual 
failure to compose a vision which would have gone beyond their interests as classes in- 
themselves to classes for-themselves, in other words, their failure to have a prograrnme 
that dealt with the problems of the independent Sudan linked to an ideological discourse 
to provide a legitimacy to their rule paving the road for the establishment of their 
hegemony. 
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3.5. The State Crisis and The First Military Rule 1958-64. 
3.5.1. A Historical Background of the Sudanese Mili! M 
Military intervention in Sudanese politics is not a post-colonial phenomena. In 1900 14th 
Battalion of the Sudanese Units mutinied, the British authorities" accused the junior 
Egyptian officers of having incited the Sudanese soldiers". (Mohamed, 1980, p17. ) 
Accordingly, the Br 
, 
itish decided to reorganize some military units to be composed of 
Sudanese only. In 1905 a military school was established to train Sudanese to be 
commissioned as officers. Later the Western Arab Corps in Darfur, the western Sudanese 
province, and the Eastern Arab Corps in Kassala, the eastern province, were formed. In 
19 10, the Equotoria Corps were formed and had"remained the only permanent garrison in 
the South until the mutiny of 1955"(Ibid, p17). 
The events of 1924 stands as another example of the intervention of the Sudanese military 
in politics during the colonial period. An ex-officer in the Sudanese Units was responsible 
for organizing and leading the Mite Flag League which played a significant role in these 
events. In August 1924, the cadet of the Military School demonstrated in Arms in 
Khartoum. The I Ith Battalion of the Sudanese Units mutinied objecting to the orders of 
the British authorities to evacuate the Egyptian Units following the assassination of Le 
Stack-, the Governor-General of the Sudan in November 1924. The mutineers who 
established themselves in the Military Hospital in Khartoum and were surrounded by the 
British troops, fought for the last man. The British used artillery fire, destroying the 
Hospital building. The leader of the mutineers who died under the ruins holding his gun 
became a symbol of Sudanese patriotic militarism. 
In order to avoid events such as those of 1924, the British authorities. reorganized the 
Sudanese Units and formed the Sudan Defence Force (SDF). The Military School was 
closed and its graduates were encouraged to apply for retirement following Act No. 80 of 
1930"which contained offers of generous pensions and incentives.. "(Ibid : 22). - 
The presence of the Italians in Ethiopia led the British to expand the SDF and reopen the 
Military School in 1935; but this time, cominissioned officers were carefully chosen from 
families loyal to the British authorities. This enforced the position of officers loyal to the 
existing institutions who remained in the Sudan Defence Force after its formation 
following the 1924 revolution. About 51 officers had been comn-iissioned until the School 
was closed in 1944. 
When the Military School was reopened in 1948, it was upgraded to a college. Its cadets 
were chosen from secondary school leavers. By then secondary school education had 
expanded, the social origin of students had changed to include the sons of the first and 
second educated generation as well as of town traders and craftsmen and wealthy 
farmers. The aftermath of the Second World War, as we have seen in chapter 2, 
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witnessed the rise of the Sudanese national movement, in which the students including 
those of the secondary schools, were actively involved. The cadets of the new Military 
College were the product of those new cond 
, 
itions. Despite the close screening practised 
by the senior officers to avoid enlisting' radical studentsI8 some of them were 
commissioned. 
By independence time and the Sudanization of senior officers posts two different layers 
of officers dominated the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The senior officers who were 
either, because of their non-political activities during the 1924 revolution, remained in the 
army, ie General 'Abboud himself, or were commissioned between 1935-1944 when the 
military School was open in its second phase. 
The second layer was of the middle-rank and junior officers most of them were 
commissioned after the re-opening of the Military School and its upgrading to a post- 
secondary College in 1948. There were two sub-groups among the group of senior 
oMcers, one was a reflection of the effects of the 1924 Revolution, which its members 
either did not participate in the revolution or they were disappointed by the stand of the 
Egyptian units and Egyptian government during the events of 1924. This trend was 
composed of the most senior officers, most of whom were commissioned before 1935 
and were close ly linked with the British authorities and the two sectarian leaderships: This 
sub-group, despite the different sectarian affiliations of its members was united by the 
military tradition and discipline and they were mainly non-politicized. 
The other sub-group was affected by the rise of the Graduate Congress, the national 
movement and the formation of the political parties and mainly composed of officers who 
were commissioned after 1935 and, despite the formal unity and discipline the army 
imposed on them, they were politically divided on the same lines of the divisions that took 
place among the members of the Congress. They were supporters of the Umma, NUP or 
the PDP. 
Both sub-groups were part of the ruling power bloc, the only difference between them 
was the degree of politicisation. As the other elements of the power bloc, the senior 
officers group was totally of Northern Arab Islamic origin, because at that time there 
were only 9 junior southern officers in the whole SAF(O'Ballance, 19 : 40). This was the 
group which was invited to take power in 1958. We will see below how and why conflicts 
and power struggle appeared among them after they seized power. 
Among the middle-rank and junior officers group three different trends were formulating 
during this period. Two main factors influenced the formulation of these trends. The first 
factor was the influence of the new trends in the national movement after World War H, 
(mainly the Sudan Communist Party, SCP, the trade union movement, the students 
18A retired Colonel MM Osman, commissioned in 1956, wrote that he was asked during the 
interview for the selection of cadets for the Military College, about the kind of books and 
magazines he used to read (Osman: 198 8,3) 
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movement and the Muslim Brotherhood ). The other factor was the influence of the 
Egyptian Coup d'etat of July 1952. The latter had two dimensions, one was cultural while 
the other was direct interference of the Egyptian intelligence agents to recruit officers in 
the SAF, in an attempt to build an organization similar to the Free Officers Organization 
which carried the 1952 coup in Egypt. 
Beshir (1974), Mohamed (1980) and Osman (1988) agreed that Salah Salim, a member of 
the Revolutionary Council and Minister Of Sudan Affairs until 1956 in Egypt, attempted 
the establishment of a pro-Egyptian organization in the army. According to Mohamed, 
this resulted in a "group of Nasserist officers in the Sudanese Army" which represented 
"one of the vehicles of Egyptian influence" (Mohamed, 1980: 23). Osman differentiates 
between two groups influenced by the coup in Egypt. One group, he claims, composed of 
recruited agents of the Egyptian government of whom the core was some Sudanese 
officers commissioned in the Egyptian -Army and transferred to the SAF after 
independence. The other group was of nationalist officers who were culturally influenced 
by the "Egyptian Revolution". (Osman 1988: 3). El Kidd, a retired Lieutenant Colonel and 
a leader of an unsuccessful coup. attempt in 1966, emphasized the cultural influence of 
Nasserism on himself and his generation. For them, he confessed, Nasserism "continued 
to be seen, Iby them of course], as the only way out of the state of political chaos and 
corruption.. " (El Kidd: 1988,3). 
The. allegations of Egyptian interference where among the arguments used by Prime 
Minister Khalil to convince the army to take over ( The Report of the Judiciary Enquiry 
Committee, 1965: 37) 
According to Ahmed, the Moslem Brethren in the Sudan were'also influenced, albeit in a 
different direction, by the Egyptian experience. An Egyptian Muslim Brother who 
escaped following the crack down on the Muslim Brethren in Egypt in 1955, 
recommended that the movement in Sudan should build its own organization in the army, 
in contrast to what happened in Egypt where they joined the Free Officers Organization. 
As a result some young members of theMoslem Brethren movement joined the Military 
College and founded a military branch of the movement (Ahmed, n. d: 93)19. 
That was the situation in the SAF when the army took power in 1958, though in 
a ppearance, it was united, different political groups were emerging and developing 
beneath the Surface. The coup of 1958 was to release all these forces, as we will see 
below. 
3.5.2. The Authoritarian Proiect: The 'Abboud's Coup. 
The 1958 coup was a project to establish an authoritarian state capable of resolving the 
political and economic crisis in the country. The original version of the project, as had 
19Ahmed mentioned the names of the officers Bashir Mohamed Ali, Abdalla al-Tabir, Abdul 
Ragman FaraI4 and Abdul Rahman Swar al-Dabab as the pioneers of the Muslim Brothers 
organisation in the anny(Ahmed, n. d., 93, fn. 3). 
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been revealed later by testimonies given to the Enquiry Committee on the Reasons of the 
Coup in 1965 and some memoirs of some politicians published after that, was to establish 
an authoritarian state by imposing the unity of the power bloc through the appointment of 
representatives of its different fractions in the different organs of the state formed by the 
coup (Maj General M. A Al Tigani Testimony the Enquiry Committee, pp 37-38, also Al 
Tom: 1987,157-158). That was the project suggested by Khalil. According to that 
project a council of state formed of five members representing the Umma, PDP, NUP, the 
Southern Parties and the military. The representative of the army, General 'Abboud, 
should be the president of the state council and the prime minister of a council of 
ministers to be formed on Khalil's own advice. The state council should be the highest 
constitutional authority and should rule by decrees after the suspension of the constitution 
and the parliament. The aim of the project, it seems, was to achieve the u nity of the 
power bloc under the guardianship of the army. Apparently the leaders of the army 
accepted Khalil's project in a meeting held a week before the coup. It is difficult to 
evaluate the effects of that version of the project because it had never been carried. 
Instead, 'Abboud announced on the 17th of November a different version, the army 
leadership decided to monopolize political power, hence put ting the state under the direct 
control of one fraction of the power bloc that of senior army officers and state 
bureaucrats. The British Ambassador in Khartoum wrote to the Foreign Office just after 
the- Coup, describing the military take-over in Sudan as one carried by the thirteen most 
senior officers in the Army. He clearly distinguished what happened in the Sudan from 
other radical coups in the area; ie Egypt and Iraq. It was hence logical for the 
Ambassador to expect no change of policies (Foreign Office: 3 71/13 1713), British 
Embassy Despatch No. 99 November 25 1958). The change was within the power bloc. 
3.5.3. The Authoritarian Proiect in Action 
The first constitutional decrees, issued by General 'Abboud, suspended the Transitional 
Constitution of 1956, dissolved the Supreme Commission, which was the head of state 
according to the Constitution, the council of ministers and the Parliament. It dissolved all 
political parties and suspended the publication of newspapers until new licences were 
issued. when the latter were issued, General 'Abboud told the press editors that they 
should not publish any news or ideas that might undermine the new regime, and -should - 
subject the religious sects, the dissolved parties and their previous members to any attack 
or assault and should not publish anything that might undermine Sudan relations with 
other countries, and finally should not publish any news about the armed forces except 
those authorized by official sources. (Sayeed: 1990,350) 
The regime immediately declared a state of emergency. It promulgated according to the 
Sudan Defence Act, the Sudan Defence Regulations which stated the authorities and 
powers designed to implement the state of emergency, which were in reality had become 
the law of the land for the six years of the Second Republic. According to the 
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Regulations, the Minister of the Interior or whom he might authorize, had the right to 
censor all mail, newspapers and any other publications. He had the right to compel any 
citizen to provide information required by the police, the right to declare curfew in any 
place or district in the Sudan, to prevent any citizen from leaving the. cciuntry and to deny 
the import of any news papers or publications in the country. The minister had the powers 
to prevent any demonstrations, rallies and public meetings and to order the search of any 
house, building, cars, boats or aeroplane by any police officer or soldier during day or 
night without a judiciary and to permit the use of force if needed to implement that. The 
Minister might order the detention of any person without judicial warrant or obligation to 
bring the detained before a magistrate as required by the Criminal Procedure Act of 1925. 
He might extend the detention of such person for unlimited periods. He might order the 
restriction of the movement and determine the residence of any person in any place, and 
the prevention of any person from the entry of any specific area in the country. To 
complete the circuit, the Sudan Defence Act of 1939 was amended to define foriving 
political parties, organizing strikes, plotting or working to overthrow the government or 
spreading any anti-government sentiment as crimes punishable by death. Such crimes or 
any crimes according to the Sudan Defence Act of 1939, amended 1959 might be tried 
before military courts (HaJ Musa, 1970,236/237). On 3rd of December 1958, the council 
of Minsters, empowered by article 3 of the Sudan Defence Act, ordered the Sudan 
Federation of Workers Trade Unions and all trade unions dissolved. (Ibid, 237 and 
Sayeed, op. cit.., 354). 
In its first meeting the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, SCAF, delegated all its 
powers to General 'Abboud, the Chairman and Supreme Commander- in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces. Regional military leaders were designated Military Governors of the then 
nine Sudanese provinces whose ex-Commissioners became executive directors. Hence a 
foundation of an authoritarian state was laid before the end of 1958. Despite all the 
decorations made. in 1963 by introducing the Central Council, this foundation remained 
intact as the solid base of an authoritarian state until the overthrow of the military regime 
in 1964. 
The implementation of the authoritarian project was faced by opposition from different 
groups at different periods of the regime. The two senior religious leaders of the Ansar 
and Khatimyya sects announced their welcome and support (Al Neil newspaper 
21/11/1958 and Suliman: 1970,358). The tribal leaders hurried to give their support while 
the capitalist class, divided as it was, did not express a unified response; some individuals 
sent messages of support others kept silence. There was no immediate response from the 
political parties which were dissolved by the military authorities in the first day of the 
coup. However, the underground SCP was the only party that issued a statement 
opposing the coup (see Suliman, 1970,360/366 , for the full statement). The response of 
the military was the immediate detention of seventeen of the party's cadres on the 27th of 
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November 1958. Fifteen were brought before a military court which on the 29th of 
January 1959, sentenced eight of them to imprisonment period between 5 years and six 
months and ordered the release of the other seven. Among those who were sentenced to 
5 years was the Secretary General of the SVVFTU, which brought the regime the 
condemnation of national and international trade unionists and trade union 
organizations. (Haj Musa, opt. cit.., 241/243). The Sudanese newspaper A] Ayam 
demanded in an editorial on January 30th that the Government should publish a statement 
on the trial explaining the crimes committed by those who were sentenced, because the 
trial were secretly held and the press was denied the right to attend. The following day 
the Minister of Interior withdrew the licence of the paper preventing its publication. 
There was no doubt by then that the Military meant what they had said; the authoritarian 
project was in action. 
3.5.4. The Crisis of the Military 
Despite the authoritarian foundation and practises, the crisis of Sudanese state continued. 
The manifestations of that crisis were: a) Three coup attempts in March, May and 
November 1959, b) Continuous opposition from'the trade unions expressed in strikes in 
November 1959, June and July 1961, memorandums to the authorities on December 
1958, November 1959, June 1961, and the conferences of August 1963 and 1964. All of 
them expressed expficitly political demands concerning the basic human rights, as well as 
the economic demands. c) The students opposition which took the form of 
memorandums, demonstrations and strikes in addition to the role they played in bringing 
the pol-itical parties together and the initiative they took in organising public meetings to 
discuss the Southern question; d)The Gezira tenants who organized a long strike in 
December 1963 which had the significance of being the only successful strike by any 
group during the mifitary regime; e) The opposition of different political parties which 
began to gather around the leader of the Ansar Seq and Umma party Siddiq al Mahdi by 
the end of 1960 and continued for two y ears and disintegrated after Siddiq's death in 
October 1961 and the release of leaders of the opposition in January 1962. f) The 
opposition of the people of Wadi Hatfa which was inspired by the government decision to 
transfer them to Khasham al Girba area which led to their demonstrations in October 
1959. g) The intensification of the war in the South as response to the government 
neglect of the South in the recommendations of the Constitutional Developments 
Committee which was formed in 1961 and presented its recommendation on 1962. 
The continuation of the crisis of the state was due to the failure of the November regime 
to unite the power bloc under its leadership, first by rejecting Khalil's project of 
representing all the elements of the power bloc in the Supreme Council and the Council of 
Ministers, and secondly when deciding to monopolize the state power by the armed 
forces, it excluded some elements of the leadership of the army which led to March and 
May 1959 coups. As a result of the March coup, the Umma and Ansar were in reality 
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weakened in the Military Council due to the expulsion of Major-General Ahmed Abdul 
Wahab and Colonel Awad Abdul Rahman who were both strong Urnma supporters. The 
expulsion of Major-General Ahmed Abdalla Hamid after the failure of May coup attempt 
almost excluded all the supporters of the Umma from the Council. The May coup also led 
to the exclusion of the-NUP elements from the Council. Hence the Council was left under 
a strong Khatimyya affiliation which meant that by 1959, the power of the state instead of 
being in the hands of the high rank military as a fraction of the power bloc, it was in the 
hand of the officers who were linked to the Khatimyya sect and represented only a 
fraction of the military. The regime was unable because of the religious sectarian 
cleavage, the Egyptian connection, and the commercial capital's interests domination of 
uniting the power bloc. It remained an alliance of the high ranks of the military and the 
bureaucrats on one side the Khatimyya on the other side. 
The regime did not attempt to neutralise the dominated classes, instead it tried to repress 
them which provoked more opposition and intensified the class conflicts in the country. It 
contributed, albeit in a negative way, to emphasize an element of a democratic dimension 
in the ideological discourse of the left in the Sudan. The struggle for democracy became 
an important issue in the programme of the communists and other leftist groups which 
began to emerge in the Sudan influenced by the rise of Nasserist and Arab Nationalists in 
the Middle East. By the fall of the regime a democratic urban movement was developed 
cons tituted of the same elements who opposed Khalil's attempts to establish a civilian 
authoritarian state in 1957/58, albeit increased in number and obtained experiences in the 
struggle under tiring circumstances. 
The issues of class struggle were democracy and the living conditions of masses, 
especially workers and organized tenants. The interrelation between the struggle for 
democracy and economic demands was established firmly because for both causes the 
workers and tenants had to face the authoritarian state, which confiscated their rights to 
have independent organizations, as employer or share-cropper. While the issue of 
democracy was capable of uniting a wide front including the students, the professional, 
and even those of the power bloc who left out of state decision making organs. while 
unsuccessivabilty of the authoritarian state by definition, prevented their legal contest for 
power. 
The economic crisis which began gathering momentum in 1963 (Kaballo: 1988,25), was 
manifested in declining yields of the main export crops, increasing inflation rates and a 
worsened balance of trade and payments accounts. The yields of long stable cotton 
declined from 774 kg per feddan in 1961/62 to 565 kg per feddan in 1962/63 to 363 
feddwis in 1963/64. If this decline in yields is combined with the decline in land cultivated 
by cotton at the same period from 1.13 million feddans in 1961/62 to 1.04 milli on 
fed&vis in 1963/64, problems in Sudan trade and balance of payments would just be 
expected. The trade account which was already in the red by 1961/62 showing a deficit of 
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LS 27.8 millions, improved in 1962/63, yet still in the red at a deficit of LS 16 million, 
deteriorated sharply in 1963/64 to a deficit of LS 36.5 million. The balance of payments 
showed similar performance, the deficits were LS 7.2,3.8 and 19 millions for the years 
1961/62,1962/63 and 1963/64. The rate of inflation increased from 1% in 1962 to 4.2% 
in 1963 and reached 6.6% in 1964. 
The economic crisis was a resultant of the economic policies of the regime which kept the 
structure of the economy inherited from the colonial era unchanged. The Ten Years Plan 
of 1961/62-70/71 was the best expression of these policies. Its strategy was built on 
extending the economic structures of production, not changing them. The designer of the 
plan described that as the strategy, 
ý"... to develop the country through the expansion of the already developed centres .... to 
concentrate the resources of the country on an improvement and expansion of the modem part 
of the economy rather than an equal rise in the modem and traditional parts. "(Mirghani: 1983, 
39) 
A logical result of such poficy was a higher growth rates and better incomes and services 
in the relatively developed areas of central. Sudan than other parts of the country, 
especially the most underdeveloped South and Western Sudan. Reading this result with 
the failure of the Constitutional Reform Committee to bring real devolution of power 
from Khartoum to-these areas and the absence of democracy and democratic institutions 
to allow the expression of regional grievances, a civil war culminated in the South- by 
1963 and an underground organization called Sony (after a place in Jebel Mara in Darfur 
Province), distributed"pamphlets against the domination of Jallaba in Darfur. The regional 
conflicts made their contribution to the crisis, and it was the discussion on the Southern 
Question that ignited the uprising which overthrew the regime. 
3.6. The Rise and Fall of the Second Democracy 
3.6.1. The October Revolution 
The October Revolution of 1964, by overthrowing an -authoritarian military regime 
through a 'general political strike' (civil disobedience), demonstrations of unarmed 
masses, and the backing of the middle and lower rank officers raised new challenges to 
the. power bloc. The first of these challenges was the experience of the masses in 
overthrowing an authoritarian regime, which would be a danger hanging over the heads 
of the ruling power bloc. The power bloc 're-discovered' the importance of the mass 
organizations, especially trade unions, and the presence of radicals and communists in the 
leadership of these organizations. This importance was reflected in the Professional Front 
which had come to existence during the revolution and assumed the role of leading the 
masses from the declaration of the 'general political strike' to the announcement by 
General 'Abboud of dissolving the SCAF and promise to hand over the power to civilians. 
The absence of the representatives of the power bloc in that Front compelled the political 
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parties of the power bloc to rally to the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, the only 
possible organization to challenge the leadership of the radicals. That possibility had 
arisen because of the class origin and composition of the Moslem Brotherhood was 
mostly composed of the new- petty bourgeois which initially began among the students 
and developed among them and the professionals. It had also arisen as the only 
organization capable of providing an ideological challenge to the radical ideological 
discourse which was in a way supported by the ideological influence of the radical regime 
of Nasser and the publications from Cairo and Beirut. From October 1964, the MBs had 
grown with the support of the traditional power bloc as a challenge to communists and 
radicals in schools, universities and trade union movement. 
It raised also the importance of the armed forces in political struggle. The role played by 
young officers in compelling Abboud to dissolve the SCAF made the Free Officers 
Organisation, though illegal, widely respected in the aftermath of October Revolution of 
1964. The Organisation itself was established during the struggle against the Abboud's 
regime. Its program which was published in its secret magazine, Sout al-Goat al-MusIaha 
(The Voice of the armed Forces), was composed of four points to be achieved by 
working closely with the popular movement. These were the overthrew of Abboud's 
regime, to restore parliamentary democracy , to issue a democratic constitution suitable 
to the economic , political and social conditions of the country that would provide 
for 
public liberties, and to present those responsible for Abboudregime to popular courts and 
to dismiss corrupt members of the civil service (ýree Officers, 1961,1). In response to 
this important role there were several attempts by political parties to form secret 
organisations within the army2O. 
The second challenge which faced the power bloc, as a result of the success of the 
Revolution in shifting the balance of power, was expressed in the formation of the first 
transitional government in which the radicals were majority. This was a direct challenge 
which could not be assigned to the MBs to resolve it on behalf of the power bloc. The 
Umma party brought its traditional Ansar supporters to the streets of Khartoum led by 
Mr. al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the grandson of Mohamed Ahmed and the Chairman of the Umma 
party. The first transitional government was compelled to resign and a new government in 
which the power bloc ensured its domination was formed in February 1965., The second 
transitional government lost no time before calling an election where the political 
domination of the power bloc was maintained. The whole process was interpreted as a 
counter-revolution by the radicals, an interpretation which would affect the development 
of Sudanese politics, especially after the dissolution of the SCP in 1965 and the events 
that followed it. 
2OMany of the officers who talked to me on this issue sighted Sadiq al Mabdi and the Muslim 
Brothers as the parties who attempted new organisations, they insisted that the communists were 
organised in the army a long time before October and that the Nasserists revived their interest 
which began just after independence. 
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The third challenge faced the power bloc was the rehabilitation of the regional questions. 
The first of these was the Southern Question which contributed to the ignition of the 
revolution as mentioned before. A Round Table Conference was held in Khartoum in 
March 1965 to negotiate a peacýful solution. The Conference which was attended by 
representatives of the Southern and Northern polit ical parties, the government and 
delegations from neighbour countries as observers, failed to reach an agreement and the 
Question was referred to a Twelve Man Committee. It was to haunt the ruling power 
bloc after the elections. 
The Beja Congress re-emerged as a parliamentary group of 10 members. The Nuba 
Mountains Union also re-emerged as a parliamentary group holding ten seats. Darfur 
regionalism which was first expressed by the Sony under ground organization, found 
itself in a Darfur Renascence Front which unlike the other regional organization did not 
contest the 1965 elections, but influenced the political parties' choice of their candidates 
by emphasizing that candidates should be Darfurians. The leader of the Front, who stood 
for election as independent candidate, was elected to the parliament. Regional politics 
were in the agenda due to the October Revolution. 
3.6.2. Unity and Split in the Power Bloc 
The elections which was carried in April 1965, resulted in a 'hung' parliament. Though the 0 
Umma emerged from the 1965 elections as the largest party with 92 seats out of the 233 
seats, it opted towards a coalition not with the small partie s in the parliament, but with 
the largest party, its historical rival, the NUP which had 73 seats. The coalition was a 
tendency to maintain the unity of the power bloc against the challenge of the urban 
democratic movement which tended to call itself the modem forces. The unity of the 
power bloc was fragile because it was built on a compromise on the distribution of the 
constitutional posts rather than a detailed programme. One thing that came to the front 
was to stop the development of the democratic movement. In this context the dissolution 
of the Communist Party in November 1965 and the dismissal of eight of the eleven 
members of its parliamentary group needs to be undestood. 
All the SCP's parliamentary bloc was elected in the Graduates 15 especial ly allocated 
seats, which in itself reflect the influence of the radicals among the educated Sudanese. 
The communists competed closely with the NUP in urban constituencies, especially those 
of the Capital, Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North. The focus on the challenge 
of the leadership of the masses in the urban areas between the SCP and the NUP was 
reflected in a challenge between the leaders of the two parties in Omdurman Southern 
Constituency. The NUP leader won the challenge, yet the votes of the Secretary General 
of SCP showed how the influence of SCP was growing and endangering that of the NUP 
as the single most powerful party in the urban areas. This might explain the great role in 
dissolving the SCP played, by Mr. Ismail al-Azahari, the leader of the NUP who was 
elected to the presidium of the Supreme Commission in 1965. It might also explain his 
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role in the government's rejection of the Khartoum High Court judiciary order of 
November 1966 which ruled the constitutional amendments allowing the dissolution of 
the SCP as being illegal and should be void. 
In contrast to what the leaders of the ruling power bloc expected, the SCP and the urban 
radical movement were able to rally a wider popular support to the right of the SCP to 
exist. The ideological discourse played great role in that battle. It is noticed before how 
the struggle against the Military regime deepened the democratic slogans among the 
masses. The SCP and supporters made great use of that by contesting the whole 
challenge in the name of democracy. The dissolution of the SCP also fired back as an 
issue of the legitimacy of the system of liberal democracy and the ruling power bloc. The 
feasibility of achieving a change of the ruling power bloc through democratic means was 
questioned by some leading members of the SCP and some radical officers in the 
Organization of the Free Officers. 
It remains that one of the major problems of the power bloc was the failure to unite and 
solve the minor contradictions among themselves. Though the coalition government of 
the two traditional parties (NUP and Umma) which were representing the main elements 
of the dominant power bloc, was an attempt in the way of unity, it excluded an effective 
part of the power bloc, the Khatimyya which did not represent only part -of the 
aristocracy, but an important part of the commercial bourgeoisie. But this problem was 
resolved before the 1968 elections by re-uniting the PDP and NUP in the Democratic 
Unionist Party, (DUP), bringing together most of the cornmercial bourgeoisie, part of the 
newly developing industrial bourgeoisie with the aristocracy of the Khatimyya sect. 
The split in the Umma party on June 1966, not only divided the power, but also brought 
instability in the government. From June 1965 to May 1969, two elections were held and 
four governments were elected by the Constitutional Assembly, the parliament of the 
Third Republic. Three of these were headed by Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub (June 1965- 
July1966, May1907-ApriI988, and April 1988-May 1969) and the fourth was headed by 
Sadiq al Mahdi from July 1966 to May 1967.. 
The NUP and later the DUP was a common partner, who exploited the division in the 
Urnma party to consolidate its position in the coalition. By holding important ministerial 
portfolios, the DUP had also attempted consolidating its influence in the economic and 
commercial fields. For four years the Ministry of Trade and Supply was under a DUPs 
Minister. The prominent DUP politician al Sharif al FEndie who held the portfolio of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economics from May 1967 to the overthrew of the third 
democracy in 1969, used his position to enhance the position of DUP supporters. Despite 
this privileged situation, by the end of 1968, unrest began within the DUP parliamentary 
gr oup which was reflected in a memorandum signed by a number of DUP MPS 
demanding a ministerial reshuffle. While the DUP was showing signs of disunity, the 
Umma was reunited in April-May 1969 when Sadiq al Mahdi and his uncle El Hadi al- 
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Mahdi agreed to share power after the presidential elections which would follow passing 
the draft of the permanent constitution in the Assembly. That constitution was never 
issued because of the May 1969 Coup. 
One area in which the power bloc preserved a united front was drafting a permanent 
constitution. The unity was preserved because there was a common vision among the 
power bloc to set through the constitution new rules for the 'democratic game' which 
would keep state power within their bloc, and excluding the dominated classes and the 
urban democratic movement from it. A constitutional authoritarian state was the project. 
The draft ensured that a compromise was made to regional groups, by introducing 
regional governments. The power bloc project was based of gaining legtimacy by 
legisilation, while legitimacy in a sovereign state could only be insured through 
hegemony. 
The 1969 Coup was a direct response to the authoritarian project. The irony of the 
Nimeiri regime was that it lasted to establish the same project it had come to stop. 
3.6.3. The Economic Crisis of the Second Democraev 
The second democratic era showed the begining of the financial crisis of the state, which 
would become an important element in the economic crisis. Despite the apparent balance 
in the current budget of the central goverru-nent, the public budget which was composed 
of the current budget of the central government, local government and development 
budget, was in deficit for the whole period of the second democracy 1965-1969 (Kaballo, 
1988,26). The deficit was LS 34.2 millions in 1965/66, LS 24.9 millions in 1966/67, 
LS21.3 millions in 1967/68 and LS29 millions in 1968/69. The main reason 
The government turned to borrowing from the Bank. of Sudan to finance the deficit. In 
1965, its borrowing amO'unted to LS 7.9 millions, which was increased to LS14 millions 
in 1966, decreased to LSIOA millions in 1967 and increased to LS 24.3 millions in 1968. 
The decrease in 1967 was necessitated by the conditions of the IIMF to support the 
balance of payment deficit. 
Except for 1966, when the balance of payment deficit of payment deficit declined to LS 3 
millions from the then relatively high LS7 millions in 1965, it showed a general increasing 
trend by rising from LS 8.4 millions in 1967 to LS 12.7 millions in 1968. At the same time 
the Sudan foreign reserves continued its decline until reached LS 16.6 millions in 1968 
which was equal to the value of 2.5 month's imports. An important component of the 
deficit in the balance of payments was the deficit in the trade account which showed 
continuous deficit amounted to LS 4.3 millions in 1965, LS 6.7 millions in 1966, LSO. 2 
millions in 1967 and LS 8.6 millions in 1968. The deficit in current accounts during the 
period 1965-1968 did not reflect a decline in exports or export values or a deterioration 
in the terms of trade, but rather an increase in the quantity of imports; the Bank of Sudan 
Annual Report of 1968 noticed that "The economy seems to have been provided with 
more goods- especially consumer goods than it needed" ( Bank of Sudan, 1968,17-8). 
III 
3.7. The State Crisis Under Nimeiri 1969-73. 
3.7.1. The Chanu in Power 
In contrast to the 1958 coup, the May 25,1969 coup was launched by a group of young 
officers who were considered, at the time, to be on the left advocating radical solutions to 
Sudan's long standing problems. The leaders of the coup formed a Revolutionary 
Command Council of ten members (9 military and a civilian), issued three 'republican 
orders' and appointed a council of ministers of 26 members, two of them were from 
Southern Sudan. 
The coup transferred the pofitical power from the traditional ruling bloc to the left wing 
of the military and civilian bureaucrats and professional, the new-petty bourgeoisie of the 
Sudan. The possibility that such a-regime could establish the hegemony of a new fraction, 
class or an alliance of classes would have depended on its achievement on the ideological, 
political and economic levels because the regime was established through a coup d'etat. 
Its ideological discourse was based on the raw-material which had been provided by the 
urban democratic movement b9fore the coup: the continuation of October 1964 
revolution, the rejection of liberal democracy and the call for a "new democracy', the 
peaceful resolution of the Southern question, and the expansion of the public sector in the 
economy and establ-ishing strong relations with the then socialist countries and the Soviet 
Union. The left in the Sudan between 1964 and- 1969,. though was dominated by the SCP, 
had used an ideological discourse similar to that of Nasser and other Arab nationalist 
organization. The officers who took power were themselves affected by that discourse. 
But the ideological discourse pursued by the new regime was not attractive to the masses 
outside the urban areas. From the be the new regime faced the problem of having 91nn] 
a narrow urban base. 
3.7.2. The Response of the Traditional Power Bloc 
In the rural areas were the traditional ideologies of the sectarian religious groups were 
dominant, the Mabdists were able to rally the Ansar and organized their migration to 
Gezira Aba to join their leader, Imam, and to represent the greatest challenge to face the 
regime. The leader of the Ansar was joined with Mr. Sharif el I-End i, the ex-minister of 
Finance and the prominent leader of the DUP, some of the Muslim Brothers, led by Dr. 
Mohamed Salih Omer, a militant Islamic Fundamentalist, ex-minister and ex-lecturer in 
the University of Khartoum. In Gezira Aba they formed the National Front which would 
be the most important opposition force to the regime until 1977. The first confrontation 
with the regime took place in March 1970 during Nimeiri's visit to the White Nile area, a C) 
strong hold of the Ansar. 
The Sudanese urban bourgeoisie was reluctant to take an open position with or against 
the new regime despite the first policy announcement made by the prime minisier 
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(Ministry of National Guidance, 1970,6). In 1969-70, a tragic Shakespearian situation of 
'a lull before the stonn' governed the business theatre. While in the period 1964-68, for 
example about 260 new private industrial enterprises were given licences and 227 new 
private companies were registered, only 69 private industries were granted licences and 
50 private companies were registered in the period 1969-73. The Sudanese bourgeoisie 
was not only reluctant politically, but as private capital they were reluctant to invest or 
form new companies. 21 The storm came in May-June 1970 when the regime announced a 
series of nationalisation and confiscation decisions. All commercial banks (two British, 
one Egyptian, one Ethiopian, one Jordanian, one Sudanese and one a French-Sudanese 
joint-ventur) were nationali sed on the first anniversary of the coup (25 May 1970). The 
nationalisations included four British companies: Gellattaly Hankey, Mitchell Cotts, 
Sudan. Mercantile, and the Imperial Chemical Industries (Sudan). Later on June 1970 
more foreign companies were nationalised including the Sudan Portland Cement 
Company, the Blue Nile Brewery, Bata Shoe Company (Sudan), Blue Nile packing 
Company, Red Sea Stevedoring Company, National Cash register Company and the Pepsi 
Cola company. In addition more than sixteen Sudanese companies were confiscated. 
Despite the nationalisation and confiscation decisions, the regime and. its president 
continued speaking about the role of private sector in development. In his two speeches 
presenting and declaring the start of the Five Years Plan 1970/71-1974/75 (Nimeiri's 
speeches on June and October 1970), the president focused on the investment allocated to 
be carried by the private sector described the role expected to be played by the private 
sector as a great one. Of the total planned investment of LS 385 million, the private 
sector was expected to contribute by LS170 millions, of which almost 14% was to be 
invested in industry. 
It was during the last quarter of 1970 that the regime tried to strike a deal with the 
national bourgeoisie without involving their political representatives, a consistent attitude 
by the regime in trying to establish its alliances while demonstrating its relative autonomy- 
In reality the need was rising because of the economic response of the busiiiess circles to 
the confiscations and- nationaEsation, and the growing problems WIth the communists, as 
would be noticed when discussed in the next section. Following the split with the 
communists in November 16 1970, the regime began approaching the Sudanese capitalists 
more directly. In his speech on the 12th of February in which the president attacked the 
SCP aggressively, he appointed a businessman to represent what he called "National 
capitalism". He went to explain his decision: 
21information on industrial enterprises were collected from Ministry of Industry and Mining, 
Administration of Statistics and Research, 1973. "A List of Working Industries in the Sudan " (in 
Arabic), while the number of companies is calculated from information gathered from the Office 
of Commercial Companies Registrar, Attorney -General Chamber by the author. 
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"The representation of national capitalism in the Council of Ministers has a great significance. 
We felt their reluctance to enter 'the door of the revolution' despite my repeated assurances; 
and I Ný-ant again to assure the national capitalism that it is one of the forces of the revolution 
and its role is necessary in the building of the country. The revolution gives it the chance 
together -aith public sector because the responsibility for the building of a nation is greater 
than to be carried by a sector without the other" (Ministry of National Guichince, 1971(l), 14) 
He promised to explain the government policy in a meeting to be held with the 
businessmen on February 15,1970. When the promised meeting took place, after 
speaking again about the role of private sector in the Five Years Plan, the president 
announced that there were three factors necessary for the private sector in order to play 
its role properly (Nfinistry of National Guidance, 1971, (2), 1-5). The first was to create a 
suitable and encouraging atmosphere for private investment which he promised by 
making a new investment act and he declared that: 
"the 1967 Act and the suggestions presented by the Ministry of Industry to amend it win 
constitute a good base for a discussion with the businessmen to know their point of view and 
their suggestion before issuing the act in its fuial form" (Ibid, 14) 
The second factor was the specification of the role of private sector in different stages of 
economic development and this was done in its first stage by the Five years Plan. The 
third factor was the elimination of all obstacles that stand before the private sector 
fulfilling its investment- role and here the president made a number of positive gesture 
towards the private sector. He promised that the government would not confiscate any 
wealth or -property of any citizen except according to the 
law and especially the Fourth 
Republican Order, the Sudan Penai Code or any existing law. He determined the crimes 
that would be punished by confiscating of property as those committed against the state 
and the independence of the country. He promised to make a law to govern the decisions 
of nationaEsation and that the state would make just compensations for nationalised 
enterprises. He declared three decisions fo compensate the Sudanese owners of 
nationalised enterprises. The first was to pay to them the realised profits of their 
nationalised companies for the year before nationalisation up to 12% of the values of their 
shares. The second was to shorten the period of compensation to those who would 
promise to re-invest their compensations in the Sudan. The third was to pay annual 
interest on the shares until they transferred to other investments (Ibid , 11). The response 
of some of the businessmen who attended the meeting was to organise public rauy for the 
president under the slogan of national unity in April 1971, but the event was a failure 
compared with similar events organised by the trade unions or the supporters of the SCP. 
It was not until after the July 1971 events when new initiatives towards the private sector 
were taken. In fact, the regime expressed good gesture when Nimeiri admitted that some 
mistakes were made in the confiscation decisions of 1970. The regime went further to 
revise the confiscations and in August 1972, " two private companies were restored to 
their owners" followed by another three in October, the same year. (ACR: 1972/73, B 113). 
Other decisions on the same line followed. In 1972/73 the regime issued a number of 
investment legislations that provide concessions and safeguards against confiscation and 
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nationalization. The promised changes in the 1967 Organisation and Promotion of 
Industrial Investment came as Legislation No. 91 issued by the president of the Republic in 
August 1972 under the title "The Development and Promotion of Industrial Investment 
Act, 1972". Without detailing that Act (see Kaballo, 1974), it is important to point two 
important features of the Act which governed the industrial investment for seven years 
until the 1980 Act was issued. The Act gave the Minister of Industry wide powers from 
defining the meaning of 'enterprise and craft 'to be covered by the Act to the number of 
concession and the time lirrAt in wMch they were provided to private investors (Mnistry 
of Industry, 1973, Sections 3 and 8, Article 14). Such powers in the previous acts were 
either vested in the bureaucracy of the Mnistry of Industry or strictly defined by the 
legislator22. 
3.7.3. The Response of the Urban Democratic Forces 
But Nimeiri's particular state crisis was its failure to establish a stable alliance between the 
fractions of the military and civilian professionals that came to control the state after the 
May coup, and the dominated classes, especially the urban population. Instead Nimeiri 
attempted to incorporate the trade union organizations, the tenants unions etc, in his 
single one-party system. This brought the conflict between the supposed allies to the 
open. The essence of the conflict was of several dimensions. 
The first dimension was a result of discussions which began before the success of the 
CoUp23. It was about the coup itself, whether it was a right tactic at the right time. The 
question was raised both in the leading committee of the Free Officers Organisation and 
the pol-itical bureau and central committee of SCP and in the discussions between the 
representatives of the two organisations. 
In March 1969, the Central Committee of the SCP discussed a report from its Secretary 
General in which he argued against the coup mentality on one hand and disputed a 
suggestion -that the country was passing through a revolutionary crisis on the other. Abdel 
Khaliq Mahgoub repeated the same arguments in his report to the Party Congress which 
was held -to settle the dispute among the party cadres and members 15 months after the 
coup. He argued that the "military operation should become the climax of a general 
22As it would be argued later this had two repercussions: one was the weakening of the authority 
of the bureaucracy, a syptomn of the Nirneiri regime which described by some authors as a 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the second was opening the way for corruption by providing licences 
for neiv investments in industries considered as not a priority because the existing capacity was 
enough to supply the market; ic vegetable oil and soap. 
23Many authors had provided a discussion of this dimension, see for example First, 1970; Woddis, 
1970, Nibloc, 1985; al-Gadal, 1986, khalid, 1993. 'ne author of the thesis was a witness and part 
of the discussions among the SCPs members on the question and has access to most of the 
documents of the party during that period. 
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revolutionary upsurge among the masses" (Mahgoub, 1970,6)24. The communists were 
not united in that position. It was clear for the observers at the end of 1968 and the early 
months of 1969 that there were two conflicting trends in the SCP. The main stream was 
led by Abdel Khaliq Mahgoub and a minority trend led by Ahmed Suliman, the member of 
the Central Committee who represented the party in the two governments of the October 
1964 Revolution. Ahmed Suliman wrote a series of articles in December 196g25 arguing 
for an alliance between the progressive officers and civilians. His argument was based on 
the experience of the October Revolution when the professional Front and the young 
officers toppled the Abboud regime. The first October Revolution government was not 
able to last long enough to fulfil the tasks of the revolution because, Suliman claimed, of 
the failure to sustain the cooperation between the two groups (al Ayarn. Newspaper,, 
8/12/1968,4). 
Among the Free Officers OrganisatiolIM the same issues of the coup tactic and its timing 
was discussed in the leading committee of the organisation in October 1968 and April 
1969 (NiblocK, 1987,238-241). The first meeting decided to formulate a plan to seize 
power when time was ripe. In the second meeting in April the majority voted against 
launching the coup, but the minority insisted on implementing the plan. Since most of 
those opposed to the idea of launching the coup were associated with the SCP, 
representatives of the minority group thought to discuss the matter with the leadership of 
the party. Colonel N-imeiri and the retired major Farouk Hamdalla, from the minority 
group, carried the discussions with Abdel Khaliq Mahgoub and Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud 
of the SCP. The conu-nunists insisted on postponing the coup and the minority refused27. 
The second dimension of the conflict was on the strategy of the 'revolution'. While the 
communists stood with the strategy adopted since their party's third conference in 
February 1956 which was re-confirmed in its fourth conference in November 1967 and 
which was based on the concept of the 'national democratic revolutiod, the May regime 
declared itself a socialist revolution and that its strategy was to build socialism in the 
Sudan. When Nimeiri announced the regime's nationalisation. decisions in May 1970; he 
declared "We are at the beginning of socialism. We must show the world that we can 
24AIthough there were many reports written by Mahgoub as Secretary General of the SCP, the 
one quoted was the only one known to the author which had Mahgoub's name cited as its author 
before his death in 197 L. 
25The articles was seen as implicit commemoration of the execution of on December the 9th, 1959 
of a group of officers who led a coup against Abboud's regime. 
26See section 3.5.1, and section 3.6.1 and fn 54,55, above. 
27 According to the SCP sources Hamadalla was more stronger in defending the coup planwhile 
Nimeiri was reluctant after the discussion. This was confirmed to the author by a military source 
who was an officer in the paratroops who said that Nimeiri after a meeting with Nugud, his school 
mate, tried to convince the group of officers who were gathered to put the last touches to the plan 
in the evening of 24 may 1969 to postpone the operation. According to that officer, Lieutenant 
Colonel Osman Haj Hussein told Nimeiri that it was too late to postpone the operation because he 
had issued the orders to his soldiers. Colonel Hussein was later executed in the 1971 coup. 
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build our country through socialism" (quoted in Khalid, 1985,22). On the other hand, 
Abdel Khaliq Mabgoub, the secretary general of the SCP wrote in 1970, 
"The caU for socialism now, not as a historical horizon chosen by our party since its 
foundation which is an understandable and known issue, but. as a strategy for this stage, would 
only lead to ambiguity among the cadres. That would lead to a choice of tactics which are not 
suitable for the current stage and wffl necessarily 'reýult in the collapse of the democratic 
revolution which NvU make impossible to achieve socialism" (Mahgoub, 1970,4) 
The third dimension was about the leadership of the revolution. The SCP described the 
group who led the coup as a progressive petty bourgeoisie group. The take-over of state 
power by that group according to Mahgoub, the SCP leader, created "an intermediate 
period in the development of the revolution [the national democratic revolution]. " 
(Mahgoub, 1970,18). The SCP argued that to complete implementing all the tasks of the 
national democratic revolution (see the first dimension above) the working class should 
qualify itself for leading the revolution when this intermediate period was passed. 
Mahgoub argued that 0 
"History has laid a burden of serious responsibilities on the working class. On its {the working 
class's) abilities depends the achievement of the tasks confronting the revolutionary movement 
during this intermediate period of the development of the revolution and hence the movement 
to complete implementing all the tasks of the national democratic revolution" (Ibid, 25) 
Mahgoub then went on to deterrnine the conditions for the working class to qualify itself 
for the tasks 'assigned to it by history'. He mentioned four conditions. The first was the 
continuous expansion of trade union organisation to include all sections of the industrial 
and agricultural working class and to give enough consideration for the working class in 
Southern Sudan. (Ibid, 25-6). The second condition was that the working class should 
play a greater role in organising the poor masses and the peasants in particular. The third 
condition was that the working class should play its role in produ. ction and should provide 
the lead in implementing the Five Years Plan. The last condition was that the working 
class should stand up to all the problems of the democratic revolution as the class which 
had the greater interests and should take the initiative in providing and in implementing 
the appropriate solutions for such problems (Ibid, 27). 
There were two responses to the SCP analysis. The leaders of the coup, the rnilitary, 
insisted that the armed forces was the leadership of the revolution. They considered their 
description as petty bourgeoisie as an insult. They saw in the SCP's call for the working 
class to qualify itself for the leadership an open plan to replace their leadership with 
members of the SCP28 
The other response was that of the minority group in the SCP, which argued theoretically 
for the leadership of the revolutionary democrats following the official Soviet Communist 
28Most of these opinions Nvere expressed by Nimciri directly to the late Brair al-Ansari Nvho 
worked as economic adviser for the Revolutionary Council. Mr. al-Ansari told the author that he 
believed the SCP position Nvas wrongly reflected to Nimeiri by Ahmed Suliman group 
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Party's stand from -the 
"socialist-oriented countries' in the Third World. The question 
became element in the dispute in the SCP which led to its split in September 1970. 
The fourth was the independence of the then existing mass organizations or their 
incorporation in the regime's one-party system on the Nasserist mode129. This included the 
independent existence of the SCP itself. The Repubfican Order No. 1, (Article 8), 
dissolved all pol. itical parties". The SCP ignored the Order and continued its activities. It 
was critical towards the leaders of the coup who contacted the party for the support of 
the coup before it was launched and who were rejecting to deal with the party after the 
success of the coup. The leaders of the coup were insisting that they were dealing with 
the communists as individuals and the party was banned Eke other pol-itical parties. the 
spokesman of the Revolutionary Command Council said: 
"All official parties, without exception, are dissolved; this includes the Communist Party. The 
Revolutionary Council deals %vith all people in their individual capacities, not as 
representatives of any party. We welcome the support to the cause of the revolution of all, so 
long as they abide by its purpose, and come to us as individuals. "(ACR, 1969/70, B49) 
The conflict was reflected in the party itself and took the shape' of a contradiction 
between a hard fine wing in the SCP which argued for the independent existence of the 
party, and a right wing which advocated the individual cooperation of party members and 
the regime. A party congress was held in August 1970 to decide on the conflict and the 
majority of the conflict adopted the proposals of the main stream which called -for the 
independent existence of the party and the mass organisation. 
The SCP suggestion for a democratic front that unite all revolutionary forces was 
suspiciously looked at by the military as a plan to impose -communist domination since 
most of the mass organisation were communist dominated. 
The coup d'etat in Libya in September brought a new dimension to the conflict , that was 
the question of the unity of Egypt, Sudan and Libya. The SCP firmly rejected the plan to 
unite the three countries. The dispute on the question of unity was reflected in the 
Revolutionary Command Council, where it was clear that three of the members were 
opposing the unity proposal., 
On November 16th 1970, Nimeiri organized a Palace Coup and dismissed the three of the 
Revolutionary Council who opposed the unity with Egypt and Libya, accusing them of 
collaboration vvith the SCP. 
29The term Nasserist model is used in this thesis to describe the political and economic system 
built by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt bctwcen 1952 and 1970. Ile main feature of the political 
system -%vas a presidential republic, %Nith a one-party system -svith great role assigned to security 
forces and the incorporation of all mass organisation within the system. On the economic side it 
, was featured by a strong public sector. 
30The Article reads "All political parties are to be considered dissolved as from today. No political 
formation or any organisation which could be used for political targets is allowed unless by a 
permission from the Reversionary Council" (al-Ayam newspaper, 1/6/69, No. 565 1, p 4) 
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In response the left wing in the Free Officers Organization, attempted a military take over 
on July 19th 1971. They seized power for three days when a counter coup brought 
Nimeiri back. The defeat of July 1971 coup attempt gave the justification the regime 
waiting for to settle its accounts with the SCP. Three of the leaders of the party: the 
secretary general, the secretary of SWUTF, and only Southerner in the party leadership 
(and the only Southerner in the leadership of any non-Southern party), were executed. 
The trade unions were dissolved, bending a new arrangements and legislation to 
reorganize them. Nimeiri achieved what the others regimes since independence failed: the 
defeat of the urban democratic movement and the destruction of their experienced 
organization, the SCP and the trade unions. 
Although state power remained in the hand of the military and civilian bureaucrats, they 
themselves went a shift to the right in an attempt to survive their local and inter national 
isolation. An intensive and extensive effort was made to find new allies both locally and 
internationally, the fori-ner were difficult to find while the latter were available in a world 
divided then by a cold war. 
The second period of the Nimeiri regime which began by his election Presi dent of the 
Republic was a period of the authoritarian state of the military and civilian bureaucrats, 
where the technocrats played the role of organizers and ideologists. Their organization 
was the Sudan Socialist Union, the only legal party in the country, and under its umbrella 
came all the other organization: trade unions, youth and women unions, and the newly 
established committees for the development of villages. Their ideology was 
modernization in practise, and socialism in propaganda (the regimes manifesto (the 
National Char-ter) and the public speeches of the regime's military leaders). It was the 
longest period of relative autonomy any Sudanese state had enjoyed since independence. - 
It was a relative autonomy of an authoritarian state, a failure of establishing a hegemony, 
except in the Southern Sudan where, for a limited period as it is argued in the coming 
chapter, the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 had stopped the first civil war and 
established a local autonomy for the region, eliminating one of the main elements of the 
post-colonial state's crisis in the Sudan. For the first time in the history of post-colonial 
state in the Sudan, its legitimacy was recognised in the South. But from the start there 
was a contradiction between the parliamentary system established by the Agreement in 
Southern Sudan and the presidential system in the centre. The first was to some extent a 
democratic system, and despite the one party system which was supposed to prevail in the 
South as in the North, Southern political parties and groupings had existed and competed 
to power. The presidential system in the centre was authoritarian. The Southern leaders 
underestimated this contradiction when they thought the coexistence was possible and 
that Nimeiri would leave them to settle their problems. Future events was to prove that 
was an illusion. The Agreement did not change the composition of the ruling power in 
Khartoum which dominated the state. Despite the fact that an alliance of several groups 
. 
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of the new petty bourgeoisie dominated the state in the North and South, the real power 
was still with the Northern portion which -was holding the national economic resources, 
the military machine and the constitutional political power. 
An important obstacle to the stability of the Nimeiri's regime after 1971, Was its failure to 
attract the elements of the traditional ruling bloc, ( who stood to benefit from the shift of 
the regime to the right), to fill the gap created by the break with the urban democratic 
movement and the SCP. Instead the traditional ruling bloc main two parties continued 
their attempts through the National Front which united them with the Muslim Brothers to 
detribalise the state. 
In addition, the regime on the international level restored its relation with the Western 
Countries, especially the United States, Britain (with which a settlement on the 
compensation of the British firms nationalized in 1970 was reached in 1973), and West 
Germany. On the regional level, the relations with Egypt and Libya underwent a big set- 
back, as Nimeiri was compelled to denounce any attempts of unity with the two countries 
following the Addis Ababa Agreement. At the same time, Nimeiri pursued a good relation 
with the Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia which became Nimeiri's regime source of 
foreign finance 
As from 1973 the economic -crisis began to manifest a new-cycle (the details will be 
described in Chapter 4). By August 1973, (as has also been shown in Chapter 4), the 
opposition of the regime was expressed openly in mass demonstrations, and in response 
the regime increased its repression. Since then, the dialectics of resistance-repression 
continued to characterize the crisis of the Nimeiri state until its overthrew in 1985. The 
authoritarian state which crashed the urban democratic movement in 1971, was 
challenged all through 1973-85 by a growing opposition, albeit weak, divided, and lacked 
a strong leadership. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE MANIFESTATION OF THE CRISIS 1973-85 
4.1 Introduction 
The 1973-85 crisis was both a continuation of the general crisis that had prevailed in the 
country since independence and a particular condensation of that crisis that resulted from 
the nature and policies of the Ninneiri regime. The elements of continuity were those that 
characterise the socio-economic structure as a special articulation of modes of 
production. This will be discussed in Chapter 6. Despite the claim made by the leaders of 
the coup when they took power that their aim was to bring radical changes in the country, 
th e socio-economic structure remained basically unchanged. Following the July 1971 
coup attempt, the regime adopted a policy of modernisation rather than radical 
transformation. 
On the political level, the modernisers thought that they could bring political stability and 
provide for Peoples' participation by establishing a new state based on four main 
institutions: the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), the Presidency of the Republic, the 
National Peoples' Assembly, and the Peoples' Local Councils. The relation between the 
institutions was thought to be determined by the Permanent Constitution, which was 
drafted and promulgated in 1973. Chapter 5 argues that these new institutions failed to 
bring political stability, to allow the democratic representation and participation of the 
Sudanese people in the decision-making and to provide the rational management of the 
economy. Symptoms of political instability. are discussed in this Chapter 4. Political 
stability is argued through out this thesis is a function of the hegemony of the ruling class 
and the legitimacy of the state. Chapter 5 argues that the nature of the state in the period 
understudy was governed by being fairly dominated by the new petty bourgeoisie. the 
new petty bou rgeoisie not only failed to establish an alliance with other classes, it was 
unable to maintain its unity. This Chapter shows the resistance of some of the fractions of 
the groups of the new petty bourgeoisie and their contribution to political instability. 
Chapter 5 argues further that a split was persistent among the ruling group itself. This 
split as argued below allowed the increasing role of the President and his use of the- tactics 
of playing the different fractions against each other. The authoritarian nature of the state 
and the weakness of the institutions established by the Permanent Constitution enhanced 
the role of the President. The character of the President himself contributed to both the 
-weakness of the institutions and hence to the instability of the system. The ruling group 
failed to establish its hegemony and its resort to coercion and repression intensified as the 
resistance of other classes and their political and trade union organisations increased. The 
legitimacy of the state declined as its policies failed to deliver the goods which were both 
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expected by the population and promised by the regime. Within this context the National 
Reconciliation is discussed and evaluated as an attempt to regain legitimacy. Its failure to 
obtain that target rested on the.. authoritarian nature of the state and the particular role and 
powers of the President. The promulgation of the Islamic laws in September 1983, the 
declaration of the State of Emergency and the Prompt Justice Courts in April 1984 were a 
dual attempt for a quest for legitimacy and a resort to intensified repression at a time 
when the economic crisis, famine and popular resistance dominated the Sudanese agenda. 
Neither legitimacy was gained, nor repression was able to prevent the overthrew of the 
regime in March-April 1985 through a popular uprising. 
Of particular importance to the political crisis was the renewals of the unrest in the South 
which is described in this Chapter. It is argued in chapters 3,4, and 5 that the Addis 
Ababa Agreement of 1972 which brought an end to the civil war in the South was the 
greatest achievement of the Nimeiri era. While this chapter describes the process through 
which the Agreement turned to be obsolete, Chapter 5 argues that the Agreement failed in 
bringing any change to the domination of the North-Arab groups on the Sudanese state. 
As a result the policies that preserved uneven development in the country continued. 
Chapter 5 also argues that the Agreement and the Southern Provinces Regional Self- 
Government Act, 1972, which was promulgated as a result of the Agreement, provided 
for a sort of parliamentary democratic system within the authoritarian presidential 
republic. The contradiction between the two systems contributed to the failure of the 
Agreement. The particular policies of the President towards the South and the 
promulgation of the Islamic Laws in 1983 provided for the concrete process through 
which the Civil War was renewed in the South. 
The modernisation policy has added new production capacities"to the economy in both 
industry and agriculture, built a new. net of modem roads and highways, modernised the 
telecommunication net work and increased the number of those enroled in the general and 
higher education. Despite all these achievement in the economy, the economic crisis of 
1973-85 was the longest and deepest in the history of the Sudan. The manifestation of 
this crisis is already discussed in this Chapter. - Chapter 5 argues that the particular 
economic crisis of 1973-85 was in essence part of the organic crisis of transformation. 
This was reflected in both levels of simple and extended reproduction. On the simple 
reproduction level the economy fOed to maintain itself resulting in the under-utilisation 
of the already installed capacities and the low and declining levels of productivity and 
yields, the increasing debt of the state and the country, and the high rate of inflation (all of 
them are documented and verified in this. Chapter). On the extended reproduction, as is 
argued in Chapter 5, the new projects failed to compensate for the decline and decay of 
the old ones while they, the new ones themselves, suffered from inadequate planning, and 
from mis-mangement of their construction and execution. They suffered after their 
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completion ftom, financial and managerial problems that led to the same problems of 
under-utilisation of capacities and low productivity and yields. 
Of particular importance both for the political and the economical crises of the Nimeiri 
regime were the policies adopted in 1978-85 under the auspices of the IMF. It is argued 
in this chapter that these policies contributed to -the deepening of the crisis of the regime. 
This chapter attempts a description of the manifestation of the crisis of 1973-85. In 
section two and its subsections, the economic manifestations of the crisis wi-11 be outlined. 
Four main symptoms are important and characteristic of the economic crisis in the Sudan 
during the period under investigation. These are: I)the decline of output and productivity, 
and 2)the under-utilization of existing capacities, 3)the internal fiscal imbalance, 4)the 
external imbalance and 5)the evidently spiraffing inflation and 6)the continuous decline in 
real incomes. 
Section three tries to give an account of the most prominent features of the political 
aspect of the crisis.. Three of these are discussed: 1)the increasing opposition to the 
Nimeiri's regime despite the increasing repres sion on one hand and the attempts of 
reconciliation on the other, 2)the discontent in southern Sudan and the beginning of the 
second war, and 3)the instability of the government as evident in the high turnover of its 
ministers, leading civil servants and army officers. 
Section four is an account for some of the social manifestations of the crisis; like the 
increasing income inequality, class stratification, increase in unemployment, internal and 
external niigration and the decline in social services and an increase in the rate of crimes. 
4.2. The Economic Manifestation 
4.2.1. The Decline in Output 
The most significant economic manifestation of the crisis was the general trend of 
declining productivity and capacity utilization. All main agricultural crops showed long 
term secular trends to declining yields per feddan as shown by the time series analysis 
carried for five leading crops in Sudanese agriculture (four principal cash crops and a fifth 
is dura the staple food crop), for the period 1970/71- 1984/85. The fourth crop (gum- 
arabic) showed a general decline in output. However no data for yields per feddan is 
available, and time series analysis is carried for total armual output. 
The yields per feddan of irrigated long staple cotton, the most important Sudanese export 
commodity, declined by 2.8% per year between 1970/71-1984/85. There was a marked 
sharp decline between 1970M and 1980/81, from 741kg to 300 kilogram per feddaii, 
though it was reversed after 1991/82 to a steady increase, it did not offset the general 
trend. 
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Groundnuts, the second principal Sudanese export crop, showed a trend of declining 
yields of 2.4% per year. Although yields of groundnuts showed significant fluctuations 
between 1970/71-1978/79, there was a sharp decline from 362kg/feddan in 1979/80 to 
220kg/ feddan in 1984/85. Sesame, the third, showed a sharper decline yields trend of 
3.6% annually during 1970/71-1984/85. Yields declined from 166kg/ feddan in 1970/71 
to 72kg/ feddan in 1984/85. 
The fourth cash product is gum-arabic. Its output had shown a declining trend of 2.5%. 
Although the output of gum-arabic fluctuated sharply between 1970M to 1975/76, 
declining from 42,300 tons in 1970/71 to 29,000 tons in 1972/73 and increasing to 
53,000 tons in 1975/76; it showed a continuous declining trend to 1979/80 when it 
started fluctuating again to reach the lowest output since 1970/71 in 1984/85 of 14,000 
tons. 
Table 3. The Yields/feddan of the Main Crovs in the Sudan 1970/71-1984/85 
Yields in Hogram/feddan except for gum-arabic output in metric tons 
Year cotton cotton groundnuts sesame dura gum-arabic 
irrigated rain-fed 
1970/71 741 95 370 160 313 42.5 
1971/72 697 119 257 158 455 35.0 
imm 566 168 345 119 317 29.0 
1973/74 655 88 317 108 311 22.9 
1974/75 617 116 518 107 301 53.2 
1975/76 387 115 338 107 332 43.0 
1976n7 495 153 386 104 267 32.0 
1977/79 529 137 385 104 300 32.0 
1978/79 381 40 344 104 310 35.0 
1979/80 304 102 362 105 267 23.5 
1980/81 300 136 332 110 297 29.4 
1981/82 281 122 307 123 354 38.5 
1982/83 575 111 267 82 256 27.3 
1983/84 570 131 225 95 206 38.0 
1984/85 652 186 220 72 137 14.0 
SOURCE: Hnistry of Agriculture Department of Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Agricultural 
Year Book, 1974,19 83. 
On the other hand, the staple food grain dura (sorghum), showed. a steady, but 
accentuated decline in yield by 3.6% per year over the same period of 1970/71-1984/85. 
Some of these declining trends in yields summarized in Table 3, were offset by an increase 
in the area under cultivation. However this was not the case forcotton and sesame. The 
area under cotton decreased from 1,210,000feddam in 1970/71 to 996,000feddons in 
1984/85. The combined result of declining yields and diminishing area cultivated by 
cotton was a fall in the total output of cotton from 731,000 tons in 1970/71 to 649,000 
tons in 1984/85. During the same period cotton reached the lowest output in 1980/81 
when output amounted to 296,000 tons. Sesame, on the other hand, showed a decline of 
only 4,000feddxzs from 1857,000feddwi s in 1970/71 to 1853,000feddwis in 1984/85, 
and in realty area under sesame between 1970/71 and 1983/84 was on average greater 
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than that of 1970/71. Hence the actual decline in output could really be attributed to the 
decline in yield. 
For both groundnuts and dura, output increased because the area under cultivation 
increased. The area under groundnuts increased ftom 915,000 feddms in 1970/71 to 
1,758,000feddwis in 1984/85, reaching its maximum in 1981/82 when it amounted to 
2,370,000feddwis. Meanwhile output fluctuated, mainly as a result of changing yields, to 
reach its maximum in 1977/78,1,030,000 tons, when it began declining steadily to 
386,000 tons in 1984/85. 
Table 4. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 1970nl- 1984/85 
(area in, 000ftddans, output in, 000 metric tons) 
Year Dura Dura Wheat Wheat Sesame Sesame Gr/dnuts Gr/dnuts Cotton Cotton 
Area Output Area Output Area Output Area Output Area Output 
70/1 4894 1535 290 163 1857 297 915 339 1210 731 
71/2 4556 1590 288 124 1921 295 1512 387 1219 685 
72/3 4095 1301 248 152 2846 339 1643 569 1176 554 
73/4 5448 1692 425 235 2228 243 1745 552 1217 671 
74/5 5727 1753 592 269 2177 225 1791 926 1219 648 
75/6 6516 2158 693 263 2273 233 2311 781 982 315 
76/7 6722 1791 633 289 2246 238 1902 733 1008 457 
77/9 7139 2160 589 312 2366 264 2080 1031 1120 559 
78/9 6908 2192 574 166 2041 216 '2341 806 1011 379 
79/0 5559 1444 453 232 1979 222 2353 858 989 323 
80/1 6956 2068 437 218 2011 221 2129 712 961 286 
81/2 9231 3272 329 142 2044 242 2376 838 972 474 
82/3 7564 1938 233 442 1999 163 862 492 982 583 
-83/4 8782 1806 349 169 2177 206 1834 413 1018 629 
84/5 '7987 1097 362 179 1853 133 1758 386 996 649 
SOURCE: I)Miinistry of Agriculture, A'gricu Itural Year Book, Different issue's. 2)National Economic 
Conference, Basic Econ omic Indicators, 1986, Khartoum. 
The area under dura increased fi7om 4,900,000feddwls in 1970/71 to 9,200,000feddwis 
inl981/82, and then decreased to 7,990,000feddans in 1984/85. Considering the recent 
increase in wheat consumption and attitudes to achieve wheat sufficiency, the 
performance of wheat cultivation is accounted for hereby. The area under wheat showed 
two different trends. The first was an increase from 1970/71 to 1975/76 when the area 
under wheat increased from 290,000feddwis to 693,000fedcktw, an increase of 139% 
over six years, while the other trend was a declining one from 1975/76 to 1984/85, when 
the area under cultivation decreased from 693,000feddwis to 362,000feddmis. Output 
increased during the first period from 163,000 metric tons in 1970/71 to 312,000 metric 
tons in 1977/78. By 1984/85 wheat output had declined to 179,000 tons. Table 4 shows 
the area under cultivation and output of the most important agricultural crops in the 
Sudan. 
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Despite the relative small contribution of industrial output compared to agriculture in the 
economy of the country, the role of industry in the supply of important manufactured 
commodities is of increasing importance (sugar, textile, edible oil, soap and cement) 
The situation in industry was not significantly different from that of agriculture. Under- 
utilization of installed capacities was the main characteristic of the crisis. The sugar 
industry which had improved its capacity in the period 1970/71- 1973/74, showed a 
declining trend in capacity utilization from 1974n5 to 1979/80 ( when the utilized 
capacity reached 21% of the installed capacity). By 1980/81 total sugar output began to 
increase and capacity utilization improved ftom 3 1% in 1980/81 to 74% in 1984/85, due 
to the high capacity utilization in the newly operated Kennana Sugar Factory and the 
rehabilitation prograrn of the sugar industry. 
Capacity utilization in the cement industry reached the highest ratio in 1972/73, then 
began to decline sharply to reach 44.2% of the installed capacity in 1977/78, to increase 
to 56.3% in 1978/79, declining the following year to 46.8% and then showed a steady 
increase to 72.9% in 1983/84. ( Mohamed: 1986,5 ; and MFNE: 1975/76,1986/87). 
The situation in the textile industry was more even disastrous. As Fadul showed in 1985, 
textile industry was working at 25% of the. installed capacity. Of 10 public sector 
factories, 4 were not workin& 2 were working under 25% of the installed -capacity, 3 
working at 50% capacity and only one working at 67%. Private sector factories were 
working at 10% capacity one had closed down since 1982/83(Fadul, 1986, p5-6). The 
output of the textile industry decreased from -120,300,000 yards in 1974/75 to 
68,500,000 yards in 1982/83. ( collected from Departmený of Customs and Tariffs, 
Khartourn, 1986). 
Edible oil factories were working at 32% of installed capacity. Although the output of 
soap increased from 27.9,000 metric tons in 1970/71 to 56.3,000 tons in 1984/85, th e 
soap industry was working at below than 50% of the installed capacity. 
Shoes production was also on the decline, . 1.8 million pairs of shoes less were produced 
in 1983/84 than in 1970/71. (coHected firom. Department of Tariffs and Customs, head 
quarters, Khartoum, 1986). 
In 1986, the National Economic Conference held in the Sudan to discuss the economic 
crisis, estimated that capacity utilization in Sudanese manufacturing industry was 25% of 
the installed capacity (NEC., 1986,21). The Industrialists" Union and the Ministry of 
Industry reported to the conference that about 100 factories were closed down as result 
of shortages in energy and raw-materials. 
Data on Sudan Gross Domestic Product(GDP) shows that, though the GDP in current 
prices increased 23.7% per year during the years 1970/71- 1984/85, in real terms the 
growth for the same period was a mere 0.04% , 
far less than population growth rate, 
estimated at 2.8% per year. The data also shows that GDP in real terms declined by 1.2% 
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from 1975/76 to 1984/85. This resulted in a decline of real per capita GDP of 4%. The 
GDP data is shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Sudan Grou Domestic Product (GDP) 1970nl-1984/85 
(in Current and Constant 1970's Prices) 
(million Sudanese pounds) 
Year GDP/Current GDP/Constant 
Prices 1970 Prices 
1970/71 761.1 761.1 
1971/72 832.4 744.7 
1972/73 896.8 684.4 
1973/74 1246.2 808.9 
1974n5 1510.8 883.4 
1975/76 1848.0 1016.5 
1976M 2339.7 1003.2 
1977/78 2882.7 897.9 
1978nq 3253.8 905.8 
1979/80 3972.0 926.2 
1980/81 4979.8 996.6 
1981182 6720.5 1029.1 
1982/83 9344.3 990.4 
1983/84 11471.7 847.4 
1984/85 14920.1 925.8 
SOURCE: I)Ministry of finance and National Planning, economic Survey, different issues 1970-1989 
2) World Bank(1982,1987) 
4.2.2. lnternal Fiscal Imbalance 
The internal fiscal and financial imbalance was a general symptom of the period 1970/71- 
1984/85. This is shown by a continuous deficit in the public sector budget. (The public 
sector budget is defined here as the sum of the central government budget, local 
government budget and the development budget; the latter constitutes the government 
investment expenditure and its finance). 
The deficit of the overall public sector operations increased from LS 19.8 million in 
1970/71 to LS 753.9 in 1983/84. All the components of the public budget contributed to 
overall imbalance. The central govermnent current budget contributed by a growth rate of 
central government current expenditure higher than that of its current revenue. While the 
latter had grown by IS% per year, the former had grown by 20%. - 
The local government deficit grew by 25.91/o and that of public enterprises by 16.2%; 
while the government investment expenditure increased by 25% per year. All of them, 
except the public enterprises deficit, had a growth rate higher than that of the central 
govenunent revenue. 
Another characteristic of the internal imbalance, and at the same time a by-product of it, 
was the dependency of the state on internal and external borrowing to finance the overall 
deficit. In 1970M the deficit amounted to 10.6% of the total expenditure of the public 
sector; foreign finance was 6.1 % and internal borTowing was 4.4% of total expenditure. 
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In 1983/84, the deficit increased to 33.91/o, foreign finance was 25.7% and internal 
borrowing 8.2% of the total expenditure. Although the contribution of foreign and 
internal borrowing to the finance of the total deficit varied from year to year according to 
the size of the deficit and the availability of foreign finance, both had increased in absolute 
and relative terms. 
Internal borrowing, on the one hand increased up to 1976/77 when it then began slowing 
down tiU 1979/80 before it increased up to 1981/82 and then declined through 1982/83 
and 1983/84, but never to its 1970/71-72/73 levels. The overwhelming source of the 
internal borrowing was the Central Bank. The result of borrowing from the Central Bank 
was the increase in the quantity of money in both its broad and narrow definitions. 
According to the narrow definition, the quantity of money is defined as the sum of 
currency at circulation and the public deposits in current account in commercial banks. 
The broad definition of the quantity adds to the narrow definition all sorts of deposits at 
banks which are cafled'quasi-money. (Sahk 1986, p166) 
The quantity of money increased from LS 35.2 and LS 40.8 million in 1960 to LS 2.55 
and LS 3.26 billion in 1984 according to the broad and narrow definitions respectively. It 
is necessary, however, to note that the average annual growth rate in the quantity of 
money between 1968 and 1976 amounted to 48% and from 1976 to 1984 to 72%, while 
it was only 15% between 1960 and 1968. 
The growth of currency in circulation showed an accelerating growth, especially in the 
pe riod 1979-1984. Generally the total amount of currency in circulation was LS 68.5 
million in December 1970, and nearly doubled in 1975 to amount to LS 132.5 million. In 
1979 it was more than five folds that of 1970 and more than double that of 1975. 
However, in December 1984 it reached 20 times that of 1970 ýnd nearly ten times that of 
1975 and 'only' four times of 1979. 
The increase in the quantity of money, when'related to the levels of material production, 
discussed before 
., reveals another 
important item of internal imbalance, between the 
quanoty of money and the total production of commodities and services. This imbalance 
usually reflects itself in spiralling inflation, another symptom of the Sudanese crisis. 
4.2.3. Sviralin Inflation and Declinin Real Incomes 
The creeping inflation in the Sudan is clearly shown, though underestimated, by three 
official costs of living indices, the first for low income groups, the second for high income 
groups and the third is unified cost of living index. This data is shown in Table 6. 
The low income costs of living index (C. L. I. ) had increased from 100 in December 1970 
to 2060.2 in December 1985, an increase of 1960.2 points, ie 19.6 times the base year, 
with a growth rate of 22.3 annually. The high income C. L. I. increased from 105.5 in 1970 
to 1938.7 in December 1985, with an annual growth rate of 21.4%. The unified C. L. I. 
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rose from 106.8 in 1970 to 1999.6 in December 1985, with a growth rate of 21.6% per 
year. 
Table 6. The Costs Of Living Indices (C. U. ) 1970- 1985 
(January 197o = 100) 
Year Low Incomes Mgh incomes Unified 
C. L. 1 C. L. 1 C. L. 1 
1970 100.0 105.5 106.1 
1971 178.7 106.8 107.5 
1972 221.4 115.5 118.2 
1973 141.6 133.7 137.6 
1974 178.7 165.9 172.6 
1975 221.4 200.9 199.0 
1976 225.1 203.4 202.6 
1977 262.9 240.7 251.8 
1978 314.9 288.8 301.9 
1979 412.0 385.9 399.0 
1980 516.6 487.5 503.0 
1981 643.5 603.9 623.4 
1982 880.9 765.2 787.1 
1983 1055.9 1007.5 1031.7 
1984 1417.2 1317.3 1367.2 
1985 2060.2 1938,7 1999.6 
SOURCE: Ministry of finance, Planning and National Economy: The Economic. Survey, different 
issues, 1970 - 1986. 
The inflation rate in general was at its lowest level in 1971 when it amounted to 3%; and 
reached its highest level in 1984 when it amounted to 46. No. From 1978 tO 1984 the 
average rate of inflation was 31.1% per year. Fadlalla estimated the rate of inflation 
between 1977 and 1982 at 38.8%. (Fadlafla, 1984. Table No. 1) 
On the other hand, creeping inflation was consequently followed by a decline in real 
incomes of the wage workers and salaried employees as well as farmers in the irrigated 
and rain-fed agriculture. 
In a study in 1987, it was found that in 1983 the real mimmum wage was equal to 28.9 % 
of that of 1970 while the highest wage paid in the public sector was equal to 16.4% of its 
corresponding in 1970. (KabaUo, 1987, pp. 14-15). The average nominal wage in the 
Sudanese manufacturing industry (establishments employing 25 or more workers) 
increased from LS 304.2 per year to LS 1120.7 annually in 1981/82, (calculated from 
Industrial Survey 198 1, Table No. 6), while if the latter is converted to its real 1970 value, 
it becomes a mere LS 174.2. 
The real salary of a newly appointed university graduate' amounted to 16% in 1983 of its 
corresponding real salary of 1970. The salary of an assistant undersecretary in the civil 
service 2 was 18.2% in 1983 of its value in 1970. 
I The 9th degree cornspondent to the Q scale in the old job scale prevailing before 1978 when a 
new scale, %&as established following the Jobs Evaluation Scheme. 
21n 4th degree corresponding to group seven in the old jobs scale prevailing before 1978. 
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Average real income in agriculture is estimated to bave declined from LS 74 in 1976/77 
to LS 56.4 in 1982/83. 
Table 7. Real Salaries and Wages of Some Scales 
As % of Their 1970's Values 
scale/ý, ear 1970 1978 1983 1986 
4 100 46 18 13 
9 100 39 16 16 
14 100 42 60 16 
18 100 64 29 21 
SOURCE : Kaballo, 1987, Wage Policy in the Sudan, Khartourrý 
ESRC., 14. 
4.2.4. The External Imbalance 
From 1971/72 to 1984/85, except for the year 1972/73, Sudan balance of trade (Exports 
minus imports) was generally in deficit. The deficit jumped from LS 19 million in 1971/72 
to LS 125.4 million in 1974/75, declined to LS 85 million in 1975/76 and to its lowest 
level in 1976/77. By 1977/78 it began increasing steadily to reach its highest level LS 
532.7 million in 1981/82 and then to decline to LS 454.7 in 1982/83 and LS 158.2 in 
1983/84. 
On the other hand, the current account (trade balance plus invisible transfers minus 
invisible payments) showed a continuous deficit from 1971/72 to 1983/84. It registered 
even a low deficit in 1972/73 when the trade account was in a surplus of LS 14.5 million. 
The highest current account deficit in the period was registered in 1981/82 was to Ls429 
million, which was better than the trade balance deficit of the same year. 
The overall external balance, the balance of payment, showed a continuous deficit from 
1970/71 to 1983/84; reaching its maximum of LS 364,206,000 in 1982/83 and its 
minimum of LS 700,000 in 1972/73 (Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 1970-1985). 
Those features of the external imbalance are closely linked with the performance of Sudan 
foreign trade. The most important feature of this performance was the decline in the 
volume of some of the main Sudanese export. The quantity exported of the long staple 
cotton, the most important Sudanese export since the year 1927, was 19.7% in 1981 of 
the volume cotton exports in 1970. The quantities of long stable cotton exported annual 
from 1973 to 1981 never reached its level of 1970. In four out of these nine years Sudan 
cotton exports were less than 50% of the 1970 level. (Department of Statistics, 1983 
p16). 
The Sudan used to contribute 87% of the world supply of gum-arabic, but this too 
suffered from a sharp decline in exports. In 1981 the Sudan gum exports were 73.2% the 
volume of 1970. From 1971 to 1985 the exports of gum never reached the volume of 
1970. (Ibid, . 16) 
Although until 1977, sesame exports registered an average above that of 1970, in 1978 its 
volume of export declined to 82.6% of that of 1970 and to 21.5% in 1979 and never, 
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reached the 1970 level again. Overall, the index of export volume declined from 100 in 
1970 to 65.5 in 1981. At the same time, the index of the volume of imports increased 
from IGO in 1970 to 137.2 in 1981. This led to a decline in the relative volume of foreign 
trade (defined statistically as the quantity index of exports divided by the quantity index 
of imports multiplied by 100), from 100 in 1970 to 47.7 in 1981. The relative value of 
Sudanese exports decreased from 94.4 in 1970 to 31 in 1981. The Sudan net terms of 
trade declined from 100 in 1970 to 53.3 in 1981 (Department of Statistics, 1983, . 15). 
Other features of the external imbalance were the increase in borrowing from international 
and regional financial institutions as well as from governments and private banks. The 
Sudan outstanding debt increased from LS 110.5 million in 1970 to LS 4342 millions in 
1985. Its total debt by the down fall of Nimeiri in April was estimated at $8 billions. 
4.3. The Political Manifestations 
The crisis also manifested politically in three main ways. The first appearance was the 
contradiction between the increasing and continuous opposition to the Nimeiri regime at 
the same time as the regime's intensification of its repressive measures, (parficularly after 
the 1975 fiailed coup). 
The second manifestation was the instability of the institutions and leading figures of the 
regime itself, despite the continuation of Nimeiri as president of the Republic. 
The third maiffestation of the political crisis was the renewed discontent in Southern 
Sudan which began to appear in the mid-seventies and developed into a new civil war in 
1983. 
4.3.1. Growing Opposition and Intensified Repression 
In May 1973 the Nimehi regime bad appeared to be stable. Nimeiri crushed the Ansar 
revolt of March 1970 and the leftist coup in July 1971, and established the Republic and 
wrote a' Permanent Constitution' and set up the regime! s political institutions and 
organizations. This feeling of stability and security was expressed in the release of all 
political detainees the day the President of the Republic signed the new constitution on 
May 13th 1973. - But the appearance was soon detected by events. 
Some minor events began in the University of Khartoum and culminated in a popular 
uprising in August /September 1973 to begin a period of instability in the country which 
subsequently became a prominent feature of the Sudanese economic and political crisis 
and led to the overthrow of the N-imeiri regime in 1985. 
The events began with a leffist student organization, the Democratic Front3 celebrating 
the second anniversary of the of the leffist 1971 coup. The President in his monthly TV 
speech criticized the celebration and threatened to take harsh measures to prevent the 
3TIe Democratic Front is an alliance between Communist and leftist students, established in 1953 
as a response to the split in the Student Congress 
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exploitation of the University by elements opposed to his May revolution elements. The 
president's speech provoked students to pressure on the Students Union to take steps to 
'defend and maintain! the' independence of the university', (as a memorandum handed to 
the union by four student organizations demanded). This led to demonstrations within the 
university campus which by the 30th of August had spread over the entire country and 
continued at different levels until September 6th, when partial strikes began in the 
railways and some factories. The response of the regime was aggressive, a state of 
emergency was declared, the army was deployed onto the streets, and the President, who 
happened to have been in an official visit to Morocco, cut it short and returned home. 
The August/September 1973 demonstrations and strikes were the first popular opposition 
to the Nimeiri regime since the failure of the July 1971 leftist coup, but the 1973 events 
had some contradictory. results. The first immediate result was that the popular 
movement, despite its division in two main streams, began to gain some confidence in 
itself and its capabilities. The atmosphere of fear which dominated the country began to 
disappear, despite the harsh security measures undertaken by the regime (as will be 
discussed later). 
The second result was the beginning of a wide dialogue among the people and the 
politicians about the alternative to the Nimeiri regime. At that time two main approaches 
to the question appeared in the underground literature of the opposition groups. The right 
wing, represented by the National Front4 which suggested (in a charter distributed during 
the demonstrations) a one party system, a presidential republic and an Islamic 
constitution. The other approach was the leftist one suggested mainly by the Sudan 
Cornmunist Party (SCP) and which argued that the question of an alternative was a false 
one. It had been asked to paralyse the popular movement and to involve it in indefinite 
discussions while the main task was the immediate unity of popular opposition forces to 
dismantle the Nimeiri dictatorship and establish democracy, respect for human rights and 
the sovereignty ofthe rule of law under an independent system ofjudiciary (SCP, 1973). 
The third result was an increase in the regime's repression. A "State Security Act of 1973 
was issued to permit trials before special 
, 
courts 
, 
selected by the President Of the Republic 
in accordance with powers given to him by the same act. Under the act new crimes were 
defined as "Crimes against the State Security" and to be punished by a scale harsh 
punishments including fife imprisonment and execution. (DRS, 1973, a). An amendment in 
"The Criminal Procedure Act 1970" permitted, (under Article 92), the detention by 
administrative order issued by either the minister of interior, the director of Public 
Security, the director of the National Security or the National Security Council. The 
41he National Front constituted the Unum Party, Democratic Unionist Party(DUP), and the 
Muslim Brethren (MIB) and AN-as fornied in 1969 to oppose the coup,, A-hich had brought Nimeiri to 
power on May 25th 1969. 
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result of these oppressive laws was a wide scale of detentions of politicians, trade- 
unionists, student activists and ordinary citizens. Sudanese prisons were virtually devoted 
to keeping detainees from 1973 to 1978 when a general amnesty, following the attempt of 
national reconciliation between the regime and the right wing opposition. 
From 1973 to the fall of Nimeiri in April 1985, ihe opposition to the regime took different 
forms. The history of this period is rich in events and activities carried by different social, 
political and military groups and individuals. In the remaining part of this section some of 
these events (which seems to have affected the development of the dialectics of 
opposition and repression as a symptom of the political instability) are discussed. 
Oneexample of such events were the High Secondary Schools students' strikes and sit-ins 
in December 1973 and January 1974 which were the first to register an important victory 
for the popular movement against the regime. The students demanded the right to 
establish free student unions, they were able to obtain that right after two month of 
students! unrest. This was an important achievement, because until that time the branches 
of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) used to control the activities of all unions and 
societies. 
The second event which we think had established a form of opposition that lasted to the 
end of the regime was the'Sugar Demonstration' of December 1974 which brought about 
two important forms of opposition. The first was the association between the student 
movement and the rest of the population in the response to economic decisions affecting 
the costs of living, bringing the struggle of students against the regime 'more down to 
eartlY. The second was the beginning of new forms of demonstration by ordinary people 
in - neighb , ourhoods, popular residential areas and 
districts. The two forms of opposition 
had been carried on virtually every year, and intensified after 1978 when official decisions 
to increase the prices of popular necessary goods followed agreements with the MIR 
On September Sth 1975, the regime faced a big challenge. A coup d'etat was attempted 
and the forces which had carried out the coup were able to capture the Army 
Headquarters and the National Broadcasting Station. The leader of the coup managed to 
make his first, (and last), announcement abolishing the basic institutions of the regime and 
although the coup was crushed within hours, "its effects was far reaching" (Fadlalla: 1986, 
48). 
The 'state of emergency' was immediately declared. The Peoples Assembly was called to 
convey an extra-ordinary session where the declared state of emergency was soon ratified 
; and the Assembly passed a set of amendments to the constitution to give the President 
and his government more powers. As Fadlalla noted, that the amendments had 
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"sanctioned the legislative enactment of preventive detention, made provisions for the 
establiShMent of special courts and enhanced the presidential powers in a manner which 
greatly, with retrospective cffect, ft original constitution" (Ibid, 49). 
The amendments were a great set back to the opposition forces. The Permanent 
Constitution of 1973 abolished the Republican Orders No. 2 and No. 4, which legalize 
preventive detention and, as we mentioned above, preventive detention was reintroduced 
by Article 92 after the amendment of the 'Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 ' in 1973. In 
1974 some detainees appealed to the Supreme Court to declare that amendment 
unconstitutional and hence to order their release. The new amendments to the 
constitution provided a constitutional sanction for preventive detention. The same session 
of the Assembly amended the State Security Act of 1973 to allow for an indefinite 
extension of three month periods of preventive detention. 
Soon after the fOure of the coup special courts were formed and the leaders of the coup 
were executed. 
In less than ten months later, the regime faced another major challenge. This time the 
parties of the National Front were able to smuggle armed civilians, trained in Libya, into 
the capital Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartourn North to attempt to seize power in July 
2nd 1976. The three towns of the capital witnessed fierce fightings for three days, after 
which the regime forces were able to destroy the infiltration, killing and impturing its 
planners and executors. For many weeks after that Khartoum Province was under a 
security's state of siege and house-to-house searches for hidden arms and haunts those 
who participated in the attempt, went ahead with rigour. 
Special courts were summered and these sentenced to death and life imprisonment those 
who had participated in the attempt. The National Front leaders in exile were condemned 
to death in absentia.. The immediate result of the July 2nd confrontation between the 
National Front parties and the regime, as Woodward put it, was: 
"not long term division and recrimination, but apparent recognition on both sides of their 
respective stýengths and vmaknesses"(Wood, %, ard, 1986,69). 
This led to the 1977 National Reconciliation (NR) which brought the elements of the 
National Front, except Sheriff al Hindie5 to an understanding summarized in an eight 
point agreement reached between Nimeiri and Sadiq a]-Mahdi in Port Sudan early in 
1977. On the one hand the agreement included the release of detainees and political 
prisoners, the rehabilitation of those who had suffered from repression by the regime and 
the guarantee of individual liberties. On the other hand al-Mahdi recognized the regime, 
its constitution Jts one party and its local governments. Changes in the constitution and 
the State Security Act were agreed oil, and the SSU structure and operation were to "be 
5Sheriff al Hindie(- 1983), -was a minister of finance when the 1969 coup took place, he then fled 
the country to Ethiopia where he convinced the late Emperor Hile Selassie, an old friend of Sheriff 
father, to help National Front parties to oppose the new regime, being a prominent leader of the 
DUP, he assumed the leadership of the party after the death of Azahari in 1969. 
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reviewed with the view to opening its bodies to elections at every level and permitting 
government policies to be freely debated and decided". The agreement included a point of 
foreign policy emphasizing "neutralism in Sudan foreign poflcy"(ACR, 1978/79 pp 
109/110). 
From the start NR faced three problems which undern-ýned its expected contribution to 
political stability in the country. The first problem was that NR did not, in realty, involve 
all the opposition groups. Even within the National Front, al-Hindie one of its prominent 
leaders was not involved until April 1978, when he reached a separate agreement with the 
regime, which neither he nor the regime never implemented. On the other hand, the SCP 
was not involved in the reconciliation (communists detainees were not released, at the 
time detainees from the National Front were released). 6 
The SCP criticized the NR as an acceptance of the traditional parties of the dictatorial 
regime. Traditional parties were criticized by the SCP that they had a political, social and 
economic program similar to that of the regime. The party called for a wide front "for 
democracy and the salvation of the country", to be "open to all political parties, 
organizations , and national characters, " to continue the struggle for "democracy, basic 
human rights" and the overthrow of the dictatorship (SCP, 1977, 
The second problem which had faced the NR was the re'ection of the main stream in the 
SSU, the 'old guards' of the idea of NR which had been imposed on them by the 
President. This was reflected in the conflicts within the SSU and the other institutions of 
the regime between those 'old guard' and the 'new comers! or the 'returnees! (as those 
joined the regime after the NR were called), (Khalid, op. cit., 176). According to Khalid, 
Nimeiri enjoyed this situation which enabled him to "contain Sadiq and introduced an 
element of conflict in the SSU itself, between the new comers(Sadiq and Islamicists) and 
the old guard" (Ibid, 176. ) 
The third problem which faced the NR was that it did not seek the inclusion of the trade- 
union movement, which was an important element in the political arena. By 1978 trade 
unions were undertaking a new round of confrontation with the regime. It began in April 
2nd 1978 by a general strike of all the technicians in the country which was called of on 
its fifth day after reaching an agreement on payment conditions. On. the same day of the 
beginning of the technicians' strike the railway workers at Atbara launched a 
demonstration demanding free elections for their trade-union. Demonstrations continued 
for two days, then culminated into a strike and a sit-in in the workshops on April 7th, 
compelling the First Vice President to fly to Atbara to look for a solution. The strike was 
6They remained in detention till May 1978, %vhen the then First Vice President Abul Gasim M. 
Ibrahim decided to release them thinking of using them in the power struggle started in the regime 
after the incorporation of Muslim Bretl= and members of Umma in the political institutions of 
the regime. 
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called off when an agreement on new elections for the railway union was reached (Al 
Meidan, May 1978,3). 
On 8th of the same month the Doctors' Trade Union started a strike which continued for 
three days and was ended only after a settlement on payment and working conditions was 
reached. 
This wave of strikes continued through 1978 and became a factor of instability during the 
following years. In 1979, in addition to the workers and the professionals strikes, the 
Gezira Tenants carried out their first strike since 1963. 
Responding to the rise in the popular movement, the regime launched a wide detention 
campaign in July and August 1979. The detention camps which were closed in May 1978 
reopened in 1979; but this time to face campaigns against detention from the Bar 
Association and the families of the detainees. The latter organized demonstrations in Port 
Sudan, Khartoum and Geddaref demanding the release of their relatives and the repeal of 
the State Security Act which pern'Utted their detention. The former sent memorandums to 
the Chief Justice and the Attorney General, demanding the respect for basic human rights, 
the independence of the judiciary and the sovereignty of the rule of the law. 
Despite these campaigns, preventive detention continued as the main repressive measure 
used by the regime. In 1981, the-regime attempted another measure which had not been 
used so widely since 1971, the dismissal of professionals, technicians , employees and 
workers for political bases. In that year more than 2,000 were believed to have been 
dismissed. 
In addition to the continuation of the demonstrations and strikes as forms of oppositions 
to the regime's policies, the 198.0s witnessed a new type of action: a limited town or 
region uprising. Two of such events might be cited. 
The first incident took place in El-Obied, the capital of Kordofan region, on November 
3rd and 4th 1980. Complaining about the decision of Northern Kordofan Commissioner 
to increase the price of dura, demonstrations exploded in the town and a general strike 
was declared. The demonstrators attacked the grain market and stores, and distributed the 
dura to the people. The Commissioner, failing to coop with the situation asked the local 
army command to interfere, but they refused. The Central Reserve Police was flown from 
Khartoum to assist the Commissioner, but the situation was not contained till the 
Commissioner was removed from office. 
The second incident took place in Darfur, the western region of the Sudan on January 3rd 
1981 when Nimeiri appointed a governor who was not a native of the region. In objection 
to the appointment demonstrations and a general strike began in El Fasher and spread to 
other parts of the region. The general strike paralysed the region. Six people were killed 
and twenty five injured. The situation was resolved when the decision was rescinded and 
a native of the region was appointed Governor. 
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The two incidents were very important in the development of the popular movement that 
recognized the possibility of compelling the regime to respond positively to their 
demands. This was reflected in the increasing role of trade unions and regional blocks. 
The regime tried to counter the rise in the popular movement by depending more on the 
Moslem Brethren, especially with their strong base among students. In 1983 the regime 
introduced Islamic Sharia laws. Facing a growing trade-union movement in 1984 a state 
of emergency was declared in April and continued until September 1984. The repression 
by the regime reached its maximum when a 76 year old Islamic thinker was executed in 
January 1985; yet the opposition continued until the regime was overthrown in April 
1985. 
4.3.2. The Discontent in the South and Tle New Civil War 
One of the most important achievements of Nimeiri's regime was the Addis Ababa 
Agreement of 1973 between the regime and the Anya-nya rebels of Southern Sudan 
which ended the eighteen years (1955-1973) war between southern rebels and the north 
dominated central government. In its report on the events of 173/74 the ACR noticed, 
"The Southern Sudan, for the first time since Sudan's independence on I January 1956, has 
become an important stabilizing political element" (ACR, 1973/74,. B90). 
By the mid seventies this element of stabilization began to appear 'as one of political 
instability. Although some isolated events took place in 1974 provoking tension, the 
sound beginning of instability could be suggested by a motion of non-confidence in Abel 
Alier's regional government in 1975 presented by the four prominent Southern politicians 
Joseph Aduhu, Clement Mboro, Benjamin Pol Akok and Philip Pedak Leith. The motion 
failed to gain the support of the Regional Assembly ; the former two were detained, the 
latter fled the country to Ethiopia. 
In 1976 the discontent began to appear among the Southern soldiers, mainly 
commissioned from the former Anya-nya forces under Addis Ababa Agreement. In 
February some soldiers mutinied in Wau and took their an-ns to the bush, and in March 
another mutiny took place in Akobo, 225 miles from Juba towards the Ethiopian 
boarders. Trouble were reported the same year in Kapoeta when southern soldiers refused 
the orders from their northern officers. One year later a mutiny was reported in Juba 
Airport when the mutineers occupied the airport for several hours killing nine soldiers and 
an American pilot. Soon government forces recaptured the airport and arrested 08 
soldiers and their leader, a sergeant. The government accused "foreign powers" of the 
"Juba conspiracy ". (AL-Ayam, 12.2.1977). 
Although these events were not directly connected, they were expressions of the 
discontent about the way the Addis Ababa Agreement was implemented and the conduct 
of the Iligh Executive Council, the regional government of the south. Complains were 
voiced by tribal representatives concerning the overwhelming domination of the Dinka, 
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the biggest tribe in the south, both on the regional government administration and the 
SSU and about the level of representation of the South in similar national bodies. 
Dissatisfaction was expressed by wider groups in the South, including prominent Dinkas, 
about the development policy of the regional government and the flow of funds from the 
central government to the Sbuth. Allegation of corruption and nepotism were made 
without being fiffly investigated or brought to trial. 
The National Reconciliation of 1977, brought another element in the Southern discontent. 
Bona Mallwal 7 Wrote in 198 1, 
"Since 1977, dangerous talk of an even wider role of religion in politics has begun again. 
There renewed talks of an Islamic Republic of the Sudan. This very decisive issue, which 
almost split the country into two parties in the 1960s is now a matter of national debate once 
more. " (MaIlvi-4 1981,249). 
The question of introducing Islamic laws was raised when a committee was formed 
following NR to "review Sudanese law 
,s 
in conformity with Sharia"8 (ACR, 1977/78, 
.B 119). 
Bona Mallwal, then Minster of Information and Culture and, hence, editor of the 
Ministry's monthly magazine Sudanmiv, expressed the fears of "some people "and called 
for the principle" the religion for the. individual and the country for all. " (Sudanow: 
October, 1977). In the same issue of Sudanow, General Lagu9 expressed the South "great 
concerrilt on the issue of Sharia which the General predicted would cause discontent 
(Ibid. ). 
Another problem which contributed to the Southern discontent was the controversy over 
Jongeli Project ( JP). The project was first suggested by Lord Cromer on the advice of Sir 
Garstin who surveyed the Nile in 1904. The aim of the project is to save the water losses 
in the Sudd area and provide a navigable water way between Juba and Malkal. The 1959 
Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and the -Sudan has given the"Sudan "the right to 
construct such projects as to decrease the losses of water at Bahar el-Gebel, Bahar el- 
Zaraf, Babar el-Gazal and tributaries Sobat and tributaries and the White Nile. "(Kaballo, 
1972,. 9). The costs and waters of the project/s to be shared and divided equally between 
Egypt and the Sudan. The Agreement gave Egypt the right to construct the JP if she 
needed the water before the Sudan, and the Sudan could pay its share when it needed its 
share in the water. In 1974 a joint communique following a visit to Egypt by Nimeiri 
7Bona, Mulwal, (1938- )a Dinka southern politician, Minister of Information and Culture (1974- 
1977) and regional Minister of Industry (1980-1983)and a long period member of the SSU 's 
Central Committee and Political Bureau. 
8 Sharia is the sum of Islamic laws. 
9General Joseph Lagu was able to unite the different political and military southern groups 
fighting the government forces in 1970 and assumed the military as well as the political leadership 
of the Anya-nya. In 1972 when the Addis Ababa Agreement was reached he became ageneral in 
the Sudanese Armed Forces. In 1978 he A%-as electAA Chairman of the 11igh Executive Council, lost 
the job in 1980 when appointed as Vice President of the Republic, a job he had held till the 
overthrow of the regime in 1985. 
138 
declared the intention to "complete the feasibility studies on the Jongeli Canal and the 
Upper Nile projects. " (Khalid, 1985 315). In 1976 an agreement between the two 
countries was signed to construct the Jongeli Canal (ACR: 1976/77, B 116). Allegations 
and rumours about the Canal and its aim to settle Egyptian farmers in the south spread 
and found some response among some circles in the South specially students who 
launched some demonstrafions. (ACIý, 1977/78, B 122) 
The discontent caused by these problems was submerged, for a while, by the internal 
conflicts among different political and tribal groups. By 1975, three groups emerged as 
opposing Abel Alier's government 10 
The first group was led by the former leader of the Anya-nya rebels General Lagu who 
found himself and his fellow Equatorions under the shadow of Abel Aliers Dinka! s 
domination. The second group was led by Samuel Aru and unifying the former SANU11 
members. The third group led by Clement Mboro and composed mostly of the members 
of the Southern Front12. 
These internal conflicts resulted in the defeat of Abel Alier in the regional elections in 
1977; and General Lagu became Chairman of the BEC uniting several groups under his 
leadership. Soon internal conflict paralysed Lagu's government. In 1979 the front which 
joined Alier's three rivals coflapsed. Lagu in February dismissed SANU leader Aru, who 
had held the post of Deputy Chairman of the IHEC, and in July Lagu dismissed. Mboro 
who was the Speaker of the Regional Assembly. By 1980 the President interfered to can 
for new regional elections and Alier returned to power in the South. 
During this second office of Alier new issues came to the front line between th e North 
and the South. The first of these issues was the decision of the central government to 
locate an oil refinery in Kosti, in central Sudan, instead of Bantiu in the south, where most 
of the oil discoveries were made. 
The second issue was the question of the boundaries of Southern Region, which was 
raised, apparently, during the decision to adopt regionalization as a system to govern 
northern Sudan. In realty. the question of boundaries goes back to the Addis Ababa 
Agreement which defined the boundaries of the Southern Region as those in force on the 
date of Independence, Ist January 1956. According to these boundaries an area 
amalgamated by the first military government in 1960 in Darfur, should be reunited with 
I 0AbeI Alier, a judge from southern Sudan, appointed Minister of Commerce in 1969 in the first 
government after the 1969 coup, in 1971 he became Minister of Southern Affairs, after the Addis 
Ababa Agreement he was elected Chairman of the IHEC and appointed Vice President of the 
Republic. 
II SANU, the Sudan African National Union, established by Wiffiam Deng -1968) as the 
political arm of the Anya-nýu forces and accepted to transfer its activities to the Sudan in 1966, 
but only a fraction of it returned to the country with their leader. 
12T'he southern front was formed in 1964, after the October Uprising which overthrew the first 
military dictatorship (195 8-1964) in the Sudan. 
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the south. Another problem concerned an area which had been part of the Kordofan 
Region since the Independence, but inhabited by Dinka. The Southerners were demanding 
a referendum in the area to ask whether the people there wanted to remain part of 
Kordofan or unite with the south. 
The third issue, although raised by Nimeiri and suggested by General Lagu, was to re- 
divide the south into three regions according to the old boundaries of three provinces, 
Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahar el-Gazal. Lagu argued that by dividing the North into 
regions the logic of uniting the South versus the North was outdated (Sudanow, June, 
1981). The issue divided the Southerners and gave Nimeiri a chance to interfere 
extensively in Southern politics. 
When, in March 1981 the Southern Regional Peoples' Assembly adopted a resolution 
rejecting the re-division plan, Nimeiri dissolved the Assembly, dismissed the Regional 
government and appointed a care-taker government under Major General Rassas. 
Immediately 22 Southern leaders signed a letter to the President announcing the 
formation of a 'Council for the Unity of Southern Sudan' and objecting to the attempts to 
divide the south claiming that the " preponderance of Southern opinions is against" the 
division and accusing the President of choosing to "abide by the opinion of the 
minority". (ACR, 1981/82, pp. B99- B 100). The response of the president was to order the 
detention of those who signed the letter. 
By the beginning of 1983, incidents of small-scale 'guerrilla' activities were being reported 
and in February 1983 the army units mutinied in Bor in the Upper Nile. The officers and 
soldiers were reported to have entered the bush. By mid-1983 two armed movements 
were reported to fight the government forces in the South. The second war has had 
started to become the most significant instability element for the regime. By 1984 both the 
oil explorations and the Jongeli Canal construction were stopped because security could 
not be assure (ACR: 1984/85, B85). 
Although the second war has had already begun, in September 1983, Nimeiri gave the 
'rebels' a new justification to continue the second war by announcing the enforcement of 
Islamic Sharia Laws. 
4.3.3. Instable Government 
One of the orthodoxies of the Third World militaries is their critique of civil democracies 
as unstable governments. The same might be said of the military regime of 1969-1985 in 
the Sudan. Although Nimeiri was the head of the State for the entire sixteen years of the 
regime, it is very difficult to speak of a stable govenunent during that period. 
Two symptoms of government instability prevailed on the political scene since the 1969 
Coup. The first symptom was the continuous cabinet reshuffles and as the Financial Times 
noticed, 
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"The President reshuffles his Cabinet and the Political hierarchy once or twice a year, 
apparently with the aim of keeping his ministers on their toes and of adjusting the power 
balance among rival political groups which thrive unofficially within Sudan's single party 
system. "( The Financial Times 31 July 1978). 
From 1969 to 1985 there were 16 ministers of finance and II ministers of planning. The 
average span of office in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning was one year. In 
the Ministry of Agriculture 10 ministers and 12 state ministers held office with an average 
of 18 month in office. The portfolios of Education, Interior, Defence, and Information 
and Culture changed hands twelve times with an average of 16 months per minister. The 
President himself held the portfolio of defence five times ; and one minister held the 
portfolio of irrigation three times. 
The second symptom was the frequent changes in the leading posts of the civil service, 
the police, the army, the judiciary and state enterprises. Khalid noticed that between 
1971-78 "Khartoum Province had six governors ; so did Gezira. None of them stayed long 
enough to see his plans through. "(Khalid op. cit.., . 35). 
Change of under-secretaries, 
their deputies and civil servants at different levels was a common phenomenon. Article 26 
of the Civil Service Pensions Act of 1973 gave the President of the Republic the powers 
to send any civil servant or government employee into retirement for" the public good". 
In July 1977, the gove 
* 
rnment decided to exclude all opponents from the civil service. In 
March 1981 more than one, 000 government employees were dismissed for political 
reasons which resulted in"a profound sense of insecurity within the civil service which 
was hardly conducive to better performance and efficiency. "(ACI; ý 1981/82,394). 
The situation in government enterprises was not different. Eight general managers 
changed office in Sudan Railways and Sudan Airways with an average period in office of 
two years. The change in the management of the public sector banks and companies was 
to a great extent related to change in mini sters concerned. From April 1978 to April 1985 
the Bank of Sudan, the central bank, had three governors, with an average period of 28 
months in office. 
The army officers also suffered casual dismissal and compulsory retirement. Dismissals 
and forced retirement followed every coup attempt, others were part of the President 
policy to keep the army under his own control. The most famous flurry of retirements was 
that of 1982, when the President dismissed his first deputy (who was the Minister of 
Defence and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces), his chief of staff and twenty 
two of his senior officers (ACR: 1982, B92). 
4.4. The Social Manifestations 
4.4.1.1nerease of Income Ing9gality 
As has been shown in section 4.3.2 that spiralling inflation had led to a decline in the real 
incomes of workers, employees, and farmers. The decline in real incomes was 
accompanied by increasing income inequalities, especiaHy after the implementation of the 
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different adjustment programmes 1978, on the advice/condition of the IMF and the World 
Bank. 
Table 8. The Relative Distribution of E212ulation and Incomes 
(According to the Sectors of the Sudanese Economy for the years 1969/70,1976/7,1982/83) 
Sectors 1969/70 1969/70 1976n7 1976n7 1982/83 1982/83 
population Incomello population Incomel/o population Income% 
Agriculture 69.7 39.0 68.5 39.2 65.8 34.3 
Social Services 16.4 23.7 16.0 13.0 19.5 12.6 
Industry 3.3 5.6 4.5 6.4 3.5 7.9 
Utilities 0.9 4.9 0.9 1.7 1.1 2.0 
Construction 1.7 4.1 1.8 4.9 2.1 4.9 
Transport 3.3 7.1 3.4 10.6 3.8 9.6 
commerce and 4.7 15.7 4.9 24.2 4.2 28.6 
finance 
SOURCE: calculated from: 1) Nfinistry of Finance and National Planning, 1973, Economic Survey. 
2)Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 1985, Economic Survey,. 3)Department of Statistics, 
National Accounting Section, National Income and the Supporting Tables, Different years. 
The first symptom of this income inequality is the redistribution of incomes between 1969 
and 1995 favoured unproductive sectors of the economy. The Gini coefficient 13 for the 
inter-sectoral distribution of incomes calculated for theyears 1969no, 1976/78 and 
1982/83 using National Accounts Tables data, and the results of 0.34,0.37 and 0.42 for 
the three years respectively showing the unproductive sectors of commerce and finance in 
comparison with the productive sectors of agii culture and industry. Table 8 shows the 
relative distribution of population and their relative share in the National Disposable 
Income for the years 1969/70,1976/77, and 1982/83. 
Ali and Hussein have shown that between 1976/77 and 1982/83 per capita income in 
trade, commerce and finance se0or of the economy had grown by 9.5% per year; 
compared with the growth rates of per capita in the sectors of construction, (6.4%0), 
both industry and public utifities, (2.7%), and agriculture, (43%) (Ali and Hussein: 1986, 
80). 
A symptom closely related to this sectoral-biased income distribution, was the distribution 
of private investment between 1970-1982; when 76% of private investment went to trade, 
commerce and non-produetive services (SaW 1986). The Islamic Banks were the most 
13Gini coefficient"is a measure of inequality derived from Lorenz Curve "(Penguin Economic 
Dictionary p. 192), which itsclrsho-A-s the relation between the cumulative percentage of some 
group units (e. g Households) and the cumulative percentage of the total amount of some variable 
(eg income)"; with the purpose of showing "the degree of inequality"(Ibid, p. 275) and "As the 
degree of inequality increases, so does the curvature of the Lorenz Curve, and thus the area 
between the curve and the 45 line become larger. "The Gini Coefficient measures the ratio between 
Lorenz Curve and the 45 degree line and the area above the line. It could expressed as G; where 
G= area between Lorenz Curve and 45 degree line\ area above the line 
(Ibid p. 192 ; also see Tbeil, 1967, pp. 121-123, Sen, 1973, pp. 29-3 1, Atkinson, 1983, pp. 53-54, 
and Van Der Plocg, 1984, pp. 406408) 
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important institution in encouraging the growth in trade and commerce sector. 89.2 % of 
their credit facilities went to. trade and commerce between 1978-1984, and only 9.4% 
went to agriculture; and even this was offered on the commercial terms of these banks for 
purchases of raw-ýmaterials or intermediate goods exported by the same banks, their 
commercial c-ompanies or exporters financed by them. 
While the number of the industrial establishment, employing 25 workers or more 
increased from 204 to 347 establishment between 1971/72 and 1981/82, the number of 
individuals and companies registered as importers and exporters with the Nfinistry of 
Commerce increased from 1379 in 1971 to 10955 in 1981 (Industrial Survey, 1971/72, 
Industrial Survey, 1981/82, Annex 2. and collected information from the Niinistry of 
Trade, 1987. ) 
Investment in the financial institutions was another area which led to increasing income 
inequality and of these institutions Islamic banks were the most important. The first of 
these banks, the Faisal Islamic Bank, was established in 1978. By 1985 there were five 
Islamic banks which capital amounted 52% of the total capital of all the commercial banks 
in the Sudan. Eighteen thousands Sudanese shareholders contributed 42% of the paid 
capital, while 3,000 foreigners, mostly ftom Gulf countries contributed the remaining 
58%. The rate of profit realized by these banks was very high. In 1983 the Faisal Islamic 
Bank, , 'or example, distributed profits to its shareholders equal to 135% of the share for 
local shareholder and 110% for foreign shareholders (Hashimie, 1986,. 6). The average 
value of shares held by a local shareholder was equal to LS 3920, which means that in 
1983, assuming the rate of profit in Faisal Islamic Bank to prevail, the local shareholder 
gained LS 5292 which was equal to 10.5 times the minimum wage that year. The average 
value of the shares held by a foreign shareholder amounted to LS 32480 in 1983, which 
means they gained LS 35728 which was equal to 70.1 times the minimum wage in Sudan 
in 1983. 
Another source of income inequality was the foreign exchange black market. The traders 
in this market were estimated to have gained'LS 80 million in 1980 and LS 110 million in 
1984.14 The ROF, in a confidential document to the Sudanese government, described the 
effect of expectations in the foreign exchange market in the Sudan as "of detemýiinantal 
economic effects" which resulted in "transfer of income from consumers to the traders". 
(Quoted in Ali, 1986, ) 
The state played important role in increasing income inequality. This was accomplished in 
three ways. The first were great privileges for those who held what was called the! higher 
constitutional offices ' (the President of the Republic, the First-Vice President, the 
14Calculations are based on Ali and Hussein(1986) estimations that [800 million were circulated 
in 1981 and [I 10 million circulated in 1984 in the black market in the Sudan and that the margin 
of profit was 10 Sudanese piasters (LS 1= 100 piasters per dollar). (Ali and Hussein, opt. cit., 76- 
77) 
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Speaker of the National Peoples' Assembly, [the Assembly], the Ministers and the 
members of the Assembly). 
In 1974 the salary of a member of the Assembly was 7.6 times the minimum wage and 4.6 
times the salary newly employed university graduate (NEUG). By 1977 the, ratio 
increased to 18.8 times the minimum wage 10.9 times the salary of a NEUG. The 
Ministees salary in 1974 was 24.2 times the minimum wage and 14 times the salary of a 
NEUG. By 1977 it increased to 33.3 times the minimum wage and 19.2 the salary of a 
NEUG. 
The salary of the Speaker of the Assembly was 26.7 times the minimum wage and 15.5 
times the salary of a NEUG in 1974. in 1977 it became 38.7 times the minimum wage and 
22.4 the salary of a NEUG. The First Vice President's salary was 31.8 times the minimum 
wage and 18.4 times the of a NEUG and increased to the ratios of 56.1 and 32.4 
respectively in 1977. 
The President's salary was 90.9 times the nunimum wage and 52.6 the salary of a NEUG 
in 1974 and increased in 1977 to the ratios of 136.4 and 78.9 for a minimum wage and a 
starting salary of a NEUG respectively. 
The second level was the use of the state apparatus to transfer incomes and surpluses to 
the private sector, specially in agriculture. In rain-fed agriculture15 the government used 
to provide the private sector in what is known as the 'guided schemes' with loans through 
the Mechanized Farming Corporation (NEC). These loans originally provided by the 
World Bank. They made to provide agricultural machinery, mainly tractors and discs and 
to cover cost of land clearance and preparations. The Sudan Agricultural Bank, provides 
the short-run finance for the sea_ýonal agricultural operations. By 1977 690000 feddans 
were financed in this way by Mechanized Farming Project I and 2. Of these 690000, 
190000 were in Simsim, 350000 in Um Seinat, both in Geddarif area in Eastern Sudan, 
and 150000feddwis were in Habila in Southern Kordofan. Except for Simsim area where 
the size of schemes followed the old mechanized scheme of 10GOfeddans each, size of 
schemes in Um Seinat and Habila was increased to 1500 fe&4wls. Although one of the 
conditions for allotting schemes to individuals was their financial abilityý they don't need 
to use this 'ability except for paying one third of the value of the tractor and to clear 100 
feddans, to satisfy the eligibility condition for the MFC's two loans. The NEC I and 2 
added to the fortune of the rich and were designed to get the"rich.. richer", as Affan put 
it. (Affan, 1978, . 40). If we took Habila 
in Southern Kordofan as an example, we find that 
most of the schemes went to merchants (60%) and ex-government employees and ex- 
army officers ( 26 %) (Ibid, . 40). 
15Agriculture in the Sudan could be classified as rain-fed and irrigated. The rain-fed could in turn 
be classified as mechanized capitalist, non-mechanized capitalist and peasantry; the latter is 
usually refýrred to in the literature and official - documents as traditional agriculture iNithin a 
traditional sector. 
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Following the Agricultural Investment Act of 1974 and the Unified Investment Act of 
1980, the number of companies investing in mechanized rain-fed agriculture increased. 
Before 1977, only one company, the African Plantation of 20 Sudanese shareholders and 
issued capital of Ls150000 was operating in 20,000feddwis in Simsim area. In 1977, the 
Sudanese Egyptian Agricultural Integration Company started 0.5 million feddmis 
concession in the Damazine area. The same year witnessed a Saudi-Sudanese joint 
investment with a concession of 0.7 millionfeddans in the Damazine area. By 1985 the 
concessions of companies reached millionfeddmis. 
To provide an estimation of the income inequality generated by mechanized agriculture let 
take the figures of 1982/83, the year before the 1983/84 -1984/85 drought. In 1982/83 
the area under sorghum reached 5.81 miflionfeddans in mechanized agriculture, of which 
3,010,000 feddan were in Gedareý 1,270,000feddam were in Damazine, 90,000feddans 
were in Renk, 3 50,000feddwis were in Habila and 280,000feddwis were in Kosti. 
The profitability of one feddan of sorghum in mechanized agriculture was estimated in 
1980/81 as ranging from LS 10.44 (average yield) and LS 29.56 (high yields) (NiFEP, 
1982,99). Hence mechanized dura production was estimated to obtain a total profit of 
LS 60.7 million (average yield) or LS 171.9 million (high yield). An average scherne of 
1500feddwis, which supposed to cultivate 1000fe&km sorghum provided a profit of 
between LS 10440 and LS 29560 which was equal to 20.5 and 58 times the minimum 
wage in the Sudan at that time. Comparison could also be made with. the peasant 
cultivation in what is called traditional agriculture. Affan estimated that 45% of peasants 
in Kordofan cultivate a farm ranges between 8.8 feddans and 17.6 feddmis and 93% 
cultivate less than 35 feddmis. If an average holding of 20 feddans per peasant family 
cultivated by sorghum is assumed, then the income of a peasant family could be estimated 
between LS 58 (average yield) and LS 451 (high yield) 16. Taking these estimates, the 
profit on an average scheme were 65.5 times (high yields) and 186.4 times (average yield) 
the net income of a peasant family. 
Using the 1967/68 and 1978/80 House Budget Surveys, the ELO in an. official report 
presented to the Government of the Republic of the Sudan in 1986 argued that income 
distribution in the Sudan had worsened between the two periods 1967/68-1978/80. The 
results which are shown in Table 9 show that the Gini coefficient increased from 0.41 to 
0.50 for all Sudan, from 0.34 to 0.51 in rural areas and fromO. 41 to 0.42 in urban areas; 
which indicates increasing income inequality over all Sudan, and more inequality in rural 
areas than in urban. 
Another source of income inequality was the high incomes generated by working in the 
rich oil gulf states and the concessions and incentives granted to them through the 
16MFEP estimated the net income from one feddan of sorghum in the so-called traditional 
agriculture as ranging from LS 2.9 (average yield) and Ls 22.59 (high yield) (Ibid, p. 99) 
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goverrunent policy to encourage their flow. Table 10 shows the transfers of the Sudanese 
working abroad through official channels (the commercial banks). The transfers increased 
steadily from LS 0.29 millions to LS 620 millions between 1968 and 199517. There was a 
big jump in the transfers after 1977 due to the increase of the numbers of the Sudanese 
working abroad (see next section), the devaluation of the Sudanese currency (see section 
5. ., table 
), the extension of the concessions provided by the state to encourage transfers 
and the rise in oil prices. 
Table 9. ]Income Distribution in the Sudan 
Docile Rural Urban Total 
1967/68 1978/80 1967/68 1978/80 1967/68 1978/80 
Bottom 2.3 1.0 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.0 
Second 1.3 2.4 3.6 3.7 3.6 2.6 
Third 5.5 3.6 1.7 4.9 4.7 4.0 
Fourth 6.0 5. o 5.4 5.8 5.0 4.8 
Fifth 6.6 6.1 6.5 6.8 6.3 6.0 
Sixth 8.0 7.2 7.6 7.9 7.7 7.4 
Seventh 9.8 8.8 9.5 9.5 9.7 9.4 
Eighth 12.1 11.1 11.6 11.3 12.0 11.5 
Ninth 14.8 15.3 15.7 14.9 15.0 15.5 
Tenth 26.7 39.5 33.2 33.2 33.1 37.8 
gini coeff. 0.34 0.51 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.50 
SOURCE: ELO, 1986, Employment and Econ omic Reform : Towards a Strategy for the Sudan, ILO, 
Geneva, 1987,36. 
Table 10. Transfers of Sudanese Workins! Abroad 
Year Transfers Year Transfers 
1968 0.29 1977 14.0 
1969 0.85 1978 55.0. 
1970 1.2 1979 90.1 
1971 0.4 1980 154.8 
1972 1.1 1981 195.0 
1973 1.2 1982 174.4 
1974 1.3 1983 356.8 
1975 2.1 1984 370.2 
1976 4.3 1985 620.0 
Source: Bank of Sudan, Annual RepqrLs, 1969-1985 
Hamed and Amin found that remittances of Sudanese working abroad had "contributed to 
new modes of behaviour which distinguish emigrants and their dependents from the rest 
of the society" (Hamed and Amin, 1987,169).. They found that distinction involved 
"economic and social mode of behaviour" and was reflected in "ownership and expansion 
of assets as well as ... of 
durable consumer goods and electrical goods in particular" (Ibid, 
169). They found that more than 80% of the emigrants and their families were in urban 
areas which add "a geographical dimension" to the distributional factor of the external 
migration (Ibid., 170). 
Another Sudanese scholar had noticed that: 
171n foreign cu-rTencv this amounted to an increase of one million dollar to $150 n-dllions 
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"Most emigrants! savings were used for land speculation, %vddings, investment in tertiary 
sector, or for imported consumer goods... This has reinforced certain undesirable traditional 
social patterns and structures, or in contrast, created tastes for foreign goods in poor country 
not likely to meet the dernand created for a significant proportion of its population" ( Galal- 
al-Din, 198,306). 
Corruption was another factor that contributed to income inequality in the Sudan. It was 
a wide practise during the 1973-85 period to the extent a popular saying was spread 
expressing that 'who does not become rich during May (meant the May 1969 regime) will 
never become ricb!. Karneir and Kursany (1985) mentioned six types of corruption 
practises that took place during the period of study. Three of these forms of corruption 
could be classified as embezzlement of public funds and they include the acquisition of 
liquid assets, the sale of state durable and consumer assets and the sale of state residential 
land (Ibid, 14-17) . The 
fourth form was the fraudulent of official government permits to 
allow the smuggle of goods and commodities across the regional boarder and the issue of 
import licences for prohibited items(Ibid, 17-18). The fifth form. was the acquisition of 
agricultural land specially in the mechanised farms schemes (Ibid, 18-20). the sixth form 
was the use of political power to obtain investment shares in commercial companies (Ibid 
22-26) 
Kameir and Kursany provided 20'cases of acquisition of liquid assets from government 
nunistries and departments, public corporations, Bank of the Sudan, and government 
owned commercial banks and factories, Sudanese embassies and the Sudan Youth 
Organisation which was financed by the government. The total of the liquid assets 
acquired amounted to more than one million Sudanese pounds, $12500, and 166000 
Saudi Rial (Ibid, table 1,15 ). The sale of government assets included the sale of huge 
amounts of medicine from Omdurman hospital and petrol from the Survey Department, 
the Civil Aviation Department and the ministry of Public Works (Ibid, table 2,17). The 
value of residential land illegally acquired in one area, El Ashara in Khartoum. amounted 
to LS 4 million while the authors were not able to estimate the value of the land from four 
other areas, all of them in the three towns of the capital. (Ibid, 17)18. The re-allocation of 
the schemes of the state farm at Habila was a clear evidence of corruption in allotting 
agriculture land. Three of the schemes went to close relatives of the managing director of 
the Mechanised Farming Corporation, including one to his father and one to his son (Ibid, 
20). The misuse of political power as a form of-corruption was discussed by Kameir and 
Kursany through analysing the shares obtained by the President of the Republic, the Vice 
president, the Minister of Finance, the director of the military economic Corporation and 
two leading figures in the Muslim Brothers Movement which was allied to the regime at 
the time, in the Islamic Development Company which was established in 1983. All of the 
18Kamier and El Bakri (1987) provided more information on the corruption in allotment of land 
for residential, agricultural use as well as land registered in the name the University of Khartoum 
and w as re-aHoted. to individuals without the consent of the. University. 
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six held shares of $100,000 each. The authors, analysing their income concluded that 
there was. no way for them to have such money from their savings to buy these shares 
which suggests that it was political corruption (ibid, 25-6). 
Khalid (1985) concerned himself with the last form of corruption. In his "Nimeiri mid the 
Revolution qfDis-May", Khalid discussed the role played by Nimeiri's minister for Special 
Affairs, Dr. IdrisI9, in corruption. Dr. Idris was part of a group in the presidential palace 
who were "in the business neither of delivering the goods nor of political mobilization, 
rather they used their special position inside the palace to promote their personal 
interests" (Khalid, 1985,71). The effects of the palace corruption went far beyond 
affecting income distribution by creating new millionaires to affect Sudan foreign debt, 
relations with other countries and international institutions as will be discussed in the 
following chapter. The fist of the palace corruption involved the creation of the Sudan 
Development Corporation and the Saudi guarantee for a $200,000,000 loan in which 
Adnan Khoshoggi profited S4milion while another $6 million went missing. (Ibid, 95- 
106). The second on the palace corruption list was the Sudan satellite project, in which 
prices were inflated by $1 million (Ibid, 112- 3). The third of the corruption fist included 
the purchase of four used helicopters for which the army did not ask and would not 
accept (Ibid, 120). The Magirus trucks deal with Klokner Humboldt Deutz of Cologne in 
Germany was another corruption deal which involved Dr. Idris, Adrian Khoshoggi and 
Mustafa Nimeiri, the President only brother (Ibid, 121-4) . The corruption involved arms 
deals for the benefit of foreign countries. 7he Observer (20 February 1983) revealed the 
involvement of a Sudanese Minister in issuing an end -use certificate to enable arms 
dealers to purchase Exocets on behalf of the Argentine Government. The Minister 
received $200,000 (Ibid, 226). 
4.4.2. The Increase in Unernploymen 
Three kind of data are available on the situation of employment and unemployment in the 
Sudan. Two of these are published annually by the Department of Labour, Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security. One is on the registration and employment of the new 
graduates of the universities and higher education institutes, and this data represents a 
good indicator to employment and unemployment among graduates; because all graduates 
seeking employment are required to have registration cards from the Depai-tment 'of 
Labour. The second kind of data published by the Department of Labour is about skilled 
and unskilled workers and those of intermediate qualification seeking work through the 
Labour Offices. It provide some indications about the urban labour market, but not a 
complete picture because not all job-seekers register in these offices. The third kind of 
19He had held the job from 1971 to 1973 except for a brief period in 1984. Dr. Idris an ex- 
university lecturer who "was made for conduct unbecoming his profession, divulging the 
zoolog7y examination papers to a girl student" (AMlid, 1985,71) 
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data is the one provided by population censuses on the labour force, its distribution, 
employment and unemployment. 
The 1973 census estimated the unemployment ratio at 6.3%, while the 1983 census 
estimated it at 8.2% (ES, 1984/85,74 and ES, 1988/89,85). This suggest an increase of 
the unemployment of more than 3(YYo in ten years. 
The annual figures of the employment of the universities and higher institutes graduates 
show that only 49.4 of them found jobs between 1976/77 and 1984/85. Of all the science 
and applied science graduates 63.1% found jobs, while of social sciences and arts 
graduates 42.4% found jobs. Among the graduates of higher institutes 42.8% found jobs 
during the same period. 
Only 15.2% of the skilled, unskilled workers and those with intermediate qualifications 
seeking work through the department of Labour's Employment Offices found jobs during 
the period 1976/77-84/85 Among those registered 18.9% of the skilled, 14.1% of the 
unskilled and 12.6% of those with intermediate qualifications found jobs. All the figures 
are shown in Table 11. 
These figures do not represent the actual level of unemployment because they show the 
percenta, ages of these seeking employment through Labour Offices, while most of the 
people seeking employment do not seek employment -through these offices because they 
simply do not know about them or because they have not the official documents required 
for registration; (identity cards or nationality certificates). 
Table 11. Emploved Graduates AS Percentage of Graduates Seeking Jobs 1976/77- 
1984/85 
year Applied Social Mgher 
Sciences Sciences Institutes 
76/77 55 30 13 
77n8 34 58 7 
78/79 56.6 54.2 18.5 
79/80 83.5 67.2 95.6 
80/81 91.5 48.3 57 
81/82 41.5 41.6 51.5 
82/83 69.7 46.7 60.4 
83/84 49.5 24.2 56.5 
84/85 36.4 11.8 25.7 
SOURCE: Ministry of FinancA Economic Survey, Different Issues, 1977-1985. 
The number of unemployed is believed to have increased after the beginning of the 
draught in 1983/84, when 425000 people were estimated to have been displaced in North 
Kordofan and were compelled to make "an exodus to large urban centres, principally the 
three town (the capital) and El Obied. "(Regional Ministry of Finance and Economy, 
1987,3). About 70000 were believed to have moved from Darfur to Central region as a 
result of the famine of 1983/84-84/85 (Bush, 1989,10) 
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In addition to that Sudan is believed to be host to 750,000 Ethiopians, 250,000 
Ugandans, 121,000 Chadians and 5,000 Zairians refugees because of the political 
situation in neighbouring countries. (MFEP, 1985,. 84) 
Table 12. The EmiDlovment of Workers Seeki" Jobs Throup-h Labowr OfMces 
1976/77-1984/85 (Emplov ed as % of r egistered) 
year skilled unskilled intermediate 
76/77 11.2 14.1 8.1 
77n8 18.2 14.8 15.1 
78/79 13.6 11.0 14.6 
79/80 23.6 19.8 13.7 
80/81 31.1 21.1 17.0 
81/82 12.4 11.4 10.5 
82/83 22.8 10.6 12.5 
83/84 20.3 12.0 11.1 
84/85 17.1 12.1 9.7 
SOURCE : As in previous table. 
The Sudan witnessed during the same period an increase in the number of Sudanese 
working abroad (SWA), specially in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. Those are 
estimated to be 300,000s in 1985. Of these 51,000 got official contracts, through the 
Department of Labour, between 1979 and 1981; 10% were professionals, technicians and 
-scientists. In 1982/83. the number of Sudanese who got new contracts amounted to 
9800s, it declined by 27.3% in 1983/84 to 6.4 thousands and declined again in 1994/95 by 
54.9% to about 4,000,1982/83 base year. (MFEP, 1986,. 91) The decline was a direct 
result of the decline of international oil prices. 
4.4.3. The Decline of Social Services 
The decline in social services is one of the most prominent features on the social level. 
Although it is difficult to quantify when the quality of these services us concerned, some 
indicators may suggest some quality valuation. 
The first of these indicators is financial. The share to social services in government 
current expenditure declined from 17.6% in 1970/71 to 3.5 in 1980/81.20 
In the health sector, health services declined, despite the increase in the number of 
doctors, beds, hospitals and health centres between 1971 and 1983,. The increase in the 
number of cases of typhoid fever, malaria and nutritional deficiencies, including 
malnutrition, show vividly the deterioration of the health service in the Sudan. The 
number of cases of typhoid fever referred to the outpatient sections in clinics and 
hospitals increased from 957 in 1971 to 5,478 in 1978 to 5,764 in 1983, while those of 
malaria increased from 713,392 in 1971 to 2,660,753 in 1978 to 3,129,130 in 1983. The 
cases of nutritional deficiencies and malnutrition increased from 310,848 in 1971 to 
20-Ile year 1980/81 is chosen for comparison to avoid the complicating introduction of regional 
goverm-nent xvhen. most of the fimds for social services were uwsferred to regional governments. 
The ILO assumed that all the subsidy paid to regional governments by the central government 
went to social services, an assumption which is not a valid one. (see ELO, opt. cite., p. 43) 
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792,387 in 1978 and declined slightly to 735,088 in 1983 (Ministry of Health Annual 
Reports 1971-1983) 
The education service had its own problems. Although generally there was a growth in 
the number of schools, pupils, and teachers as shown in Table 13: , the education service 
suffered from many 'set-back. The first was the increase in costs to the poor. In 1969, 
when Nimeiri came to power, public general education was free to all Sudanese. Pupils 
and students used to receive in addition free textbooks, notebooks and some stationary. 
Although no official decision had been taken to abolish free education; students and 
pupils were not only asked by their schools to bring their textbooks notebooks and 
stationery, but they were asked in some schools to bring their chairs, and in all schools to 
pay a 'popular contribution' or 'self-assistance contribution'. At the beginning these 
contributions were voluntary and their payment or not did not affect the pupils or 
students' attendance to classes; but by the 1976 pupils and students were prevented from 
attending classes if they did not pay these contributions. Free education was in this way 
practically abolished. 
Table 13. Growth Rates of Number of Schools, Puvils and Teachers and the 
PuR ilsheachers Ratios 197onl-1983/84 
level Growth Rates pupils/Teacher 
schools Pupils Teachers 1971 1983 
Primary 4.5% 6% 7.9% 42 33 
Intermediate 11.91YO 15.1% 8.0% 11 24 
Secondary 14.2% 16.2% 7.9% 11 24 
(academic 
Secondarv(Tee 16.7% 20.9% 9.1% 16 30 
hnical) 
SOURCE: Ministry of Education and Instruction, Annual educational statistics 
. 1975-1983 
The second set-back in education was the increase in the size of classes. Till 1970, the 
class in any school 'should not exceed 40-50 students or pupils, but by the 1976 the 
average class in primary schools reached 90-100 pupils, in intermediate schools reached 
50-60 students and in secondary schools 45-55 students. 
The third set-back was the rise of pupils and students per teacher ratios for all schools 
except primary schools due to the migration of teachers to Saudi Arabia, Gulf countries 
and Yemen Arab republic, ie. 21% of Sudanese working in Yemen were teachers (ALI, 
1981, . 16). The pupils per teacher ratio 
improved from 44 pupil/teacher to 33 pupil/ 
teacher between 1971and 183 in primary schools. In the intermediate schools the ratio 
increased from II students per teacher to 24 students per teacher during the same period. 
In the academic secondary schools the ratio increased also from II to 24 students per 
teacher-, while for the technical secondary schools it increased from 16 in 1979 to. 30 in 
1983184 (Data from Ministry of Education and Instruction, Annual Education Statistics, 
Different issues 1975-1985) 
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4.5. The Famine. 
The last and comprehensive manifestation of the 1973-1985 crisis was the famine of 
1983-85. Though that was not the first famine under the Nimeiri Regime, for a previous 
limited famme took place in 1973 in Darfur, and some 200,000 were estimated to have 
died in Western Sudan (De'Vaal, 198 8,1). 
The 1983-85 famine was a culmination of the regime crisis which exposed the economic, 
political and moral dimensions of that crisis. Nimeiri and his associates were aware of that 
for they, at the beginning, refused to acknowledge the presence of the famine which was 
reported from an early time by the Governor of Darfur region where the symptoms had 
been apparent since 1982. In 1983 the then Governor of Darfur fled to the Gulf and 
Europe in protest of the President rejection of the declaration that Darfur had been struck 
by famine and appealed for international relief 21 Meanwhile the Governor of Kordofan 
was suppressing the reports from his junior government officials on the famine in his 
region. One year later, in October 1984, the famine struck the population of Northern 
Kordofan were on the move towards the Nile, their Governor was accusing the 
international media of spreading rumours about 'a famine' in the region to discredit "the 
most magnificent revolutionary achievement of the May Revolution"( in A] Rayah: 1987, 
3). At the same period the National Security Apparatus reported the sudden arrival of 
'murtazaga' (the Arabic word for mercenaries) west of Omdurman. When. the Military 
Commander of the area. hurried to investigate the situation he found the impoverished 
Kordofan citizens displaced by'the worst disaster that living generations could remember. 
The President paid a visit to the displaced and immediately (November 198 4) ordered a 
formation of a committee headed by the Minister of Health to look after the displaced. It 
was until March 1985 that the Sudan Government (through the Minister of Health) 
acknowledged -there was 
famine and appealed for relief assistance and aid. Ironically, 
international assistance had already been decided by a number of countries and 
international agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The USAID had 
comnlitted itself - to ý2,000 metric tons of relief grain to Darfur and Kordofan in 
September 1984, appointing the Save the Children Fund (SCF) of the UK. and CARE of 
the U. S. A_ to distribute on its behalf Oxfam and UNCIEF were engaged in the relief 
process since October 1984, especially in the Red Sea Hi1ls were the famine struck about 
750,000 people in Senkat, Haya, Dardaib, Halaib and North Tokar. In February 1985 
they were joined by the World Food Program. In total there were about 42 NGOs, 
international organizations and foreign government agencies already working in relief 
when Sudan tabled its official request in the Geneva meeting of donor countries in March 
1985 (Ibid, 4). 
21Personal communication with Mr. Ahmed Ibrahim Dreig 1989. 
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The famine struck two regions in addition to the Red Sea I-Ells: Darfur and Kordofan. In 
the Red Sea Province 750,000 people stricken by the famine, all were believed to have 
lost all their entire animal wealth. Kordofan Regional Government, (KRG), estimated the 
number of people who died as a result of the famine as 10,000. (KRG: 1987,2). This was 
an almost certainly underestimate, for the Saudari Council of the region estimated that 
between August 1984 and March 1985,5200 children died of malnutrition related 
diseases in the Council area and 7000 children died in el Moelih Displaced Camp at the 
same period. (Saudary Area Council: 1987,2). 
One million people were estimated to have migrated fforn original homes towards the Nile 
or water supply centres within the region. For example the Saudari Council estimated 
16.8,000 people had migrated from the Council area, half of them to el Obeid area, a 
quarter to Bara area, and the remaining quarter towards the Nile and Gezira areas. (Ibid, 
4). 
The loss in animal wealth was estimated at 69% of total cattle, 36% of sheep, 90% of. 
goats and 84% of Camels (KRG, op. cit.., 2). A study carried by the Regional Ministry of 
Finance and Economics and the Regional Administration of Animal Wealth in three 
administrative areas in Northern Kordofan estimated the loss as 93%, 92% 86%, 62% and 
72% of the cattle, sheep, goats, camels, horses, and donkeys respectively (KRMFE: 1986, " 
4) 
In Darfur Region almost 100,000 people were estimatedto have died as a result of the 
famine of 1983-85. Because of early indicators of the drought in Darfur, by August 1984, 
25% of the three and half million inhabitants of the region were classified as"seriously 
affected by famine (Bush: 1988,2). By January 1985 when the President of the Republic 
acknowledged the existence of the famine in Darfur, the sale of a cow could not provide 
enough grain for a fan-fily of five for one weak. (Ibid, 4) While the price of livestock 
declined by ten time between January and October 1984, the prices of dura and millet, the 
basic grain food had increased by three times, a classical 'example of the price-scissor 
effect or a loss of the Market entitlement, to use Sen's terminology (Sen: 1988,15 1). ý- 
The 1983-85 famine in addition to being a human tragedy in itself, had m anifested the 
crisis of the Sudanese state and economy. The economy was not able to provide relief to 
the famine struck population and the state which had to appeal for international relief 
assistance, was not able to manage the relief aid provided by donors, to transport it to the 
affected areas and to rationally distribute it to those who needed it. The national buffer- 
stock had been exported in search of foreign exchange, table 2: 15 shows the dura balance 
sheet. 
The famine exposed the weakness of the state apparatus in the management of the relief 
operation. The burden of the management was shouldered by the non-government 
organizations of which 42 were reported working in the Sudan in 1986. Of these Save the 
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Children Fund and Oxfkrr4 of the UK., and CARE of the United States of America played 
the main role in relief operation, while the USAID, WFP, EEC, FAO, and UNCIEF, 
provided the funds and the grain supply. 
Table 14. Table 14. Dura Balan*ce Sheet 
1979/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 Average 
Local Production 1669 2068 3345 1938 1806 1097 
consumption 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 2100 
Surplus/Deficit 431 -32 1245 -162 -294 -1003 
Exports 286 241 413 256 24.9 - 
Balance -717 -273 832 -418 -318 -1003 
Durae exports as % of 5.8% 22% 8.3 1% - 
total exports 
Sources 1) Output figures from the National Economic Conference, Economic 
In&cators, 1986 39.2) For exports of dura, Bank of Sudan Annual Reports, 1981-1986. 
3) % calculated from Bank of Sudan Annual Reports 1981-198 
4.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter an attempt to provide a description of the crisis through its main 
manifestations and symptoms has been made. The description has revealed how extensive 
and deep was the crisis in the country. The main target now becomes to try and 
understand how this crisis situation had developed and what were the reasons behind it 
and whether the crisis constitutes a continuity or a disruption in the political and 
economic history of the country. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE GENESIS OF THE 1973-85 CRISIS 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter provides an explanation of the 1973-85 crisis by discussing the forces, 
institutions, structures and policies that led to the crisis. 
In section 2 in this chapter a critical survey of the attempts to explain the 1973-85 crisis is 
provided. 
In section 3 the nature of the Nimeiri regime and its implications on the crisis of the state 
is discussed. The legal frame work and the political institutions of the authoritarian state 
are discussed in section 4. The policies of the state are discussed in section 5 Sections .6 
deals with the particular economic crisis of 1973-85. It discusses the crises of simple and 
extended reproduction, and the financial crisis of. the state as weft as the Sudanese debt 
crisis. Section 7 provides a conclusion by focusing on the nature of the crisis of hegemony 
during the 1973-85 period.. 
5.2. Attempts to Explain the 1973-85 Crisis in the Literature 
The literature on the crisis of the Nimeiri regime is rich with diverse contributions. It is a 
rich literature because it is numerous, extensive and enlightening. It is diverse in both its 
themes and contributors. The themes included those of orthodox political science and 
economics as well as those of political. economy. 
The differences in explaining the crisis included the determination of the duration of the 
crisis (ie when did it start? for how long did it continue? ), and what kind of crisis was it 
(political, economic, or organic ... etc). the quýstion has also been raised comparing the 
specificity and continuity of the crisis with previous crises. 
5.2.1. A Testimony 2f an Insider* 
As an active and influential participant in the regime between 1969 and 1978, Khafid' was 
able to disclose some of the internal conflicts and practises of the regime which makes his 
works one of the primary sources of the study of the crisis under Nimeiri 
'Mansour Khalid held the portofolio of Foreign Minister t%vice: 1971-1975 and from February to 
September 1977. He was also influential in determining the foreign policy between August 1976 
and February 1977 when he served as assistant to the President for Coordination and Foreign 
Affairs. 
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Khalid has divided the Nirneiri era into four periods: 1969-72,1972-76,1976-83 and 
1983-85. In afl four phases he found the elements of crisis. These elements were the 
character of Nirneiri, the totalitarian nature of the regime (and any regime based on the 
single party'system) and the centralisation of state power, the divisions among the elite, 
the cultural failure of that elite to recognise the relation between modernisation and 
continuity and the presence of a corrupt group within the same elite around president 
Nirneiri (Khalid, 1982,1985,1990 and 1993). He tried through a historical documentation 
and discussions of the different important events, to show how these elements worked 
together to buRd the crisis of the regime until. it was overthrown in Apri-l 1985 
Khalid's contribution to the analysis of the crisis has been very positive. His contribution 
stands as an important source of primary information because he was an insider and has 
an exceflent ability to document. Yet it lacked the appreciation of the role and interests of 
the ruled classes, for him the crisis of the state emerged from within the elite. The absence 
of class struggle in Khalid's analysis made it difficult for an analysis of strikes, 
demonstrations and unrest in the army from 1973 to the fall of Nimeiri. 
5.2.2. A Political Science View 
There are many attempts to explain the crisis from the stand point. of political science 
(Woodward, 1985,1990, ... etc; 
Hamid, 1982, Wai, 1982). Of these Woodward works 
were the best representative because he was consistent in his methodological approach, to 
the Sudanese crises pre and post-1969. He kept examining the elements of ethnicity, 
religion, class with respect to the economy, political and state institutions and foreign 
relations and their reflection and interrelation with Woodward's common theme of the 
unstable state . 
This is especially clear in his 1985 paper to the Conflict Studies series of 
the Institute for the Study of Conflict and his book of 19902. An important aspect in 
Woodward's analysis, is his study of the political and trade unions movement, an aspect 
ignored in many other studies. In addition Woodward, as Khalid (1984), focused on the 
role of Nimeiri and his misuse of the presidential system, he wrote: 
"Above afl, the man who had begun as a little-known officer and primus inter pares in the 
Revolutionary Command Council had moved from the degree of support of a neo-patrimonial 
ruler into a sultan seen by many as a devil incarnaie and the source of all Sudan's woes" 
(1990,164) 
He noticed as early as 1971 that Nimeiri had developed some skills of "political 
calculation, flexibility and element of surprise" based on pragmatism. Woodward also 
pointed out the problem of the regime was in seeking alliances with other groups "always 
ultimately on its own terms" (Ibid, 164). He stressed a point which is argued in this thesis 
and February 1977. when he served as assistant to the President for Coordination and Foreign 
Aff-airs. 
2Both Nvorks have stability in their titles, though the first emphasises the threats to stability 
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as a key to the understanding of the regime in its post-1971 period, that is following the 
1971 coup the regime was left "with unstable army and no allies in "civil society 
whatsoever" (Ibid, 141). In that context Woodward looked rightly to the Addis Ababa 
Agreement. and he was also accurate in emphasising the role of the central government 
and Nimeiri in particular in the failure of the Agreement (pp 158-59) . National 
Reconciliation of 1978 is also evaluated in that context and its failure to "construct a new 
political frame work" (Ibid, 157) is argued as a back ground to the introduction of 
Sharia. 
Woodward's discussion of Sudan foreign relations is fairly satisfactory, especially when he 
pointed that at "the central feature of Sudan's foreign relations was to be domestic 
politics, and as these changed from radicalism, through institution-building to personal 
rule and long decline, so too did foreign relations" (Ibid, 165). 11is analysis has 
enlightened the writing of this thesis in that particular aspect as in many others. 
5.2.3. An Economic Interpretation of the Crisis 
It could be noticed that some of those who look at the crisis as essentially an economic 
one, see its starting point as the mid-seventies (1975-78) which continued to the end of 
the regime in 1985 (Kruger, 1982; Ali, 1985; RAF, 1985; Brown, 1986; Faaland, 1987; 
]ELO, 1987 ). 
Most of the literature concerning the economic crisis during 1978-85 was centred around 
the IW analysis of the crisis and the response to that analysis. This is the literature 
known in the academic Sudanese circles as the 'the IMF Debate. Ali (1985), provided a 
good summary of the IIMF argument and their critiques. Altho ugh the ROF argument 
were found in an undated note presented to the Sudan government Some times around 
1977, the basic argument of the RAF was first elaborated by Nashashibi (1980) -and 
Kruger (1982). 
The FvJF argued that: 
"Over the past few years a number of domestic and external developments affecting budgetary 
operation, credit expansions and cost-price -relationships have resulted in structural 
disequilibrium, in the Sudanese economy; these'are clearly indicated by the severe imbalances 
in the budget and balance of payments. " (quoted in Ali; 1985,27) 
According to the IMEF the causes of the internal imbalance were to be - found in the 
increase of investment expenditure from LS30 miffion in 1972/73 to LSIOO million in 
1974/75 which was financed from external and internal borrowing (Ibid, 28). It is true 
that such a large investment expenditure financed from borrowing would have inflationary 
pressures in the economy in the short run. But such a reasoning would not explain 
inflationary pressures in the medium and long term. It did not justify that the new 
investment did not contribute to the increase of the supply of goods and services to offset 
the inflationary pressure. It also did not explain the stagnation of exports which the RvfF 
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argued it had "lasted over a decade (1965-75). The formal logic of trying to provide 
reasoning by linking economic variables might lead in such a case vicious circle. Although 
Nashashibi3 (1980) has provided a more sophisticated analysis, he fell in the same trap. 
He explained the decline in exports by the reduction of 20% of cotton acreage and decline 
in average cotton yields (Nashashibi, 1980,32). The decline of cotton production was a 
result of the government policy to diversify by altering "the cropping pattern and the shift 
of incentives away from cotton" (Ibid, 36). Nashashibi asked an important question: 
"were the tenants incentives consistent with the newly established cropping pattern? ". He 
did not answer the question, but he noted that the answer required "a detailed analysis of 
the potentialities and constraints affecting Sudan's major productive activities, and the 
overall allocation of resources" (Ibid, 36). That was generally true, but in the particular 
case of Gezira Scheme there is a need for the study of the production relations and the 
institutionalised articulation as will be argued below. Though the study carried by 
Nashashibi for the competitiveness of Sudan major crops was necessary, it is irrelevant to 
the Gezira main problem. Whatsoever the result of the calculations of the economic 
efficiency of the cropping pattern to be adopted in the Gezira would be, the 
diver 
* 
sification. within the Gezira articulated model would have undermined the production 
of cotton. What required change was the Gezira model itself. 
Of these economic interpretation of the crisis, Richard Brown has provided an interesting 
analysis. Though he determined the beginning of the crisis by 1978 (Brown, 1986,488), 
he tried to identify two origins of the crisis from the 1960s and the early 1970s. Those 
were the stagnation in agricultural output and the scarcity of resources for development 
expenditure (Ibid, 488). By analysing the trade gap and Ihe current account 'deficit, 
Brown established a relation between the decline in cotton output and the decline of 
yields of other agricultural products and the growth of the deficit from about 1% in 1970 
to almost 10% by the end of the decade. He argued against the conventional wisdom of 
relating such growth in the deficit to the deterioration of Sud&s terms of trade. He 
substantiated his argument by quoting both the statistics of cotton's acreage and yields to 
show the decline of its output and hence the volume of its exports. At the same time he 
provided statistics on Sudan terms of trade to show that they fluctuated around the 90 
index (1977-78=100), while arguing that the demand for long-staple cotton and its 
international price were stable because Egypt reduced its production. He rightly 
attributed the decline in cotton output and yields to government's price policy and 
prevailing production relations in irrigated agriculture which were A discriminating 
against cotton. This argument is further substantiated by a thorough discussion of the 
production relations and their depe ndency on a specifically rigid institutional articulation 
3 Mr Karim Nashashibi, %vas then Senior Economist of the U*Y1F Middle East Department. 
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and how independence brought some changes in the state and class relations that made 
these relations obsolete and represented an obstacle to the development of production 
forces, productivity and production itself. 
Though the latter point was mentioned in a different perspective by the World Bank's Rist 
Report of 1966 and the discussions of the SCP (196,1976), of the problems of Gezira, in 
this thesis the discussion is part of a comprehensive analysis of the crisis of the socio- 
economic structure (in particular the state and the economy). The decline of cotton yields 
is looked at in this thesis as a socio- political question as well as an economic and 
technical one (see the building of the argument through Chapters 2,3,5 and 6). The 
argument could be surnmarised as follows: despite the contribution of the technical 
problems which were the result of the failure to replace depreciated means of production 
(the agricultural equipments and the irrigation system) and the price policy of the state 
(the multiple system of exchange rates for cotton exports and cotton's inputs imports), the 
development of class struggle which resulted in the inability of the state to pursue the 
colonial coercion on which the whole production relation was built, was the main reason 
for the decline of yields. This was because the Gezira Board (the arm of the state ) was 
not able any more to compel the tenants to carry on the agricultural activities according 
to the schedule, pattern and quality which they used to do under the colonial state. A 
corollary to this argument is the need to replace institutional administrative measures by 
economic measures (incentives). Both the World Bank (1-966) and the SCP (1968,1976) 
accept this corollary though through different analysis and with different alternate policy 
perspectives to what these economic measures should be. The World Bank actually made 
the acceptance of his report a condition for financing the rehabilitation of the Gezira, 
when it was financing the new Rahad Scheme which was based on the production 
relations suggested in the Rist Report (Awad, 1983,13). 
Brown also examined what he had- seen as the other origin of the crisis, the internal 
imbalance and its relation with the development expenditure. He pointed out that while 
the combined current and development expenditure rose from 20% in 1970/71 to 22% in 
1977/78 of the GDP, the government revenue declined from 22% to 16% during the 
same period. Until 1974/75, the massive external flow of resources financed the deficit; 
but when the "external resources flows tapered ofF the deficit finance through the 
borrowing from the central bank increased to enhance inflation (Ibid, 492-30. That 
analysis was partially true, for deficit finance, as shown Chapter 4 in this thesis was on 
going long before that. On the other hand Brown did not say why "external resources 
were tapered off". He did not say why revenue did not match the increase of current and 
development expenditure. 
Brown's most important contribution was the study of the 1978-85 period. Showing the 
failure of the RVIF backed Economic Recovery Programmes, he asked an important 
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question about the reasons why the programme despite its failure was not abandoned by 
the IMF, the donor countries or the Nimeiri regime. His answer to the question was that 
the programmes and the different agreements reached between the EMF, the Sudan and 
donor community were not meant to be implemented but were to bail the Nimeiri regime 
(Ibid, 503-508). This attitude was motivated by the US government (p 509). In an earlier 
paper Brown suggested that a hardening attitude was adopted by the RVIF in 1984/85 
when the US became disinterested in the regime and decided to iacilitate its downfall 
(Brown, 1985,12). 
Of these explanations depending on an economic interpretation is that of Charles Gurdon 
(1991). Gurdon has determined the beginning of the crisis by the 1980s and warned that 
"It would be too easy to use Nimeiri as a scapegoat for all Sudads economic problems" 
(1991,18). In this thesis, it is argued that the particular crisis began as early as 1973, and 
that crisis, despite its particularity which was the -'contribution' of the Nimeiri regime to 
the general Sudanese crisis, had its common origins with the previous crises. It is not the 
intention to make any particular person a scapegoat, however it is not also the intention 
to deny any person the 'honour' of contributing to the crisis if he had done so! 
Gurdon con tribution has suffered from untrue statements and definitions. For example 
Gurdon stated that they were "thousands of expatriates" who left the country after the 
nationalisation and confiscations of 1970 (1991,18). This is simply untrue. Sudan was 
one of the few Affican countries that never had such numbers of expatriates working in it 
after independence, whether they were from the West or East. It is not true that the 
Soviet and Eastern European technicians who replaced them "became indispensable in 
ensuring the smooth operation of the essential industries as well as the armed forces". 
Simply because the essential industries in the Sudan were run by Sudanese experts, even 
those established by the Russian during Abboud's regime (1958-1964). Another example 
is the definition of groundnuts "of which the locally important Thl sudani' is made" (Ibid, 
20) which is a strange definition. 'Ful Sudani'is the name of groundnuts in the Sudan and 
not one of its productO. A third is his definition of AAAID as "a body co ntrolled and 
financed by the Saudi Arabian royal family", which again is not true. AAAID is a regional 
inter-governinental Arab authority financed by the Arab countries, including Sudan. It is 
true that the rich Arab countries contributed most of its capital but it is controlled by its 
Board of Directors which is composed of the Arab ministers of finance or their 
representatives. There is another inaccurate statement about the Arab capital inflow and 
the oil supply. The statement is about the cut back of Arab aid to the Sudan. It says, "The 
problem for Sudan was that Arab investment specifically directed to ambitious and 
4The question itself is not important if it does not imply that Gurdon NN-ants to show his knoweldge 
of the country that he writes about! 
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expensive agricultural projects disappeared and the Sudanese government was left with 
half-completed schemes on its hands" (p 27). The statement is not true because no Arab 
finance for any on-going project was withdrawn. It is true that the plans for the 
rehabilitation of the existing projects suffered during this period not because finance was 
withdrawn, but finance was not agreed on with the Arab Fund for Social and Economic 
Development, mainly for political reasons. I 
Despite all these misgivings in Gurdorfs analysis, he tackled some of the important factors 
that contributed to the extent and intensity of the particular economic crisis of the Nimeiri 
regime like what is called in this thesis the absorption capacity of the Sudanese economy 
and Gordon calls the "Sudan! s infrastructure problems and bureaucracy" (Ibid, 21) or 
Sudan attempt "to develop its agricultural sector too quickly"(Ibid, 22). FEs discussion of 
Western and Arab aid to Sudan has contributed positively to the literature in this area and 
is found to be useful to strengthen the discussion in. this Chapter on the debt crisis and the 
failure of debt re-scheduling. 
5.2.4 Political Economy Interpretation AttemlRts 
In the literature studying the Sudanese crisis, several attempts were made from the stand 
point of political econ9my (Niblock, 1989,1991; OBrien, 1985, ONeil, 198 ; and 
Barnett, 198 
Tim Niblock's analysis (1985,199 1) of the Nimeiri regime and its crisis is one of the most 
serious works which studies the period. One important characteristic of Niblock's early 
analysis (1985) was his ability to both document and evaluate the performance of the one- 
party system in 1974-77. He recognised the limited role played by the Sudan Socialist 
Union (SSU) at grass-roots and its failure to function in mobilizing support to the regime 
or to reflect popular demand and concern (1985,267-272). Niblock was not able in his 
1995 analysis to pursue the results of his empirical analysis to a conclusion of studying 
the nature of the state and was content with his conclusion that government after 1972 
was dominated by the ' technocratic neutrals' (1985,264-5). This left him with the 
alternative of judging the regime according to its declared aims of national unity and 
development. Even within that role his account was unimpressive. Though he reached the 
ýonclusion of the failure of the regime in reaching its self-assigned targets, he did not 
provide satisfactory analysis for the reasons of that fOure. For example in his evaluation 
for the national unity, he emphasised the internal struggles among the Southern Sudanese 
factions rather than the contradiction between the semi-democratic parliamentary system 
es . tablished by the Addis Ababa Agreement and the presidential dictatorship established by 
the 1973 Constitution and its amendments in 1975. In his discussion of the development 
issues he concentrated on the fkilure of economic planning rather than pursuing an 
interesting argument he only touched on of the change of tack from the "transformationist 
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perspectives of 1969-70" to "national unity and economic development" (1986,256). 
This thesis has argued that without resolving the question of the transformation of the 
socio-economic structure inherited from the colonial period, the general crisis will 
continue. 
In a later work, Niblock (199 1), provided a more interesting theoretical question: 
"to idcntijly the nature of the Sudanese state under Nimeiri and consider whether the fall of the 
regime stemmed from the inherent weaknesses of this state-form, from the particular 
characteristics of Nimeiri's rule, or else from the wider economic and social conditions over 
which Nimeiri had no direct control" (Niblock, 1991,34) 
Niblock has arisen a number of theoretical and empirical problems in his study. The first 
was his distinction between three forms of the state that existed in the Arab countries. I-Es 
first form is that of "A dominant social forces state" which "existed in the Sudan prior to 
1969", his second form is that "reformist/revolutionary autonomous state" which existed 
in Sudan between 1969-72, while his third form is the bourgeois-bureaucratic state which 
prevailed from 1972 and until the fall of Nimeiri in 1985 (1991,34-36). Two critical 
remarks need to be made here. One of these remarks is about the distinction between the 
second and the third forms in Niblock's model. While the distinction according to policies 
and ideologies could be undeptood, the question is whether there is really a distinction in 
term of the class in power. This thesis has argued that there is no distinction, it is the 
same new-petty bourgeoisie, albeit different fractions of the same class. Even the 
fractions are distinguished according to their political stands and alliance with other 
classes. It is argued in the previous section that the new petty bourgeoisie could be won 
or lost by the working class in the concrete class struggle and in its political manifestation 
in particular. The tension among the urban democratic forces, the split in the communist 
party and the tension between the main stream in the party and the May regime which 
developed into open confrontation after the palace coup of November the 16th 1970 and 
reached its climax in the 19th of July 1971 Coup and the 22nd of July bloody counter 
coup, could only be understood within the context of a conflict on the conditions of the 
alliance and the fOure to establish an alliance with the working class,. the left fraction of 
the new petty bourgeoisie which allied itself with the communist party'and the 
international allies of these groups, the countries of the Eastern bloc. That failure, 
whatever the bloody shape it tooký did not mean that one side of the-conflict had changed 
its class origin. It is argued in this Chapter that power continued within the new petty 
bourgeoisie, though under new constitutional arrangements. That fraction also failed in 
establishing an alternative alliance for the same reasons: the conditions of the political 
alliance and this was reflected in the failure of the negotiations sponsored by King Faisal 
of Saudi Arabia between Nimeiri and. Sheriff al Hindie in'Jeddah in 1972 (See Khalid, 
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1984,172-3 and 1993,555-6)5. No genuine attempt to build a new internal political 
alliance was made until 1978 except with the Southern fraction of the new petty 
bourgeoisie. In March 1972 the fraction of the pew petty bourgeoisie in power, which 
was Northern Sudanese of Arabic Islamic origin won a hegemonic fraction of the 
Southern new petty bourgeoisie through what was known as Addis Ababa Agreement, 
but the power of the state remained firmly within the Northern fraction. Another success 
was the international and regional alliance the regime was able to make. But even here 
and because of the lack of internal base the regime was a weak partner, a dependent one, 
which reminiscent of Alavi's discussion of the post-colonial state (Alavi, 1972). 
A further criticism of Niblocles works is to his use of the concepts of bourgeois- 
bureaucratic state and the state bourgeoisie. He wrote: 
"The term 'state bourgeoisie becomes appropriate in this state-form by virtue of the personal 
involvement of state bureaucrats in the private sector where as direct investors, or through 
support for business run by family members, or through contacts which envisage the 
bureaucrat ultimately leaving the public for the private sector (where his or her knowledge of 
government personnel and procedures will duly be utilised)" (1991,35-6). ' 
If one adopts such a reasoning then there is no need for concepts like corruption, 
nepotism or clientelism, for all of them will be descriptions of a state bourgeoisie. Further 
more one should classify private sector employees according to whether they held a 
government job before or not, for those who were'ex-employees of the government are 
state bourgeoisie! A more challenging argument is'whether under Niblock's first state- 
form which existed in the Sudan before 1969 the three practises mentioned above were 
carried out or not and if they were carried, as real life in Sudan showed, would the 
bureaucrats be defined as a state bourgeoisie? 
Despite of these critical remarks, Niblock suggested three possible types of explanation of 
the crisis of the state were very enlightening. He argued: 
1) "the bourgeois-bureaucratic state is inherently unstable, possessing dynamics which lead to 
its own destruction. 
2) "a narrowly based, ineffective and/or corrupt political leadership exacerbated the inherently 
unstable dynamics of the bourgeois-bureaucratic state 
3) "factors in the international environment, interacting with Sudan! s domestic environment, 
rendered the bourgeois-bureaucratic state's dynamics particularly destructive" (Ibid, 40-41) 
The three types are not exclusive, but they lack one important element: the response of 
other classes. In the former element one can find the difference between the Sudan and 
other Arab (and African) countries: the existence of an independent political movement 
which rejects the authoritarian form of state (despite the fact that some fractions of the 
movement wanted to build their own authoritarian state). 
5Khalid N%w a N%itness to that meeting. 
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Another attempt to explain the crisis in the Sudan from a political economy stand point 
was Jay OBrien (1986,193-200) who argued that an agrarian fraction of the Sudanese 
bourgeoisie adopted a policy of expanding mechanised agricultural food production 
oriented towards the intemal market. This expansion, according to O'Brien, ignored that 
the economy depended on export revenue to import inputs, equipments and other 
consumer goods and to pay its debts. The negligence of the export-sector and 
concentration of resources on the expansion of the food production for the internal 
market is hence led to the crisis. "However, " wrote OMrien, " the hegemonic agrarian 
bourgeoisie took no significant steps to resolve the contradiction of the switch to a 
pattern of internally oriented growth from a structure of acute export dependency. " (Ibid, 
195). He suggested that the reason behind the crisis was 
" Pursuit of capitalist growth led by expansion of food production for internal market without 
any solution to the problem of export dependency to finance the imports involved thus paved 
the R-ay for a crisis of massive proportions,.. " (1986,195) 
Despite the apparent consistency of OBrien's argument, his analysis suffered from many 
shortcomings. The first is his basic proposition about the hegemony of the agrarian 
bourgeoisie. The agrarian fraction of the Sudanese class played a great role in the 
Sudanese politics and economy, yet it was ne ver able to establish its hegemony (at least in 
the sense hegemony is defined in Chapter I in this thesis). This thesis has argued (Chapter 
3) that no class or a fraction of class was able to establish its hegemony and that was the 
main reason behind instability of the state in the Sudan. O'Brien took the launch of 
mechanised agriculture as a proof of the interest of the assumed hegemonic agrarian 
bourgeoisie of "expansion of food production for the internal market" at "the expense of 
the government-operated export (cotton) sector", which was simply untrue. The Sudan 
foreign reserves inherited from the colonial state were spent mostly in the expansion of 
irrigated agriculture. Abdel RAim Mirghani, an authority in Sudanese economic 
development and- planning until 1969 "6 wrote about that period, 
"During this period increasing emphasis was laid on productive schemes in order to raise the 
output and income of the country as -quickly as possible. For example, expenditure on 
productive schemes increased from 16.81ý'o in the 1951156 development budget to 55% in the 
1957/58 budget, 45.9% in the 1959/60 budget and to 65.2% in the 1960/61 budget. These 
increases reflect the high priority given to cotton, the countly's major cash crop and the 
source ofa substantial part of government revenue (emphasis added)" (Nfirghani, 1983,10) 
The Managil project which added 800,000feddwls to the Gezira area was implemented 
between 1957/58 and 1961/62 and cost about LS 30.5 millions. The irrigated area under 
cotton increased from 245000 feddWis in 1948/49 to 643769 feddans in 1960/61. The 
6Abdel Rahirn Mirghani was Director-General of Planning in the Sudan in the early sixties, he 
became the Under-Secretary of the Department of Economic Plannin in the Ministry of Finance 
and Economics, when it was established in 1963. In 1967 he became Governor of the Bank of 
Sudan. 
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period of the Ten Years 1961/62-1970/71 were the years of constructing the Damazine 
Dam, Khasham el Girba Dam and the Khasham El Girba agricultural scheme where 
cotton was also a dominant crop. The Nimeiri period was not an exception with projects 
like Sukki, Rahad and later the rehabilitation of all the irrigated schemes. Almost all the 
effort in the agricultural research was directed towards the improvement of cotton 
production. On the other hand the mechanised rain-fed agriculture passed through four 
development stages under different regimes. The first phase during the colonial period 
1944/45- 1953/54 was mainly a period of experimentation in both cultivation methods 
and farm organisation. The second period began by the acceptance of the Working Party 
Report of 1954, (Sudan Government, 1954)7, which advised leaving investment in 
mechanised agriculture to the private sector. All investment during the period 1955-1968 
was mainly financed by private savings and commercial banks finance. The Agricultural 
Bank began its involvement into mechanised agriculture soon after its establishment in 
1959 when the mechanised farms faced its first crisis of declining prices because of over- 
productions. The government instructed the Agricultural Bank to interfere and bale the 
scheme ow ners by issuing credit on dura (sorghum) delivery to the Banks stores. In 
1960, the Bank again interfered to issue credit for the purchase of machinery which the 
machines. dealers refused to sell to scheme owners on credit terms because of the 
"unacceptable number of defaulters" (Simpson and Simpson, 1978,12). Concentration on 
dura, (sorghum), production was not planned by the "hegemonic agrarian bourgeoisie" as 
argued by O'Brien, but rather a result of the failure of producing two cash crops: sesame 
for exports and short-sfaple cotton? for local industry (Sudan Government, 1962,89-90). 
The third period (1968-1978) was different because it was characterised by government 
establishment, on the recommendation of IBRD, of the Mechanised Farming Corporation 
(Nff Q. This was the period when the government established its state farms in Simsim, 
Agadi, Habilla, Nertiti, and Urn AjaJ. It was the period when private swor befitted from 
the easy loan provided by the International Development Association (IDA), a member of 
the World Bank. It is questionable whether this was the period of the hegemony of 
agrarian bourgeoisie or "the imPOrt-export oriented commercial bourgeoisie, which 
captured the state by 1972", as O! Brien suggested (OBrien, 1 986,199); or "the 
7Known as the 'Butting Repore, after its author the head ofthe woricing party Mr Butting. 
8By December 1959 there were over one million feddans cultivated by Dura and the prices 
decreased to the extent that scheme owners declined to harvest their crop. (Simpson and Simpson, 
1978,12) 
9Tbough cotton cultivation failed in the Gedaref area because it vk-as found to be labour intensive, 
in Habilla it was continued to be cultivated in the State fluTn until my htst research field work in 
1976. In 1976n7 a total of 27 thousandfeddons were sfffl under cotton representing only 1% of 
the total area of mechanised farms, while that under sesame was564 thousands, about 16% of the 
total area. 
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bourgeois-bureaucratic state" (Nliblocký 1991,36), because the state was fairly dominated 
by the new-petty bourgeoisie as it would be argued in this Chapter. For the state to be 
dominated by one or another fraction of a class, or by the whole class, is one thing and for 
that fraction or class to establish its hegemony is another, completely different thing. 
Another point which needs to be clarified is the question of the "bread-basket strategy". 
013rien wrote: 
"Foreign Arab capital began, following the October War of 1973, to promote Sudan as the 
potential 'bread-basket! of the Arab worU Arab -oil exporters agreed to guarantee Sudan's 
mounting debts provide short-term balance-of-payments &4)port and development aid in 
return for SudaWs acceptance of the stringent terms of the WF stabilisation plan and Arab 
access to Sudan's agricultural resources for direct private investment (emphasis added). " 
(1986,198). 
It is important to point out the misleading connection between the flow of foreign capital, 
bread-basket, IIMF and private investment. The connection made between the flow of 
Arab capital between 1973 and 1978 and the bread-basket strategy is simply not true. The 
former whether private or public flow of capital was not initiated by the bread-basket 
strategy and most of it was not invested in agriculture in general or food production in 
particular. Between 1971 and 1978, the government of Kuwait and the Kuwaiti Fund 
presented ten loans to the Sudan 'Government of a total value of- 81.3 million Dinar 
equivalent to 101.5 million Sudanese pounds at the time). Only thrýe of these loans were 
directed to agriculture, the largest (14.5 million Dinars ) to finance al-Rahad scheme 
which co'ncentrates in cotton production, the second was to finance the Sudan purchase 
of Kuwaiti produced fertilizers while the third was to finance the state farms in the 
mechanised agriculture and was the smallest of the three (1.6 million Dinars). On the 
other hand the Kuwait and Sudan'formed a joint-venture called 'the Sudan Kuwaiti 
Investment Company' in 1973/74 with an issued capital. of one million Sudanese pounds 
(equal to $2.8 million at that time), with the Government of the Sudan holding 44%, the 
Kuwaiti Foreign Trade, Contracting and investment Company, (a Kuwaiti government 
owned company), holding 49% and Sudanese private sector investors holding the balance 
of 76/o of the shares. Of the subsidiaries established by the company only one was to 
invest on the agricultural sector that was the Sudanese Kuwaiti Animal Production 
Company (SKAP C) with a capital of LS 3.2 million which was later doubled to LS 7 
million. The SKAPC did not begin production until 1985. Other subsidiaries included 
Sudanese Kuwaiti Road Transportation and the Sudanese Kuwaiti Building and 
Construction Company. One can conclude that the Kuwaiti capital in the Sudan had 
nothing to do with the bread basket strategy. In reality the same could be said about the 
Saudi official loans to the Sudan. Betweiýn 1975 and 1978 the Saudi Government and the 
Saudi Development Fund provided the Sudan with eight loans for the investment in 
different sectors, five of them went to transport, one to education and only two to 
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agriculture including one to the Rahad project which mostly a cotton production scheme, 
and the second to the Savanna Development Project dealing with small farmers in 
Western Sudan, Abu Dhabi aid was not an exception. Six loans were made available to 
the Sudan by the government of Abu Dhabi and Abu Dhabi Fund between 1971 and 
1990. Of these three were in cash to support the balance of payment and one to finance a 
textile factory, one for rural water supply and the three others for transport sector 
including one for railways, one for a highway and a third for improving Khartoum airport. 
Arab capital flow to the Sudan between 1973 -77, except for the contribution in the 
capital of the Arab Authority for Agriculture Investment and Development (AAAID) 
which was established by a decision of an Arab Summit of Head of States in Rabat in 
April 1976, had nothing to do with the bread-basket strategy. Arab capital flow was 
initiated by political and profit-making motives. The first governed the government aid 
while the second governed the joint ventures. Sudan between 1973-76 was implementing 
its Interim Action Programme which amended the Five Years plan for 197onl-74/75 and 
extended it to 1976/77. The main target of the programme was self-sufficiency in food 
items like sugar, rice and wheat, in some other commodities like textile and the 
improvement of transport and communication and the increase of Sudan traditional 
exports: cotton, groundnuts and sesame. 
The story of the bread-basket strategy was different The discussion about the bread- 
basket strategy began in 1974, when the FAO began speaking about a World! s food crisis. 
Sudan was then sighted as one of the few countries which had un-exploited agricultural 
resources. Mohamed Hashim Awad, then the Convener of the Secretariat for 
Development and Services in the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), provoked the idea of the 
'World Granary for the future" by writing a number of articles in local, regional and 
international newspapers and Magazines (ie the Sudanese daily Al Sahafk May 1974, 
African- Development, January, 1975). Following the World Food Conference in 
November 1974, an international symposium organised by the Sudan in February 1975 
discussed the possibilities of the Sudan becoming the World Granary. The idea was then 
circulated among Arab parliamentarians in their meeting in Khartoum in March 1975 and 
the Arab economists in Baghdad in May 1975. By the time the Arab Fund for Social and 
Economic Development had submitted to the. government of the Sudan the study of 
agricultural resources in the country and suggesting the "Basic Programme for 
Agricultural Development in the Democratic republic of the Sudan 1976-85". The 
Ministry of Planning in the Sudan included the first phase of the programme in the "Six 
Years Plan for Economic and Social Development 1977n8-1982/83". That plan was 
never implemented because the Sudan in 1978 accepted the IMF stabilisation programmes 
which called for seizing new investment, abandoning the plan and implementing a rolling 
three years programmes which were mainly concerned with the rehabilitation of the 
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existing industrial and agricultural schemes. it is not only that the flow of Arab capital 
before 1977 had nothing to do with the bread-basket strategy but that the IMF in reality 
hatted the implementation of that-. - strategy. Ostterdiekhoff and Volmuth rightly noticed 
that : 
"The most important outcome of the IMF supported "reform" programine is the implicit 
rejection of the basic priorities of the bread-basket strategy. The new programme favours the 
promotion of the traditional export cash crops of the country (first long staple cotton and 
traditional sector groundnuts; second medium staplecotton and irrigated grown groundnuts). 
This reorientation should be at the expense of those products which were central at the 
breadbasket strategy (grains like wbeat and sorghum, sugar and rice)" ( Osterdiekhoff and 
Volmuth, 1983,57). 
The Middle East Economic Digest reported shortly after the beginning of the 
implementation of the RdF supported policies, 
talk about Sudan being the bread-basket for its oil-rich but food starved Arab neighbours has 
been muted smce the IMF imposed tight financial restrictions on the Government's 
development programme as a condition for its SDR 200m. ($256.8m) credit in May [1979)" 
Thus OBrien was right in arguing that there was a change of policy which undermined 
food production, but that change of policy also undermined the bread-basket strategy 
which was consistent in raising food production fbr self-sufficiency and export at the 
same time. The only element of that strategy which continued was the establishment of 
the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID) which 
decided to begin its activities by Sudan and concluded and agreement to that effect with 
the Sudan Government in January 197710. Yet the AAAID became involved in the IMIF- 
World Bank suggested policy of rehabilitation of the existing schemes as wen as 
implementing few ýnd limited new schemes which are allowed by the new investment 
policy adopted after the abortion of the Six Years Plan that included the new projects of 
the bread basket strategy in 19.78. 
It is true as O'Brien mentioned that Arab capital played role in Sudan's acceptance of INT 
conditionality in 1978; but the flow of Arab capital until 1978 played great role in 
strengthening Sudan position in negotiation with the DAF before that Year. Mansour 
Khahd wrote: 
"By mid-1978 Saudi Arabia, not without reason, decided that budget support to the Sudan 
would only be made on the basis of a certificate of good health from the IMF. " (Khalid, 1986, 
137). 
The reasons for this change of heart were concerning the dissatisfaction of the Saudi 
officials about the management of their financial and commodity assistance (Ibid, 137) 
and effort made by the 11"F to stop the Arab capital flew to the Sudan to accept their 
IOThe writer who was at the time working in the Ministry of planning, wrote the minutes of the 
meeting of the Ministers of Finance N,, ho reached the agreement and attended all the technical 
meetings which prepared it. 
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conditionality' 1. However, it is important to emphasize here that before 1978 the flow of 
Arab capital into the Sudan played the opposite role. Salih wrote: 
"For three years -1974 to 1977 - the economy was shielded from bearing the full brunt of the 
balance of payments deficit through a sizable inflow of foreign loans (and grants) coming 
principally (80 per cent) firom. the oil-rich Arab countries'(1984,94) 
5.3. The Nature of the State 
The state in the Sudan between 1973 and 1985 resembled what Alavi identified as the 
"bureaucratic military oligarchy" which 'rnediate( d} "{the} competing but no longer 
contradictory interests and demands" of "the indigenous bourgeoisie, the Metropolitan 
-neo-bourgeoisie and the landed classes" (Alavi, 1972,59 ). The main difference was the 
absence in the Sudanese case of "landed classes" and the addition of the Gulf states 
(especially Saudi Arabia) to the neo-cblonial bourgeoisie (as their allied forces, if not their 
satellites). The political power in the Sudan for the 1973-85 period was controlled by a 
military-bureaucratic fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie, which tended to mediate the 
interests of the national and international capital. The tendency to mediate started as a 
result of both the political events that took place between 1969 and 1971 and the group 
of technocrats and professiprialS'who dominated the government in the post 1971 coup. 
The political events of 1969-71 led to a failure of the project of the alliance between the 
military and the organised democratic movement which was dominated by the SCP12. The 
expression of this failure was the coup d'etat of July 19,1971 and the counter coup of 
July 22,1971 which reinstated N-uneiri to the power. The bloody events which included 
the massacre in the Guests House on the 22nd of July and the execution of the leaders of 
the coup and the SCP in the week that followed marked a dramatic end to any possibility 
of reviving the project. The dissolution of the Revolutionary Command Council and the 
dismissal or resignation of its members13 from the government and. the political 
institutions of the regime, isolated from power and decision-making centres those who 
I lAn official in the Sudan Government who attended negotiation bet"cen the then Minister of 
Finance Mamoun Behiri and Abdul Shakour Shalan, the Rýff representative for the Middle East, 
told the author that Mr. Behiri said to Shalan "I can obtain three time the money you are offering 
by telephoning the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance and he will not ask for the devaluation of 
Sudanese currency". The Minister was sacked after this discussion and all the Gulf governments 
and the Arab Funds made the condition that the Sudan should reach an agreement with the IMF 
before being legible to any financial assistance from them. 
12The difference that led to the failure in the project are discussed in Chapter 3. 
13This started by the resignation of Mj. General Khalid Hassan Abass, then Vice-President and 
Minister of Defence in February 1972, followed by Babiker Awadalla, the First Vice President in 
May 1972. On May 29,1972 the removal of Major Ma! mon Awad Abu Zaid, then Secretary- 
Genral of the SSU "-as annotmced, though rumours about his resignation were circulated since 
February. In November 1972 Major Zein al-Abdin Mohamed Ahmed, then Secretary of the 
Public Services in the SSU, resigned. By then only President Nimeiri and Major Abul Gasim 
Mobamed Ibrahim of the dissolved RCC remained in the Government. 
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could be motivated by their political orientation to revive the project or to attempt a 
national Nasserist model. Meanwhile, the technocrat who were promoted to the decision- 
making in the SSU and the Council of Nfinisters advocated new policies of a trilateral 
partnership between European technology, Arab oil money and Sudanese natural and 
human resources. Mansour Khalid, then Foreign Nfinister, explicitly stated the policy, 
"We envisage as our ultimate aim a partnership between Europe* with her technology and 
skills, the Arab with their oil wealth and Afiica {Sudan) with her great untapped natural 
resources" (Affica, February, 1974,61). Musa Awad Billal, then NEnister of Industry and 
Mning was more articulate when he said to the same magazine " My vision is that of 
European technology being combined with Arab oil money to develop the Sudan" (Affica, 
September 1974,61). It was not an accident that the two Sudanese officials were 
repeating Tony Roland's14 view expressed to African Development, "in the future, I see a 
partnership between Western technology, Arab oil money and African resources" (African 
Development, June 1973,7). 
The tendency to mediate between foreign capital and Sudanese private sector was 
reflected in the economic and financial policies of the Sudanese state in the period under 
consideration. This will be discussed in the following section 5.4. - 
Though, as argued in Chapter 3, the Northern military fraction of the new petty 
bourgeoisie was able to strike a deal with the Southern fraction in the Addis Ababa 
Agreement of 1973, the political power at the centre continued to be based firn-dy with 
the hands of the Northern fraction. With the concentration of power was the 
concentration of economic resources and investment decision. 
The state thus continued to express the donýnation of a fraction of the military- 
bureaucrýts and professionals of Arab-Islamic origin. Even within the military - 
bureaucrats- professionals groups the ruling group was not able to rally the majority, not 
only by failing to intellectually win them, but also by the failure to represent their 
interests. This was expressed by the fact that most of the trade unions of the 
professionals, -technicians and government employees remained in the hands of the regime 
opponents whether members of the opposition political parties or independent individuals. 
That was reflected in the strikes and trade union disputes -enlisted in Chapter 4 above and 
in the leading role played by these trade unions in the overthrow of the regime in March- 
April 1985. The regime support within the army was not as strong enough to prevent the 
occurrence or discovery of coup plots (12 May 1974,7 October 1974,19 May 1975,5 
September 1975,2 July 1976,2 February 1978) or the regime dismissing or sending on 
compulsory retirement some of the leading officers of the armed forces (dismissal of 17 
14Tony Roland, a managing director of Lonrho, played significant role in the counter coup that 
reinstate Nirneiri in July 22,1971 according to Cronje et al( 1976) 
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leading officers in February 1979, the dismissal of another 22 leading officers including 
the First Vice-President and Nfinister of Defence and the Chief of Staff and his deputies in 
January 1982). 
5.3.1. The Relative Autonomy of The State 
During the period 1973-85 the state was characterised by being an authoritarian state 
which maintained its relative autonomy vis-A-vis the indigenous classes and social forces. 
The elements of discontinuity were reflected in changes in policies, slogans, and the social 
groups the regime had used or approached to co-opt or incorporate in its quest or claim 
to establish its legitimacy. They were reflected in what appeared to be three different sub- 
periods of the regime: 1973-77,1978-83 and 1983-85. In the first period the regime 
depended on the moderate professionals and bureaucrats in establishing the state political 
and executive institutions and negotiating peace in the South ýnd establishing new foreign ZD CI 
relations with the Gulf and Western countries. The second period was characterised by 
the National Reconciliation and the attempt to co-opt the leaders of the. par-ties of the 
National Front. The regime recognising its narrow social base and deteriorating 
legitimacy was compelled to accept the Saudi second proposal for a national 
reconciliation with the traditional opposition parties. The elements. of discontinuity were 
in reality a direct result of the attempts of the regime to claim or renew its legitimacy as 
its previous claim eroded or new challenges rose. These elements of discontinuity 
remained temporary features of the regime. Yet, it was the relative autonomy that was 
based on an authoritarian state which prevented the necessary changes in the state, and 
especially in the political power structure, which were required if the composition of the 
state and its political institutions were to express the changes in the class structure and 
social forces which were instigated and brought by the policies of the same regime. One 
example was very striking. 
The National Reconciliations of 1977/78 was a result of the regime's awareness of its 
weakness after the July 1976 military insurrection attempt by the National Front. Both the 
Port-Sudan Agreement between Nimeiri and Sadiq al Mahdi in July 1977 and the London 
Agreement between Sheriff el Hindi and a Sudanese Government delegation in April 1978 
demanded some changes in the political institutions including the SSU. These changes 
never materialised. What appeared as an attempt by the regime to widen its social base 
was in fact a delaying tactic by Nirneiri to gain time. The apparent attempt to establish a 
new alliance, materialised in reality as an attempt to incorporate and co-opt new forces 
without representing them or giving them any political power. Even those who were 
appointed to the high leading posts in the SSU and the goverment became mere tools of 
Nimeiri because as a President, Chairman of the SSU, the Supreme Commandant of the 
Peoples Armed Forces and the Chairman of the Supreme Judiciary Council was able to 
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remove them, over-rule their decisions and even detain them. The latter was what 
happened to the leadership of the Muslim Brothers in 1985. They were holding 
prestigious posts in the political and executive institutions of the regime's when they were 
detained by the security and distributed to Port-Sudan, Kober and Shalla prisons. 
5.3.2. The Foreign Dimension 
Although during this period 1973-85, the state was relatively autonomous vis-A-vis the 
indigenous classes, it lost its relative autonomy vis-A-vis the foreign forces. After 1973 the 
influence of the foreign forces increased as the political and economic crises in the Sudan 
deepened and the economic and financial dependency of the state and the country on 
foreign aid and borrowing increased. The United States, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
states as well as other Western countries became the most important sources of finance 
and trade partners of the Sudan. The influence of these countries, especially the USA and 
Saudi Arabia, affected the Sudanese state policies both in economic and political areas. In 
addition, the economic decisions after 1978 became more influenced by and dependent on 
the sanctions of the international financial institutions and the Paris Club. The policies of 
US and Saudi Arabia were not always identical towards the Sudan, though their strategic 
concern. about the Sudan was a common one: the security of the region16. The cold war 
gave the security of the region an anti-commurlist dimension. Almost the role of 
undertaking the "control of the anti-co nu-nunist offensive. towards Somalia, Sudan, 
Ethiopia and Djibouti" was assigned to the Saudi Arabia which 
"has acquired a direct hold on forces in these countries that the USA could never match, 
because it would be more visible. There are also no pressmen and Congressmen in Saudi 
Arabia, demanding to know how state money was spent " (Halliday, 1977,23). 
Within this context the following subsectionwill review the US-Saudi-Egyptian relations 
with the Sudan. 
5.3.2.1. Saudi Arabia and the Sudan - 
Saudi Arabia played significant role in the politics and economics of the Sudan after the 
failure of the 1971 coup of Hashim a]-Atta17. Soon after the defeat of the coup and the 
return of Nimeiri the Saudi King sent his congratulations to Nimeiri. Nimeiri visited Saudi 
Arabia in November 1971 for the first time. Following his second visit in November 
1972, Saudi Arabia provided the Sudan with $200 million loan and concluded a number 
15The list of detainees included Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the Advisor of the President for Foreign 
Affairs, Ahmed Abd at-Rahman, member of the SSU political bureau and ex-minister of Interior, 
al-Mukashfi Taha a]-Kabashi, the president of the Appeal Courtý and Mohamed Adam Eisa, a 
State-Minister in the Attorney General Chambers (ACR, 1984/85, B82). 
16T'he author found himself in complete agreement with Halliday (1977), "The two parties have 
independent but converging approaches" (halliday, 1977,24) 
17Sudan had accused Saudi Arabia and King Faisal of "complicity in the Mahdist plot which led 
to the confrontation atAba Island. " (ACF, 1971,1352) 
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of agreements concerning the financing of joint projects In 1974 the Saudi Arabian 
Development Agency agreed to guarantee a $200 million loan"' to be raised in the 
international money market. In January 1976 Nimeiri carried his third visit to Saudi 
Arabia and concluded an -agreement to establish a joint authority to explore and exploit 
the mineral resources in the Red Sea. In December 1977 Saudi Arabia agreed to finance 
Sudanese purchase of 12 Northrop F-5 fighters and six Lochead C-130 at a cost of $74 
million. This was followed in February 1979 by financing more military equipment from 
the US composed of 50M-60 tanks and 100 armoured personnel carriers. Table 16 shows 
the importance of financial and economic assistance provided by Saudi Arabia to the 
Sudan until 1985. 
Table 16. Saudi Loans and Financial Assistance to the Sudan As of December 1985 
Project or Loan Value (millions) interest rate 
Rahad PrOject RiYal 98.00 3% 
Port. Sudan Airport Riyal 35.30 2% 
Kassala Haya Road Riyal 91.78 2% 
Western Savanna Development Riyal 30.00 2% 
Microwave (Domestic Satalitc) Riyal 35.30 2% 
Telecommunication Project Riyal 24.70 25 
Education Equipment Riyal 12.30 2% 
Nyala Kass Zalingi Road Riyal 123.60 2% 
Rahad Interior Roads Riyal 20.10 2% 
Kenana Sugar Factory Riyal 20.20 2% 
Gezira Rehabilitation Riyal 56.80 2% 
Balance of Payments 50.00 2% 
Saudi Monetary Agency (loan) $ 200.00 5% 
Saudi Monetary Agency (loan) $ 400.00 5% 
Saudi Monetary Agency Ooan) $ 50.00 5% 
Source: 
-Bank of 
Sudan (1985), Tiventy Sixth Annual Report, Khartown. 
On the political side Saudi Arabia affected both the internal and foreign politics of the 
post. 1971 state in the Sudan. Saudi Arabia tried to achieve an internal strong coalition 
after the defeat of the July 1971 coup attempt which was closely linked with the SCP. 
King Faisal brought Nimeiri and Sheriff al-I-Endie, the leader of the opposition National 
Front to the negotiating table in 1973. By that time Nimeiri felt that he was mastering 
position. He had had success in dismantling the urban democratic movement by detaining 
most of the cadres of the SCP, dissolving the SWUFT and reorganising it according to 
new laws, (see below), on one hand, and he bad brought to an end the civil war in the 
South. The failure of the negotiations drifted at Hindie towards the more radical states of 
Libya and Iraq, while Nimeiri became the ally of the Saudi Arabia Egypt and the Gulf 
states, and the West. In 1976, after the armed military-civilian attempt to overthrow the 
regime in July the second, the Saudi pressed again for the conciliation between Nimeiri 
and the National Front (this time through negotiations with Sadiq al-Mahdi). By 19.76 
18This Nvas the loan which involved later Triad and Adnan Khashogi and began the accustion of 
corruption against Nimeiri's Minister for Special Afairs (see Chapter 4 above). 
173 
assistance was greater than 1973. In May 1977 President Nimeiri announced that he 
decided "in response to the efforts and good offices of ftiendly governments and 
indiWduaIs to welcome all those who have been misled into committing crimes against 
their country" (al-Sahafe4 26 May 1977). 
The Saudis pressed for Islamic laws in the Sudan. In 1975, toto Kora, (the lottery run by 
the government to finance sport and youth activities) was closed. The same year the 
President issued directives for government leading officials to restrain ftom drinking 
alcohol or resign. In both cases general opinion in the Sudan claimed the Saudi were 
behind the actions (ACIý, 1976/77, B 117). After the National Reconciliation, the Saudi 
played their greatest role in influencing the future political development in the country by 
contributing to the promotion of Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan. 
The relation between the Saudi and the Moslem Brotherhood Movement in the Sudan 
began after the October Revolution, when the -Saudi adopted to assist the Sudanese 
Islamic movement through the Patriotic Youth Union19. The organisation kept close 
relations with Prince Mohamed al-Faisal and King Faisal attended one of its festivals. (El 
Effendi, 1991,98). The relation between the Muslim Brothers and the Saudi continued 
after the May Coup through Ali Abdalla Yagoub, the President of PYO, who became an 
employee of Prince Mohamed -Faisal al-Faysall-Faisal. Just before the National 
Reconciliation Prince Mohamed al-Faysal got a licence to establish the Faisal Islamic 
Bank in the Sudan. As 4 main shareholder, he brought the Sudanese Muslim Brothers, as 
shareholders and as management and employees (el-Effendi, 1991; 116) Though the 
Sudanese Muslim Brothers' share in the Islamic Banks was not influential, their "power 
comes from being able to influence loans and other-advances to customers who could be 
supporter" (Ibid, 117) 
For Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan that "was an era 
of Islamic economic activity, which began before the [National] Reconciliation, and 
continued after that. It became one of the institutionalised achievements of the Islamic 
Movement" (El-Tuiabi, 1992,37). The Islamic Banks provided "financing facilities for 
those comn-utted to the rules of Islam ... enabled them to compete and gain profits... which 
increased the donations {to the movement greatly" (Ibid, 88). 
Yet the significance of the Islamic financial institutions, according to El-Effendi, was that 
19EI -Affendi, a Sudanese Islarnic Fundamentalist defined PYO as one of the "sattelite 
orgainsation " which A-as "broadly anti-communist, supported by both Umma and NUP" 
(1991,98) 
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"they opened up avenues of economic mobilityfor many who would otherwise have been at 
most high civil servants [italics added]. In this sense the significance of the Ikhwan [Muslim 
Brothers] mo-, cment is that it represents one important avenues of social, economic and 
political mobility on merit for young people who would have otherwise lacked the necessary 
connection" (EI-Effendi, 1991,119) 
The effect of Saudi capital which established Islamic financial institutions in the Sudan 
was the transformation of the Muslim Brothers Movement from a small movement of 
young professionals and students to a movement of a new capitalist class of merchants 
and financial dealers which attracted through financing a group of craftsmen and owners 
of small workshops. 
5.3.2.2. The US Connect: lon 
The diplomatic relations between the USA and the Sudan were broken when Nimeiri took 
power in 1969. They had been broken since the June 1967 War in the Middle East. The 
relations were restored in July 1972 making the Sudan the first country of the members of 
the Arab League to do so. While the relations were in the process of takeover'O, the 
assassination of the American Ambassador Cleo and. his aide George Moore the 
Palestinian Black September Organisation in March 1973 brought a halt to any 
development. A major set back took place when the. Sudan accepted to transfer the 
convicted assassinates to a PLO Prison to serve their sentences. For the USA government 
that was equal to their release, so the American Ambassador was recalled to Washington 
in protest in June 1974. The USA-Sudan relations kept low profound until the first visit 
of President Nimeiri to the US in June 1976. Despite the interest shown by the private 
American companies to invest. in the Sudan after the visit, the official USA response was 
delayed. The most significant sign of change of attitude was shown in November 1976 
when President Ford decided that the Sudan became eligible for the purchase of American 
military equipment, the Washington Post wrote 
'President Ford has taken another significant step to deepen US involvement in Africa by 
formally declaring that Sud, * the largest country on the continent, is eligible for the purchase 
of American military equipment.. his declaration ... is. a major move in US efforts to 
encourage Sudan to play a role as a buffer state to more'radical Arab and African states 
adjoining it. [emphasis added)" (Washington Post, 17 November 1976). 
Between 1976 and 1980 the USAID was involved in more than 25 projects in the Sudan 
which included projects in agricultural, health and education sectors. The Sudan returned 
to benefit from the programme of PL 480 by buying American wheat and rice and paying 
in local currency. Yet the most important assistance provided by the US, was its 
2OAccording to Saced (1984), an official USA embassy report -, vriten in December 1972 favoured 
expanding economic relations '"ith the Sudan a coference on the trade development between the 
two countries Nvas held in March 1973 in which "the Department of State expressed its support of 
the Sudan's undertaldrig and noted that the US was encouraging the expansion of trade and 
development there" (Saeed, 1984,157) 
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interference to influence the IMF policies towards the Sudan (Brown, 1985,1988 and 
1989). 
The US change of heart was governed by political consideration of the situation in the 
region (both the Middle East and Affica, and in particular the Red Sea region). The first of 
these were the problems in Chad, the west neighbour of the Sudan, and the involvement 
of the Libyan government in these problems. The second was the fall of the old ftiend and 
ally of the US, Emperor 11ile Selassie, and the rise of a left military government (the 
Dergue) led by Mengistu Hailla Mariam in his place2l. The third was the alliance made by 
the left government in the Southern Yemen with Ethiopia and Libya and the involvement 
of the Soviet Union in supplying military equipments to them and the presence of Cuban 
soldiers in Ethiopia. This development put the southern entrance of the Red Sea, Bab al- 
Mandeb under the influence of anti-American powers The fourth consideration was the 
isolation imposed on Egypt by the Arab countries because of its peaceful settlement with 
Israel in Camp David in March 1979 (Ismael and Ismael, 1991,347-8). The Sudanese 
support to Egypt was needed both for security and political reasons. 
As Sudan's strategic position for the security of the region increased, US developed 
economic interests in the Sudan. Chevron Oil company, a subsidiary of Standard OR of 
California (SOCAL), discovered oil in Southern and Western Sudan. Starting its 
operations in Sudan in 1976, and drilling its first well in 1979, by July 1985 Chevron has 
drilled about 88 wells. Chevron was estimated to have spent $500,000 daily in oil 
exploration in the Sudan. 
Sudanese security itself had worsened because of internal and external threats. The 
immediaýe external threat came from Libya which hosted the Sudanese National Front and 
was resulted in practise in the July 1976 insurrection. Ethiopia became another threat as 
the war in Eritrea intensified. President Nimeiri denounced the Ethiopian regime openly 
and accused it of interference in the Sudanese affairs in December 1976 and repeated his 
accusation in January 1977 ACR, 1977, B115). The Ethiopian threat increased in 1983 
when Ethiopia hosted the SPLA/SPLM which started the second civil war in the Sudan in 
September 1983. Internally, despite the National Reconciliation the Sudanese regime 
became more unstable afler 1978 as the economic crisis led to the implementation of the 
austerity measures agreed on with the IMF. The Sudan became dependent of the US and 
Saudi Arabia to bale her out as she was not able to meet her financial obligations towards 
the IMF, a necessary condition for reaching any arrangement concerning the use of the 
IMF facilities. Arrangement with the HvIF turned to be another necessary condition to 
have the Sudanese debt rescheduled in the Paris Club (see below). 
21For interesting account of the development of the relations between the USA and the Dergue 
between 1974 to 1977 when it turned to open hostility see Halliday (1977) 
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Although the US-Saudi-Sudanese relations had always an element concerning Egypt, 
(political pressure on Egypt before 1973, security of Egypt and Egypt as partner in the 
security of the region after 1973), the Sudanese Egyptian relations have always their own 
dynamics. Egypt quest for political influence in the Sudan is historically governed by three 
main concerns: its own security, the Nifle waters, the possibilities of economic benefits 
that arises from the Sudan as a market and as a potential area for investment. 
5.3.2.3.. Spgqial Relation with Eg&pt 
The Sudanese Egyptian relation suffered a temporary set-back in 1972, when Nimeiri, 
after the Addis Ababa Agreement, retreated from the plans to join the Federation of Arab 
Union with Egypt, Libya and Syria. The Sudan restoration of diplomatic relations with 
the USA in July 1972 and the prevention of Libya from fly military assistance to General 
Amin in Uganda in September 1972, increased the tension in the relations between the 
two countries. The Sudan insisted on maintaining its relations with Egypt. The Sudanese 
Foreign Minister told the press in January 1973, 
"Sudanese Egyptian relations ... stem from a common heritage and common destiny which is far larger than any one incident or any one min. Certain instances of misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation. that have occurred last year [19721 have not distressed us... Intense 
diplomatic activity was generated betaven Cairo and Khartoum; exchangevisits and contacts 
between the Socialist Unions in both countries, as well as consultations at higher levels, have 
augured well and ushered an era of vast and genuine co-operation, be that in the fields of 
irrigation, agriculture or communications ... Any system that fails to appreciate, exploit and 
expand areas oftnutual co-operation cannot be useful It goes without slýying that a Sudanese, 
who fails to review these areas of common endeavour within the context of Sudanese interest 
is not worthy of representing his country. Nor is an Egýptian who is not mindful of his 
countrv's best interest worthy ofrepresenting" (ACPL 19773n4, B 107). 
In April 1973, the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union sent a high delegation to Khartoum. In 
May, the same year, President Sadat and Nimeiri discussed the mutual relation in Addis 
Ababa, during their attendance the African Summit. In June the SSU sent a delegation to 
Cairo. The major breakthrough in the relation between the two countries was the signing 
of the Pýrqgramme of Polifical Action and Economic Integration in February 1974 in 
-Alexandria. The joint High Ministerial Committee which was formed accordingly met in 
August 1974 to draw the outlines of the Programme. The Committee decided to form six 
technical committees dealing with different aspects of the Programme. The most 
important item in the Programme was the implementation of Jonglei Canal in accordance 
with the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 between the two countries. The Jonglei project 
provoked a lot of discussions and immediate students demonstrations in the South. (see 
Chapter 4 above). 
Following the July 2,1976 military insurrection in the Sudan and the deterioration of 
relations with Ethiopia in 1976, the Sudan and Egypt signed a Joint Defence Agreement 
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on 20th of July 197621. The Agreement provided that signatories would consider any 
attack on one side as an attack on the other. 
The Egyptian Sudanesý relation became a problem for the Sudanese regime after 
President Sadat visit to Israel in November 1977 and the Camp David Agreement in 
March 1979. The internal effect was its obstruction to the National Reconciliation efforts 
because Sadiq al-Mahdi denounced Sadat's visit and Camp David Agreement. In foreign 
relations Sudan was left with the difficult option of chosing between close relations with 
Egypt or the rest of the Arab countries. Sudan chose to continue its relations with Egypt 
despite a tactical withdrawal of Sudanese ambassador from Cairo. There was a 
strengthening of Sudan's relations with the US, but a worsening Sudanese relations with 
Gulf countries. 
5.4. The Political and Legal Structure of the Authoritarian State 
5.4.1. The Permanent Constitution and the Legal Frame of Authoritarianism 
By' 1973 both the legal and political structures of the authoritarian state were well 
established. The promulgation of the Permanent Constitution of the Democratic Repuýlic 
of the Sudan on the 8th of May 1973 established the basic legal framework of the 
authoritarian state. The Constitution ruled that the Sudan was a single-party state. Article 
4 of the Constitution stated that "The Sudanese Socialist Union is the *sole political 
organisation in the Democratic Republic of the Sudan" (Attorney Generals Chambers, 
1973,2). 
It established a system of presidential republic where the President was "the head of 
state", in whom "vests the executive powers and he participates in making law" (Ibid, 15, 
Article 80). 
The Constitution established a Peoples' Assembly which should be, "together with the 
President", "the legislative power" (Ibid, 2, Article . 118 The Assembly "shall approve 
the General plan for Development, pass the general Budget and exercise supervision and 
control over the Executive " (Ibid). 
The Constitution defined the role, powers and status of some of the already existing 
institutions such as the judiciary, the an-ned forces, the, security forces and the civil 
service. 
When discussing the political institutions established by the 1973 Permanent Constitution 
or codified by it, one has to look at the model theoretically to examine its consistency and 
to examine and evaluate its practical experience. One has to find out whether the crisis of 
22Tbe Agreement was announced after Nimeiri and Sadat met King Khalid of Saudi Arabia in 
Jeddah folloving their joint talks in Alexandria between 13 and 17 July 1976 (ACRý 1976/77, B 
116). 
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these institutions was built in the model or a result of a diversion from that model23 
Those who stood behind the establishment of the system (drafting the Permanent 
Constitution, the Local Government Act, the Basic Rules of the SSU etc) thought they 
had built a system of institution which would allow democratic practises (decision- 
makin& checking and controlling of power) (see for example Khalid, 1985, Chapter 2). 
Theoretically the system raised the question of whether a single-party rule could ever be 
democratic. The one-party system by definition was based on the restriction of the right 
to associations, particularly the right to establish competing parties. Such a restriction 
meant that those who did not agree to be members of the single-party should not 
participate in the political process except as voters in the plebiscite to accept or reject the 
nominee determined by the same single-party or in the elections for the members of the 
Peoples' Assembly or the People Local Councils, where the single party sanctioned the 
norrfinqes. The single party owned all the newspapers while the government owned the 
state radio and television. The State Security Act of 1973 prevented the establishment of 
any political organisation, the holding of any political meetings or the printing or 
distribution of any political publications that oppose the government policy. 
The legal frame of the authoritarian state was tightened after every show of opposition. 
Chapter 4 provided evidence of that. In 1973 after the popular uprising in August, the 
State Security Law was promulgated and the Sudan Criminal Procedure was amended to 
provide for preventive detention without judiciary warrant. In 1975, after the failed coup 
d'6tat of September 5, the Constitution and the State Security Act were both amended to 
ti-hten the hold of the Authoritarian state (see 4.3.1 above). Following the growing 
opposition at the beginning of -1980s (which almost included all the social classes and 
groups, see Subsection 4.3.1 above), the regime announced its islamic Laws in September 
1983 and the state of emergency and the system of Prompt Justice in April 1984. 
5.4.2. The Sudanese Socialist Union 
The model was based on, what was called in the SSU circles, the supremacy and 
governorship of the organisation. 24 It was simply meant that the SSU had to be the ruling 
party, the higher policy and decision maker. The President and all the state apparatus 
within the model would be the executive arm of the SSU that implement the policies and 
decision made by the organisation. The organisation was said to be a popular one which 
represented the alliance of the Peoples' working forceS25 who were identified as the 
workers, farmers, the officers and soldiers, the intellectuals and the national capitalists 
23Though the recent expeience of the collapse of one-party system provides enough evidence of the 
failure of the model, the exercise worth doing because, for this thesis, the study of the crisis in the 
Sudan require doing it. 
24Hakimyat al -Tanziem ? ý-ra Zý-q- 
25Tahaluf Quah al-Shaab al-Amylah ZUtJ --2 Ls. ý -11-5 
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(SSU, 1972,29). Though the organisation was built from above, in its performance it was 
expected to function according to the principal of 'democratic centralism' where the 
leadership was to be elected from the basic units through branch conferences, provincial 
conferences to the national conference that would elect the chairperson and the central 
committee. The elected Chairperson should appoint not more than 10% to be members of 
the Central Committee to assure the representation of the different forces of the Peoples' 
alliance. He should also nominee to the Central Committee a list of persons to be 
members of the political bureau. He had to be the nominee of the SSU to the presidency 
of the Republic. A plebiscite then would be held so the people should approve or 
disapprove the election of the sole nominee to the presidency. 
The Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) was built on the model of the Arab Socialist Union in 
Egypt. President Nimeiri appointed its first preparatory committee in May 1971. In 
January 1972 it held its founding conference, in which it elected Nimeiri as its Chairman, 
adopted its organisational regulations and elected its Central Committee. The Conference 
also adopted a National Charter that defined the nature and objectives of the regime. The 
Conference adopted a new economic programme entitled 'The Interim Action 
Programme', according to which the Five Years Plan 1970/71-74/75, was amended and 
extended to 1976/77. When the first national conference was held in January 1974, the 
President, in his capacity as Chairman', reported the completion of building the structure 
of the SSU (Al Ayarn, 26/l/1974). The second national conference was held in January 
1977, attended by 2,004 delegates and re-elected Nimeiri as Chairman of SSU and the 
sole nominee for the presidency of the republic (Sudanow, March 1977,10). The events 
that followed the second conference provided the most convincing evidence of that the 
SSU was not the policy maker in the country. They proved that the President both in his 
capacity as the president of the Republic and Chairman of the SSU can make decisions 
and undertake -obligations that would changej not only the nature of the regime and the 
policies of the state, but also the history of the country without the mere consultation of 
the SSU. 
Six months after the second conference, on the 12th of July 1977, the President of the 
R epublic held a me-- ting in Port Sudan with one of the leaders of the opposition, Sadiq at 
Mahdi, to discuss a national reconciliation. As Khalid pointed- out rightly that was carried 
behind the back of the SSU, the Council of Ministers and the National Peoples Assembly 
(Khalid, 1993,546-7). The meeting itself reached an agreement -which touched almost all 
aspects of the policies of the state including the structure of the SSU (See Appendix). 
Whatever the real outcome of that agreement, the mere decision to negotiate and sign it 
-without the consultation of the SSU, was not the policy maker in the country as the 
regime used to declare. 
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Following the National Reconciliation, appointed 51 persons as members of the SSU 
Central Committee. The appointment of these new members showed that the SSU Basic 
Regulatigns were not binding to the President because he appointed people who were not 
members in the SSU in its Central Committee and that he had appointed members (51) 
more than the 10% that the Basic Regulations allowed him. 
Although it had been imposed on the SSU, the National Reconciliation, would have 
provided a good opportunity to reorganise the SSU and for the SSU to reclaim its lost 
authority. In reality that was what the modernisers, building on the article in the 
agreement between Nimeiri and Sadiq, proposed in a memorandum submitted by 
Mansour Khalid to the SSU Politburo in May 1978. The memo suggested ten 
recommendations concerning the democratization of the SSU by holding elections to all 
its posts and membership of the Central Committee and the Politburo including the 
election of the SSU Secretary General, who was appointed by the Chairman. It suggested 
that the President should act accordin,,! to the decisions of the Politburo in both capacities 
as President of the Republic and Chairman of the Organisation. It also proposed that the 
speciabsed committees of the SSU should address themselves to the question of policy 
making and plans and programmes drafting. The memorandum suggested that the SSU 
should cut its bureaucratic apparatus and raise its own fund without depending on state 
finance. (Khalid, 1985,178-9, and Khalid, 1993,564-5). The Politburo rejected the 
recommendations. 
In August 1979 the President himself criticized the SSU as being absent in dealing with 
the problems facing the people and being silent or neutral in the face of the corruption in 
the executive organs of the state and the problems facing some development projects (Al- 
Ayam, 7 August, 1979). He attacked the SSU, its structure and its bureaucracy. He 
dissolved its political bureau and Central Committee and appointed a care-taker 
comnuttee to prepare for the third National Conference. Nimeiri dismissed his First Vice- 
President who was holding the position of Secretary-general of the SSU from both jobs. 
He himself took over as Secretary General. He further announced that he would organise 
a new plebiscite, afler the Conference, in which he will seek- re-election as President, 
though his official term would last in March 1983 
The third National Conference of the SSU in 1980 was very special. It came afler the 
President, attacked on the SSU in August 1979. The Conference in addition was the first 
to be held afler the National Reconciliation of 1977/78. The Conference witnessed a 
relatively more open discussion than any of the previous two. The most significant 
discussion was the one on the divisiop of Northern Sudan to regions because it showed 
how strong was the regional movements especially in Darfur and in the Red Sea Hills 
among the Beja people. The representatives of Darfur insisted on having their own 
region, instead of the government's proposal to a united region of Western Sudan which 
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would join Kordofan and Darfur (Sudanow, March, 1980,10). The representatives of the 
Beja refused to be part of the Northern Region and demanded to join Kassala to form an 
Eastern Region (Ibid, 10). The discussion on National Reconciliation suggested that the 
SSU suffered a deep division between the 'old guards' and the 'new comers' and that 
instead of the Reconciliation being the means to resolve the political crisis, it gave new 
dimensions while the SSU remained as inefficient as before. The elected Politburo 
represented the victory of the 'old guards' with Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, 'the leader of the 
Muslim Brothers, the only'new comer' being elected. 
The crisis of the SSU was to be the focus of the political agenda once again when the 
President in his speech in January 1982 before the political and military leadership 
dissolved the SSU. In February 1982 he appointed a Popular Committee to reorganise 
the SSU and in April a Preparatory Central Committee to lead the national political action 
until the Fourth National Conference to be convened in 1983. 
The Fourth National Conference of the SSU was held in February 1983. As if the SSU 
used to practise any power on the executive, the President in his keynote speech to the 
Conference proposed that the SSU should not exercise any authority on the executive. 
Instead it should be indulged in policy making and programmes preparation as well as 
stimulating public debate and discussion on them. As usual the Conference adopted the 
President Programme and nominated him for a third mandate. 
The aftermath of the Fourth Conference provided a new proof for the disrespect of the 
President for his own organisation. The President in. September 1993, announced the 
immediate implementation of Islamic Sharia Law without the consultation of his 
organisation and against his own programme for the third mandate which was discussed 
and adopted by the Fourth Conference. In that programme he pointed that the Islamic 
transformation would be a long-term strategy and that the process of revising the existing 
laws would be slow and cautious and would depend on building religious consciousness 
by "lifting morals and social well-being" (ACR, 1983/84, B60). 
When -the SSU leadership appealed to its members and the population to show their 
support to the revolution on the second of April 1985, the turnout was incomparable with 
the masses who gathered to attend the opposition rally on the third of April. That was 
enough to "convince the military commanders that at least as far as {Nimeiri) and the 
SSU were concerned the Sudanese had made their feelings abundantly clear" as 
Woodward (1986,633) by noted. 
5.4.3. The President: From Member to Master of the Ruling Institutions 
According to the Constitution, the executive owers were vested in the president. The p 
constitution did not establish a council of ministers as an independent institution. Yet it 
empowered the President to appoint a Prime Minister if he wished. The President used 
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that power to appoint a prime minister in August 1976. The appointed Prime Minister 
remained in 1ýs post for 13 months only and was removed in September 1977. Except for 
these 13 months President Nimeiri was also the prime minister. The Constitution did not 
require that the President seek ratification for the appointment of his ministers or aides. 
Article 88 of the Constitution empowered the President to appoint any number of vice 
presidents and relieve them from office without any other institution like the Peoples 
Assembly or the SSU. 
Five persons, all except one were army officers, held the position of the First Vice- 
President. Two of them resigned because of difference of policy (Awadalla in 1972, and 
Mohamed al-Bagir Ahmed in 1977), two were dismissed (Abul Gasim Mohamed Ibrahim 
in 1979 and Abdel Maggid Khalil in 1982), while the fifth was overthrown with Nimeiri in 
1985. Four others, of whom two were Northerners and two were Southerners, held the 
post of Vice-President. While Khalid Hassan Abass resigned as early. as 1972, Abel Alier 
remained Vice-President for 14 years of Nimeiri rule. Though while he was Vice- 
President, the First-Vice President post changed hand several times, he was never 
promoted to First Vice-President. The only apparent reason was that he was a 
Southerner. This is very significant in a country where until Nimeiri's announcement of 
the Sharia Law in September 1983, had a secular constitution and its citizens were 
supposed to be equal. 
During his sixteen years in power, Nimeiri appointed about 128 Ministers to serve in the 
Council of Ministers Table 16 shows the previous occupations of those served as 
ministers between 1969-95. Almost 80% of Nimeiri's ministers came from four 
-occupational backgrounds: 21.9% of the total. were officers, 19.5% were university 
lecturers, 18% were civil servants, 10.2% were lawyers and 10.2% were diplomats. The 
technocrats (mainly engineers, agriculturists and economists) represented 8.6%. 
While Nimeiri's cabinet was dominated by the left groups between 1969-71 (communists, 
Arab Nationalists and their allies), a transitional period, 1971-73, witnessed a council of 
ministers were communists who defected from SCP, Arab Nationalists and independent 
modernizers shared its membership. By 1973 the independent modernisers led by 
Mansour Khalid, Gafar Bakhiet and Abdul Rahman Abdalla26 became the majority of the 
council of ministers and continued to influence the policy making, of the regime until the 
major reshuffle in January 1975. Most of the investment projects which would remain to 
'26T'he group included Ibrahim Muniem Mansour, a director in the Gulf-International which owned 
a number of factories in the Sudan, Wadie Habbashi, ari experienced agriculturist and ex- 
undersecretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Musa Awad Billal, an expert in sugar industry, 
Yahya Abdul Mageed, an engineer and expert in irrigation and water management., and Zaki 
Mustafa, an ex-Dean of the Faculty, of LaNv at the University of Khartoum (information collected 
by the author). 
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remind the people of Nimeiri his regime, had their plans, programmes and decisions 
drafted, passed, contracted, their finance sought or their implementation began or carried 
during this period. It was the period'-when the foreign policy of the regime was directed 
towards serving the investment programme included in the Interim Action Programme 
which amended the Five Years Plan 1970/71-74/75. 
Table 17. The Previous Occupations of Nimeiri's Ministers 1969-85 
Occupation No. % of Total 
Officers 28 21.9 
University Lecturers 25 19.5 
Civil servants 23 18 
Diplomats 13 10.2 
Lawyers 13 10.2 
Technocrat 11 8.6 
Teachers 4 3.1 
Journalists 3 2.3 
Doctors (medical) 3 2.3 
Businessmen 3 2.3 
Workers 1 0.8 
Farmers 1 0.8 
Total 128 100 
Note: 128 ministers were employed by Nimeiri in his 16 years rule, a number of them held several 
nortfolios at different T)eriods, dismissed or shifted to the uolitical oreanisation. and reaDwinted as 
ministers 
Source: Data collected by the author from the Sudanese newspapers and ACR (different issues). 
The January 1975 reshuffle was an important incident, not because reshuffles of the 
council of ministers were rare in Nimeiri's time (see Chapter 4 above); but rather because 
it reflected on the nature of the regime and the role of the President in the SysteM27. It 
was the first public incident, after the promulgation of the Permanent Constitution and the 
apparent establishment of the state's institutions, that showed the disunity of the ruling 
group on one hand and the awareness of the President of it and his attitude to use it to 
promote his own authority on the other hand. Khalid identified three groups within the 
regime until 1978 when the National Reconciliation was adopted. The first group was the 
technocrats and professionals whom he named as the'doers, while the second group was 
constituted of those who were involved in the SSU po litical and organisational activity. 
The third group, according to Khalid, were "the palace queries and place-men" who were 
interested in promoting their own interests (Khalid, 1985,70-1). 
Nimeiri's ability to manoeuvre among the three groups was enhanced by the amendments 
of the Permanent Constitution following the 5 of September coup attempt. Among these 
271n one way it resembled the ma or resuffle of the ministers in October 1969 -which followed the i 
statement made by the then Prime Minister Babik-er Awadalla in the German Democratic Republic 
about the relation of the communists with the regime. 'nat reshuffle sbowed that the real power 
was vested within the military, especially Nimeiri and the Arab Nationalist. The 1975 Showed that 
the real power was vested in the President. 
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amendments in the constitution, the amendment of Article 82 concentrated more powers 
in the hand of the President and declared him "the protector" of the constitution and the 
achievements of the "May Revolution". It reads "And to that effect he may take such 
actions and make such decisions as He deems fit and His decisions in this respect shall be 
binding and valid with accordance with provisions" (DRS: I 973, b, 15) One of the 
draftsmen of the 1973 constitution wrote ten years later that after 
"September 1975 the constitution we had promulgated two years before was 
never the same again, not because of preventive detention, but because of the 
very nebulous addition to articles 881 and 82 which turned out to be pretext for 
undoing the constitution itself" (Khalid, 1985,149). 
The political theatre in the period between 1975-85 was dominated by one man. There 
were almost annual cabinet reshuffles. The leaderslýp of the SSU was also subjected to 
the President's will of change. Ministers who lost their portfolios were appointed to the 
SSU leadership. Except for the Constituent (1971-73) and the first National Peoples' 
Assembly (1974-78), none of the other four elected Assemblies had completed their term, 
because the President dissolved them and called for new elections. Major decisions and 
important legislations during this period were taken by the President without proper 
consultation of the state political, executive and legislative institutions. Among these 
decisions were the National Reconci-liation, the establishment of regional governments in 
the North. (a decision which referred, to the third SSU Conference to ratify after the 
President declared it and appointed a technical committee to determine the boundaries of 
the new regions), the division of the Southern Region and the promulgation of the Sharia 
Law in September 1983. 
5.4.4. The Local and Re2ional Government 
Despite the Peoples Governments Act of 1971, (Ministry of Local Government, 1974,9- 
42), which alleged the transfer of power to the people at their villages, towns and 
provinces, political power- in Northern Sudan remained concentrated in the centre until 
1980 when the Regional' Government Act was passed. In reality the powers of the 
Peoples' local councils established by 1971 Act were a sort of a decoration by virtue of 
Article. 6 of the same act which provided for the appointment of a province commissioner 
and specified his powers. These powers were extended and detailed in 1973 when the 
Minister of Local Governments issued 'The Powers, Authorities and Duties of the 
Commissioners of the Provinces Regulations for 1973' (Ibid, 44-50) and the sin-fflar 
regulations that defined the powers, authorities and duties of the local government 
administrative officers (Ibid, 51-58). According to article 6 of 1971 Act and to the 
regulations issued by the Minýister, the Cormnissioner who was to be appointed by the 
President of the Republic and should be responsible to him (Article 6-1,6-2, Ibid, 12) He 
185 
was to be "the first representative" of the central government in the province (Article 6-3 
of the 1971 Act, Ibid 12, and Articles 4 and 5 of the Regulations, Ibid, 45). The duties 
assigned to the Commissioner made him responsible for the security, the finance, and the 
execution of the state and government policies (Article 6-4,6-5, of the Act, Ibid, 13; and 
article 27 of the regulations, Ibid, 48). He was to be responsible to the consolidation of 
national unity and enlightening and educating the masses and their organisations (Article 5 
and 6 of the Regulations, Ibid, 45). The Commissioner was ex-officio the Chairman of the 
Peoples' Executive Council and his deputy was ex-officio the secretary of the Council. 
Both the 1971 Act and the 1973 Regulations explicitly put the Commissioner above the 
Peoples' Executive council in the province by stating that the Commissioner could over- 
rule any decision taken by the Council which he thought to be in accordance to "the 
public good or the general policy of-the state or endangers the security or violates the 
rights of the citizens or the principle of equity" (Article 6-6 of the Act, Ibid, 13; and 
Article 29 of the Regulations, Ibid, 49). The Commissioner in such cases should repo rt to 
the Council of Ministers and unless the latter objected to the decision of the 
Commissioner, it should be carried (Ibid, same articles). The same scenario was repeated 
in the relation between the local government administrative officer and the correspondent 
local Peoples' council. Generally it could be argued that the Commissioner and the 
Administrative Officer were the real governments in rural Northern Sudan. Since they 
were representing and responsible to the central government, it - seems that power 
remained firmly in the centre. In addition to the powers and authorities of the 
Commissioner and Administrative Officer, ministers in the central government had powers 
to intervene in the work of the local Peoples' councils. The Minis ter of Local 
Governmýnts had the right, according to Article 28, to suspend any local order 
exclusively or partially for three months, during which he had to advice the Council of 
Ministers on whether to repeal or to amend that local order (Ibid, 27). He had the 
authority to instruct the Peoples' Executive Council to promulgate a definite local order 
or ordinance within a specific time limit and the Council should carry the Ministers' 
instruction (Ibid, 27). 
The domination of the centre was not only through the' concentration of political and 
administrative power, it was also practised through the concentration of economic and 
financial power. The local governments remained dependent on the fund transfers from 
the centre to supplement its budget. El Raffia noticed that the "financial weakness of local 
government units is an extremely potent factor in the failure to fulfil the goals and 
objectives of 1971 Act" (EI-Arifi, 1978,25). 
In 1980 regional governments were established in Northern Sudan. The five regions of 
Darfur, Kordofan, the Central, the Eastern and the Northern were to have their 
governors, regional governments and regional peoples' assemblies. Khartoum would 
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have a commissioner and a people' local council. the regime justified the move as an 
attempt for bringing government closer to the people and widen popular participation. ' to 
stimulate and to take the burden of local issues from the central.. government to increase 
efficiency in delivering the public goods locally and nationqlly. These aims were not fully I z: 1 - 
achieved during. The regional peoples' assemblies' elections draw the attention of many 
people and the competition among some of the nominees contesting in these elections 
was high. Most of the competition was on tribal or clan basis. The Tribal competition 
intensified when it came to the nomination of the governors and their deputies and the 
appointments of regional ministers. Instead of providing for national unity, it seems that 
regionalisation renewed tribalism which was a dying phenomena in Northern Sudan. In 
practise the powers of the Governors, their appointment by the President (though from a 
list of nominees suggested by the Regional Peoples' Assembly and the Regional 
Conference of the SSU), to whom they were held responsible for the good administration 
of the region, made the Governor both powerful and weak. He was very powerful as 
representative'of the President and the Central Government and weak as representative 
for his region. The case of Darfur Governor who tried to be a real 'representative of his 
region compelled him to resign and flee the country during the farriine in 1983 (see 
Chapter 4 above). 
The experience of regional governments in the North for five years (1980-85), confirmed 
both the Southern experience (1972-85), that political power without funds would 
achieve too little. The 1980 Regional Government Act assigned the regional governments 
the task of the development and utilisation of financial resources in the region (Article 
8b), the organ isation of trade, commodities, cooperation and industries in the region, and 
the organisation and provision of care for agriculture, pastures, and animal wealth in the 
region. Yet the Act did not provide for any satisfactory sources of finance to carry these 
tasks or any other duties of a good government. The act specified four sources for 
regional revenue: !0 revenue obtained from commercial, industrial and agricultural 
projects and activities in the region; 2)funds approved by the national government to the 
regions; 3)loans and donations; and 4) direct and indirect taxes levied by the region. For 
the period 1980-85, the only source proved to be practical was the funds provided as 
subsidies by the central government. 
The Central Government subsidy constituted 80% of the revenues of the Northern 
Region between 1980/81-1983/84. They were 66%, 67%, 68%, 80% and 69% of the 
revenue of the Eastern, Central, Darfur Regions and Khartoum Commission for the same 
period (1980/81-1983/84) respectively. Most of the subsidy was used to finance the 
increase of regional governments employment. The regional budgeted posts increased 
from 218,792 to 250,200 between 1980 and 1985 (of these posts 109 thousands were 
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classified jobs in 1980/81 and they increased to 126 thousands in 1984/85) (11LO, 1986, 
124). 
By the end of Nimeiri regime it was clear that the financial burden of the regional 
government was greater than what an economy in crisis can bear. If the announcement of 
the regional system government was an attempt by the regime to shift the pressure of the 
political and economic crises from single unified centre in Khartoum to many several 
regional capitals, in reality it concentrated the financial crisis of the state, and focused the 
concern of the people in the regions on the economic crisis as general. the question of 
uneven development as a cause of regional dissatisfaction was no resolved (see section 
6.3 below). 
5.5. The Policies of the State 
5.5.1. The Interim Action Pr9grarnme 
In November 1972, the SSU approved the Interim Action Programme to amend the Five: 
Years Plan for Economic and Social Development for the years 1970/71-74/75 and to 
extend it to 1976/77. The Programme was adopted by the President as his I programme 
for the remaining of his presidential mandate (until 1977). The Programme shifted the 
emphasis of public investment from increasing production by the utifisation of existing 
capacities and limited new investment in agriculture and industry to investment in 
infrastructure especially road construction and a wide range of projects 'in agriculture and 
agro-industry. the Programme envisaged a total investment of LS666.2 million. The 
transport and communication sector was allocated LS228 millions which amounted to 
34% of the total investment of the Programme. The share of the agricultural sector was 
reduced from 38% in the Five Years Plan to 23% in the Interim Programme. The share of 
industrial sector was increased to 19% as compared with the previous 17%. The share of 
services declined to 14% as compared to 201/o in the Five Years Plan.. 
The financing of the Programme depended on internal- and. external borrowing. The 
government accumulated debt to the Central Bank increased from LS149 million in 1973 
at the beginning of the implementation of the programme to LS 610 million by the end of 
its period in 1977 (Bank of Sudan, 1973,1977 The private sector's debts to the banking 
system increased at the same period from LS 107 to LS287 million (Ibid). 
The Government foreign borrowing increased from LS 18.4 million in 1969 to LS 21.7 
million in 1973, jumped to LS 137.6 million in 1974, when it began to decline until 1977 
when it reached LS 26.5 million. 
By the end of the programme period, Sudan foreign debts amounted to LS356.4 million 
($ 891 million, 1977 prices). Table 17 shows the net disbursement of concessionary 
development assistance provided to Sudan by different sources between 1973 and 1978. 
188 
Table 18. Concessionarv Develonment Assistance 1973-1978 (Net Disbursement i 
US $ milligg) 
SOURCE 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Western Europe 42.6 54.4 110.3 115.6 109.2 224.2 
OPEC(ARAB) 3.3 80.0 188.2 253.2 111.3 71.7 
Ex5tern Europe 8.8 -- 10.9 -2.0 -6.2 -6.1 -3.3 
China 7.9 9.2 3.4 2.8 2.7 
SOURCE Tdialid, 1985,68 
By 1975, the ability of the Sudan to pay its debts was deteriorating. The actual debt 
service ratio increased from 11.2% of the total exports earnings in 1972 to 23% in 1974 
and in 1975 it pointed to 31.4% of export earnings. It declined to 27.2% in 1976 and to 
16.6% in 1977. 
It was during this period 1973-77 that the main causes of the particular economic crisis 
began to gather. The Interim Action Programme ignored the renewal, replacement of the 
tools of the production of the existing schemes. The Programme did not provide for the 
investment in the development of the energy resources. The shortages in electricity supply 
Was evident and causing low capacity utilisation in some main industries (Bank of the 
Sudan, 1976,14; 1977,14; etc). The Railway transported less freight in 1976/77 
compared to 1970 (82% of the 1970/71), (Sudanow, April 1982,24-25). All the other 
symptoms of the crisis began to manifest clearly: low productivity and yields, balance of 
trade and balance of payment deficit, high rates of inflation.. etc (see Chapter 4 above), 
5.52. The IMF and the Abortion of the Six Years Plan 
Despite the clear manifestation of the economic crisis, the government insisted on 
drawing a new optimistic Six Years Plan of Economic and Social Development (1977/78 
-192/83), QJinistry of National Planning, 1977). The Plan which was the expression of 
the 'Bread'- basket strategy, was aborted just after one year of implementation. It was 
replaced by a three years rolling Public Investment Programme. The main target became 
the rehabilitation of existing schemes and projects and the completion of the on-going 
projects from the interim Action Programme. 
As shown in Section 5.4.1 above, by the end of the Interim Programme period, Sudan 
foreign debts amounted to LS356.4 million ($ 891 million, 1977 prices). As the debt 
service burden reached 23.1 % and was expected to increase as more debt maturated and 
interest payment were due to be paid, Sudan tried to seek re-scheduling arrangements for 
its outstanding debts, but in vain, because such arrangements required an agreement with 
the IMF, which the Sudan failed to reach before 1978. 
By June 1978 the Sudan began to implement a series of arrangements with the IMT. The 
first of these was a'Credit Tranche Purchaseof SDR (Special Drawing Rights) 21 million 
on June 1978 and an Extended Facility and Compensatory Financing of $90 million. It 
was followed by a declaration by the Sudanese Government of the Economic Reform 
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Programme'. Tle programme included a devaluation of the Sudanese pound from 
$2.8715 to $2.5 per Sudanese pound which amounted to 13%. 
In May 1979 a three years Extended Fund Facilities' of SDR 200 million was reached. In 
September 1979 the Sudan announced the Economic Stabilization Programme which 
included a new devaluation and the establishment of a foreign currency market (though 
deals were limited to commercial banks) allowing the free movement of foreign currency 
from and into the Sudan (Al Ayarn Newspaper, 16.9.1979) 
One year later the Sudan asked for an increase of the Extended Facility to SDR 427 
million which she obtained. In November 1981 an Economic Recovery Programme' was 
announced. The Programme included a new devaluation. It further removed immediately 
subsidies on petrol and petroleum products and phased the removal of subsidies on sugar 
and wheat eighteen months. The programme committed the government. to cut its 
expenditure and its borrowing from the central bank, to increase indirect taxation on 
imports and to replace the share-cropping system in the public irrigated schemes by a new 
system of land and water charges system. The programme also announced the 
government intention to the rationalisation of the public sector and to ensure its 
management according to commercial principles (El Ayam Newspaper, 10.11.198 1). The 
programme paved the way for an agreement on February 1982 on a one year 'Stand-by 
Arrangement' of SDR 190, million. In November 1982 another devaluation was 
announced to provide for a new Stand-ýby Arrangement February 1983 and another one in 
June 1984. The latter was shelved after 17 days only because the Sudan failed to meet its 
financial obligations towards the IMF. The Sudan by . the time had $18 millions of arrears 
on payment due to the IMF. The United States government intervened to bail out the 
Sudan by diverting the amount required from USAID funds already committed to the 
Sudan to be paid to the IMF (Brown, 1985,5). 
These. IMIF arrangements resulted in five direct and six indirect devaluations of the 
Sudanese pound from $2.87 per LS in 1977 to $0.40 per LS in 1985, a total devaluation 
of 86.1%. Table 18 shows these changes in the Sudanese currency. 
As early as 1982, Professor M. H. Awad, a prominent Sudanese economist who resigned 
as Minister of Trade in opposition to the devaluation in June 1978, pointed out that 
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"[It] is clear that the FRP [Economic Reform Programme], ESP[ economic Stabilisation 
Programme] and ERP [Economic Recovery Programme] have failed to produce the intended 
rise in exports. fall in imports, increase in capital inflows and reduction in inflation rates. But 
they have succeeded in a) curtailing our growth rate, b) increasing living costs tremendously, 
c) redistributing income from the poor to the rich, d) encouraging capital flight, and e) 
creating a speculative atmosphere in the country, so that no one wanted to invest in 
agriculture or industry and all wanted to speculate in land, hard currencies and hoarded goods 
and f) encouraged dealing in luxuries at the expense of essentials with controlled prices. " 
(Awad, 1982,21) 
Chapter 4 noted that the economic situation in the Sudan deteriorated after 1979. The 
IMF policies deepened the economic crisis instead of resolving it. By doing that, they 
contributed to political instability and the erosion of the legitimacy of the state. Evidence 
of political unrest accompanied every announcement concerning the devaluation, the 
removal of subsidies and the increase of indirect taxation is shown in Chapter 4 above. 
Table 19. Devaluations of the Sudanese Pound 1978 -1985 
Date Actual Price Official Price 
(in US $) (in US S 
May 1978 1.75 2.87 
June 1978 1.50 2.50 
September1979 1.25 2.00 
November 1981 Free 1.11 
June1982 0.881 1.11 
Novemberl981 0.48-0.58 0.77 
March 1983 0.57 0.77 
May 1983 0.48-0.55 0.77 
June 1983 0.43 0.77 
October 1984 0.35-0.44- 0.77 
Decernber1984 0.22-0.29 0.77 
February 1984 0.22-0.29 0.40 
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, (1986), (in Arabic), The Report ofthe 
Technical Committeefor Evaluating the Relation ofthe Sudan, the A, fF, and the World Bank August 
1986 Khartoum. 
5.5.3. The Poligy Towards P6vate Investmen 
Chapter 3 argued that the tendency to co-opt the Sudanese capitalist class into the regime 
started as early as February 1971 and was followed after the events of July 1971 by the 
decisions of denationalisation and deconfiwation and by issuing a new act to promote 
industrial investment. It included the dissolution of trade unions and their re-organisation 
according to the Labour Trade unions Act of 1971. These decisions were followed by a 
number of legislations to promote private investment in all fields. In 1974' the 
Development and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act was revised to extend the tax 
holiday to be granted to new investors from five years in the 1972 Act to ten years. The 
guarantees and concessions in the 1972 Act were extended when the act was replaced by 
the Development and Encouragement of Industrial Investment Act of 1974. The new act 
clearly stated that no distinction was to be made in granting the licenses or concessions 
between private or public enterprises, or between national or foreign capital. (Nfinistry of 
Industry, 1974, Section 15). 
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The concessions were wended to non-manufacturing investment when a new act to 
encourage investment in non-manufacturing- activities (tourism, transport and storage) 
was promulgated in 1974 as 'The Organisation and Encouragement of the Investment in 
Economic Services Act'28. The objectives of the act were stated as 
"to encourage the investment of foreign and national capital in economic 
services in the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, with the view to realizing the 
state's economic plans or, of accelerating the economic growth of the country, 
by granting concessions, facilities and guarantees which would achieve these 
objectives. " (DRS, 1974, Act No. 18,1974, sect. 4). 
The Minister of National Economy was empowered by the act to grant the approved 
enterprises a range of concessions including allocating land at low prices, business profit 
tax holidays, exemption from paying custom duties on imported materials and equipment 
... etc. As 
in the tradition of industrial investment acts, guarantees against nationalisation 
and confiscation were clearly stated as well as guarantees to transfer profits of foreign 
capital invested. 
It was followed in 1976 by 'The Promotion of Agricultural Investment Act' to encourage 
agricultural investment. The Minister of Agriculture, Food and National Resources Was 
authorised to grant new agricultural projects similar concessions to those granted to 
investors in industry and economic services. 
The whole legislation package to encourage private investment was unified in the 
Encouragement of Investment Act of 198029 which created a new governmental body 
called 'the General Secretariat for Investment' which was responsible to the Minister of 
Finance and Economic Planning to simplify and shorten the procedure of issuing 
investment licences. 
The authority to approve new investment in industry, agriculture and economic services 
was assigned to the Minister of Finance. and Economic Planning. The Minister was 
authorised to grant new approved projects concessions which included business profit tax 
holidays, exemption from paying excise and customs duties, allocating land at low prices, 
and taking adequate protection measures by restricting or raising custom duties on 
competing imported goods. The Act continued the grantees as to nationalisation, 
confiscation and the transfer of profits of foreign capital. 
2Me act was first issued by the President as Provisional Order No. 14, and mas confirmed after 
being passed by the National Peoples' Assembly and signed by the President as Act No. 18 for the 
Year 1974. 
2971"his act repealed the three acts; `Ihe Development and Encouragement of Industrial Investment 
of 1974, "Tbe Organisation and Encouragement of Investment in Economic Services Act of 
1974', and Me Development and Promotion of Agricultural Investment of 1976". 
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5.5.4. Poli Towards Foreign Capital 
In addition to the guarantees and concessions provided for in the above legislations, the 
government policy towards foreign capital was characterised by forrrdng joint ventures 
with public and private sector in industry, agriculture, banking and transport. In March 
1974 a decision issued by the President established a special financial institution the 
Sudan Development Corporation, (SDC), to promote the joint venture. Its authorised 
capital is $500 million while its paid capital was $200 nffionS30, paid by a loan guarantied 
by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The SDC was assigned the role of bringing together 
foreign and local investors. 
Table 20. Proiects rinanced bv the Sudanese Investment CorDoration 1974-84 
(miH ion of dollars ) 
Sub-sectorst Total Cost SDC SDC Employment 
Contribution Contribution. 
as % 
TexWe 249.2 36.3 14.6 5,628 
Food Industry 836.8 64.0 7.8 22,291 
Transport 55.3 16.8 30.0 81 
Housing and Construction 28.8 28.4 98.6 
Total 1170.9 145.5 12.4 28,000 
Source: Ministry- Finance and National Planning (1985), Ae Economic Survey 1984- 
85, p. 168 
By 1985 the SDC was able to attract $1,250 million in the joint ventures formed under its 
supervision. Table 17 shows the sectoral distribution of the projects in which the SDC has 
contributed financially. 
In the period 1972-81 there were 58 joint venture projects in the Sudan with an 
estimated capital of LS 413 millions (1982 prices) (Gad Karim, 1986,26). About 27 
enterprises owned by foreigners were established during the same period (Ibid, 26). Table 
20 shows the distribution of both joint ventures and enterprises* according to different 
econon-k sectors and sub-sectors. 
3Me SDC recieved only $190 million from the loan and it NNTote the remaining $10 million as a 
loan to the government. 
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5.6. The Particular Economic Crisis 1973-1985. 
The particular economic crisis under the Nimeiri regime was the result of two main 
effects. The first was the long- run effect of the economic stnicturel, inherited from the 
colonial period and sustained, though expanded, by the post-colonial state. This long-run 
effect will be discussed in Chapter 6. The second effect was the result of the particular 
policies of the Nimeiri regime which responsible for two Idnds of interrelated crises: the 
simple and the extended reproduction crises. The first generally produced the decline in 
productivity and yields and the low capacity utilisation of the schemes and establishments 
inherited by Nimeiri from the previous regimes. The main reason behind that trend was 
the absence of maintenance and renewal. The crisis of simple reproduction was one of the 
replacement of used means of production. The second crisis of extended reproduction 
was different from the ordinary extended reproduction crises of over-production, under- 
consumption or disproportionate sectoral investment (though it involves an element of 
disproportionate distribution of investment), as it will be shown below. Its main result 
was the low or no returns from the newly established projects, with their consequences on 
internal and external debt and inflation. 
The particular economic crisis of the Nimeiri regime was that the old productive schemes 
declined while the new one's were not implemented on time and some never implemented 
despite the money spent in importing their equipment (ie Melut sugar factory and Gadow 
Spinning and Weaving Factory). Even those implemented, did not utilize their full 
capacity and most of them continued to produce at belowýeconon-k capacity level. 
5.6.1. The Simle Reproduction Crisis 
In capitalist production simple -reproduction is. hypothetical, because capital by definition 
is an expanded value. The concept is used here on the same hypothetical meaning 
assun-dng that all the economic surplus produced is consumed, still there is that part of the 
constant capital transferred into ýhe product which has to be maintained to permit the 
repetition of the production process (this is in analogy with Marx's hypothetical capitalist 
who consumes all the surplus value that has been realized). 
By 1976/77 the symptoms of a simple reproduction crisis began to show up, the economy 
was not maintaining, renewing or replacing some of its fixed capital: its machines, 
irrigation network, railway locomotives and waggons ... etc. In Gezira Scheme for 
example, the sharp decline in output in 1975/76 was a resultant of decline in both yields 
and area cultivated The Bank of Sudan in its annual report of 1976 stated that "In Gezira 
Scheme (bwluding the Mwiqgil Extenmon), the area under cultivadon decreased 
suhstantially hy 35%"(Bank of Sudan: 1976,6). The Government appointed a Cotton 
'See Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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Technical Committee to investigate the reasons. The decline in output and area continued 
through -1976/77-1978/79 and in response a Tact Finding Commission' in the Ministry Of 
Agriculture was appointed. In 1981, by the time it was not a secret any more, the Bank 
reported that the decline in cultivated area was due to "inadequate irrigation, shortage of 
machinery neededfor landpreparation... " (Bank of Sudan: 1981,11). Al Amin Ali noted 
that by 1979 only 50% of the Gezira Scheme's crawlers, deep blades, disc ploughs, 75% 
of its harrow ploughs and 30% of its land levellers were in good working condition (Al 
Amin Ali: 1990,25 8). 
Other irrigated agricultural schemes were facing similar problems. The Economic and 
Social Research Council reported on the situation in the Blue N-fle and White Nile 
Corporation showing that both pumps and agricultural machines and equipments were 
obsolete to the extent that they hindered irrigation and proper agricultural operations 
(Economic and Social Research: 1978,43). These results were confirmed by a 
Commission appointed to study the future of the two corporations (Report of the 
Commission, 1983,7). 
Awad (1983) ac cepts the argument that the decline of Sudanese economy during the 
1970's was the result of the neglect of maintaining the existing schemes, but he goes 
further to argue that was partially because the World Bank "refused to assist in the 
rehabilitation of existing schemes until the recommendation of the Rist Mission of 1966 as 
to changing production relation had been implemented" (Awad, 1983,13). This seems to 
be true because the IBRD, during the same period, contributed to the finance the new 
Rahad Scheme in wlých the water charge and land rent system was implemented. The 
IBRD also launched a large rehabilitation of the irrigated agriculture just after Sudan was 
compelled to implement the water charge and land rent system as a part of the EMF- 
World Bank package in 198 1. 
Industry faced the same problem. The Bank of Sudan stated that the Sudanese industries 
encountering some problems concerning the under-utilization of capacity which were due 
to " obsolete and inefficient machinery, shortage in raw material, failure in electric 
power, transporting bottle-necks wid morketingproblems"(13 ank of Sudan: 1978,14) 
The transport sector had faced similar problem. The best example was Sudan Railways 
which reported to the National Economic Conference in 1986 that by 1983/84 only 34% 
of its steam and diesel locomotives, 72.9% of its freight waggons, and 71% of its oil- 
tanks waggons were in a satisfactory condition. 
The problem extended to the education and health sectors where the buildings of schools 
and hospitals were not maintained regularly and obsolete implements were not replaced. 
Generally the problem reflected the irrationality in resource allocation and the inefficiency 
of the management of the economy if looked to from one side, and reflected a new 
pattern of capital accumulation and class interests from another side. For example the 
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allocation of financial resources in the government current budget favours defence and 
security compared to economic and social service. In the period 1969/70-80/81 all 
economic and social services' share in current government expenditure was 15.9%, while 
that of defence was 17.8% of the total expenditure. The average expenditure of the 
Ministry of Irrigation and Hydro-electric Power for 13 years (1971/72-1983/84) was LS 
13.7 million per year while that for defence and security was LS 84.3 million (calculated 
from Ministry of Finance, different years). This irrational allocation of the state financial 
resources was governed by the fact of the dependence of the state on the muitary for its 
survival. Since the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 and until the restart of the civil war in 
1983, the Sudanese army was enjoying the longest peaceful period in its history. 
The inefficiency in the management had many examples, but to take one concerning the 
underpricing of public sector's commodities. Government was paying a price for local 
sugar which was far behind the international price and the consumer retail price in the 
p eriod 1971/72-1980/81. The international price in 1971/72 was LS 55/ton while the 
government was paying LS 46. In 1972/73 the price for the imported sugar increased to 
LS 135 while that paid for the local sugar increased to LS 52. In 1974/75 the international 
price increased to LS 465 and that paid to local factories increased to LS 101. The 
government kept a difference LS 162 in 1980/81 between the price of the imported (LS 
525) and that locally produced. When local factories needed funds for the spare parts and 
the renewal of machinery, they had to wait in the queue for public funding. 
Another example was the loss from the decline in cotton output in 1975/76 which was 
equal to 500,000 bales of export value of LS 100 million, enough in 1975/76 prices to pay 
for the rehabilitation of the Scheme and save substantial losses thereafter. 
The National Energy Plan Committee estimated that in mechanised agriculture there a 
loss of LS18.5 was incurred for each unavailable gallon of gasoline costing LS2.7 
(Ministry of Energy, 1985,7). In 1983 the loss incurred due to energy shortage was 
estimated to be LS 13 3 million (Ibid, 7). 
The crisis of simple reproduction could also be attributed to the shift of resources to the 
extended reproduction, the new schemes, though most of the latter were financed by 
external resources and internal deficit finance. 
5.6.2. The Extended Reproduction 
The concept of extended reproduction is usually used to define the process of capital 
accumulation where part of the surplus value is used to expand the production process. In 
the Sudan most of the investment programme of the 1973/74-1977/78 was financed by 
borrowing from external sources while the local component of the investments was 
financed by borrowing from the central bank (see Chapter 4). Instead of allocating these 
resources or part of them for renewing the existing capital stock and raising the efficiency 
197 
of capacity utilization, new investment were planned. The Interim Action Programme 
which replaced the Five Years Plan (1970/71-1974/75) in 1972 aimed at achieving self- 
sufficiency in a number of agricultural and manufactured commodities Eke wheat, rice, 
sugar and textile. The crisis of simple reproduction would have appeared less significant if 
this programme would have achieved its goals. 
The new schemes and projects were not implemented on time, and some never 
implemented despite the money spent in importing their equipment (ie Melut sugar 
factory and Gadow Spinning and Weaving Factory). Delays in implementation was a 
serious problem because it involved direct and indirect costs. The direct costs include the 
increase in the costs of implementation due to inflation, insurance cost of labour ... etc The 
indirect costs which are, usually, more important include the costs of delay in debt service 
(when the project is financed by a loan or expected to contribute to exports earnings to 
meet part of the debt burden, or to substitute imports, allowing the use of freed resources 
to meet other external obligation ... etc), 
loss of income and losses incurred by other 
projects depending on the output or service of the project. The delays also contributed to 
the inflation both through cost-push and demand push inflation. 
In irrigated agriculture the Rahad Scheme was completed six years behind schedule due 
to the long process of negotiation with the World Bank. Road construction had the least 
delay period of-36% of the planned. In industry the delay period was 113% of planned 
implementation period. , 
The industrial programme of the Nimeiri regime was an example of the cost to an 
economy from implementation delays. The cost of sugar imports borne by the Sudanese 
economy as a result of the delays in implementing the planned sugar factories in Sennar 
and Assalya amounted to $193 million in the period 1975/76-1980/91. The costs of delay 
of the textile programme of six weaving sheds and three spinning factories was estimated 
to be around LS 82 million between 1976-1980. (El Tayeb and El Tayeb: 1984,43). The 
delay caused some LS 34 million as direct co sts for both industries. (lbid, 43) 
The failure of new'investments to contribute to production and hence to release funds for 
debt servicing contributed to the accumulation of external and internal debt. With the 
decline in exports and increase in imports due to the collapse of old schemes and 
industries, the balance of payments deficit increased and the economy became unable to 
service the debt. By 1977/78 the Sudan was to seek the assistance of the ROF and the 
World Bank to ease its balance of payments deficit, to re-schedule its debt and to seek 
finance for the rehabilitation of its existing projects and schemes. The period 1978/79- 
1984/85, the Sudanese state was under the pressure of the international institutions on 
one hand and the popular opposition on the other. The austerity measured suggested by 
the IMF, led to the fhH of the Nimeiri regime bending the solution of the economic and 
political crisis of the country. 
198 
5.6.3. The Financial Crisis of the State 
The essence of the financial crisis of the state is the decline of its ability to capture enough 
portion of the actual economic surpluS2 to provide for the goods and services expected by 
the population in order to sustain its legitimacy. This suggests that there two sides of the 
financial crisis of the state: the first the actual portion it has captured of the economic 
surplus, ie its actual revenue; while the other side is the actual value of goods and services 
it is able to supply, ie its actual expenditure. In responding to its own financial crisis, the 
Sudanese state was "caught within a set of contradictory institutional imperatives", to 
borrow Habermas perception of the state legitimation crisis: "if it responds to one set, it 
undermines the rationality of the economy, and if it responds to others, it depletes the 
legitimacy the state itself " (Connolly, 1984,12). 
Chapter 2 has argued that the colonial state. kept a low level of direct taxation to avoid 
discontent. The colonial state depended on indirect taxation and income from state owned 
(or shared) production or economic service entities (ie Gezira Scheme, the Railways, the 
Post etc. ). The post-colonial state before the May 1969 depended financially on the 
increasing indirect taxation and introdu ' cing new 
direct taxes as well, as the stagnant and 
declining revenues from the state owned production and services activities. When the 
Nimeiri regime nationalised and confiscated a number of private foreign and local 
companies in 1970, the state became the potential holder of a greater portion of the 
economic surplus. From 1973 this potentiality declined and the Sudanese state faced a 
deep financial crisis. Chapter 4 has shown the increasing deficit in the public budget from 
1970/71 to 1984/85. The figures in Chapter 4 show that the government current revenue 
increased by. 18% while its expenditure increased by 20% annually'for the period 
1970/71-1984/85. The public enterprises instead of providing the government with 
substantial revenue, became receivers of government subsidy. Their deficit increased by 
16.2% per annum during the same period. There were two main reasons behind that poor 
performance. The first and this mainly concerned the public agricultural enterprises was' 
the obsolete level of institutional articulation of modes of production that governed the 
production relation in Sudanese irrigated agriculture until 1981. This will be discusses in 
Chapter 6 below. The second reason which has been discussed in subsection 5.6. L is the 
neglect of maintenance and renewal of the tools of production and the shortage in the 
supply of raw materials, what is defined as the crisis of simple reproduction. 
The state to increase its revenues was left with the unpopular alternative of increasing 
direct and indirect taxation. Table 20 shows how some items of direct and indirect 
213aran defines the actual economic surplus as "the difference between society's actual current 
output and its actual current saving" (Baran, 1962,22). 
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taxation increased dramatically during the period under study. The inflationary result of 
increasing custom duties, which were mainly laid on import items, and excise duties, 
which were mainly laid on locally produced goods and services, was obvious. This was 
even linked to the cycle of devaluation and inflation3 which governed the Sudan economy 
since the first direct devaluation in 1978. 
Table 22. The Value and Growth Rates of Some Items of Direct and Indirect 
Taxation 1974/7&83/84 
Revenue Item Average Average Average Average Average 1983/84 grouth 
1974n5- 1977n8- gmw-th 1980/81- growth rate 
77M 79/80 rate 82/83 rate 
Custom Duties 139.5 234.5 68.1% 498.5 104.7% 722.1 44.8% 
Excise Duties 42.9 68.2 5910/0 98.5 44.4% 148.2 50.4% 
Business Tax 25.6 41.6 62.5% 85.5 105.5% 175.7 105.4% 
Personal Income 
Tax 8.5 18.4 116.5% 56.3 206.0% 61.4 9.1% 
Sourcc: Calculated from Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Economic Survey, various 
issues, 1975-1985 
The other side of the financial crisis of the state was the rapid increase of its expenditure. 
The volume and structure of the state expenditure did not express the optimal utifisation 
of resources. It was affected by the nature of the authoritalian state on one hand and the 
increasing demand for public goods and services by the population on the other hand. 
5.6.4. The IMT, the Debt Crisis and the Rescheduling Illusion 
By the mid seventies as argued above Sudan was not able to serve her debts. Sudan 
sought the resheduling of debts through the Paris Club. Between November 13th 1979 
and May 3rd 1984 the Sudan signed four agreements to re-schedule her due debts under 
the auspices of Paris Club(l). Although, legally speaking, the term "agreements" was not 
used in Paris Club ("Agreed Minutes" was used to describe the re-scheduling 
arrangements signed ). The tenn're scheduled agreements' is used here to refer to these 
Agreed Minutes". 
The first re-scheduling agreement was signed on November 13th 1979 between the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan (DRS. ) and eleven creditor countries, (this agreement 
will be referred to as Paris Clubl). The creditor countries were Austria, Belgium, 
Dem-nark, France, F. R- of Germany, Italy Japan, Holland, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America. The second agreement, ( Paris Club2), was 
signed on March the 18th 1982 with Canada and Norway in addition to the countries 
signed Paris Clubl. Spain and Sweden joined the third agreement, ( Paris Club3), of 
3The cycle worked in this manner: devaluation would lead to inflation Which would lead to rise in 
wages and salaries, w1lich lead to government increasing indirect taxation and its borrowing from 
central Bank to finance increase in wages and salaries which would increase inflation leading to 
new devaluation ... etc; to mention only some elements of the cycle. 
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February 14th 1983 to bring the number of creditor countries to fifteen, all of them 
involved in the fourth agreement of May 3rd 1984. 
The four "Agreed Minutes" between the Democratic Republic. of The Sudan and the 
western creditor countries in the Paris Club were generally identical in structure and 
similar in contents. They were composed of five sections. The first section is a preamble 
that outlines the countries involved in the meeting, the international and regional 
organizations attending the meetings as observers, the place and the date of the meeting. 
The second section defines the debts to be re-scheduled and the terms of consolidation 
and the rates of interests to be paid. The third section outlines the general conditions 
while the fourth lays down specific conditions to be met before the implementation of the 
agreed minutes. The fifth section includes the signatures of the chairman of the Paris 
Club, the representatives of the Sudan and the creditor countries. 
The most important items of the "Agreed Minutes " were the conditions made for the 
implementations of the re-scheduling arrangements. Section four makes the clear 
condition that, 
"the provisions of the present agreed minutes will apply provided that the 
Goverm-nent of D. R. of S. has an effective arrangements with the IMF-in upper 
credit tranches. For this purpose, the Government of the D. R-of S. agrees that 
the EMF inform the chairman of this creditor group regarding the status of 
Sudan relations with the IMF. "( Section 4: 3). 
This condition was made in all agreed minutes despite the fact that the delegation of the 
Sudan, "oullined the serious economic andfinancial difficulties faced by their country 
twid the strong determination of their goveniment to reduce the economic andfinancial 
imbalances and to reach the targets of the pLegram undeLlying the stand-by 
! Lný, an igments with the Inteniational MoneLaa FujuL " temphysis is addeL&Sectionl: 3). 
The IMF representative were there to give their testimony on 
"the economic situation of the Sudan and the major elements of the adjustment 
program undertaken by the government of the Sudan and supported by a 
twelve-month stand-by arrangement with the IMF" (Section 1: 3). 
For the participating creditor countries what was important was not only "their taking 
note of' the measures of adjustment program undertaken by the government of the 
Sudan, but also "the importance they attach to the continuing and M implementation of 
this program, in particular the revitalization of the productive sector of the economy and 
the improvement of public finance and foreign exchange management. " (section 1: 4) So 
the RVIF was appointed a 'watch-dog' to "inform the chairman... regarding the status of 
the Sudan relations with the IMF" (Section 4: 3). Future debt re-scheduling was also 
conditional on "the Sudan continues to have an aiTangement with the IMIF involving use 
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of the Fund's resources subject to upper tranche conditionality" (Section 4: 5 in Paris 
Club4 and 4: 4 in Paris Club2). 
The"Agreed Minutes" also determined that the Sudan should treat her creditors equally in 
any bilateral arrangement and"on terms comparable to those set forth in this agreed 
minutes for credits of comparable maturity making sure to avoid inequity between 
different categories of creditors. " (Section 3: 1). The government of the Sudan was 
demanded to "accord to each of the participating creditor countries a treatment not less 
favourable that which it may accord to any other creditor", as long as that the debts 
concerned were of "a comparable term". ( Section 3: 2). It was also agreed that any 
agreements to re-schedule the Sudanese debts with commercial banks or any other 
creditor not participating in the meetings should be comply with the terms of the" Agreed 
Minutes". 
Both the Sudan and the parflcipating creditor countries were required to inform. the 
Chairman of Paris Club of any bilateral agreement between the Sudan and any of the 
participating creditor countries. The "agreed Minutes" determined the payment of all 
arrears less than SDR 250000 on the" original due dates" and those arrears which were 
not paid when the minutes were signed were to be paid before a date defined in the 
minutes, ie Paris Club4 defined June 1984. 
The "Agreed MinuWs" also determined that all debts not included in the re-schieduling 
minutes should be paid on "original due dates". 
The 1984 "Agreed Minutes" introduced a new condition. The government of the Sudan 
had to. deposit in "Central Bank of one Creditor Country of at least SDR 4760000 at the 
end of each month of 1984", to create a special account "so that The Government of the 
DR. of S. will'pay from [it] due payments. " No other payment should be made of that 
account before "all ýýents du-c for 1984 under the bilateral agrpgment are to be'made. " 
( Paris Club 4 section 4: 4) 
All the four re-scheduling arrangements covered commercial credits guaranteed by 
creditor goverm-nents as 'well as governmental loans before a date specified in 
every"Agreed Minutes" ( Paris Clubl: January the Ist 1979, Paris Club2: July Ist 1981, 
Paris Club3: January the Ist 1983, Paris Club4: January Ist 1984). In addition Paris Club3 
provided for re-scheduling of the arrears of Paris Clubl and Paris Club2, as well as 50% 
of the interest due on 1983 not included in Paris Club 3. The 'Agreed Minutes' of Paris 
Club 4 dealt with 50 % of the interest due on 1984 for debts dealt with in Paris Club 3 
and Paris Club 4. 
The first re-scheduling agreement ( Paris Club 1) dealt with two types of debts according 
to their due dates. The first type was all debts due up to October Ist 1979. These debts 
were divided into five groups, as shown in Table22. The first group amounted to 14% of 
aH due debts and was to be paid in four instalment beginning in July 1980 and ending on 
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October 1981, with an interest rate of 3.5%. The second group amounted to 28% of 
total, to be paid in four instalments between April 1982 and October 1983, at a 7% 
interest rate. A third 17% group was to be paid at an 8.5% interest rate in two instalments 
in April and October 1984. The fourth division was 20% of the total debt to be paid at a 
10% interest rate in two instalments in April and May 1985. The last division amounted 
to 21% of the total, payable in April and October 1986 at 10.5% interest rate. 
Table 23. Re-scheduling of Sudanese Deb t Due Before October 1979 
Division %of Total interest Instalments Payments 
Rates 
1 14% 3.5% 4 15/7/1980 
1/10/1980 
1/4/1981 
1/10/1980 
2 28% 7% 4 1/4/1982 
1/1011982 
1/4/1983 
1/1011983 
3 17% 8.5% 2 1/4/1984 
1/10/1984 
4 20% 10% 2 11411985 
1/10/1985 
5 21% 10.5% 2 1/4/1986 
1/1011986 
SOURCE: Paris Club, AgreedMinutes, November 13th 1979. 
The second type of debt dealt with in Paris Club I was that debt due between October I st 
1979 and June 30th 1981. Only 85% of this debt was re-scheduled, which imphed that the 
remaining 15% had to be paid on "original due dates". The fon-ner were to be paid in 14 
equal instalment beginning June 30th 1983 for debts due before June 30th 1980; and on 
June 30th 1984 for payments due during the following year (July 1980-June 1981). 
Interest rates and terms of payment were left to be negotiated bilaterally. 
The second re-scheduling agreement signed on* March I 8th 1982 (Paris Club2) dealt with 
debts, principal and interest, which were due before or on the 31 st of December 1982. 
The ma or part of these debts, 90% of them, was to be paid in eleven biannual instalments 
between July the Ist 1987 and 1992 with five years grace period (1982-87). The 
rernai ning 10% of these debts were to be paid in three instalments. The first 2.5%of the 
total due debt, was paid on or before December 31 st 1982. Another equal instalment was 
due on December the 31st 1983 while the last instalment was, equal to 5% of the total 
debt due, was to be paid on December the 31st 1984. Rates of interest were left to 
bilateral negotiations. 
The third re-scheduling agreement, ( Paris Club3), dealt with debts due before or on 
December the 31 st 1983. Paris Club3 re-scheduleq all the principals due and 50% of the 
due interest which was capitalized, while the remaming interest was to be paid on the 
original due dates. Those re-scheduled were to be paid in twenty equal biannual 
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instalments commencing in July I st 1989 and ending on January I st 1999 and thus giving- 
6 year moratorium and ten year repayment period. Interest rates on the re-scheduled debt 
were left to be determined throuA bilateral 
negotiations. 
The fourth agreement, ( Paris Club4), re-scheduled all principals due during 1984 and 
50% Of the interest during 1983 and 1984, while the other half of the interest due during 
1983/84 was to be paid. Payments should be in 20 equal instalment commencing on 
January Ist 1991 and ending in July the Ist 2000. Interest rates were left to be determined 
through bilateral negotiations. Table 2 summarizes Paris Club 2, Paris Club 3, and Paris 
Club 4. 
Table 24. Summarv of The Terms of Paris Club 1.2 and 3 Amed Minutes 
Agreement % of Total No. of Grace Payment 
Instalments Period Period 
Paris Clubl 90% 11 5 5.5 
10% 3- 3 
Paris Club2 1()0% 20 6 10 
Paris Club3 100% 20 6.5 10.5 
SOURCE: Agreed Minutes Between The Government of Democratic Republic of the Sudan and 
Creditors Countries, 1982,1983 and 1984. 
Despite all these arrangements, the Sudan failed to pay its debts and accordingly the debts 
-accumulated to reach $11 bilfion by 1985 and the debts service was to constitute more 
than 150% of the value of the Sudanese exports. Though all the debts resheduling 
arrangements were arrived at in Paris Club where both the hMF and the World Bank were 
present, they did not reflect the ability of the Sudan to pay according to her actual 
economic situation. The arrangements did not provide for the new funds the Sudan 
needed then in order to rehabilitate its productive schemes to ease its ballance of 
payments problems by improving the production of exports'and the import- substituting 
commodities. The rescheduling arrangements, thus, turned to be an illusion. The debt trap 
was fastened rather than being eased. 
5.7. The Crisis of Hegemony and the Quest for Legitimacy 
The political economy of the Nimeiri regime between 1973-85 showed how the regime 
attempts to establish its hegemony and its quest for legitimacy failed. It is argued in 
Chapter I that authoritarian states are the product of the inability of a class or a group of 
classes to establish its hegemony. The Nimeiri regime which came to power through a 
military take-over was to resolve the crisis of hegemony if it was to rule through the 
consent of the people and not mere coercion. Its history from 1969 to it downfall was a 
history of a continuous quest to legitimacy, a condition for the establishment of 
hegemony. 
204 
The failure to build an alliance with the urban democratic movement in the North between 
1969 and the July 1971 coup 66tat was a turning point in the history of the Nimeiri 
regime. Between 1971 and 1977, the regime failed to incorporate or work out an alliance 
with the traditional political parties and the Islamic Charter Front. The National 
Reconciliation of 1977 did not reach its logical conclusion by widening tha base of the 
regime. 
The change in tactics, the shift in alliances and the attempts of co-opting could only be 
understood as part of this quest for legitimacy. Political instability with its main elements 
of the growing opposition and the increasing repression were the direct result of the 
failure in the quest of legitimacy. 
When the crisis accelerated in the early eighties, the regime turned back to use Islam as 
the only remaining possibility that could provide both 'the carrot and the sticle, a quest for 
legitimacy and a justification and tool for repression. The promulgation of Islamic Sharia 
Law in 1983 did not promote the regime's quest for legitimacy and remained as an 
additional tool of repression. It was too late for the crisis of legitimacy had already 
reached the point were "the allegiance needed if the dominant institutions are to function 
effectively is well below the level they actually receive" (Connolly, 1984,12). In March- 
April 1985 the crisis of hegemony reached its turning point. Tens of thousands of the 
Sudanese people all over the country took to the streets demanding the end of Nimeiri 
regime (Abdelkarim, el Hassan an Sedon, 1985,86-89). The masses, to borrow from 
Gramsci, had "passed suddenly from a state of political passivity" (Gramsci, 1971,210) 
and they launched their second popular uprising. 
The military intervention on April the 6th 1985 was to prevent the uprising from 
becoming a revolution. Nimeiri regime was overthrown a new phase of the Sudanese 
general crisis began. 
CHAPTER 6_ 
THE GENERAL AND THE PARTICULAR: 
IN THE CRISIS. QE 
-IS73-85 
6.1. Introduction 
In Chapters 3,4, and 5 it has been shown that four particular crises had struck the Sudan 
over the period 1956-1985. The manifestation of those crises has been described and 
discussed. In this Chapter, the 1973-85 crisis is discussed as part of the general crisis. 
The relation between the general economic and political crises and the 1973-85 crises is 
examined to show whether the latter was a phase of a complex crisis of an uncompleted 
socio-economic transformation. This is done through an analysis of the particular and 
general in the 1973-85 crisis in an attempt to discover the elements of continuity and 
discontinuity in the political economy of the post-colonial Sudan. Those elements of 
continuity and discontinuity could not be just reduced to comparison of what 
manifestations had continued over the whole 1956-85 period and what'were the specific 
manifestation to the particular 1973-85. It is *rather a process of discovering forces and 
structures that have allowed the continuation or otherwise of policies and organisational 
procedures that kept a specific level of articulation of modes of production to continue as 
an obstacle in the development of new structures that would express new levels of 
articulation. This is particularly clear and significant in the case of Sudanese agriculture 
where the level of articulation of the capitalist. and pre-capitalist modes of production that 
was inherited from the colonial era could not provide for the development. of productive 
forces in the agricultural sector any more. The relative development in the productive 
forces in irrigated and mechanised agriculture reached its maximum possible'limit under 
the existing level of articulation. This explains the trend towards horizontal expansion of 
cultivated areas rather than the vertical development in labour productivity and land 
yields which governed agricultural production between'1956-85. 
In section 6.2 it is argued that the decline in agricultural yields is related to the production 
relations in agriculture especially the land tenure system which is part of the articulated 
modes of production and the institutionid organisation of irrigated agriculture as well as 
the process of capital accumulation and re-investment of surpluses generated in the 
agricultural sector which favoured the non-agricultural sectors and worked against the 
most undeveloped areas in the country. 
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The mechanism, which was set during the colonial rule and preserved and strengthened 
during the post-colonial era, to attract new investment and or enhance the process of 
capital accumulation, favoured the Khartoum-Kosti -Sennar Triangle and continued to 
govem the process of uneven development. The outcome of this process is discussed in 
section 6.3. 
The class structure in the country had changed since independence. The 1973-95 period 
had contributed significantly to these changes bringing the question of the domination of 
the state and class hegemony to the fore front of Sudanese political, economic and social 
agenda. The prevalence of the authoritarian state between 1973-85 prevented social 
classes and groupings from democratically competing for political power, promoting 
their political organisation and manifesting their political and ideological discourse. This 
had prolonged the particular crisis of the Nimeiri regime. Changes in class structure are 
discussed in section 6.4. 
6.2. The Crisis of AgriculturAl Production 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP), (constant 1955/56 prices), grew at 3.6% over the 
period 1955/56 - 1984/85. The real per capita ine ome grew with only 0.8% over the same 
period (population growth rate was 2.8%). The value of agricultural production had' 
increased over the period by 2.3% per year. Taking into account the prevailing trends of 
declining yields over the same period for the main agricultural crops, (that of cotton had 
been reversed since the abolishing of the crop sharing system 'M irrigated agriculture in 
1981/82), it is important to underline that the growth of agricultural output was mainly 
the result of horizontal expansion of the area under cultivation. All cash crops except 
groundnuts confirmed the declining trends in yields. The trend of cotton yield between 
1955/56-1 980/81 was declining by 2.9% per year from 642 kg1feddwi in 1955/56 to 298 
kg1feddan in 1980/81; - (for the four years 1981/82-1984/85 yields increased by 21% 
annually, a growth rate which suggests that the abolishing of the crop-sharing system 
provided incentives for the increase of productivity, but that. needs to be examined in the 
next section. ). Despite the declining cotton yields, -the output of cotton over the period 
1955/56-1980/81, increased by 0.4%, which could be explained by the 1.8% annual rate 
of expansion of the area under cotton cultivation. 
The average yield of sesame from 236 kg perfeddan in 1955/56 to 118 kg ffieddan in 
1981/82 (taken instead of 1984/85 to avoid the effect of the drought of 1983-85. ) The 
growth rate of 0.2% in sesame output could be attributed to an expansion in cultivated 
land by 4.4% per year over the period 1955/56-1981/82. 
The output of gum Arabic declined by 0.4% annually over the period 1955/56-1981/82 . 
The only cash crop of the four under discussion which preserved a rising yields trend was 
groundnuts. Groundnuts yields increased from 217 kg Ife&kui in 1955/56 to 353 kg, an 
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annual increase of 1.8% (93.4% of the area under cultivation was in 1981/82 in the rain- 
fed traditional sub-sector where yields over the same period increased by 1% per year 
only. ) The area under groundnuts cultivation increased from 297,000feddwis in 1955/56 
to 2,376,000 in 1981/82 increasing by 8% per year. Output of groundnuts increased by 
6.6% over the same period 
The yields of dura declined by 0.7% annually from 428 kg1feddan in 1955156 to 354 
kg1feddan in 1981/82. Despite the decline in yields, the output of dura increased by 5.1% 
(which should have left per capita share in dura output increased by 1.3%). This increase 
of output was mainly due to the increase in areas cultivated by dura from 2,135,000 
feddans in 195 5/5 6 to 9,23 1,000 feddans in 1981/82, an increase of 5.6%. Wheats yields 
declined from an average yield of 597 kg1feddan in 1955/56 to 494 kg in 1984/85, an 
annual decline of 0.7%. The output of wheat increased by 5.9% annually, from 30,000 
tons to 142,000 tons over the same period. The areas cultivated by wheat increased by 
7.5% per year between 1955/56 and 1984/85. 
Table 25. Areas Under Cultivation of Five Maior Crops 
1955/56-1984/85 
(in thousandfeddans) 
year cotton sesame groundnuts dura wheat 
1955/56 576 636 298 2135 42 
1981/82 982 2044 2376 9231 432 
1984/85 996 1853 1758 7987 362 
gro, mh rate* 1.8% 4.4% 8% 5.6% 7.5% 
Note: * calculated for 1955/56-1981/82 to avoid the effect of 1983-85 drough t excevt for cotton and 
wheat. 
Source: Calculated from: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Re-soumes: Agricultural year 
Book, Department of Agricultural Economics and Statistics. 
The horizontal expansion of agriculture was the main characteristic of Sudanese 
agricultural policy between 1955/56 and 1984/85. Table :1 shows the areas and their 
respective rates of growth over the same period.. While the horizontal expansion in 
irrigated agriculture in the Sudan was mostly a repeating of the model of the Gezira 
Scheme, in rain-fed agriculture it was mainly the expansion of the mechanized agriculture 
in he central clay plain. Both were initiated by the state policies. 
A third expansion took place in response to market incentives as well as its own internal 
dynamics (the development of commodity production, -the increase in population and 
animal wealth. 
6.2.1. The Crisis of the Gezira Model 
The irrigated agriculture in the Sudan is of two forms, the big state managed schemes, 
such as the Gezira, the White and Blue Nile Schemes, al Rahad, al Suki ... etc, and the 
relatively small pump schemes on the banks of the Nfle, the White and Blue Niles and the 
saggia of Kassala Province. Except for al Rahad and the Northern Region irrigated 
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schemes, the state schemes followed the Gezira model in their organization and 
production relations, despite the different irrigation systems, 
The Gezira model was built on the institutional articulation of the capitalist mode of 
production and what had remained of the feudal patriarchal mode of production which 
had prevailed during the Sennar Sultanate-(1504 -1821), the share-cropping arrangement 
for the distribution of the output. The colonial state used coercion to compel the 
landowners in the Gezira to lease their land to the state. Land itself was prevented from 
becoming a commodity. Labour power was not transformed into a commodity, instead it 
was articulated through the tenancy contract into the production of cotton. The tenant 
was subjected to a tied time table for carrying the agricultural operations which require 
high discipline. The tenancy agreement reads: 
"If the tenant neglects or is careless in the cultivation of his crops the Syndicate [later the 
Board] shall have the right without the consent of the tenant to take such steps as the 
S,. mdicate may consider proper for the safeguarding of the crops, and any expenses incurred 
thereby shall be a debt from the tenant to the Syndicate and may without his consent be 
deducted by the syndicate from his share of the crop. " (reproduced in Gaitskell, op. cite.., 342) 
The reproduction of the labour power of the tenant and his family was partially carried by 
producing dura and lubia (Dolichos lablab), and partly from his share in the cotton 
procpeds. The tenant had to hand over his cotton crop to the Syndicate. The tenant as a 
producer was allenated from his basic means of production, the land, and from part of his 
product (cotton). The essence of capitalist mode of production, the allenation of the 
producers, was not complete. This was part of the institutional articulation to mystify the 
exploitation of the tenants by the state and the Syndicate. This pattern of articulation was 
capable of extracting the maximum economic surplus because of the use of coercion. 
Barnett noted that the "organizational form adopted in the Qezira Scheme" was'"highly 
authoritarian in tone and hierarchical in structure"(Bamett: 19 , 194). Saying that Barnett 
failed to see the origins of the authoritarian nature of the management in the state and the 
tenancy contract which the Syndicate duty. was to see to it that it was implemented. The 
working of the system depended on the authoritarian state. The rise of the tenants 
movement in the aftermath of the World War IL and its first strike in 1946, was a 
challenge to the authoritarian state and the Gezira system. The Gezira Board which took 
over from the Syndicate (in 1950 after the elapse of the contract period) and the post- 
colonial state, failed to maintain the authoritarian manner of administration. 
This fOure affected the performance of the static Gezira model in four of its basic 
elements. The first was the crop pattern of the scheme which was set to include two types 
of crops. A cash crop, the cotton, the production of which was the aim of the scheme and 
its proceeds were the subject matter of the whole share-cropping arrangements. Every 
thing in the Scheme was determined relative to the cotton. The subsistence crops 
cultivated by the tenants (dura and lubia) were for the reproduction of the labour power. 
AH the calculation and estimates of costs and revenues were based on this crop pattern. 
209 
The change in this pattern through the diversification and intensification had res te in 
the introduction of wheat and groundnuts, both were cash crops. The logic of the system 
should have included them in the share-cropping arrangement with the cotton, but instead 
they were left out of the arrangement as 'tenants' crops'. The tenant was no more 
dependent on cash earnings from cotton. Of course it was just logical to expect the 
tenant's inputs, including labour power, to be shifted to the production of the new crops, 
the total earnings of which went to the tenant. The part of the costs of production 
operations carried by the Board, were deducted from the cotton proceeds. This was the 
case, more supervision would have needed to ensure that the tenant carried the operations 
of cotton cultivation according to the Board's requirements. 
The decline of the authoritarian management made such supervision unavailable. Four 
reasons contributed to the decline of the management. First the decline of the 
infrastructure and logistics available to the field inspectors to carry a close supervision 
(the roads, cars , petrol, maintenance etc). 
Secondly, the increasing bureaucratization of 
the management and the involvement of the field inspectors in. office work, letters and 
report writing, lessened the time available for field supervision and contact with the 
tenants. Thirdly the challenge to the authority of the field inspector by the intervention of 
his work by tenants o rganizations. Abdel Salarn noted that, "there is currently more 
involvement in their ffield inspectors] work by tenants associations and various local 
political organizations" (1987,373). Lastly the decline in the real incomes of the field 
inspectors (as was the case for other government employees, see Chapter 4), led to their 
involvement in other income generating activities, "such as money lending mid livestock 
rearing (though not officially allowed)"(1bid, 373). 
The distribution of the burden of the costs of production among the partners underwent a 
change under the pressure of the tenants union which pressed for including new costs 
items in the joint account. In 1961/62 the costs of cotton seeds had been shifted from the 
tenant account to the joint account. in 1963/64 the costs of ploughing were transferred in 
the same manner, and the same happened for the costs of cotton picking in 1965/66 and 
the ridging in 1968169 and the first weeding in 1968/69. (Hakim, 1976,60) 
The distribution of the net cotton earnings also changed under the pressure of the Tenants 
Union. The profitability of the Scheme was calculated on the bases of. -40% for the tenant, 
20% for the Syndicate (the Board) and 40% for the Government. After the December 
1963 Tenants strike the tenants share increased to 42% , the government 42%, the Board 
10% and 2% for each of the tenants, reserved fund, the social services' fund and the local 
government. In 1965/66 the tenants share increased to 48% while that of the governments 
decreased to 38% and the share of the board and the other funds remained as they were 
before. 
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Apparently the tenants income from cotton should have increased, because the struggle of 
the tenants had increased their shares in the net returns of cotton and more items of the 
costs of the production of cotton were transferred to the joint account. Despite that 
appearance, empirical studies had shown evidence of the decline of real incomes of the 
tenants in the Gezira and other irrigated schemes working on the Gezira model (Al Amin 
Aliý 1990, Chapter, VH). There were four main reasons behind that decline in real 
income. The first was the spiralling inflation in the Sudan, (See Chapter 4 above). The 
second was the increase in the costs of production which was partially because of the 
substantial dependency of the scheme on imported inputs, (fertilizers, insecticides and 
other chemicals, petroleum and spare parts ... etc), and partially because of the indirect 
taxation imposed by the government on the imports of those inputs. The Sudan Gezira 
Board official figures showed that the costs deducted as under joint account increased 
from LS 33 perfeddan in 1970/71 to LS 85 in 1878/79, an increase of 165%, while the 
tenant's individual costs perfeddivi of cotton increased from LS 9 to LS 10 , and increase 
of 11% only. (calculated from Sudan Gezira Board, 1980). The third reason was the 
taxation imposed by the government on the crops themselves. Taxation on cotton gross 
proceeds were a 10% export duty, 2% development tax, 2% stabilization fund, 2% 
national equalization fund and 2% for the cotton ma rketing corporation. An implicit tax 
was laid on cotton by the different exchange rates according to which cotton imported 
inputs and cotton exports were calculated. It could easily be said that the state through 
taxation and exchange rates policies not only took back what the tenants had achieved 
through their struggle, but subjected them to more exploitation. The fourth reason for the 
decline of the incomes was the decline in yields perfeddan (see both of this section and 
Chapter 4). 
The decline in cotton yields in particular affected the government revenue as well, albeit 
in a complex manner. It directly decreased the government earnings as a- partner, and 
indirectly decreased its revenue from taxes on cotton gross proceeds and, on cotton 
generated incomes and activities (including imposed duties on imports which were mostly 
financed by the earning of cotton exports). This contributed to the financial crisis of the 
Sudanese state. 
Faced with declining income from tenancy and especially from cotton, the Gezira tenant 
spent overall less labour on the tenancy and tended to find income compensating activities 
whether by selling his/her labour power in or out of the scheme area. This was facilitated 
by the decline of the management ability to use coercion in carrying out the tenancy 
contract or agreement. It was also made possible by the illegal share-cropping practise 
between. the Gezira tenants and sub-tenants, especially in groundnuts cultivation. Al Amin 
Ali showed that 49ý'/o of the tenants in four Gezira areas did cultivate their groundnuts 
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tenancies through sub-sharecroping arrangements. (Al Amin Ali, opt. cit.., 324, Table 
7.14). 
While institutional articulation in the- Gezira model curtailed the development of 
production relations, it generated a contrasting development in the forces of production in 
irrigated agriculture. In addition to the modem irrigation system, there were other 
developments such as the use of tractors and other agricultural equipments, the 
introduction of fertilizers, insecticides, and herbicides and the application of scientific 
research (the Gezira Research Station was established in 1918). The tenants as cultivators 
themselves underwent a progressive development in skills and accumulated experience in 
cotton cultivation in particular and irrigated agriculture in general. 
The introduction of land-water charges to replace the fixed percentage share in cotton 
proceeds did not change all the -aspects of the production relations. The land tenure 
system remained as before with the government owning about 68% of the land and 
compulsory renting the remainder. Tenancies are allocated by the Board, though a minor 
change towards fixing the plots cultivated by tenants overtime was introduced. No right 
of tenancy transfer is established and all the sub-renting and sub-sharecroping in practise 
is illegal and is practised without the consent of the Board. All the decisions on crop 
patterns and farm enterprises are still taken by the Board. (in consultation with the 
Ministry of Agriculture). The time table for agricultural operation continues to be 
determined by the board as well as the use of some inputs such as the frequency of 
irrigation, the number and times of herbicides and pesticides spreading and theoretically 
the use of fertilizers. 
Despite the increasing role of permanent workers on the Scheme (tractor and other 
machines operators), they have no say. in the Scheme management and they are -not 
directly employed by the tenants, hence he/she could not supervise them or see to their 
work to be done according to the tenants" satisfaction. Cotton, groundnuts and wheat are 
still to be handed to the Board at the prices determined by the Government. The 
alienation of tenants from their means of production and their products does still exist. 
The Gezira model's tenant is not a partner (because he has no saying in the production 
organization and management), is not an agricultural worker and is not an independent 
small commodity producer. The articulated institutionalizing continues and with it the 
crisis of the Gezira model. 
6.2.2. The Crisis of Rainfed Agliculture 
Rainfed agriculture in the Sudan is of two types, mechanized farming and rion-mechanized 
farming. The latter is usually referred to as the traditional agricultural sector. It is 
important in referring to the latter as traditional to explain that the term here describes the 
means of production and not the production relations. It is not synonymous as used 
commonly with pre-capitalist or small commodity production. 
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6.2.2.1. MechanIzed Fannin 
Mechanized farming was introduced in the central clay plain of the Sudan in 1944/45. 
Four periods could be distinguished in the development of mechanized farming in the 
Sudan. 
The first period was between 1944/45 and 1952/53 which characterized by the direct 
involvement of the government in investment and the organization of production. The 
experience was carried in the Gadambalia area north of Gedaref in eastern Sudan. On the 
first year 12,000 feddWis were cultivated. The farm and tractors were owned by the 
Government. Because the production process was not completely mechanized, seasonal 
agricultural labour was sought (for weeding and harvesting). The failure of getting 
enough supply of labour from the area made the government revise the organization of 
production and to attempt to apply the crop-sharing system. Land was distributed in 28 
feddans tenancy to local population. The government was to provide the tractors for 
ploughing seeding, while the tenant was to be responsible for weeding and harvesting. 
The yield was to be divided equally between the government and the tenant. Not like the 
Gezira, the experience failed because the area had no tradition of share-cropping, and the 
tenants were used to cultivate small peaces of land for their subsistence while their main 
concern was animal husbandry. The government returned to hiring labour in 1948/49 and 
continued to carry the experience until 1952/53 when a working party was formed to 
evaluate it. 
The recommendations of the working party began a new period in the development of 
mechanized farming in the Sudan. The most important of the working - party's 
recommendations was that investment should be left to private sector while the 
government should concentrate on providing the services, the infra-structure and to carry 
research. The government immediately accepted the recommendations and private sector 
was invited to invest in schemes of 1000 feddaw each. The period 1954/55-1960/61 
could easily be described as a period for the 'scramble for Gedaref. By 1960/61 new areas 
( the Dali and Mazrnourn in southern Blue Nile Pýovince, and the Renk area in northern 
Upper Nile Province). were opened for mechanized farming and the total area reached 
over one millionfeddans (1,040,000 in 1961/62). 
The third period began by the establishment of. the Mechanized Farming Corporation in 
1968 to plan, demarcate and allot areas for mechanized farming and to provide finance for 
new schemes. The area of the mechanized farm increased to 1,500feddwis. Land rented 
to investors at LS 0.051fed&m This period was dominated by the influence of the IBRD, 
which proposed the establishment of the WC and provided two loans towards financing 
the new extensions in Habilla (Southern Kordofan), Darnazine (Southern Blue Nile), 
Sarnsarn and Urn Seinat ( Southern Gedaref), and Al Miganis (near Kosti, Southern White 
Nile Province). By 1976 the area under mechanized farming reached 3.5 millionfed&ws. 
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While the investment in mechanized farming before the IBRD finance was financed by the 
private resources (previously accumulated capital in other activities) or the Sudan 
Agricultural Bank (since 1961), the investments after 1971 were financed by the NTC. 
NTC provided two loans to tbefariner, one for clearing the land and the other for buying 
a tractor and a disc (supplied by the NEC). The first loan (LS 2.5ffieddan) was to be 
repaid in equal ten annual instalments. The second loan (equal to 80% of the price of the 
tractor) was to be repaid in equal five annual instalments. 
The fourth period began after 1976 (following the 1974 and 1977 Investment Acts) when 
for the first time since 1950 large scale plantations were allotted to individuals and 
companies (see Chapter 4). 
Almost more than half the national dura production is produced in mechanized farming. It 
also produces between 50 to 70% of the output of country's sesame. It became an 
important source of season 
' 
al employment of peasant from traditional agriculture. In all 
these aspects, mechanized fanning had a positive effect on the economy. On the other 
hand, mechanized fanning had negative effects on the traditional farming, the pastors and 
the environment. Its effects on income generation and distribution were discussed in 
Chapter 4. The nature of land tenure in mechanized agriculture is like mining industries, 
and it has encouraged continuous large scale farming practises which has exhausted the 
land through , The experience of 
Gadambalia north Gedaref stands as an undisputed 
example. 
6.2.2.2. Rain-fed Aglicufture. 
It has been discussed in Chapter 2 that the rain-fed sub-sector had been subject to an early 
articulation process. The link with the international market had been est ablished during 
the early days of colonialism. After World War H, groundnuts came to play great role in 
this link and thus contributed to the transformation of the sub-sector into commodity 
production. Just after independence the land under groundnuts increased from an average 
of 141,000feddwi between 1954-56 to an average of 455,000fe&kais between 1957- 
59. It continued expanding to reach 847,00 0 feddan by 1964. The contribution of 
irrigated agriculture constituted less than 5% which meant that most of the newly 
cultivated lands were in the rain-fed sub-sector. In 1974/5 the area under groundnuts in 
the rain-fed sub-sector underwent its third major increase, to 1,783,000 feddam'an 
increase of 26% in comparison with the previous year. In 1976/7 the area exceeded two 
millionfeddwis and remained around the two millions until the drought of 1982/3-84/85. 
Sesame was the second oil-seeds cash crop that had shown increasing importance, in the 
traditional rain-fed sub-sector. The area under sesamels cultivation increased from an 
average of 557,000feddans in the period 1953/54-1957/58 to around two miflionfeddans 
just before the'drought of 1982/83-84/85. The increase of groundnuts and sesame 
cultivation was related to a spread of three types of capitalist operations in that sub- 
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sector. The first was a share cropping operation to finance the production of groundnuts 
jumping over the constraints of the communal land tenure system existing in most of the 
areas of the sub-sector, hence pushing the articulation process a step forward. The second 
was the arrangement through the tribal chiefs, local government officials or clientele 
relations to acquire land which would be cultivated by hired labour directly. Both village 
shopkeepers and rich farmers were reported to "operate a proprietor set up in which they 
rely in hired Jabour for all cultivation tasks" (Saad: 1989,85). The two types of 
operations where not exclusive and a share cropping which involve wage labour was also 
observed in areas Eke Westem Kordofan and eastem Dar Fur( personal information 
collected from the area in 1979,1984 and 1986). The main labour force were Dinka and 
Nuer coming from the South and the poor peasant families of the Hamar and Berti of the 
area. As early as 1976 in a field work I had carried' among the Habilla seasonal workers, 
it was found that almost 80% were found to supplement their farm incomes by working 
for rich farmers or merchants' farms. Saad reported that the majority of farmers he 
interviewed in his 'research in Kordofan "state that they work partly as lahourers and 
partly on theirfarms"(Saad: 1989,85). Haalandpointed that in the Baggara area "Rich 
herd owners have also invested in groundnut production, by employing cheap labour 
from the Dinka areas ofBahar all-Gazal" (Haaland, 1990,243). 
The third was the spread of the shail system for financing groundnuts cultivation by the 
farmers themselves. All three types of operations were the result of the articulation of the 
pre-capitalist modes of production and the capitalist mode through market and exchange 
relations. The result was the spread of commodity production and capitalist production 
relations. The institutional frame established by the colonial regime underwent a 
substantial change. The closed districts ordinance and the passport and permits order 
seized to exist. The native administration had been dissolved since 1969. The tribal 
aristocracy had been transformed into a rural capitalist class investing in capitalist 
farming, transport (especially lorries), and commerce. The tribal aristocracy continued to 
play its political in the newly established political institutions of the Nimeiri Regime, 
especially afier 197-1. 
In contrast to'the irrigated agriculture the commoditizaion process did not lead to a 
development in the means of production. The same traditional tools like hoes and 
cutlasses were used. No use of chemical fertilizers, limited use of pesticides (controlled by 
Central Government in locusts eradication campaigns), and limited application of 
scientific research. Tully reported that the government provided groundnuts seeds in the 
early fiffies; in Dar Masalit in Western Darfur, and they were not changed since 
then. (Tully: 198 8,99). The same was reported about groundnuts seeds in Kordofan 
(Kaballo: 1984,6 1). 
was worldng as research assistant to Khalid Affan (see Affan, 1978) 
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The stagnation in the means of production left the burden of production on labour and 
land only. Capital benefited from both cheap labour power and land. Capital had to pay 
less than the necessary value for the reproduction of Uour power because part of that 
value was produced by the peasant and his family in their subsistence cultivation. The land 
tenure system based on communal land ownership (and legally state ownership) was 
either obtained free for members of the community or at below opportunity costs for non- 
members through the relation discussed above. 
The increase of areas in cash crops disturbed the traditional rational rotation of hariq and 
shift cultivation which had been practised by the peasants to maintain the land fertility and 
the ecological balance of bush-cultivated land. The fallow period decreased from average 
of 6 -7 years to 3 years. Tully reported that in Dar Masalit that; "currently, any 1wid that 
has beenfalIawfor three years is considered uncultivated (bur) wid availablefor anyone 
to cut. " (Tully, op. cite.., 207). When 275 farms were investigated by Tully, he found that 
land cultivated by old people had mostly been cut from bush, while as the age decline, the 
younger generations either inherited the farms or received them as gifts. Tully's finding 
were rearranged and calculated in percentages in table 6: 2. 
Table 26. Source of Land Cultivated hj fanners in Dar Masalit (in Rercentage) 
source of land age groups 
over 50 41-50 30-40 under 30 
Inheritance 16.9 25.9 16.1 22.6 
Gift 16.5 40.3 59.7 62.3 
Cut from 62.6 32.5 24.2 15.1 
bush 
Other 3.6 1.3 00 
Source: Calculated from TuHy, 1988, Culture and Context in the Sudan: The Process of Market 
Incorporation in Dar Masalit, State University of New York Press, New York, page 21 
Haaland noticed that the communal land tenure system 
"may operate quite smoothly as long as production on family farrres geared 
towards satisfying one's own consumption requirements and -as long as there is 
relatively low population pressure. " (Haaland, 1990,23 5) 
This process of commoditizaion through the production of groundnuts in vast communal 
areas permitted the supply of cheap groundnuts and large profits for merchant capital and 
oh manufacturers. Capital accumulated in the process was transferre. 4 to Central Sudan 
and most of groundnuts merchants of the fiffies and sixties moved to Khartoum and Port 
Sudan in the seventies and eighties leaving behind new generations of merchants. and off 
manufacturers. (Mahmoud, op. cit., 212). 
The process had its effect of the peasants economy and the environmental and ecological 
balance. T-raditional peasants became more dependent on the market and affected by the 
fluctuations in the market prices of groundnuts. The restriction of their cultivation-fallow 
bush rotation led to the decline of the yields of both their cash and staple food crops. As it 
is noted above more of them were compelled to sale their labour power both in the local 
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market and through seasonal migration to near by mechanized farms or irrigated 
agricultural schemes. 
The ecological effect of the increasing commoditizaion was disastrous because vast areas 
of bush were cut especially in the savannah areas north of the Central clay plain. The effect 
in the Qoz areas of North Kordofan and Dar fur were grýater because of the unstable soil. 
The location of the area adjacent to the Sahara made it more viable to desertification and 
accumulation of sand dunes. Although no research had established the relation between 
the decline in rainfall and the process described above, it is believed that the two 
phenomena were interrelated. 
More emphasis in the literature on desertification was given to the phenomenon of over- 
grazing and exceeding the carrying capacity of the land (lbrahim: 1984, El Sammani 
1984,1986... etc). In reality the increase in the number of livestock and the vast 
cultivation of cash crops both contributed to desertification and both were related to the 
utilization of communal resources by the merchant capital and the tribal aristocracy The 
latter had transferred their accumulated wealth into livestock herds because they could 
enhance their social prestige and gain large profits since the costs of pasture was the 
burden of the communal land according to the land tenure system, central to the 
articulated modes of production. Haaland wrote ".. the income from pastoral production 
accrues to the individual management unit while the costs in term of over-grazing are 
shared by every one. " (Haaland, op. cite.., 243). 
The crisis of the traditional rain-fed agriculture had its reason deep in the land tenure 
system which permits the 'miningý of the communal land without investors paid the real 
costs. Vith land utilization far below its opportunity costs, the exhaustion of the land 
would continue since no efforts from private beneficiaries would be made -to develop the 
means of production and the introduction of new technologies and patterns of cultivation. 
The crisis will continue unless land tenure reforms are introduced and/or direct investment 
by the state is made. 
It was tragic that the sub-sector which was the source of most of the foreign currency 
when irrigated agriculture declined in the mid-seventies was to suffer the longest and 
more acute famine of its history as a result. 
6.3. The Reproduction of Uneven Development 
One important element in the colonial legacy that has continued is the uneven 
development of the different Sudanese regions. This was not only an economic problem, 
2This section draN%s on a paper presented by the author to the Secretariat of the Central Committee 
of the SPC in 1987 and -vNas incorporated in the SCP memorandum to the political parties on the 
Sudan entitled: National Constitutional Conference: For Consolidated Democracy, Even 
Development and Permanent Peace' and published in El Meidan Newspaper on 18 December 
1988. 
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but it was, (and still is ), the major element in the political instability and the unstable state 
in the Sudan. 
Uneven development -was a result of the rigid articulation of modes of production 
inherited from the colonial era and preserved by the post-colonial state. Uneven 
development in the Sudan is an expression of the local division of labour, albeit dependent 
on and linked to the international division of labour as has been argued in Chapter 2. 
It was just logical for the market forces to deepen the uneven distribution of private 
investment, for capital tends to seek areas of high averagerate of profit (or high marginal 
efficiency of capital in Keynsian terminology). Government intervention was not enough 
to upset this general trend. Its intervention took two measures: the first was the 
encouragement of private sector to invest in the most undeveloped areas, especially 
through the investment laws; while the second was direct government investment. Except 
for the investment in mechanised agriculture, the first measure failed to attract private 
investment outside the triangle area of Khartoum-Kosti- Sennar, where most of the infra- 
structure and public utilities were concentrated. Though mechanised agriculture did 
contribute in generating extra income by providing seasonal work opportunities, its 
effects on the environment, the peasant agriculture, the availability of pastures for 
. pasturalists were negative. 
Many empirical studies haye argue that surpluses generated- by 
mechanised agricultur e were transferred to urban areas and to the Khartoum-Kosti- 
Sennar triangle (See Affan, 1978). The direct government investment was mainly limited 
to social services and public utilities. There are some other isolated government projects 
(Wau Fruit and Vegetable Canning Factory, Babanosa Milk Dehydration Factory, and the 
Textile factories in Nyala, and Kadogli) which did not constitute part of a 
comprehensive rural or regional development strategy. Both the central government the 
regional governments fOed in drafting such a strategy. 
Uneven developed in the Sudan has been reflected in three main characteristics: a) the 
uneven development of. the forces of production,. b) the uneven development of social 
services (especially education and health) and the other infrastructure and public utilities 
which are necessary for the development of both 'social services and productive forces 
transport and communication, electricity and water) 
6.3.1. Uneven Develol2ment of the Forces of Production 
The most important symptoni of uneven development in the Sudan was the uneven 
development of the forces of production. agricultural producers in the less developed 
areas (despite the production relations that governed their production) were still by 1985 
using primitive tools and means production (no irrigation facilities and complete 
dependency on rain fall, no modem agricultural equipment, no use of modem fertilizers or 
chemicals, absence of agricultural research and instruction ... etc). This resulted 
in a low 
crop yields. This is shown in table 27. The yields of dura in the less developed areas 
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amounted to 54% of the yields perfeddmi in the most developed areas. Groundnuts Yields 
amounted to 25.2% and those of sesame were 73.4% of the respective Yields perfeddan 
in the most developed areas 
Table 27. Yield s ver Feddan for Three Main Crovs in the Sudan (Averaste o 
1975/76-1984/85 in K2 ýCed&n) 
Dura Groundnuts; Sesame 
Less developed areas* 238.9 203.1 92.4 
Most Developed areas" 442.4 807.1 125.8 
All Sudan average 272.7 321.3 101.6 
Note: *T'he less developed areas are defined here as the non-mechanised rainfed agriculture 
"The most developed areas are defined as the irrigated and the mechanised rainfed agriculture 
Source: Calculated from: Nfinistry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources, (1984), Sudan Year 
Book ofAgricultural Stalislics, 1984. 
In industry the discrepancy in the forces of production could be shown by the relative 
distribution of industrial establishments, their fixed assets, production, contribution to 
value added, number of workers and the salaries and wages they paid. Table 28 shows the 
relevant data on that. The Khartoum-Kosti-Sennar triangle is taken as the most 
developed areas, while the rest of the country is defined as less developed. 
It is clear from table 28 that industry in 1981/82 was concentrated in the Khartoum-Kosti- 
Sennar triangle3. The discrepancy in the level of the development of forces of production 
is shown by the fact that although the less developed areas had 43.6% of the total number. 
of industrial establishment they employ 20.1% of the industrial labour force and paid 
19.1% of the industrial wage bill, produced 23.4% of the total industrial production and 
29.8% of the value added. Their of the fixed assets was only 20.7%, most of it located in 
Port Sudan and Kassala towns of the Eastern Region. 
Table 28. Uneven Develooment of Industry. in the Sudan 1981/82 M 
No. of No of Salaries and Total Value Added Fixed Assets 
establishments Workers Wages Production 
Khartoum-Kosti- 56.4% 79% 80.9% 76.6% 70.2% 79.2% 
Senna Triangle 
The rest of the 43.6% 21% . 19.1% 23.4% 29.8% 20.7%* Sudan 
Note: * Of this 16% were located in the Eastern Region (mainly in Port Sudan and Kassala) and the 
remaining 4% is located in the other regions of the Sudan 
Source: Ministry of Industry: Indusirial Survey of 1981182, Khartoum. 
6.3.2. Uneven Development of Social Services and Infrastructure: 
6.3.2,1. Education Services 
The discrepancy in the distribution of education services throughout Sudan could be 
shown by comparing the number of pupils in general education in every region as 
percentage of the total number of pupils, in the country with the size of the population of 
3For and interesting discussion of the geographical location of industry in the Sudan see Mohamed 
Ali (1989), Chapter 3 and 4. 
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that region as percentage of the total population in the Sudan. Table 29 shows the 
percentage distribution of pupils and teachers in the different Sudanese region in 1983. 
While only 8.8% of the population of the Sudan lived in Khartoum in 1983, Khartoum 
had 15.7% of the primary schools pupils in the country. It had 22.5% of the intermediate 
schools pupils, 27% of the academic and technical schools pupils and 9.7% of the 
teachers institutes students. The Central Region share in education service was also 
greater than its relative size of population. While its population constituted 20.5% of the 
population in Sudan it had 30.3% of primary school pupils, 30% of intermediate schools 
pupils, 28.4 of academic secondary schools students, 33% of the technical secondary 
schools and 20.9% of the teachers institutes students. 
Table 29. The Distribution of Pogulation, Puvils and Teachers in the Different 
Rep-ions in the Sudan (in mrcentaee. 1983) 
Regions Population Primary Intermediate Secondary Secondary Teachers 
Academic Technical Institutes 
Northern 5.4 11.0 14.5 13.5 8.8 14.7 
Eastern 10.7 9.6 8.7 8.3 13.4 10.8 
Northern and 
Eastern 18.1 20.6 23.2 21.9 22.2 25.5 
central 20.4 30.3 30.0 28.4 33.0 20.8 
Khartoum 8.8 15.7 22.5 27.0 27.1 9.7 
Central and 
Khartoum 29.2 36.0 52.5 55.4 60.1 30.6 
Kordofan 15.0 10.8 9.8 8.7 4.8. 9.1 
Darfur 15.0 13.1 7.1 5.2 7.5 15.9 
Equatoria . 6.3 5.7 4.2 4.6 3.8 7.7 
Bahar el Gazal 11.1 1.3 1.5 2.2 1.5 11.1 
Upper Nile 7.8 2.3 1.8 2.1 -- - 
Less Developed 55.7 33.2 24.4 22.8 17.2 43.8 
Sourre: 1) Department of Statistics, Population Census 1983 (unpublished). 2) Ministr7 of Education 
a nd Instruction, (1985), Educational Statistics 1984185, Khartoum, 
If the figures for Kordofan, Darfur and the Southern Regions are together compared with 
those of Khartoum and Central Region, the disparity in the distribution of education 
services will be clearly apparent. The less developed region was the home for 55.7% of 
the population, It had 33.2%, 44.4%, 22.8% 17.6% and 43.8% of the pupils and students 
in primary; intermediate, academic secondary, technical secondary schools and teachers 
institutes respectively, compared with 465,52.5%. 55.4%, 60.1% and 9.1% for 
Khartoum and the Central Region together where only 29.2% of the population where 
living. 
The comparison of the less developed areas with the Northern Region raises directly the 
question of the regional and ethnic composition of the ruling classes in the Sudan. The 
Northern Region had more pupils and students than its relative size of population. This 
has no explanation except that the ruling classes who predominantly of Northern regional 
original favoured their areas in allocating educational services. 
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The uneven distribution of general university services was reflected in the higher 
education. Students from Khartoun-ý Central and Northern regions continued to dominate 
the annual intake in higher education. They represented about 70% of the University of 
Khartoum annual intake for the years 1979/80-1984/85, while students from Kordofan 
and Darfur regions represented 12% on average during the same period Al Maidan, 18 
December 1988,6). 
6.3.2.2.. Health 5ervices 
the disparity in the distribution of health services could be looked at by evaluating five 
indicators: the number of persons per doctor, per hospital bed, per specialist doctor, and 
per nurse; and the number of hospital beds per doctor. Table 29 shows these indicators in 
the different Sudanese regions. 
Table 30. Indicators of the Distribution of Health Services in the Wifferent Sudanese 
Rggions 
Region Persons/ Persons/ persons per Persons/ Hospital bed 
Doctor Hospital bed Specialist nurse Doctor 
doctor 
Khartoum 1367 484 5474 456 2 
Eastern 9324 945 41928 1421 9 
Northern 9783 654 30500 864 14 
Central 14643 1156 67360 1445 12 
Kordofan 19595 1449 89222 1196 13 
Darfur 49600 2591 16047 2871 19 
Southern 42739 1023 173333 2977 41 
Sudan 8861 1035 33707 1298 7 
Source: Calculated from. Ministry of Healtb, (1982), Annual Health Statistical Report, Khartoum 
1982. 
In 1982 there 1,367 person per doctor in Khartoum, while there were 19,585 persons/ 
doctor in Kordofan and 49,600 persons/ doctor in Darfur and'42,739 persons/ doctor in 
the Southe rn Region. While there were one hospital bed for every 484. persons in 
Khartoum, the ratio was a bed for 1449 in Kordofan, 2491 persons in Darfur, and 1023 
persons in the Southern Region. there were two bed per doctor in Khartoum, 13 beds per 
doctor in Kordofan , 14 
bed per doctor in Darfur and 41 bed per doctor in the -Southern 
Region. The indicators of persons per specialised doctor and per nurse confirm* the same 
trend of uneven distribution of health services. There was a specialist doctor for every 
5,474 persons in Khartoum. The indicator for Kordofan was . 17 time higher (99 thousand 
persons per specialised doctor), in Darfur 32 times higher, (160 thousand persons per 
specialised doctor) and in the Southern Region 34 times higher (173 thousand persons per 
specialised doctor). There was a nurse per 456 persons in Khartoum, 1,196 persons in 
Kordofan, 2,871 persons in Darfur and 2,977 persons in the Southern Region. 
6.3-2.3.. Other Infrastructure 
The National Electricity Grid is concentrated in the Khartoum-Kosti-sennar triangle. 
Except for the Eastern Grid which distributes Khasham al-Girba Darn electricity to New 
221 
Halfa and Kassala towns, the other urban parts of the Sudan depended on local disel 
generated electricity. Most of the regional thermal stations suffer problems of shortage of 
diesel oil and spare-parts supply. 
Darfur and Kordofan Regions suffer from continuous shortage in water supply. 
Until 1985, out of eleven modem roads built to connect the main Sudanese towns only 
three were in the less developed area. The total length of modem road built between 1973 
and 1985 was 2,148 Idlornetres, of them only 401 Hometres were in Kordofan and 
Darfur. 
6.3.3. Regional Responses to Uneven Development and 1heir National effects 
Chapter 3 has argued that uneven development was responsible for the rise of regional 
movements between 1956 and 1969. After 1969 many regional movementS4 were 
discovered within the armed forces. the first of these groups was disclosed and members 
arrested in July 1969 (Wai, 1979,98). The Sep; ember 1975 coup was labelled racist. The 
leaders of the coup in their testimony in Atabara trials argued that "a deep feeling of 
Regional deprivation and disillusionment, especially among the Western province and the 
Nuba hills- provided the core motivations" (ACR, 1975n6, B 113). 
Chapter 4 has shown that discontent in the South began since 1974. 
6.3.3.3-The Rise of The SPLU-SPIM 
The rise of the SPLA/SPLM was a response to the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement 
to solve the problem of uneven development. Its appeal to all the people of the less 
developed areas in the Sudan was significant. 
The SPLA/SPLM provided in'its "Manifesto", an attempt to explain the crisis that led to 
its formation. The SPLA/SPLM analysis was based on the proposition that there 
"is generally a ? roblern of Back-ward Areas' in the whole country that is particularized and 
exacerbated in the South by successive minority clique regimes in Khartoum. " (SPLA/ SPLK 
1983,1) 
The uneven development that led to the creation of these backward areas was traced back 
to the colonial regime (Ibid, 1). These areas were defined as the whole Sudan except 
Khartoum and Blue Nile old provinces5, the latter two were together defined as the 
North. The problem of underdevelopment, according to the Manifesto, "was 
particularized in the South especially in the field of education. " (Ibid, 7), which led to a 
development of a Northern elite more rapidly than a Southern one. This was "to become 
the central problem in Sudan's post-independence politics" (Ibid, 7). Accordingly the 
Manifesto evaluated the mutiny of Turit and the rise of Any-anya I as a response to the 
distribution of jobs after independence, "The objective and aims of Anya-nya I therefore 
4Tbc official description for such movements Was that they were racist movements. 
517he old provinces, which became regions according to the Regional Government Act of 1980, 
Avere divided into smaller provinces in 1974 . 
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centred around jobs and jobs titles" (Ibid, 8) . That 
is why it was possible to reach an 
agreement such as Addis Ababa which "was a deal between the Southern and Northern 
bourgeosi6d bureaucratic elites" (Ibid, 9). Such an agreement was "thus bound to 
collapse as it ignored the real interests of the masses of the people" (Ibid, 9). In addition 
to that, the Northern elite in Khartoum undermined the agreement by its policies and 
actions, the Manifesto did not say why? Instead it went on listing the policies and actions 
on the political economic, and military sides (Ibid, 10-14). In response to these policies 
and actions Southern people began to organise themselves in different opposition groups : 
National Action Movement (NAM), Movement For Total Liberation of Southern Sudan 
(MTLSS), Equatoria Central Committee for Re-division (ECC), and the Council for the 
Unity of South Sudan (CUSS) (p 12). At the same time 
" the old CNF (Congress of New Forces, which included the Fur, Nuba and BqJa) took 
advantage of the political crisis in the South and organized African-based coups against 
Khartoum" (p 12) 
The 1975 coup was quoted as an example. 
John Garang, in a speech to the nation from SPLA/SPLM radio, tried to sum up the 
reasons of the crisis by saying: 
"The neocolonial system that has de%vloped in our country since 1956 and, %-as represented by 
Nimeirism. since 1969 is a regime in which a few people have amassW great wealth at the 
expense of the majority. The injustice has resulted in profound crisis and distortion in our 
economy, politics, ethics and even religion which Niniciri has perverted into an article of 
trade" (Garang, 1992,19) 
Though Garang was more explicit in exposing the national nature of the crisis on both 
economic and political levels, he emphasised the particular crisis in the South which 
justified that his movement began from there to liberate the whole Sudan. The 
SPLA/SPLMs and Garang's analysis concentrated on the problem of uneven development 
and they did not see any classes beyond the bush! This led to a serious undermining of the 
democratic movement in the North (within the limits of the definition of the North in the 
SPLA/SPLM Manifesto). It is not enough to define the ruling bloc as 'a minority elite in 
Khartoum' or a 'bourgeosified bureaucratic group' in the North and South, though the 
latter represent an important step towards a class -based analysis. The analysis of Anay- 
njý, a and the Addis Ahaha Agreement was more sound than the rest of the analysis, yet it 
is not enough alone to provide satisfactory explanation of the reasons for the 17 years war 
or for signing or fUure of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Concrete analysis requires a 
comprehensive outlook to all the elements and their interrelation. The "distribution of 
colonW jobs between the Southern an Northern bourgeosified bureaucratic elite" might 
be an important element in the 17 years war initiation, but it was not the sole element and 
the continuation of the war for seventeen years had other -additional reasons. The same 
could be said about the reasons for reaching the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972. Both 
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international, (including regional), as well as internal conditions contributed to reaching 
the Agreement. 
The rise of the SPLA/SPLM and the continuation of civil war in the Sudan provided an 
evidence of the importance of the question of uneven development in the organic crisis in 
the Sudan. The contribution of the second civil w- ar to the 1973-85 crisis was important 
in deepening the crisis after 1983. 
6.4. The Failure to Establish a Hegemony 
Chapter 3 argued that the traditional power bloc who ruled the country between 1954 and 
the coup d'&tat in May 1969 failed to establish its hegemony. Chapter 3 and 5 extended 
the argument to show that the military-bureaucratic fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie 
had failed to estabfish its hegemony as well. Hence, the failure to establish hegemony is an 
important element in the general crisis in the Sudan. 
6.4.1. Chanee in Class Structure 
The policies of the state between 1973-85 greatly affected the development of the social 
classes in the Sudan. The change that development has brought to the class structure in 
the country made the question of the transformation of the socio-economic structure 
more urgent than any time before. This explains why the crisis under the Nimeiri regime 
was more acute and deep than previous crises. It also explains why the class struggle was 
more extensive and intensive, despite the confiscation of the rights to association and 
expression under the authoritarian state 
During the period 1973-85 there were quantitative and qualitative changes in almost all 
social classes in the Sudan. These changes were instigated by many factors of which three 
were main:. capital accumulation, the expansion of state apparatus* and the expansion of 
education. Through capital accumulation changes happened in both the capitalist class 
and the working class, while through the expansio .n ofeducation and the state apparatus 
the new petty bourgeoisie went through important quantitative and qualitative changes. 
The rural masses of peasant and nomads who are the majority of the Sudanese population 
were affected by the factors which brought these changes. Though some of them joined 
the irrigated agriculture (Suld and Rahad), others suffered drastically from the effects on 
environment and the redistribution of resources, wealth and incomes. 
The foflowing sections give an account of the changes in class structure. 
6.4.1.3L. 
. 
The Aristggrarpy: Decay pr Change? 
The 1969 coup that brought Nimeiri to power was in itself a great blow to the tribal and 
religious aristocracy which were the main partner in the ruling power bloc in the post- 
colonial era in the Sudan. In August 1969, native administration was dissolved in 
Northern Sudan. In March 1970 during the confrontation with the Ansar sect, the 
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property of the Mahdi family, the leading religious aristocrats were confiscated. The 
proper-ties of Al Mirghani family, the leading Khatimyya, family, were confiscated in May- 
June 1970. 
When the Peoples Local Councils were formed in 1971, the ex-tribal leaders wasted no 
time in joining them. A study Conducted in 1972 showed that the tribal leaders and their 
families had dominated the Peoples! Local Councils (Alassam, 1983,72-73). During the 
1973-85 period, the tribal leaders and members of their families participated in the 
elections for the several National Peoples' Assemblies. They were fairly represented in the 
five assemblies elected during that period. (AFC, 1975/76, B 116) 
Most of the tribal aristocracy shifted to investment in trade, transport and agriculture, 
especially mechanised agriculture. The tribal aristocracy decided to change into a rural 
capitalist class instead of decaying. 
While most of the members of the Mahdi family went into exile to participate in the 
opposition until 1978, the Mirghani family stayed in the country and shifted activities to 
trade. As part of the National Reconciliation agreement in 1977 the confiscated properties 
of the religious aristocracy were either returned to them or generous compensation was 
paid instead (see Appendix A below). 
6.4.1.2. T-be Capitalist Class 
All fractions of the capitalist class'expanded and increased in number. The number of 
registered private companies increased from 995 in December 1971 to 2811 in May 1984. 
In 14 years of Nimeiri rule, the number of registered companies were about 182.5% all 
those companies registered under the Companies Act from its promulgation in 1925 to 
1971(Ifformation and data gathered by the Author from the Commercial Companies 
Registrar Office, the Chamber of the Attornýy Gen eral, Khartoum, Sudan, 1987) .A 
spiral increase in the number of capitalist who were registered as export-import dealers 
happened between 1971 and 1984. When the'register was cancelled by the President in 
April 1984 there were 13113 dealers while in December 1971 there were only 1379 
dealers, an increase of 850.9% (Information and data gathered by the Author from the 
files of the Ministry of Commerce). The expansion, though no reliable statistics were- 
available, was observed in retail traders. Research carried in the three towns of Khartoum, 
Khartoum North, and Omdunnan confirmed that almost 81% of the grocery shops in six 
61n 1975n6, during a-field work conducted by the author in Habilla Mechanised Fam-dng, he 
interviewed both Babu Nirnir, the ex-Nazir of Missarya Baqqarm of Southern Kordofan and Mr. 
Abdul Gabar Zald el Deen, the ex-Nzir of the Bedairyya. 
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main streetS7 were opened after 1971 (Data collected by the author in October 1987). The 
three most popular markets in the three towns were established in the same period8. 
The number of people classified in the national statistics as working in trade commerce 
and finance9 increased from 4.75% of the total labour force in 1969/70 to 4.9 in 1976/77 
to 5.7% in 1983 (calculated from data of Ministry of Economics and National Planning, 
1985,79 and 1990,27). 
The second large expansion was in financial capital. The Sudanese financial capital lost its 
only banking institution, the Sudan Commercial Bank, when the commercial banks were 
nationaUsed in May 197010. No private banks were allowed to operate in the Sudan until 
1976 when the Bank of Sudan issued a statement aflowing foreign banks to establish 
branches in the Sudan. In 1978 the Sudan Investment Bank, a joint private French- 
Sudanese bank commenced its operation. (Bank of Sudan, 1978,57). In the same year the 
first Islamic bank, Faisal Islamic Bank, began its operations in May 1978. By 1985 there 
were five Islamic banks, the capital of which amounted to LS168 millions which 
represented 52% of the total capital of all the commercial banks in the Sudan. Eighteen 
thousands Sudanese shareholders contributed 42% of the paid capital, while 3,000 
foreigners, mostly from Gulf countries contributed the remaining 58%. There were other 
four joint venture banks, the capital of which was equal to 3 8.6 millions (Kaballo, 1987, 
4). 
By 1970 there were six local insurance companies'l. After the new economic policy of 
1974, new 9 insurance companies were established. There were 15 insurance companies 
in 1985. By 1985 the issued capital of these companies amounted to LS21 millions, their 
paid capital LS 9 millions, while they were dealing in LS67 million of insurance premiums 
(Ibid, 4). In 1985 the premium collected increased to LS 100 million, of which 60% was 
collected by the big four companies: the General Insurance (LS 17 million), the Blue Nile Cý 
Insurance (LS 17 million), the United Insurance (LS 15 million), and the Islan-fic 
Insurance (LS II million) (Sudanow, August 1986,18). 
The fraction of agricultural capitalists was characterised by the expansion in mechanized 
agriculture, the expansion of groundnut production in rain fed areas and the expansion 
mixed fanning around big towns of the Nile valley. Small farms of less than 100feddwi 
(average size of l4feddans) dominated Sudanese private agriculture by 1985. Although 
'rrhese Nvere Sharia al Daim and Sharia al-Aman-aat in Khartoum, Sharia al-Postah and Sharia al- 
Mo'ana in Khartoum North, and Sharia al-lEjara and Sharia al Arbeen in Omdurman, 
8al-Suq al Shabi in Khartoum was established in 1970, Suq Saad Gishra in Khartoum North in 
1973 and Suq al Shabi in Omdurman in 1979. 
9Tbe group included all those working in trade commerce and finance whether they were capitalist 
or employed by them. 
1OFor a history of the Sudanese banking system see Ali (1982,1985), and Kaballo (1987) 
1 IT'he six companies dominated the market after foreign insurance firms lost their licences in May 
1970. Insurance industry became totally owned by indigenous capital. 
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the number of large farms and company farms was not great, their size and the total area 
they claimed were substantially great. By 1985 there were about 8,000 large farms of 
more than'100feddwis and less or equal to 1500feddans. The average size of such farms 
was 1125 fed&zns. They command about 9 million feddans which constituted about 
3 2.6% of the total area under cultivation. There were about 36 companies' farms of an 
average size of 500,000feddwjs. Of these only four are public sector companies (sugar- 
cane farms of total area of 127,000 feddans). They command an area of 1.8 million 
feddwis constituted about 6.5% of the total area of cultivated farms. (Zaki and Satar, 
1986,18-19). Table 18 shows the distribution of farms according to size. 
Table 31. Estimated Number of A2ricultural Farms 
Category Farms Number % Area % 
(OOO)feddans 
Small holders (Under 1,200,000 99.3 16,800 60.9 
100feddans) 
Large Private Farms (100- 8,000 0.7 9,000 32.6 
1500 F) 
Company Farms 36 - 1,800 6.5 
Total 1,208,036 100 27,600 100 
Source: Zaki and Star, (1986), Structure of Sudanese Agriculture As Basis For Estimation and 
Prcqection of Agricultural Production, Table 2.4, p 18. 
The fraction of the industrial capitalists had expanded in the period 1971/72/-1981/8212. 
The number of industrial establishment that employed more than 25 workers, increased 
from 209 in 1971/72 to 347 in 1981/82. Those employing less than 25 workers increased 
from 1,067 in 1971/72 to 6,656 establishments in 1981/82. The gross capital invested in 
all the Sudanese industry increased ftorn LS 112.5 million in 1971/72 to LS 1,905 millions 
in 1981/82. The fixed capital of these industries increased from LS95 millions to LSI, 091 
millions in 1981/82. Within the Sudanese industry the role and size of the private sector 
increased 
. Almost all the 
industries employing less than 25 workers were owned by the 
private sector in 1981/81. As for the manufacturing industries that employed 25 workers 
or more, the role of the private sector increased substantially. By 1991/82,290 
establishments, (83.6% of total establishments) were owned by the private sector 
compared with 153 establishments (73% of the total) in. 1971/7.2. Though the private 
sector's share in industrial employment increased in absolute from 20,690 workers in 
1970/71 to 44,020 in 1981/82, its relative share decreased from 48.6 to 41.8% during the 
same period. This was mainly because of the presence of 7 joint ventures13 (2% of the 
12The comparison is made Nvith 1981/82 figures because the last reliable industrial within the 
limits of the study period was carried in 1981/82 Qviinistry of industry, 1985) 
130f the seven joint ventures three were joint-venture between private Sudanese and private 
foreign capital, two were public sector and foreign capital and two were private sector-public 
sector and foreign capital joint venture. By 1985 the number of the latter increased to four raising 
the number of the joint ventures to 9. (information collected from Ministry of Industry in 1987 by 
the author. ) 
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total establishment) which employed 31.8% of the workers in the Sudanese 
manufaýturing industry. The private sector increased its total capital investment in 
industry LS42.1 millions in 1970/71 tol, 021 millions in 1981/82. The private sector 
produced 78.6% of the gross output value and 69.5% of the gross added value of 
manufactured industry in 1981/82 compared to 48.4% and 46.91yo in 1970/71 
respectively. Table 19 shows the structure of Sudanese manufacturing industry according 
to the ownership of the means of production. 
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6.4.1.3. The Working Class 
The period 1973-85 witnessed a growth in the working class in the Sudan. the industrial 
working class increased in number from 49,216 in 1971/72 to 144,889 in 1981/82, a total 
increase 194.4%. While 87% of the industrial working class used to work in 
establishments that employ 25 workers or more in 1971/72, only 72.6% worked in these 
establishments in 1981/82. The relative decline in the size of the workers in the large 
establishments was not due to an absolute decline in the number of workers in such 
establishment which grew by 246% on the period 1971/72-1981/82, ftorn 42,823 to 
105168. The reason for that relative decline was the relatively high growth in the size of 
the working class in the industries employing less than 25 workers. The number of the 
latter increased from 6,393 workers, (13% of the total industrial working class), in 
1971/72 to 39,721 workers, (27.4%), in 1981/82, a total increase of 621%. This had its 
repercussions on the organisation of the working glass especially as far as trade unions 
were concerned. The direct effect was that 27.4% of the industrial working class 
remained by law outside the trade union movement, because the law determined the 
minimum number of workers allowed to form a trade union to be 30 workers. 
The industrial working class remained concentrated in Khartoum and the Central Region 
(the previous Blue Nile Province). In the two regions together lived 79% of the industrial 
working class. The relative weights of the two had changed during the period under 
study. While Khartoum used to be the industrial area with the greatest number of 
industrial workers in 1970/71 (a total number of 30,335 workers which accounted to 
61.6% of the total number of industrial workers), it became the second industrial area 
(with a total number of 49,9ý2 workers which amounted to 47.8% of the industrial 
working class in the country) in 1981/82. 
The Central Region became the greatest industrial area in the Sudan as far as the size of 
the industrial working class was concerned. ýn 1981/82,44.6% of the industrial working 
class (about 64,592 workers) were employed in the Central Region; compared with about 
21% (10,327 workers) in 1970/71. The Eastern Region, (the old Kassala province), 
remained in the third place with 8.8% of the industrial working class. Kordofan had 5.7%, 
the Northern Region 3.3%, and Darfur Region with 2.3% of the industrial working class 
in 1981/82. No reliable infl6rmatio'n about the size of the industrial working class in 
Southern Sudan because the industrial survey of 1970/71 covered Bahar al Gazal only 
while that of 1981/82 covered the Equatoria only. However, since most of the private 
industries in the South were concentrated around Juba, the figures provided by the 
1981/82 survey, (NIinistry of industry, 1985, Annex 5), are taken to be a base for the 
estimate of the industrial working class in the South. The number of the workers was 
estimated to be 1,779 in Equatoria, (Deng, 1986, Table 1,5-6) and 96 in Upper Mile (Ibid, 
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Table IL 7), and 263 workers in Bahar al Gazal (Industrial Survey, 1970/71, table 20,75 
)-. The total size of the industrial working class in the South before the beg inning of the 
second civil war could be estimated at 2,138 workers. Only 70% of them were working in 
establishments that employed 30 or more workers and hence had the right to form a trade 
union. 
While the distribution of the industrial working class did not constitute an element of 
weakness to its trade union movement before 1971, it became an element of that 
weakness according to 1971 and 1977 trade unions acts. Trade unions according to the 
1949 Workers Trade Unions Act were organised according to employer. This was 
changed in the Labour trade Union Act of 1971 and 1977 and organisation was based on 
industry. Most of the industries were distributed in the different parts of the Sudan. For 
example, the textile industry was almost in all the Northern provinces and in Equatoria, 
the food industry in all the Sudan. The workers in one establishment constituted a branch 
or a branch unit which had no legal or juristic identity independent of the trade union 
according to Article 8 (2) of the 1977 Act (Abu Eisa, 1990,78). The branch or branch 
unit had to seek the ratification of the trade union executive to its decisions before 
implementation. '(1bid, 79). 
Though there is no detailed statistics on the workers in the services. sector, the total 
statistics provided by the Department of Labour in 1980 showed that the number of 
workers in the service's public sector amounted to 450,000 (compared to 27,724 in the 
industrial public sector). Of those working in the services' sector, the number of the 
workers in transportation and communication is the greatest 
The total number of workers organised in trade unions according to the Department of 
Labour were 623,792 workers in 1980, organised in 501 trade union branch which were 
united in 39 General Trade Unions. Of these 479,225 (77%) were employed by the public 
sector (including 'the Central and Regional Governments) and 144,567 (23%) were 
employed by the private sector. 
An important fi-dction of the working class which had grown fast during the period under 
study was the agricultural working class. The development of the agricultural labour force 
went t' hýough Oifferent periods'. During the earl y period of the colonial role, as argued in 
Chapter, the absence of people who were ready to sefl their labour power, was one of the 
main reasons for adopting the Gezira model of articulation of pre-capitalist and capitalist 
modes of production. After the establishment of the Gezira scheme in 1925, and as a need 
for seasonal work increased, the colonial government had encouraged West African 
Muslim imn-iigrants to settle in and around the Gezira Area and had used the native 
'For a thorough discussion sw Jay OTrien (1980) and (1983). 
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administration to recruit (rather in a compulsory manner) peasants from Kordofan and 
Darfur to'pick the Gezira Cotton (O'Brien, 1993,19-20). The practise of recruiting 
seasonal labours, by the direct intervention of the state apparatus continued after the 
independence. It involved in addition to the use of native administration, -the use of the 
state propaganda and information machinery (especially the only State owned Radio 
Omdurman, the moving cinema ... etc). The scramble 
for Gedaref in the fifties and early 
sixties to establish private mechanised schemes, the Managil extension of the Gezira 
scheme. Khasharn al-Girba agricultural scheme and sugar factory increased the demand 
for agricultural labour. The trend of increasing demand for agricultural labour continued 
in the seventies and the eighties. The expansion of mechanised agriculture, the 
establishment of the Rahad project and the Sugar factories with their large sugar-cane 
farms in Kenana, Assalya and Sennar In order to insure the growth of the supply of 
agricultural labour to satisfy the increasing demand, the state continued a policy 
reproducing uneven development, while increasing the cash requirements of the peasants 
in the less developed areas. The need for economic measures as the dissolution of native 
adminiwation in 1969 had weakened the administrative and non economic measures to 
recruit labour. The import policy- not only encouraged the demand for imported 
commodities but also undermined the non-agricultural products of the rural handicraft 
that used to be sources of earning cash and supplying rural population by locally 
produced goods. The rising inflation since the early seventies and the RAF supported 
inflationary policies 
' 
of the rnid-seventies worsened the rural population terms of trade 
with the urban area and the international market contributing to the increase in their cash 
requirements. The po tentialities to produce forest products (building materials, household 
furniture and wood ' 
and coal for energy, both for household consumption and near-by 
urban markets), in the Savanna Belt of Central Northem Sudan (both the'Central Clay 
Plain and the Qoz Area), had declined because of the expansion of mechanised agriculture 
(in the Central Clay Plain) and commercial groundnuts production (in the Qoz Area), 
especially during the 1970s. The same reason, as argued in Chapter 6 below, contributed 
to the decline of land available for the peasants which meant the collapse and removal of 
the agricultural rotation based on shifting and hariq cultivation leading to the decline of 
the productivity and yields. The environmental consequence of the expansion of both 
types of capitalist agriculture was making the whole Savanna Belt in general and the Qoz 
Area in particular vulnerable to drastic climatic changeS2 (See Chapter 4 and 6). 
2 Among those who tried to explain the relation between human activity and environmental 
changes in the Sudan are Hultne and Trillbach (1991), Callaghan ct al. (t985), Musand. and El 
Rashced (1979), Ibrahim (1978). 
232 
A study carried by the Nfinistry of Finance and Economic Planning in 1983 showed that 
there were a core of agricultural working class representing 5% of the resident tabour 
force in rural Northern Sudan (Nfinistry of Finance, 1983,70). These were people who 
were classified as depending on their living on selling their tabour in the process of 
agricultural production. Of this core about 74% were employed within their villages and 
26% were working outside their villages (Calculated from Jbid, 70) . In addition to this 
core the number of those who became used to supplement their farm income by seasonal 
temporary agricultural hired work increased substantially. The ELO described this pattern 
of employment as being "more than a purely temporary type of employment ... and that 
for many at least it represents a sizable contribution to their yearly employment. " 
(ELO, 1985,62). The ELO estimated the number of the seasonal agricultural workers 
employed annually in mechanised farms to be about One million (ELO, 1987,41). The 
same report estirfiated that about half a nfflfion seasonal labourers are employed annually 
by the large irrigated schemes in the Sudan. According to the IILO, about 2 millions of the 
rural tabour force "migrate seasonally in search of cash income7earning opportunities on 
large scale rainfed or irrigated farms"(ELO, 1987,41). Neither the core of the agricultural 
working class nor the large number of the seasonal labourers were organised in any sort 
of trade union, though a tendency among the seasonal workers who were coming from 
the same locality, ethnic, or tribal origin to have a sheikh or a leader to speak and 
negotiate on behalf of them was observed (OBrien, 1983,21). 
6.4.1.4.. The New Pe= Bourgeoisie 
The new petty bourgeoisie in the Sudan increased in number because of the spread of 
general and higher education. Higher education intake had increased from in 1970/71 to 
in 1984/85. By 1984/85 there were 36,226 students in Sudanese higher education 
institutes. The number of medical doctors employed by the Ministry of health increased 
from 1,082 in 1970/71 to 2,728 in 1982, an increase of 152.1%. The numbers of dentists 
increased from 30 to 159 and that of pharmacists from 20 to 71 for the same period 
(Ministry of Health, 1982,38). Substantial numbers of medical doctors, dentists and 
pharmacists were either self-employed, emigrant in the GulP . 
The number of registered lawyers in the Sudan amounted to 663 on the average between 
1978-81. 
By 1982. the number of teachers in all levels of general education were 63,960 teachers 
c ompared with 24,635 in 1970171 (Ministry of Education, 1982,20) 
3Almost 315 of the general practicioners and 1.3% of the specialist doctors were working abroad 
in 1983/84 (ESRC, 1984,13) 
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The growth in the size of the Sudanese bureaucracy could be shown by looking at the 
posts incorporated in the budget every year both in the central and local/regional 
governments. Table 30 shows the budgeted posts between 1978/79 and 1984/85. 
Table 33. Budimted Pos . tv Central and Ucal/ re2ional Government 1978/79 
1984/85* 
Years All budget Posts Classified posts 
Central Regional Total Central regional Total 
1978ng 106,153 168,788 274,941 56,358 77,788 134,146 
1979/80 103,738 173,300 227,038 52,591 83,300 135,891 
1980/81 103,110 218,792 321,902 55,329 109,792 165,121 
1981182 109,753 221,000 330,753 56,679 105,000 161,679 
1982/83 112,392 230,000 342,392 57,632 109,000 165,632 
1983/84 108,809 228,400 337,209 56,523 109,200 165,723 
1984/85 81,800 250,200 332,000 43,000 126,600 169,600 
Note: *Regionalisation began in 1980/81; prior to that year posts refer to local government 
Sou ree: JILO, (1986), Employment and Economic Reform: towards a Strategyfor the Sudan, 1986, 
Geneva 
In addition to the Central and local/ regional government posts, the other public sector 
corporations and institutions employed about 168,872 in 1984/85, of whom 50,392 were 
employed in classified posts. If the classified posts are considered to be those of the 
bureaucrats, professional and technicians, then the total number of these factions 
employed by the public sector and the government increased from some 2oo thousand in 
1978n9 to 350 thousand in 1984185, an increase of 75%. 
According to the Department of Labour (1980) there were 132,707 employees, teachers 
and t echnicians who were organised in 327 trade union branches which -were part of 35 
general trade unions. The number of professionals, according to the same source, were 
76,817 who were organised in 104 trade union branch which were part of 18 general 
trade unions. 
By 1983, the Sudanese armed fbrces which was composed of 58 thousand soldiers (ACR, 
1984/85, B 86), had about 3.5 to 4 thousands officers (SCP, 1985,51). 
6.4.5.2hg Peasants. 
- 
Tenants and the Nomads 
The majority of the Sudanese population remained peasants and nomads living in the rural 
areas. The nomadic population of the Sudan was estimated to be 10.7% of the total' 
population, compared with 69.1% sedentary in rural areas and 20.25 in urban areas 
(Abdel Salam, 1987,21) 
The labour force engaged in agriculture in the declined from 69.5% in 1969/70 to 68.5% 
in 1976/77 an to 65.3% in 1983. The total number of peasant, tenants and herdsmen 
amount to 4 million persons. Two million of them are small holders farmers Cultivating 
about 9 miffion feddans in the rainfed sub-sector (ILO, 1997,40). The irrigated sub- 
234 
sector cultivates about 2.5 million feddwis most of them are within six large schemes 
which were divided into some 200,000 tenancies (Ibid, 4 1). 
Peasants in rainfed sub-sector and nomads in savanna belt of Northern Sudan suffered 
greatly from the 1983/84 draught. Almost eight million people were affected by the 
draught in the five Nor-them region, of them about 1.9 million persons were displaced 
from their original homes. Table 24 shows the details of drought victims and displaced 
people. 
In Southern Sudan peasants and nomads suffered from the start of the second civil war in 
1983. Almost 2 million people were displaced and the whole region suffered from a war 
created famine. 
Generally during the period 1973-85, the rural population had their living condition 
deteriorated and their share in national income declined (See Chapter 4 above). The 
peasants and nomads suffered from the expansion of the mechanised agriculture, which, 
though created seaso nal jobs as agricultural workers for them, decreased the size of land 
available for their shift agriculture and grazing practises. 
Table 34. Drought Victims and-Disolaced Persons in the Sudan 1983/84 
Region Draught Victims Displaced People 
No. % No. % 
Darfur 2,830,000 33.7 500,000 27.8 
Kordofan 2,870,000 34.2 425,000 23.7 
Central 1,350,000 16.0 420,000 23.4 
Northern 150,0()0 1.8 50,000 2.8 
Eastern 1,200,000 14.3 400,000 22.3 
Source: Modoawi, Soluman and Ahmed, (1987) Topulation, Employment and adjustment', in 
Saghayron, et al., (editors), (I 987). Population and Development in the Sudan, Proceedings of the third 
National Population Conference, 1987, Khaftouin., pp4l-66 
6.4.2. Class Strutnale: ldeoloiiical and Political Problems 
The change in class structure has put forward again the question of who should dominate 
the Sudanese state? Who would provide the leadership that is capable of resolving the 
question of transformation and nation-building? The answer to both questions was to be 
found on two levels. The first is the level of the objective class structure and the change 
that happened to different classes in the course of economic development. The second 
level is that of the ability of those classes to be aware of their interests, to express them in 
programmes and to create organisaiions and provide leadership that are capable of 
arguing these programmes through a political and ideological discourse that is able of 
putting forward that programme not only as an expression of the interest of that particular 
class but as the expression of the interests of the whole nation. In other words the need 
for a class to establish its hegemony 
The 1973-85 crisis added, to the previous failures of the ruling power bloc 1954-69, the 
failure of the rniEtary bureaucratic fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie to establish its 
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hegemony. Yet the failure of that fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie posed a number of 
questions -on the level of ideological and_ political discourse as well as mass political 
organisation- 
The authoritarian state of the niffitary bureaucratic fractionwas the only state in the post 
colonial history of the Sudan to destroy the urban democratic movement at the same time 
in which it dismantled the old political parties representing the power bloc that ruled the 
Sudan from 1954 to 1969. Yet it failed to produce an ideological and political discourse 
and an effective political organisation capable of rallying the masses. It is no use to be the 
sole actor in the theatre when the audience starts leaving. The question remains always 
whether the audience is interested on the play or not. In a regime established a coup 
d'etat, legitimacy would not be gained by exposing the mistakes, corruption and bad 
policies of the dismantled regime. The masses need material evidence in terms of actual 
benefits to be convinced that the new regime worth their support. Instead the Nimeiri 
regime through out its history was providing promises about future benefits; ie self- 
satisfaction in -sugar, wheat, rice and textiles which was never achieved until the 
overthrow of the regime. Despite the massive investment programme in the period 1973- 
76, the masses did not feel any benefit. On the contrary their living standards were 
deteriorating (see Chapter 4 for the decline in real income and the increase in income 
inequalities). As from the uprising in August 1973, the audience insisted to establish their 
independent theatres and to act their own plays. Despite the authoritarian state and its 
repressive legislation and institutions, the masses sought new forms and means to put 
forward their demands, ie the towns uprising, the general meeting of trade unions that 
were held and strikes that were organised despite the will of the official leadership (the 
case of the railway workers and the primary school teachers in 1978 who both were able 
to organise strikes despite the official leadership of their trade unions). The political 
organisation returned to other old ways they had abandoned during the second democracy 
as being unnecessary or primitive (writing slogans on the walls, issuing and distributing 
underground pamphlets and newspapers ... etc). 
The 19733-85 crisis as a crisis of hegemony focussed the importance of constructing an 
ideological discourse in acquiring legitimacy and establishing hegemony. Between 1973 
and 1978, the. regime ideological discourse was composed of three elements: national 
unity, development and popular participation. The achievement of Addis Ababa 
Agreement provided a ground for the regime quest for national unity and was capable of 
providing the regime with legitimacy in the South. The argument for development and 
popular participation was less convincing. The former did not materialise as actual 
benefits for the people and the latter was impossible under the authoritarian nature of the 
regime and the confiscation of democracy and human rights. The question of national 
unity was raised again within the context of the National Reconciliationý but the 
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authoritarian nature of the regime did not allow for the necessary changes in political and 
government institutions to achieve that national unity. 
As from 1975, an Islamic ideological discourse began to appear in Nimeiri's speeches. 
Except for the abolition of toto Kora, (the lottery run by the government to finance sport 
and youth activities) and the directives issued by Nimeiri to government leading officials 
to restrain from drinking alcohol or resign, no major Islamisation measure was taken. 
General opinion in the Sudan claimed the Saudi were behind the actions (ACR, 1976/77, 
B 117). In Mayl 977, a committee was formed to revise the existing laws so that they 
would become in line with Islamic Sharia. Though the question of Islamic Sharia was 
brought in the National Reconciliation negotiation between Sadiq al-Mahdi and Nimeiri 
in 1977, the agreement between them did not include any mention of it. Following the 
National Reconciliation, new members were added to the above mentioned committee, 
including Dr-Hassan al Turabiý the leader of Muslim Brothers in the Sudan. In 1980 
Nimeiri published a book, W-Nahaj al-Islami fimmadha?, (why is the Islamic Path? ), in 
which he described why he shifted from his national leftist tendencies to strict observance 
of Islam. He promised to publish a second book to explain how the Islamic path would be 
implemented,. but before the book was published4 he announced the Islamic Sharia laws in 
September 1973.. ' 
The Islamic ideological discourse contained in the Islamisation measure composed of 
three elements: the return to the Sudanese cultural heritage, the prevention of crime 
(purification of the society) and the prosperity that would follow the Islamisation of the 
economy. Such a discourse ignored two things about the Sudanese heritage. The first was 
that Sudanese cultural heritage did not compose of Islamic cul ture alone. It contained non 
Islamic culture both in the North and the South whether it had its roots in the ancient 
Sudanese civilisations, Christianity or African traditions and customs. The second was 
that Sudanese Islam because of the effects of the roots of Sudanese culture mentioned 
above was different from the fundamentalist Islam which was expressed in the 1983 laws. 
Sudanese Islam which is based on sufist Islam is one which adheres to preaching and 
teaching of the followers providing spiritual guidance rather than adheres to punishment 
and imposing values on the people. Islam was used as an ideology by the Neo-Mahdist 
and the Khatimmyya aristocracy to accumulate wealth as argued in Chapter 2. The 
relation between the religious aristocracy and followers was based on blessing (harka) by 
the former in return for tribute in kind, money or work by the latter. Between 1964 and 
1969, the power bloc that ruled the Sudan used Islamic ideology in order to face the 
challenge from the urban democratic movement. 
4'fbe book, A I-Nahj al-lslami kav , 
fa? (Islarrdc Path: How), NN-as actually published in April 1985. 
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The prosperity promised by the change of the economy to an Islamic one never 
mat erialised. Instead the economic situation deteriorated. The regime had to announce 
new austerity measure in March. These measures instigated the March-April uprising. 
The adoption of an Islamic ideological discourse by the regime resulted in its loss of any 
legitimacy claim in the South and contributed to the decline of its already deteriorating 
legitimacy in the North. 
6.5. Conclusion 
Chapters 4 and 5 argued that the 1973-85 was a particular crisis that had specific manifest 
and it was a product of a definite authoritarian state and was caused by specific policy 
measures. This Chapter has argued that it had its roots in the rigid level of articulation of 
modes of production, in the continuation of the uneven development and the failure of a 
class or group of classes to establish it hegemony. 
CHAPTER 7_ 
CONCLUSION 
7.1. The Theme of the Thesis 
The thesis has examined the poUtical economy of the Sudan in order to reveal the nature 
and causes of the 1973/85 crisis in that country. The 1973-85 crisis was placed within the 
historical context of a more general political and economic crisis which has been a 
characteristic of the independent Sudan. 
The general crisis facing the Sudan is identified as an organic crisis of transformation. The 
thesis argued that the transformation crisis has faced the Sudan since her independence. 
The main reason for the crisis was that the problems of transforming the inherited colonial 
economy and structures which had risen to the national agenda since then, have not been 
resolved. 
The thesis fiujher argued that particular political and economic crises had occurred over 
the period 1956-1985. Despite the distinguishable features of those particular crises -there 
were several common features. These features constituted general political and economic 
trends that, in their turn had characterized the general crisis since independence in 1956. 
The study of the colonial political and economic legacy provided an important component 
of the thesis as it reflected on the process of the articulation of the capitalist mode of 
production. and the pre-capitalist modes of production which had prevailed in the country 
before the rý-conquest of the Sudan in 1898. Political, institutional and market 
articulation affected the nature of the Sudanese economy, the class structure and class 
struggle. The nature of the colonial state as an authoritarian and relatively autonomous 
state left its features in the pol-itical economy of the country. 
The thesis studied the historical development of the post-colonial state. The- colonial 
heritage of the country and the concrete class struggle had given the post-colonial state its 
nature and constituted its crisis. In revealing the nature of the post- colonial state a ruling 
power bloc is identified. That power bloc was composed of the religious and tribal 
aristocracy, the bourgeoisie and the military and civilian bureaucracy. 
The crisis of the post-colonia] state, has been argued in the thesis, is a crisis of hegemony. 
The failure of the power bloc, a fraction or a class of it to establish its hegemony is the 
main cause of the crisi's of the state and the particular form of that crisis: the military- 
civilian governments alterance in power. 
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The ruling power bloc, mainly empowered and enriched through_ the political and 
economic articulation carried by the colonial state, had basic interests in the continuation 
of inherited institutions of articulation of the capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of 
production. The power bloc was divided in the politics of the spoils distribution using 
religious sectarianism both as clientelist linkage and ideological cover. Meanwhile an 
urban democratic movement and several regional movements challenged the authoritarian 
tendencies of the power bloc which were aimed at preventing the dominated classes from 
having a say in the future of the country. The ruling power bloc was not able to 'deliver 
the goods!, because delivering them required a deep transformation in the legacy of the 
colonial economy. The colonial economy was not established to meet the ever increasing 
needs of the population. It was an export-oriented, linked to the international world 
market through the export-import of commodities and capital. 
The thesis argued that the crisis of the economy has its basic causes in the patterns of 
agricultural production both in its irrigated and rain-fed sub-sectors. Irrigated agriculture 
is characterized by a rigid and static institutional articulation that prevented the 
development of production relations to match the relative development in the productive 
forces. In the rain-fed agriculture, with the-- exception of the large scale capitalist 
mechanized farm, the articulation through exchange led to the spread of capitalist 
relations of production, but, in contrast to the irrigated agriculture, without the 
development of productive forces. Both sectors are found to be strongly linked to the 
international capitalist market, a link which has enabled the export of economic surplus, 
the import of devastating effects of international depressions and the limited effects of 
booms. The crisis of agricultural production explains most of the other features of the 
economic crisis because of the dominant role of agricultural production in the Sudanese 
economy. 
The expansion of the economy vvithout. radically transforming the rigid level of the 
articulation inh erited from the colonial era had resulted in changes in the forces of 
production and t* he class structure. The changes in productive forces and class structure 
aggravated the crisis situation and made the question of'radical transformation more 
urgent and vital. 
The failure of transforming the economy was accompanied by a failure in managing'it. 
The management of the economy during the colonial period was based on the vast powers 
of the authoritarian colonial state. Coercion became central in the management of the 
colonial economy. The post-colonial state's ability of using coercion was legitimately 
limited *and its tendency towards authoritarianism had been challenged by the urban 
democratic movement and the effective regional forces, especially the Southern Sudanese. 
The politics of ethnic and regional conflicts were closely related to uneven development 
of the country and the composition of the ruling power bloc as Northern and of Arab 
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Islamic culture. It was in the politics of ethnic and regional conflicts that coercion was 
widely used against the Southern people. The civil war which struck the country twice 
contributed to the crisis of the post-colonial state. 
The crises of the state and the economy strengthened each other through the politics of 
spoils and the failure to deliver the goods expected by the population. 
Within this context the thesis studied the particular 1973-85 crisis. The particular crisis is 
found to be a continuation of the general crisis despite its specific features. The military- 
bureaucratic fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie which dominated the state during the 
1973-85 period failed to establish its hegemony and ruled the country through an 
authoritarian state. The faure to build an alliance with the urban democratic movement in 
the North between 1969 and the July 1971 coup oi'ýtat vas a turning point in the history 
of the Nimeiri regime, Between 1971 and 1977, the regime failed to incorporate or work 
out an alliance with the traditional political parties and the Islamic Charter Front. The 
National Reconciliation of 1977 did not reach its logical conclusion by widening the base 
of the regime. The promulgation of Islamic Sharia Law in 1983 did not promote the 
regime's quest for legitimacy and remained to be an additional tool of repression. 
Nimeids greatest achievement in the quest for legitimacy was the conclusion of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement which ended the first civil war in 1972, The Agreement failed in 
application because it did not provide for a fair share in the distribution of wealth and its 
attempt to establish a fair distribution of power was haunted by the contradiction between 
the authoritarian state in the centre and the semi-democratic state in the South. By 1993), 
when the second civil war started in the South, the regime had lost its legitimacy in the 
South. 
Despite being a continuation of the general economic crisis, the particular crisis of 1973- 
85 was a crisis of simple and extended reproduction that resulted from specific policies of 
the Nimeiri regime. The regime deepened the general trend when it failed to transform 
the structure of the economy. Despite its expansion, the economy remained an unevenly 
developed, export-oriented economy With weak inter-sector and inter-regional linkages, 
liable to be severely affected by international cnses and moderately benefiting from 
international booms. Between 1973 and 1985 the economy became more unevenly 
developed in contrast to all the claims of the regime about regional governments. The 
failure to maintain and utilise the existing producing capacities of the economy led to the 
decline of yields of agriculture and the productivity of industrial and services sectors. As a 
result, the country failed to maintain the previous levels of exports and its imports bill 
increased drastically bringing the trade balance and with it the balance of payment into 
great deficit. The economy also suffered from the failure to complete the construction of 
the new project or to optimally utilise the new added capacities. Instead of compensating 
the decline in output and revenues due to the lack of maintenance and repairs, the new 
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projects added to the problems of the Sudanese economy by increasing the national debt. 
Unable to *serve its Obts and to pay the bill of the increasing imports, the Sudan turned to 
the RvfF for financial rescue. To qualify for the RAF extended facilities, the Nimeiri 
implemented an austerity programme that let to-the deterioration of the standard of living 
of the majority causing a further decline in the legitimacy of the regime and its overthrow 
in AprH 1985. 
7.2. The Sudanese Case: A Comparative Analysis 
The Sudan was not unique in facing a transformation crisis. Many Affican, Asian and 
Latin American countries face the same crisis. Sudan was different from some Affican 
countries in her political culture and her strong mass organisation. These differences made 
the Sudan more unstable than other African countries. In this section comparison would 
be limited to two Affican countries. The first is Nigeria where the military civilian 
alterance of governments resembles what happened in Sudan. The. second is Egypt to 
which Nasserist model the Nimeiri regime was closely linked. 
7.2.1. Niaeria-. Petroleum Won't Solve the Transformation Crisis 
There are. many similarities between Nigeria and the Sudan. The main sin-diarity is the 
structure of their economies: both are unevenly developed and export-oriented. The 
second similarity is that both countries face a transformation crisis. The case of the Sudan 
has been argued above. The case of Nigeria has been summarise by Bangura: 
"The Nigerian economymas incorporated into capitalist world economy through the activities 
of giant trading companies... and the colonial state. Colonialism dissolved the multiple pre- 
6pitalist. socio-economic systems and connected them to a %ider, centrally-controlled 
imperialist systern. The colonial state imposed a specific system of division. of labour on the 
economy, forcing it to specialise in the export of selected raw materials and the importation of 
manufactured commodities" (Bangura, 1986,47). 
Ihonvbere (199 1) noticed that: 
"Political independence in October 1960 did not witness any termination or fundamental 
restructuring of unequal relations Aith imperialist states" (Ihonvbere 1991,74) 
Oil production remained an enclave of a "notoriously capital intensive" production which 
"had very little direct effect on the mass of Nigerians" (Freund, 1978,93). Nigeria began 
exporting oil in 1957 and revenues of oil exports overtook others after the Nigerian civil 
war. It was the vast sums of revenue which accrued to the Nigerian government that were 
centre of the crisis of the Nigerian state and economy. The conflict over oil revenue was 
behind the civil war, the military civilian alterance of government, the rise of Nigerian 
bourgeoisie and the corruption of the Nigerian bureaucracy and political life. Connected 
with oil production and utilisation of oil revenues was the domination of foreign capital 
and multi-nationals in Nigeria. (See Turner, 1976; Beckman, 1982) 
Though different the details o and the forces that contributed to the Nigerian crisis than 
those in the Sudan, the essence of the crisis remained the same: an organic crisis of 
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transformation. Poor the country (Sudan) or rich (Niglýria), without solving the crisis of 
transformation, political instabilityý economic crises and regional problems will continue. 
7.2.2. Nasserist kaylat Similar Political Model Different Policies: 
If compared with the similar regime in Egypt during Nassees era until 1967, one can 
argue that there were similarities in the political model, but differences in the policies and 
their outcome. The similarities were those of the single party system, the presidential 
republic and the authoritarian nature of the state. The first difference was the popularity 
of the Nasserist regime and the isolation of the Nimeiri regime. There were many reasons 
for this distinction. 
The first reason for the popularity of the Egyptian regime was due to actual benefit 
acquired by the masses. For example the agrarian reform in 1952 "released almost a 
millionfeddans for redistribution and improved fife for some 342,000 families, namely 
tenant families and permanent wage labourers" (Zaalouk, 1989,26). Another example 
were the measures "taken to ease the burden of poverty on local classes", such as 
subsidies which "were raised to reduce prices of basic commodities, " and "rents, fares and 
educational fees" which were 4 cut (Woodward, 1992,91). 
The second difference was the ideological discourse of the Nasserist regime which wa s 
used to rally the masses on anti-imperialist, anti-zionist and Arab unity slogans as well as 
local issues of ag'an reform and industrialisation. 
The third reason was the charismatic character of Nasser which was categorically 
different from that of Nimeiri. Nasser "spoke like a rural &Wdi of upper and was full of 
well-known references to daily rural life. " He was "not just an Egyptian, he was an 
ordinary Egyptian and this -increasingly was the way he was perceived" (Woodward, 
1992,36). Nimeiri, in comparison, was not able to communicate through public speeches 
with the people and when he did not adhere to the text written for him by his advisers hý 
usually made a laughing stock of himself. - One example is striking in the difference 
between the two characters. While Nasser resigned after the Egyptian loss of the 1967 
war assuming all responsibility of what happened, Nimeiri always blamed other (including 
his associates and advisers) for in any mistakes or shortcomings. For Nimeiri the escape- 
goat was always there: the communist, the SSU or the Islamic fundamentalists. 
Both regimes were authoritarian and were not keen on dipveloping any independent mass 
movement. Malak Zaalouk noticed that: Nasser was not particularly keen on the issue of 
democracy, nor was he keen to allow a working class movement" (19989,24). Nasser 
succeeded in destroying any significant independent political or trade union movement as 
early as 1953 when parties were dissolved in Egypt (Richards and Waterbury, 1990,340). 
In 1961 when the Cairo University students demonstrated in protest against the coup in 
Syria that broke its political union with Egypt, Nasser "closed down the universities for 
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having der,. Ionstrated at all" (Richards and Waterbury, 1990,138 fh18). The re-emergence 
of the Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of the Qutub brothers was promptly-. 
dealt with in 1966. Nasser was carefid in dismantling any independent mass movement. - 
Nimeiri was only able to defeat the democratic movement after fOed coup of Hashim. al- 
Atta in 1971. By 1973, the movement had began to grow again, albeit as underground 
movement. Nimeiri succeeded in weakening the trade union movement and incorporating 
its leadership. ffis alliance with the Muslim Brothers (1979-85) contributed to their 
growth- While Nasser began with the alliance of the Muslim Brothers and ended in 
alliance with the left, Nimeiri went completely in the opposite direction. 
There were differences in the international and regional political and economic condition 
in which both regime existed. Nassers revolution was part of a rising liberation movement 
linking anti-imperialist slogans (and policies) with development and social change. The 
Nimeiri regime came after the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab countries which was 
a land mark in the decline in the ' national liberation movement. The role of the 
conservative Saudi Arabia and the Gulf state in the politics of the region, especially after 
the 1973 war b; etween Israel and the Arab countries and the rise of the prices of oil, 
influenced the Nimeiri regime as well as that of Sadat's in Egypt. 
Though the Muneiri regime was modelled on the Nasserist model, it adopted totally 
different policies between 1973 and 1985. The regime policies were rather comparable to 
Sadat's policies than to Nasser's. These were: the alliance with the West and the 
conservative Arab regimes in foreign. policy and the open-door policy towards foreign 
capital and the austerity measures in internal economic policies. 
7.3. The Thesis Contribution to Sudanese Studies 
The main contribution of this thesis to Sudanese studies is its analysis of the problems 
facing the Sudan as a general crisis of transformation. Within the context of the 
transformation crisis, the need to transform the rigid level of articulation of modes of 
production in the Sudan is argued. The interlink between the political crisis and economic 
crisis has been established. The crisis of the unstable state is revealed as a crisis of 
hegemony. 
The thesis also made a main contribution to the study of the Nimeiri regime in general and 
the 1973-85 period in particular. It provided the most comprehensive account of the 
manifestation of the political, economic and social aspects of the 1973-85 crisis. It 
revealed the authoritarian nature of the regime by discussing its constitutional and 
instituional structure. It discussed the particular economic crisis of 1973-85 and related it 
to the general crisis of the economy while revealing its particular nature as a crisis of 
simple and extended reproduction. 
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In order to provide the above contributions the thesis has to provide an account of the 
political e6'Onomy of the Sudan from the colonial period. In doing so, it provided a new 
interpretation of the colonial state and colonial economy. 
The main distinction between this thesis and previous Sudanese studies is its different 
analysis and interpretation. Though it was not the first to attempt a political economy 
analysis of the Sudanese society, it has been more comprehensive than other attempts to 
study the political economy of crisis in the Sudan. The thesis has also provided a 
theoretical frame work and basic background data for finiher and future studies in the 
post-Nimeiii era. 
APPENDIX A 
The National Reconciliation Agreement 
The Port Sudan Agreement between Nimeiri and Sadiq a[-Mahdil- 
1. All the political prisoners shall be freed, and a general amnesty declared for those 
charged with offences with political activities. 
2. All actions taken against individuals involved in the political struggle (confiscation of 
property, dismissal from civil service position, etc) shall be revoked. 
3. The structure and operation of the SSU shall be reviewed with a view to opening its 
bodies to election at every level and permitting government policies to be freely debated 
and decided by majority vote. 
4. The constitution shall be revised so as to ensure a greater protection of individual 
liberties. 
5. Greater emphasis shall be given to neutralism in Sudan's foreign policy. 
6. The laws restricting personal liberties (primarily the State Security Act) 'shall be 
revoked 
7. The local government structure shall be reviewed so as to remove the negative aspects 
of it, especially with a view to cutting down the vast expenditure of resources in this field. 
8. The prejudicial attitude to members of the Ansar sect should be revised, mainly by 
issuing a statement of regret at the death of Imarn al-Hadi in 1970. 
IT'he Agreementwas first publisbed by the Financial Times, B July 1978. It is quoted here from 
ACR, Vol. 10,1978-79, pp BI 09-B I 10. 
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